Merge pull request 'docs(verbiage): TL;DR prologues per comms-etiquette v1.0' (#2) from coo/verbiage-1 into main

Reviewed-on: #2

.ciagent/ARCHITECTURE.md

@@ -45,4 +45,35 @@ Two runtime modes share the same file: (a) Open WebUI workspace tool — a `Tool
 
 - The in-memory verified-token cache maps `(uuid, token) -> registration row`; it is populated on first successful slow-hash verification and cleared on restart. SQLite remains authoritative; cache entries are re-validated against row status/expiry on every hit.
 - Creds adapter contract: lookup by path string (`coreci/<agent_id>`) → JSON object. FileCredsSource reads a single JSON document mapping paths to secret objects (default for dev/tests, `BROKER_CREDS_FILE`). OwuiApiCredsSource calls the Open WebUI HTTP API with `BROKER_OWUI_BASE_URL` + `BROKER_OWUI_API_KEY` and is exercised in production; its exact KB-file layout is resolved in P4 research.
-- This file is the init-time snapshot; it is refined at phase boundaries per ci-files discipline.
+- This file is the init-time snapshot; it is refined at phase boundaries per ci-files discipline.
+
+## Distribution (v0.2 — cli-packaging)
+
+v0.2 adds a distribution layer around the unchanged v0.1 broker: no broker-line changes (`run_standalone`, `boot`, `load_config`, `_parse_env_file` are consumed as-is). Three new components sit outside `coreci_broker.py` and are exercised by the same stdlib-unittest harness (in-process stub servers on ephemeral ports; subprocess boot tests against the built artifact).
+
+### Components (v0.2)
+
+| Name | Description | Boundaries | Depends on |
+|------|-------------|-----------|------------|
+| CLI artifact build (`scripts/build_cli.py` + `cli/__main__.py`) | Stages `coreci_broker.py` + `coreci_broker_client.py` + `coreci_broker_ui/` + the boot shim + a generated `_cli_version.py`, builds `coreci-broker.pyz` with stdlib `zipapp` (`--compress`, shebang `#!/usr/bin/env python3`), then a deterministic normalization pass (sorted entries, fixed timestamps) for byte-reproducible output; emits `dist/coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz` + sha256 | Produces the artifact only; never publishes; owns no state; the shim materializes bundled UI/static assets into `<state>/.coreci_broker_assets/<version>/{ui,static}` at boot (temp+`os.replace`, overwrite-per-boot) and sets `BROKER_UI_ROOT`/`BROKER_STATIC_ROOT` only when neither process env nor the user `.env` defines them; `--version` is answered from the generated `_cli_version.py` before any broker import | Broker module surface (`run_standalone`, `_parse_env_file`) — import-only, zero edits |
+| Release-asset pipeline (`scripts/release.py` + `scripts/_env_secrets.py`) | Builds release notes (milestone summary, phases, verification, CLI install/usage, docker usage, artifact sha256), create-or-get the gitea release by tag, attaches `coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz` via `POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/{id}/assets` (multipart field `attachment`, `Authorization: token <T>`); idempotent re-attach; bounded retry (3) → `release_pending` escalation on exhaustion — never blocks tag+merge | Owns the forge API conversation for release assets only; token resolved exclusively from `.env*` files via the file-reading loader (never shell env; assert non-empty before any call — empty token → gitea 404 masking, v1.8); does not build the artifact, does not push images | CLI artifact build (attaches its output); gitea API (`/api/v1/...`) |
+| Daemonless registry publish client (`scripts/publish_image.py`) | Once per milestone: pull the pinned `python:3.11-slim` base from Docker Hub (anonymous token exchange → OCI index → resolve linux/amd64 child manifest → config + layer blobs), append one deterministic broker layer carrying `/app/coreci-broker.pyz` (tar+gzip, fixed metadata, `mtime=0`), build a new config blob (diff_id appended; Entrypoint `["python3","/app/coreci-broker.pyz"]`, Cmd `[]`, WorkingDir `/state`), and push `git.coreci.dev/coreci/broker:<milestone-release-tag>` + `latest` to the gitea container registry (Basic-auth token exchange at `/v2/token`, `Bearer` JWT on API calls, HEAD-skip + monolithic blob uploads, OCI image manifest PUT; explicit `Location`-following — stdlib urllib does not follow 307/308 on PUT) | No container runtime (D-019); base layer digests reused verbatim, base blobs re-uploaded (no cross-registry mount); records resolved base digests as provenance; failure follows bounded-retry → `release_pending` escalation — never blocks the milestone merge | CLI artifact build (ships its output in the layer); Docker Hub + gitea registry HTTP APIs (OCI dist-spec v2) |
+| Dockerfile (documentation) | Self-contained docker-build path for users WITH docker: same base, in-image `zipapp` build of the same sources + shim, same entrypoint/`/state` anchoring | Documentation + alternative build path only; the daemonless client is the executable source of truth for what the pipeline publishes; equivalence with the published image is required, byte-identity is not | CLI artifact build (same staging content, same shim) |
+
+### DataFlow (v0.2 distribution)
+
+1. **CLI boot (packaged)**: `./coreci-broker.pyz` → shim resolves the state dir (`BROKER_ENV_PATH`-anchored; CWD-relative defaults preserved) → materializes UI/static assets into the versioned assets dir → sets `BROKER_UI_ROOT`/`BROKER_STATIC_ROOT` (user env/`.env` overrides win) → `coreci_broker.run_standalone()` → first-boot `.env` generation, admin pass printed once, `broker.db`/`broker.audit.log` 0600 in the state dir, UI served at `/ui/`, client at `/static/coreci_broker_client.py` — behavior byte-identical to the unpackaged standalone mode.
+2. **Release attachment (per phase ship from the CLI-building phase)**: `scripts/build_cli.py` → reproducible `dist/coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz` (+sha256) → `scripts/release.py` → gitea create-or-get release by tag → multipart attach → notes body (CLI install/usage + docker usage + digest). Bounded retry; `release_pending` escalation on exhaustion; tag+merge is the completion gate.
+3. **Image publish (once per milestone, at the final ship)**: `scripts/publish_image.py` → anonymous Docker Hub pull (`python:3.11-slim` OCI index → amd64 child + blobs) → deterministic broker layer (contains the pyz) + new config → gitea registry auth (`/v2/token`, Basic `<user>:<GITEA_TOKEN>`) → blob upload (HEAD-skip, monolithic POST, explicit Location-following) → manifest PUT `<milestone-release-tag>` then `latest` → provenance digests recorded. Bounded retry; never blocks the milestone merge.
+
+### BuildOrder (v0.2 — appended to the v0.1 order above)
+
+8. CLI build pipeline + boot shim + packaging/boot-parity tests (P1 — REQ-21)
+9. Release-asset uploader + daemonless publish client + Dockerfile + stub tests (P2 — REQ-22/REQ-23)
+10. Cumulative acceptance (v0.1 suite through the packaged artifact), security review, milestone ship: attach pyz to `v0.2.3`, publish image, merge (P3)
+
+### Notes (v0.2)
+
+- Distribution components hold no secrets: the archive bundles only broker + UI + client code; the image ships no state; forge tokens live in `.env*` files loaded only by `scripts/_env_secrets.py` (blocked from shell env by `config.security.bash_allowlist`).
+- All three pipeline scripts take injectable base URLs (stub-testable); live-forge interactions are read-only in tests and attempted-only at ship per the bounded-retry contract.
+- Verified environment facts backing this section live in RESEARCH.md v0.2 (gitea 1.26.1 API shapes, OCI index resolution for `python:3.11-slim`, gitea `/v2/token` Basic-auth exchange, zipapp normalization, urllib 307/308 behavior).

