T

coreci-cairo 1f07737bf5 executor-config: replace v1 send-mailbox-message.sh with v2 (production, zero placeholders)

Per CEO approval 2026-10-04. Option (a): overwrite v1 with v2.

Changes:
* send-mailbox-message.sh - production implementation with zero
  placeholders. Real rail callbacks via urllib.request POST to
  submit_request. EXECUTOR_API_KEY in Authorization header only.
* delivery-pack.sh - informational template (main script
  generates per-recipient copies inline).
* SKILL.md - v2 spec (what's new + what's the same).
* v2-vs-v1-diff.md - side-by-side diff.
* README.md - bundle index.

Honours brief locked decisions [1]:
- Decision 2: outbox canonical; inbox mirrored (own inbox only).
- Decision 6: mailbox writes AUTO_RUN per recipient.
- Decision 7: append-only inheritance; this skill is additive.
- Decision 8: naming convention coreci-<role> validated at parse.
- Decision 9: extend, don't duplicate.

Does NOT (per brief):
- Edit coreci/agent-definitions/ (read-only per Rule #7).
- Implement deny_read_targets (xfail; out of scope).
- Classify mailbox writes as NEEDS_APPROVAL.
- Write to anyone else's outbox/.
- Provide cross-repo atomicity (per-recipient only).

2026-10-04 18:07:31 +00:00

app

executor-config: bump to v4.1; add MAILBOX_PATH_RE + Decision 6 exemption

2026-10-04 17:58:12 +00:00

docs

executor skeleton v0.1.1: complete app/docs; Dockerfile git+curl; main.py fixes (syntax, credential injection, cleanup); prohibit_login verified (pack 2026-10-03-E2)

2026-10-03 17:17:40 -04:00

logs

executor skeleton v0.1.1: complete app/docs; Dockerfile git+curl; main.py fixes (syntax, credential injection, cleanup); prohibit_login verified (pack 2026-10-03-E2)

2026-10-03 17:17:40 -04:00

tasks/2026-09-26

tasks: archive CAIRO D1-D6 task brief (per-home mailbox + read_targets parser)

2026-10-04 16:50:52 +00:00

tools

executor-config: replace v1 send-mailbox-message.sh with v2 (production, zero placeholders)

2026-10-04 18:07:31 +00:00

.gitignore

executor skeleton v0.1.1: complete app/docs; Dockerfile git+curl; main.py fixes (syntax, credential injection, cleanup); prohibit_login verified (pack 2026-10-03-E2)

2026-10-03 17:17:40 -04:00

allowlist.yaml

executor-config: bump to v4.1; add MAILBOX_PATH_RE + Decision 6 exemption

2026-10-04 17:58:12 +00:00

compose.yaml

Update compose.yaml

2026-10-03 21:41:01 +00:00

executor.env.example

executor skeleton v0.1.1: complete app/docs; Dockerfile git+curl; main.py fixes (syntax, credential injection, cleanup); prohibit_login verified (pack 2026-10-03-E2)

2026-10-03 17:17:40 -04:00

README.md

executor skeleton v0.1.1: complete app/docs; Dockerfile git+curl; main.py fixes (syntax, credential injection, cleanup); prohibit_login verified (pack 2026-10-03-E2)

2026-10-03 17:17:40 -04:00

README.md

coreci/executor-config — coreci-executor (Write Executor, Design v1.0)

Single governed write rail from Open WebUI agents to Gitea.

allowlist.yaml — policy engine config (AUTO_RUN vs NEEDS_APPROVAL; fail-closed)
compose.yaml + executor.env.example — deployment (secrets in .env only)
app/ — coreci-executor v0.1.1 (FastAPI)
docs/ — approval-UI spec, runbook, Open WebUI registration guide
logs/ — git-durable audit JSONL (one line per request event)

Governance: agent authors -> executor gates -> PO approves (NEEDS_APPROVAL) -> executor runs as coreci-executor (non-admin; collaborator-write ONLY on the repos granted in the deployment pack) -> audit + Discord notify. Secrets never in chat, repos, or tool calls — executor env vars only.