.ciagent/CHECKPOINT.json

@@ -1,8 +0,0 @@
-{
-  "phase": 4,
-  "stage": "verify",
-  "milestone": "v0.1",
-  "phase_role": "execution",
-  "attempts": 0,
-  "updated_at": "2026-10-10T03:45:00Z"
-}

.ciagent/GRILL.md

@@ -1,129 +1,254 @@
 # CIAgent Grill Report
 
-## Run: 2026-10-09 23:10 (mode: interactive, focus: all)
+## Run: 2026-10-10 (mode: interactive, focus: v0.2 plan red-team — cli-packaging)
 
-### Verdict: Proceed  (confidence: 0.85)
+**Supersedes the v0.1 grill in this file** (v0.1 run of 2026-10-09; its full text and
+verdicts G-001..G-008 live in git history at `7f7868f` and remain binding where the plan
+depends on them: G-005's owner-run post-ship OWUI smoke checklist and G-008's 90-day
+adoption criterion carry forward in ROADMAP.md §Post-Milestone Notes; G-007's
+forge-repo-creation test was executed at v0.1's P0 ship and is closed). New verdicts
+number G-009 onward.
 
-7 of 9 axes resolved on evidence; the four escalated items (Axes 7, 9) were resolved interactively by the owner on 2026-10-09 — decisions G-005..G-008, zero open escalations.
+### Verdict (summary): GO-WITH-CONDITIONS (confidence: 0.82)
 
-### Axis 1 — Business Case
-- **Q1**: Is the per-tool credential problem real and top-priority?
-  - Evidence: PROJECT.md:9,47 (four live creds via KB/env/0600 JSON today; proxmox tool exists now — no revocation, no audit, no allowlist); ROADMAP.md:5 (owner-directed 2026-10-09)
-  - Answer: real and current — the estate's path has no revocation or audit; owner directed same-day. (0.85)
-- **Q2**: Named sponsor who has decided under pressure?
-  - Evidence: D-007 owner-confirmed §13 defaults @0.95 (ffdc539); D-012..D-015 forced under clarify pressure (53d99e8)
-  - Answer: CEO-owner is sole sponsor and decision-maker; pressure decisions on the record. (0.85)
-- **Q3**: What breaks if cancelled — and is ROI evidence-based?
-  - Evidence: PROJECT.md:9 (counterfactual explicit); no financial deck exists; cost is tokens only
-  - Answer: cancellation returns the estate to unaudited per-tool reads (capability loss, not continuity); ROI is operational, measured against the documented counterfactual. (0.80)
+The plan rests on genuinely strong research — live-verified forge/registry wire shapes, a
+working zipapp prototype booted against the real broker sources, zero-broker-lines
+verified against the actual file (1390/1400). Red-team findings are concrete and
+fixable by task/ship-step edits: one **unexecutable mechanism** (the v0.2.1 attachment
+bridge cites a harness path RESEARCH itself proved absent from this environment),
+one **ship-sequence inversion** (P3-05 attaches the release before the tag exists —
+gitea would mint `v0.2.3` at the wrong commit), one **false-green determinism gap**
+(the normalize pass "preserves" umask-derived zip attributes, so must-have 4 passes
+while the "clean checkout" exit criterion silently fails cross-machine), and a set of
+test-realism holes (subprocess harness with no timeout discipline, missing creds env
+in the packaged secret-read, no live read-only validation before the one live publish).
+Three forks were resolved interactively with the owner this session (G-011, G-013,
+G-014); everything else is bound on evidence below.
 
-### Axis 2 — Scope
-- **Q1**: Stable, frozen, owned?
-  - Evidence: REQ-01..REQ-20 frozen from spec v0.5, full traceability (REQUIREMENTS.md:5,78-99); D-008; "No requirement is deferred" (PROJECT.md:27); owner coreci-coo (REQUIREMENTS.md:3)
-  - Answer: frozen and traced; one acknowledged in-scope unknown (KB file layout → P4, ARCHITECTURE.md:47) with candidate flows pre-verified (RESEARCH.md:55). (0.85)
-- **Q2**: Explicitly out of scope?
-  - Evidence: 12-row table, each row with reason + spec source (REQUIREMENTS.md:57-74)
-  - Answer: exhaustive; covers the usual silent creep targets (rotation, HA, MFA, federation). (0.90)
-- **Q3**: Hidden requirements (security, ops, accessibility)?
-  - Evidence: security reviews P3-06/P5-02 (PLAN.md:113,145); traversal research (RESEARCH.md:62); D-013 cookie hardening; REQ-15 0600; ops README P5-04
-  - Answer: security/ops surfaced pre-code; accessibility unstated — immaterial for a single-admin internal UI in v0.1. (0.75)
+---
 
-### Axis 3 — Architecture
-- **Q1**: Validated by the builders, not the sellers?
-  - Evidence: RESEARCH.md §4 source-verified against OWUI source at main (no activate() hook, Valves rule, `__file__` temp-delete; KB endpoints from knowledge.py/files.py); plan-checker PASS_WITH_NOTES (b8122be)
-  - Answer: yes — the executing pipeline authored and checked the plan against source. (0.80)
-- **Q2**: Integration surface bounded?
-  - Evidence: exactly two external surfaces — OWUI Tools mount (RESEARCH.md:30-38) + OWUI KB read API (RESEARCH.md:40-55); gitea push per sibling convention (RESEARCH.md §3)
-  - Answer: bounded and source-verified; no third integration exists. (0.80)
-- **Q3**: Replaced-system edge cases; inherited debt?
-  - Evidence: four creds, single host, no volume concern (PROJECT.md:47); spec defects 1-4 found and resolved pre-code (RESEARCH.md §2; D-004/D-005); greenfield repo (acf5557)
-  - Answer: edge cases (pepper chicken-and-egg, KB-loss, re-reg KeyError) resolved by decision; external debt = OWUI lifecycle quirks, mitigated by the once-per-process guard (ARCHITECTURE.md:7); 800-line budget fails fast via AC14 at P1-08. (0.75)
+## Surface 1 — Determinism claims (must-have 4; P1-01)
 
-### Axis 4 — People
-- **Q1**: Key-person dependency — acceptable?
-  - Evidence: D-007 CEO sole approver, binding (PROJECT.md:61); tokens re-register on TTL; allowlist changes are the only CEO-gated act
-  - Answer: accepted — CEO absence stalls new onboarding only, not broker continuity; by design for a v0.1 credential broker on a trusted single host. (0.75)
-- **Q2**: Resources allocated; PO with authority?
-  - Evidence: agent pipeline, sequential, parallelization off (config.json:33-37); guided autonomy, escalation_hooks ["*"] (config.json:5-9)
-  - Answer: no BAU contention applies; owner-CEO is PO with absolute authority. (0.80)
-- **Q3**: Building capability they don't have?
-  - Evidence: sibling precedent on same pipeline + forge (RESEARCH.md §3); the one novel surface (OWUI mount) is source-researched
-  - Answer: capability precedented; unproven only in that zero code exists — P1 is the cheap falsifier. (0.70)
+**Forcing question**: Is two-build sha256 equality actually achievable and testable, and
+what does the normalize pass fix vs. miss?
 
-### Axis 5 — Timeline
-- **Q1**: Deadline set before or after scope?
-  - Evidence: spec v0.5 (ffdc539, 22:37) precedes plan (b8122be, 23:02); no external deadline exists anywhere in the corpus
-  - Answer: spec-first; no reverse-engineered date to fail against. (0.85)
-- **Q2**: Critical path; single 3-month pusher?
-  - Evidence: P1→P5 sequential (ROADMAP.md:24-57); only live-environment unknown is OwuiApiCredsSource KB layout (P4), bounded by FileCredsSource default + CEO-controlled KB structure
-  - Answer: no 3-month pusher; worst case is bounded P4 adapter rework. (0.75)
-- **Q3**: Evidence-based estimates; definition of done?
-  - Evidence: 30 one-commit tasks, tests ship with task (PLAN.md:12); must_haves frontmatter (PLAN.md:2-7); AC1-AC14 + per-phase exits (ROADMAP)
-  - Answer: slice-sized with checker sign-off; done is test-enforced, not demo-defined. (0.80)
+- **Evidence** (stdlib source, read this session): `/usr/lib/python3.11/zipapp.py`
+  builds via `for child in source.rglob('*'): z.write(child, arcname.as_posix())` —
+  entry order = scandir order, entry mtime = source mtime (`ZipInfo.from_file`), and
+  `external_attr` = the staging file's stat mode `<< 16`. PLAN P1-01's normalize pass
+  fixes order (sorted), `date_time=(1980,1,1,0,0,0)`, `ZIP_DEFLATED` — but specifies
+  "**preserved** `external_attr`". Preserved from what zipapp wrote, i.e. derived from
+  staging file modes — which are `0666 & ~umask` if staged via plain copy, or
+  checkout-mode if via `copy2`. Umask 0022 vs 0002 across machines/clones → different
+  `external_attr` → different sha256, **while must-have 4 (two consecutive builds, same
+  machine) still passes**. A silent false green against the phase exit criterion
+  ("builds reproducibly from a clean checkout").
+- **gzip is not in the pyz path** (zipfile DEFLATE only). Image-layer gzip is
+  deterministic on-platform: `gzip.compress(..., mtime=0)` routes to
+  `zlib.compress(wbits=31)` on 3.11 (verified in gzip.py source) — fixed header, fixed
+  OS byte, stable per zlib build. Scope claim: byte-identity is **same-environment**
+  (same machine, same zlib); cross-zlib-version identity is neither claimed nor
+  required by must-have 4.
+- **Answer**: achievable and testable as scoped — provided the normalize pass also
+  fixes what it currently preserves. → **G-009**.
 
-### Axis 6 — Budget
-- **Q1**: Cost profile and burn?
-  - Evidence: token/compute only; phase 0 complete in ~30 min wall-clock (5 commits); no cash budget exists
-  - Answer: no runway question; pipeline runs on owned infra. (0.75)
-- **Q2**: Predictable drivers outside the budget?
-  - Evidence: stdlib-only eliminates licensing (D-009); forge org exists (RESEARCH.md:9); OWUI self-hosted; no pip, no npm
-  - Answer: none uncovered — the design removes the usual cost drivers by construction. (0.80)
-- **Q3**: Contingent on something unhappened?
-  - Evidence: forge repo creation untested (assumption d), but release_blocking false (config.json:24) and manual forge-UI fallback is trivial
-  - Answer: no financial contingency; the sole contingency is operational (→ Axis 7). (0.70)
+## Surface 2 — Boot parity via subprocess (P1-02)
 
-### Axis 7 — Risks
-- **Q1**: Top assumptions, evidence per item?
-  - (a) bcrypt ships in OWUI runtime + daemon-thread tools allowed: RESEARCH.md §4 source+docs — but validated at `main`, deployed version unpinned; absorbed by dual-mode scrypt fallback (0.70)
-  - (b) stdlib dev parity with the OWUI runtime: D-001 dual-mode covers both environments (RESEARCH.md:8) (0.80)
-  - (c) FileCredsSource makes tests hermetic: tempdir + env-var state (RESEARCH.md §6; PLAN P1-01/P4-01) — plan-level, proven at P1 (0.70)
-  - (d) forge repo creatable with current token: token valid, org exists, repo 404 — creation UNTESTED (RESEARCH.md:9). **→ ESCALATION**
-- **Q2**: Dependencies outside the team?
-  - Evidence: OWUI (host + API + process perms), gitea — all in daily estate use (PROJECT.md:47; RESEARCH.md §3)
-  - Answer: bounded and precedented. (0.75)
-- **Q3**: Single killer risk; pre-mortem?
-  - Evidence: worst case = mount or adapter fails on the live host → standalone mode is functionally equivalent (ARCHITECTURE.md:7); defect table (RESEARCH.md §2) is the pre-mortem substance
-  - Answer: no project-killing risk found on evidence — but NO plan task validates against the live OWUI host before ship. **→ ESCALATION** (0.65)
+**Forcing question**: What makes the subprocess acceptance flaky, and what's missing?
 
-### Axis 8 — Governance
-- **Q1**: Decision-maker under disagreement?
-  - Evidence: single owner-CEO; guided autonomy escalates every gate (ROADMAP.md:9; config.json:6)
-  - Answer: no committee exists to deadlock; owner is arbiter. (0.85)
-- **Q2**: Cadence, escalation, omissions from status?
-  - Evidence: ---ci--- blocks with confidence on all four commits (ffdc539..b8122be); 15 decisions recorded; checker notes published, not buried
-  - Answer: decision log is exemplary; the mild contradiction is RESEARCH.md:82 "no genuine blockers" sitting beside untested assumption (d). (0.70)
-- **Q3**: Stop-the-project trigger?
-  - Evidence: MISSING as a formal trigger — but sponsor = approver = decision-maker is one person
-  - Answer: implicit owner prerogative suffices where one person holds all three roles. (0.70)
+- **Evidence**: zero v0.1 tests use `subprocess`/`Popen` (grep over `tests/`: no hits) —
+  P1-02 introduces the repo's first subprocess-boot harness. The plan's env enumeration
+  (`BROKER_BIND`, `BROKER_ENV_PATH/DB/AUDIT`) omits `BROKER_CREDS_FILE`/
+  `BROKER_CREDS_SOURCE` while requiring "secret-read reuse the v0.1 acceptance request
+  patterns" — the v0.1 precedent (`tests/test_acceptance_full.py:76-77`) sets both;
+  `FileCredsSource` on a missing file raises `_SecretNotFound` → 404
+  (`coreci_broker.py:440-441`), so the packaged secret-read would fail. `Popen(["python3",
+  ...], env={minimal})` leaves the child without `PATH` (works today via execvp's
+  confstr fallback — by accident). No timeout discipline on "read stdout lines until
+  `coreci-broker listening on`" (RESEARCH §4.3) — a failed boot never prints the line and
+  hangs the suite. "Pass printed exactly once" is asserted against a *still-running*
+  server; shutdown-path output is unread unless drained after terminate. And every
+  planned boot pins absolute state paths — the owner's literal happy path (download →
+  `python3 *.pyz` in some directory → `.env`/db/audit materialize in the CWD) is never
+  tested.
+- **Answer**: harden the harness — the plan's claims are all testable once the harness
+  is honest about them. → **G-010**.
 
-### Axis 9 — Adoption
-- **Q1**: Who uses it; what's in it for them?
-  - Evidence: CEO gets allowlist + audit UI replacing blind KB edits; tool authors get a zero-dep client replacing hand-rolled 0600 JSON (REQ-19; PROJECT.md:9)
-  - Answer: both user classes shed concrete work — not a "train them and pray" case. (0.75)
-- **Q2**: Ops handoff; rollback plan?
-  - Evidence: ops = owner; README + backup guidance P5-04 (PLAN.md:150); full state = broker.db + broker.audit.log + .env (PROJECT.md:37-39); unmigrated tools never depend on the broker
-  - Answer: rollback = stop process, restore three files; migrated proxmox tool reverts to direct reads. (0.75)
-- **Q3**: Success criteria validated with the judges?
-  - Evidence: judge = owner via AC1-AC14 (spec §12, owner-owned); but every OWUI-facing test is stub-driven (PLAN P3-04, P4-01), no task touches the live host, and proxmox migration is "post-broker", dateless (PROJECT.md:47)
-  - Answer: acceptance is owner-validated; live readiness and the adoption criterion were escalated and are now resolved as G-005/G-008. (0.85)
+## Surface 3 — One-shot lead upload bridge (P1-03)
 
-### Meta
-- **Auditor's flag**: no live-host validation before ship; forge repo creation untested; deployed OWUI version unpinned; adoption criterion undefined. All cheap to fix; none fatal.
-- **Not being done**: live smoke test on the OWUI host; OWUI version pin; a risk register; post-ship adoption criteria.
-- **Simplest 80% version**: drop the admin UI + reference tools (CLI allowlists, file creds only) saves ~one phase — but the UI is the CEO's core value and OwuiApiCredsSource is the production path; at 30 tasks / 800 lines, the over-scope charge does not stick.
-- **90-day must-be-true**: broker live on the OWUI host; proxmox tool on the client module; allowlist + audit in CEO daily use. Not true today (no code) — but every gating factor is internal.
+**Forcing question**: Is the v0.2.1 ad-hoc attachment a discipline violation, and is it
+even executable as specified?
 
-### Binding Decisions
-| ID | Axis | Decision | Confidence |
-|----|------|----------|------------|
-| G-001 | 4 | Key-person dependency accepted for v0.1: sole-approver CEO absence stalls new onboarding only, not continuity (D-007 by design) | 0.75 |
-| G-002 | 7 | Assumptions (a)-(c) accepted as mitigated-by-design (dual-mode hashing, hermetic test plan); (d) + live validation escalate | 0.70 |
-| G-003 | 9 | Rollback accepted: full state = broker.db + broker.audit.log + .env; stop-and-restore; tools revert to direct reads | 0.75 |
-| G-004 | 3 | 800-line budget risk accepted: AC14 enforced from P1-08 (fails fast); spec §12.14 amendment is the owner's pressure valve | 0.70 |
-| G-005 | 9 | Post-ship live-OWUI smoke checklist (owner-run: mount, register, read) is the plan of record; v0.1 ships on standalone + stub tests; no real tool migrates before the checklist passes; rollback = disable the tool | 0.85 |
-| G-006 | 7 | Deployed OWUI pinned at v0.11.3 (owner-stated 2026-10-09) — same-era as the researched `main` surface, no re-research required; smoke checklist item 1 re-confirms the two KB read endpoints on v0.11.3 | 0.85 |
-| G-007 | 7 | Forge repo creation is tested at the P0 ship (POST /orgs/coreci/repos with the existing token), not deferred to P5-06; on scope failure: local-only fallback + auto-escalation, and the owner's 30-second manual forge-UI creation is the recorded fallback | 0.9 |
-| G-008 | 9 | 90-day adoption criterion: proxmox_readonly_tool.py runs on coreci_broker_client.py with direct KB reads removed by 2027-01-09; owner owns the date; recorded in ROADMAP as a post-milestone note (out of v0.1 scope) | 0.8 |
+- **Evidence**: PLAN P1-03 attaches via "the same harness mechanism v0.1 used for its
+  `broker-vX.Y.Z.tar.gz` assets" — but RESEARCH §2.2 (the plan's own research base)
+  found that mechanism is the ship harness's `coreci build/package/release upload` CLI,
+  **"not installed in this dev environment"**; v0.1's archives were produced
+  container-side, ad-hoc, with no repo-owned script. The bridge as written is therefore
+  unexecutable via the cited mechanism, and its realistic substitute is an untested
+  hand-rolled live-forge write (multipart encoding, token handling, idempotency) at
+  first live use — performed by lead-developer, the one persona barred from code
+  writes, using token discipline that `scripts/_env_secrets.py` (which does not exist
+  until P2) is supposed to enforce. This is precisely the practice REQ-22 formalizes
+  away.
+- **Owner decision (this session)**: restructure — release automation moves into P1;
+  the bridge is deleted. → **G-011**. The hard gate question dissolves: v0.2.1 ships
+  script-driven; there is no bridge to become permanent.
 
-### Escalations
-- (none — all four escalated challenges resolved interactively by the owner on 2026-10-09; decisions G-005..G-008 above)
+## Surface 4 — Daemonless OCI publish (P2-02, P3-05)
+
+**Forcing question**: Does the milestone ship sequence hold up when publish fails after
+the tag exists — and does it even run in the right order?
+
+- **Evidence — sequence inversion**: P3-05 as written runs `release.py` attach →
+  publish image → squash-merge → `main` → tag `v0.2.3` → push. But `POST /api/v1/repos/
+  {o}/{r}/releases` with a missing tag creates the tag at `target_commitish`
+  (default-branch head) — gitea's documented CreateReleaseOption semantics (schema in
+  RESEARCH §2.1). A create-first flow pre-merge would mint `v0.2.3` pinned to
+  **pre-merge main**, then collide with (or silently diverge from) the harness's own tag
+  push. The plan's own P2-04 sequences correctly (tag → merge → push → release) — P3-05
+  alone inverts it.
+- **Evidence — wire discipline**: bounded retry(3) is specified but no per-request
+  timeout anywhere; a hung 29.8 MB monolithic POST through a throttled gitea turns
+  "bounded retry" into an unbounded hang. The 307/308 stub test proves only
+  Location-following, and gitea's `Location` may be **relative** (RESEARCH §3.3) — the
+  harder case is untested. Upstream `3.11-slim` drift is handled (resolve-at-publish +
+  `--base-manifest` + provenance digests; RESEARCH §3.7) and the anonymous-200 token
+  trap fails loudly per spec.
+- **Evidence — failure story**: "publish never blocks merge" is honored, but when
+  publish fails after `v0.2.3` exists, the plan records only `release_pending` — no
+  named post-milestone re-run/closure step. The ship contract makes the escalation
+  auto-resolution; somebody must own the retry.
+- **Answer**: reorder P3-05, add timeouts + relative-Location coverage, and make the
+  escalation carry its own closure runbook. → **G-012**, **G-019**, **G-020**.
+
+## Surface 5 — Scope discipline (P2-03, REQ-22/23)
+
+**Forcing question**: Is anything decorative, and is anything REQ-22/23 implies missing?
+
+- **Evidence — decorative risk**: P2-03's verify is presence-only ("`Dockerfile` +
+  README sections present") and the dev environment cannot build the Dockerfile (no
+  runtime) — a syntactically or semantically broken Dockerfile passes the gate. The
+  "equivalence mapping" header is documentation with no enforcement.
+- **Evidence — missing**: no `.dockerignore` anywhere in the plan — `docker build .`
+  ships the whole repo (`.git/`, any local `.env*`, `data/`, `*.db`, `dist/`,
+  `__pycache__/`, `.ciagent/`) as build context, adjacent to a security review that
+  asserts "no secrets in any image layer". REQ-22's notes model is covered (§2.3, stub
+  asserts sections present); the sha256's *source* is unspecified (hand-pasted vs.
+  computed); `latest` semantics are coherent (once per milestone at final ship —
+  v0.2.3 is the first image ever, D-021); the state-dir volume contract is documented
+  (`WORKDIR /state`, README docker run).
+- **Answer**: make the Dockerfile contract testable, add `.dockerignore`, pin digest
+  provenance. → **G-015**, **G-016**, **G-017**.
+
+## Surface 6 — Frozen broker / shim dependency risk (P1-01)
+
+**Forcing question**: Does the shim need broker cooperation, and what is the coupling
+risk?
+
+- **Evidence**: RESEARCH §1.2's prototype booted from the real sources with zero broker
+  cooperation — re-verified against the file this session: `run_standalone`
+  (`coreci_broker.py:1369`), `_parse_env_file` (:154), `boot` (:598), `load_config`
+  (:240) are module-level; `load_config` precedence (process env → `.env` → defaults,
+  :246-257) makes the shim's pre-set `os.environ` approach contract-identical. The
+  broker's `.env` resolution is CWD-relative by default (`ENV_PATH_DEFAULT=".env"`,
+  `ENV_DEFAULTS` :53-66) — packaged boots with unset `BROKER_ENV_PATH` anchor state to
+  the CWD, which is exactly the documented happy path and is currently untested (folded
+  into G-010). Residual risk: the shim calls `_parse_env_file` — an underscore-private
+  symbol. Within v0.2 the broker is frozen so the risk is nil; across future milestones
+  a rename breaks the shim with a loud ImportError (acceptable), but only if somebody
+  knows to look.
+- **Answer**: no cooperation needed (verified twice); the private-API dependency must
+  be documented and review-tracked, and the default-anchoring boot must be tested. →
+  **G-018** (anchor case bound under G-010).
+
+## Surface 7 — Test realism: stub fidelity (P2-01/P2-02 tests)
+
+**Forcing question**: What would a stub MISS that the real forge does — and is the
+as-built client ever validated against the real forge before its one live write?
+
+- **Evidence**: the stub coverage is unusually good (anonymous-200 trap, index→amd64
+  resolution with Accept check, HEAD-skip, monolithic+two-step uploads, 307-following,
+  digest and diff_id assertions, both tags; multipart field/`?name=` byte assertions,
+  idempotent re-attach, 500×3 marker, token discipline). Gaps: fixtures are frozen at
+  research-time shapes (2026-10-10) while upstream index and forge auth can move
+  mid-milestone; the 307 test doesn't pin the relative-`Location` case (bound in
+  G-019); gitea's 4 MB attachment cap is out-of-band (pyz ≈30 KB — immaterial, noted);
+  and **no step anywhere validates the as-built scripts against the real
+  `git.coreci.dev` in read-only mode** — the first live run of `publish_image.py` is
+  the P3-05 milestone publish itself, the one shot per milestone.
+- **Owner decision (this session)**: add an env-gated, read-only live smoke as a
+  P3-05 pre-ship verify step. → **G-013**.
+
+## Surface 8 — Wave ordering & effort (P2 packing)
+
+**Forcing question**: Is P2 overloaded, and are there hidden dependencies that break
+the wave order?
+
+- **Evidence**: original P2 packs `_env_secrets` + `release.py` + `publish_image.py` +
+  `Dockerfile` + README + 2 test files into 3 waves — the overload is real, and the
+  bridge finding (Surface 3) is the reason it dissolves: release automation belongs in
+  P1 (G-011), leaving P2 = publish client → Dockerfile/docs → ship. Hidden
+  dependencies check out: `publish_image.py` imports `_env_secrets` (lands earlier in
+  P1 now — order preserved transitively); the Dockerfile task consumes P1-01's staging
+  allowlist (G-016 formalizes the contract as a test). `publish_image.py` remains the
+  plan's biggest single commit even after the restructure.
+- **Owner decision (this session)**: keep it one vertical task — the pull/push seam is
+  artificial, the stub fixtures are shared end-to-end, RESEARCH §3.4 is near-pseudocode,
+  and a split would not isolate the actual risk (first live write — covered by G-013).
+  → **G-014**.
+
+---
+
+## Binding Decisions
+
+| ID | Surface | Decision | Binds | Confidence |
+|----|---------|----------|-------|------------|
+| G-009 | 1 | Normalize pass must SET constant `external_attr` (files `0o100644<<16`, dir entries `0o40755<<16`), not "preserve" staging-derived modes; staging is an explicit allowlist (`coreci_broker.py`, `coreci_broker_client.py`, `coreci_broker_ui/**`, shim staged as root `__main__.py`, generated `_cli_version.py`) — never a repo rglob, `__pycache__`/`dist/` excluded by construction. Byte-identity scope = same environment (same zlib/machine); cross-zlib identity is not claimed. | P1-01 task edit | 0.85 |
+| G-010 | 2 | P1-02 harness hardening: subprocess boots use `sys.executable` (absolute); child env adds `BROKER_CREDS_SOURCE=file` + `BROKER_CREDS_FILE=<tmp fixture>` (v0.1 precedent test_acceptance_full.py:76-77); deadline-bounded wait for the listening line (~30s → fail with captured stdout+stderr, terminate child); pass-once/silent-second-boot assertions completed by draining stdout after terminate; ADD a default-anchoring boot case (`cwd=<tmp>`, no state overrides beyond `BROKER_BIND`) asserting `.env`/`broker.db`/`broker.audit.log` in the CWD — the owner's literal happy path. | P1-02 task edit | 0.85 |
+| G-011 | 3 | **Restructure (owner, this session)**: move `scripts/_env_secrets.py` + `scripts/release.py` + `tests/test_release_upload.py` into Phase 1 as new wave 3 (P1-03 · release-asset automation); old P1-03 ship renumbers P1-04 and ships v0.2.1 script-driven (`build_cli.py v0.2.1` → `release.py v0.2.1 <pyz>`); the one-shot lead-upload note is DELETED (its cited mechanism is absent from this environment — RESEARCH §2.2). P2 renumbers: publish_image.py → P2-01 (wave 1), Dockerfile+docs → P2-02 (wave 2), ship → P2-03 (wave 3). Four-test-file count unchanged. | PLAN edit (before P1-01 executes) | 0.90 |
+| G-012 | 4 | P3-05 sequence corrected: squash-merge → `main` → tag `v0.2.3` → push → THEN `release.py` attach (GET-by-tag finds the real tag; no pre-merge release create) → publish image → closeout. Mirrors P2's own correct ship order; eliminates the gitea create-tag-at-target_commitish hazard. | P3-05 ship-step edit | 0.80 |
+| G-013 | 7 | **Env-gated live read-only smoke (owner, this session)**: pre-publish P3-05 verify step — gitea `GET /v2/` 401 challenge shape, `GET .../releases/tags/{tag}`, `GET /v2/token` Basic → non-empty JWT, Docker Hub anonymous token + `3.11-slim` index→amd64 resolve. Implemented as a `--check`/verify mode on the scripts or `scripts/verify_endpoints.py`; GET-only, never in the default unittest run; tokens only via `_env_secrets`. | P3-05 verify + task edit | 0.85 |
+| G-014 | 8 | **publish_image.py stays one vertical task (owner, this session)**: shared stub fixtures, RESEARCH §3.4 near-pseudocode; a split would not isolate the real risk (first live write — G-013 covers it). | PLAN shape (no edit) | 0.75 |
+| G-015 | 5 | `.dockerignore` added to the Dockerfile task: excludes `.git`, `.env*`, `data/`, `*.db`, `*.log`, `dist/`, `__pycache__`, `tests/`, `.ciagent/`. Build-context hygiene; P3-02 scope gains "no secrets in the build context" alongside "none in any layer". | P2-02 task edit | 0.85 |
+| G-016 | 5 | Dockerfile equivalence made testable: the Dockerfile task adds a consistency test (into `tests/test_build_cli.py`) asserting COPY source set == `build_cli.py` staging allowlist, identical zipapp flags (`--python "/usr/bin/env python3" --compress`), identical `_cli_version.py` generation format, `ENTRYPOINT`/`WORKDIR` == publish_image's `config.Entrypoint`/`config.WorkingDir`. Presence-only verification no longer gates a possibly-broken Dockerfile. | P2-02 task edit | 0.80 |
+| G-017 | 5 | Digest discipline: the sha256 in release notes is computed by `release.py` from the artifact file itself — never a CLI argument, never hand-pasted. Digest/asset mismatch becomes structurally impossible. | P1-03 task edit | 0.85 |
+| G-018 | 6 | Shim private-API dependency tracked: `cli/__main__.py` header documents the coupling to `coreci_broker._parse_env_file` + `run_standalone` ("private-API dependency — any future broker refactor must re-run the v0.2 packaged acceptance"); P3-02 review scope lists it. Loud-ImportError breakage accepted. | P1-01 task edit + P3-02 scope | 0.75 |
+| G-019 | 4 | Publish-client wire hardening: explicit per-request timeouts on every registry call (generous on blob uploads, ~120s); blob-level bounded retry with HEAD-skip between attempts (a timed-out 29.8 MB POST resumes cheap); the 307 stub test uses a RELATIVE `Location` at least once (gitea may answer relative — RESEARCH §3.3; absolute is the easy case). | P2-01 task edit | 0.80 |
+| G-020 | 4 | Publish-failure closure is a named step, not an open escalation: the `release_pending` entry records the exact re-run command (`python3 scripts/publish_image.py` on `main` @ `v0.2.3`; `--base-manifest` optional pin) and its close condition (both tags visible in gitea packages). "Never blocks merge" unchanged. | P3-05 ship-step edit | 0.80 |
+| G-021 | 4 | The `v0.2.0` (phase-0) release carries NO `.pyz` and its notes must not promise one — D-020 starts at `v0.2.1` (build tooling first exists in P1). Prevents a D-020 misread at the phase-0 ship immediately following this grill. | Phase-0 ship note | 0.85 |
+
+## Escalations
+
+- (none open — the three material forks were resolved interactively with the owner this
+  session: G-011 restructure, G-013 live smoke, G-014 task packing. G-001..G-008 from
+  v0.1 remain binding per git history; G-005/G-008 carry forward in ROADMAP post-milestone
+  notes unchanged.)
+
+## Promotion note (explicit, not performed by the grill)
+
+G-011 shifts REQ-22's attach automation into Phase 1; ROADMAP.md's Phase 2 description
+("release-asset automation" wording) and Phase 1's requirements line need a one-line
+touch-up when the PLAN restructure is promoted — by the orchestrator/owner via the
+normal plan-revision path, not by this file. Nothing else in PROJECT/REQUIREMENTS/ROADMAP
+is affected by these verdicts.
+
+## Overall Verdict
+
+**GO-WITH-CONDITIONS** — confidence 0.82.
+
+The plan is research-grounded to an unusual degree (live wire shapes, working prototype,
+zero-broker-lines verified against the file), and every finding is actionable by task or
+ship-step edit. It is GO only with all of the following applied:
+
+1. **G-011 restructure applied to PLAN.md before P1-01 executes** — the bridge is
+   unexecutable as written; v0.2.1 must ship script-driven.
+2. **G-009 + G-010 applied to P1-01/P1-02** — determinism must fix (not preserve)
+   entry attributes; the subprocess harness needs interpreter-path, creds-env, timeout,
+   drain, and default-anchoring discipline.
+3. **G-012 + G-020 applied before P3-05** — attach-after-tag ordering and the
+   publish-failure closure runbook are ship-contract corrections, not optional polish.
+4. **G-013 live smoke wired as the P3-05 pre-ship verify step** — the one live publish
+   must not also be the first live wire contact of the as-built client.
+5. **G-015/016/017/018/019 applied with their tasks** — context hygiene, testable
+   Dockerfile contract, digest provenance, tracked private-API coupling, wire timeouts.
+6. **G-021 noted at the phase-0 ship** — v0.2.0 carries no `.pyz`.

.ciagent/PERSONAS.md

@@ -1,39 +1,28 @@
 # PERSONAS — CoreCI Broker
 
-RESEARCH-stage roster (2026-10-09, milestone v0.1). Pure stdlib Python 3.11 project: single-file broker, no package.json, no JS framework, no src/ tree; the only UI is server-rendered static HTML/CSS/JS from `coreci_broker_ui/` (P2). Execution is sequential (parallelization off), so phase-specific personas activate only at their phase boundaries per this roster.
+Execution-stage roster (2026-10-10, milestone v0.2 cli-packaging). Pure stdlib Python 3.11 project: no package.json, no JS framework, no pip, no npm, no container runtime in the dev environment — frameworks are stdlib modules; tests are stdlib unittest against in-process stub HTTP servers and subprocess boots. The v0.1 broker is FROZEN this milestone: `coreci_broker.py` stands at 1390/1400 lines (REQ-17/AC14) and v0.2 adds zero broker lines (verified, RESEARCH §4.2), so no persona holds `coreci_broker.py` — or the v0.1 UI/client/reference sources — as writable territory; a P0 defect there is a lead-developer-dispatched exception only. All v0.2 work is new files: `cli/` boot shim, `scripts/` build+release+publish tooling, `Dockerfile`, four new test files, additive README sections, `.gitignore` additions. The custom release-engineer persona owns the whole distribution pipeline; backend-engineer — v0.1's primary persona — is deactivated with the P0-dispatch exception documented below. Execution is sequential (parallelization off), so phase-specific personas activate only at their phase boundaries per this roster.
 
 ---
-name: backend-engineer
-domain: backend
+name: release-engineer
+domain: distribution
 active: true
-reason: Primary execution persona — the entire v0.1 product is Python on one file: P1 core skeleton, P2 admin-plane API, P3 tool auth plane, P4 secrets adapter + public client module + reference tools. Owns every security-critical code path (token derivation, slow-hash verification, allowlist gates, audit trail, path-scoped reads) and every test that gates a phase.
-frameworks: [python3.11, http.server, sqlite3, hashlib.scrypt, unittest]
-constraints: ["coreci_broker.py stays one file under 800 lines (REQ-17, AC14)", "stdlib-only runtime; bcrypt is the sole optional import; no pip, no npm (D-001/D-009)", "all errors use the {error, message} JSON contract on 400/401/403/404/409/500", "broker.db and broker.audit.log are created mode 0600 (REQ-15)", "the broker never writes to creds-coreci-coo (REQ-08)"]
-territory: [coreci_broker.py, tests/**, coreci_broker_client.py, reference_tools/**]
+phase_specific: false
+reason: Primary execution persona — v0.2 is distribution engineering on a frozen broker, a domain distinct from v0.1's broker application work; hence a custom persona rather than a fold into backend-engineer, whose identity, constraints, and territory are the broker's runtime contract — a poor fit for build/release/publish tooling and a structural guarantee that the frozen file is owned by nobody. Owns the full pipeline — P1 zipapp build + materialization boot shim (REQ-21), P2 gitea release-asset automation + daemonless OCI registry publish + Dockerfile (REQ-22/23), P3 ship — and every security-critical surface this milestone: secrets discipline (file-only token loader), artifact integrity (no secrets in the .pyz or image layers, reproducible digests), registry auth flows.
+frameworks: [python3.11, zipapp, zipfile, tarfile, gzip, hashlib.sha256, urllib.request, json, subprocess, http.server, unittest]
+constraints: ["coreci_broker.py is FROZEN — zero lines added (1390/1400, REQ-17/AC14); broker sources (coreci_broker.py, coreci_broker_client.py, coreci_broker_ui/**, reference_tools/**) are read-only staging inputs to the build, never edited; a P0 defect there routes through lead-developer dispatch", "stdlib-only build path — python3 -m zipapp --compress; no pip, no npm, no wheel/PyInstaller, no container runtime (D-009/D-019)", "secrets discipline — GITEA_TOKEN resolves ONLY via scripts/_env_secrets.py reading .env/.env.secrets/.env.* files, never os.environ (blocked_env_vars: GITEA_TOKEN); assert non-empty before the first API call (v1.8 lesson: empty token → gitea 404 masks auth failure); no secrets ever enter the .pyz or an image layer", "digest determinism — zip entries sorted with date_time (1980,1,1,0,0,0) via the normalize post-pass; tar entries sorted with fixed TarInfo metadata; gzip.compress(mtime=0); json.dumps(sort_keys=True, separators=(',',':')); two-build sha256 equality gates the artifact (REQ-21)", "OCI end-to-end — manifest application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json, config application/vnd.oci.image.config.v1+json, layers application/vnd.oci.image.layer.v1.tar+gzip; base layer descriptors reused verbatim; never push an index; urllib does NOT follow 307/308 on PUT/POST — implement explicit Location-following; gitea's anonymous-200 /v2/token answer must fail loudly; HEAD-before-upload makes re-runs idempotent", "bounded retry (3 attempts) on release attach and publish; on exhaustion exit non-zero with a machine-readable marker → ship harness records release_pending escalation; never blocks tag+merge", "stub-testability — scripts take base URLs as parameters (no hardcoded hosts); stubs bind ('127.0.0.1', 0) per the v0.1 _StubOwuiHandler precedent; no live-forge writes in tests; v0.1 test files are frozen reference — v0.2 adds test_cli_packaging.py, test_build_cli.py, test_release_upload.py, test_publish_image.py only, and the cumulative suite stays green", "dist/ is build output — gitignored (dist/, *.pyz), never committed; README.md edits are additive sections (CLI install/usage, docker usage) with v0.1 content intact"]
+territory: [cli/**, scripts/**, tests/**, Dockerfile, README.md, .gitignore]
 subagent_type: backend-engineer
 ---
 
----
-name: frontend-engineer
-domain: frontend
-active: true
-phase_specific: true
-reason: P2 only (REQ-13 admin UI). Inactive outside P2 — no UI work exists in P1/P3/P4/P5; deactivate at the P2 exit boundary and do not dispatch outside P2.
-frameworks: [html, css, vanilla-js]
-constraints: ["server-rendered static pages from coreci_broker_ui/ on the same port as the API; no build step, no client framework, no npm (REQ-13)", "pages: /ui/login, /ui/app_registrations, /ui/user_allowlist, /ui/audit plus /ui/dashboard and a persistent nav header with Logout", "pages refresh via the corresponding admin API after each action; the API contract is owned by backend-engineer — frontend adapts", "session cookie broker_session is HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax (D-013); no direct DB or file access — admin API only"]
-territory: [coreci_broker_ui/**]
-subagent_type: frontend-engineer
----
-
 ---
 name: security-engineer
 domain: security
 active: true
 phase_specific: true
-reason: Custom persona activated for P3 (tool auth plane: register gates, App-token verification, identity enforcement) and P5 (security review pass before ship); inactive in P1/P2/P4 unless the lead escalates a finding.
-frameworks: [python3.11, unittest, STRIDE, CWE]
-constraints: ["review-only: coreci_broker.py and tests stay owned by backend-engineer; findings route through lead-developer, never direct edits", "findings are STRIDE-classified and CWE-first (cite CWE ids)", "focus: path traversal on /secrets/<path> (URL-decode before validation), authz (allowlist gates, path scoping, identity match), audit completeness, pepper never re-printed, 0600 modes, token scoping"]
-territory: [coreci_broker.py, tests/**]
+reason: Review-only pass activated for P3 (milestone security review — artifact integrity, no secrets in the archive/image, token discipline in upload paths, registry auth flows, boot parity of materialized assets); inactive in P1/P2 unless the lead escalates a finding — same posture as v0.1.
+frameworks: [python3.11, unittest, STRIDE, CWE, oci-dist-spec]
+constraints: ["review-only — every v0.2 file stays owned by release-engineer; findings route through lead-developer, never direct edits; coreci_broker.py is in review scope for zero-delta verification (AC14) only and is writable by nobody this milestone", "findings are STRIDE-classified and CWE-first (cite CWE ids)", "focus — secrets discipline (file-only token path via scripts/_env_secrets.py, never shell env, non-empty assert before first use), artifact integrity (no secrets in the .pyz or any image layer; sha256 provenance recorded in release notes), registry auth flows (gitea anonymous-200 /v2/token quirk, Basic username-ignored shape, 307/308 handling), attachment idempotency and bounded-retry escalation paths"]
+territory: [coreci_broker.py, cli/**, scripts/**, Dockerfile, tests/**]
 subagent_type: ci-security-auditor
 ---
 
@@ -41,20 +30,46 @@ subagent_type: ci-security-auditor
 name: lead-developer
 domain: coordination
 active: true
-reason: Active across all execution phases (P1–P5): decomposes plans into vertical slices per persona domain, arbitrates territory conflicts, revises the plan at phase boundaries, and sequences tasks across persona dependencies. No direct code writes.
+phase_specific: false
+reason: Active across all execution phases (P1–P3): decomposes plans into vertical slices along the build → attach → publish pipeline, arbitrates the frozen-broker rule (no persona writes coreci_broker.py — P0 fixes are lead-dispatched exceptions), routes security findings, and sequences tasks across phase boundaries. No direct code writes.
 frameworks: [none]
-constraints: ["no direct modifications to code files — coordination and conflict resolution only", "arbitration: backend-engineer owns files in cross-persona conflicts and defines the API contract; frontend adapts; security findings flow through backend", "enforce boundaries: no direct database access from the UI, no UI logic inside coreci_broker.py; battle-tested defaults over novel approaches"]
+constraints: ["no direct modifications to code files — coordination and conflict resolution only", "sole gate for frozen-broker exceptions — any P0 fix to coreci_broker.py (or the frozen UI/client/reference sources) is a lead-dispatched, defect-scoped task, never a persona territory claim", "arbitration — release-engineer owns every v0.2 file in cross-persona conflicts and defines the artifact/registry/release contracts; security findings flow lead → release-engineer; battle-tested defaults over novel approaches", "enforce — zero broker-line delta (AC14), secrets only via the .env* file loader, no secrets in artifacts, bounded-retry release_pending escalations never block tag+merge"]
 territory: [.ciagent/PLAN.md, .ciagent/*.md]
 subagent_type: lead-developer
 ---
 
+---
+name: backend-engineer
+domain: backend
+active: false
+phase_specific: false
+reason: Deactivated — the broker is frozen in v0.2; RESEARCH §4.2 verified run_standalone/boot/load_config/_parse_env_file are importable as-is, 1390/1400 lines leaves 10 lines of headroom, and zero-change is a hard constraint. All v0.2 engineering is distribution tooling owned by release-engineer. Reactivates only as a lead-developer-dispatched, defect-scoped P0 fix to coreci_broker.py — never via its own territory.
+frameworks: [python3.11, http.server, sqlite3, hashlib.scrypt, unittest]
+constraints: ["stays inactive for all planned v0.2 work; any broker change is a lead-developer-dispatched exception scoped to the P0 defect", "if dispatched — the 1400-line AC14 cap and every v0.1 runtime constraint (REQ-14..REQ-18, {error, message} JSON contract, 0600 modes, never write to creds-coreci-coo) remain binding"]
+territory: []
+subagent_type: backend-engineer
+---
+
+---
+name: frontend-engineer
+domain: frontend
+active: false
+phase_specific: false
+reason: Deactivated — no UI work in v0.2; REQ-21..23 touch no page. The v0.1 UI (coreci_broker_ui/) is complete, frozen, and consumed as a read-only staging input by the zipapp build, then materialized verbatim at boot; any UI defect surfaced through the packaged path is a lead-dispatched exception.
+frameworks: [html, css, vanilla-js]
+constraints: ["stays inactive for the whole milestone; coreci_broker_ui/** is a read-only build input owned by no persona"]
+territory: []
+subagent_type: frontend-engineer
+---
+
 ---
 name: data-engineer
 domain: data
 active: false
-reason: Deactivated — no database tier exists beyond sqlite3 embedded in the single file; the spec §5.2 schema and all SQL live inside coreci_broker.py and are owned by backend-engineer; no pipelines, ETL, or migrations in v0.1 scope.
+phase_specific: false
+reason: Deactivated (carried from v0.1) — no database tier beyond sqlite3 embedded in the frozen broker; no schema, pipeline, ETL, or migration work in v0.2. Image layers and release assets are build outputs owned by release-engineer, not data surfaces.
 frameworks: [sqlite3]
-constraints: ["stays inactive for the whole milestone; any residual data work folds into backend-engineer"]
+constraints: ["stays inactive for the whole milestone; any residual data work folds into release-engineer or a lead-dispatched broker fix"]
 territory: []
 subagent_type: backend-engineer
 ---

.ciagent/PLAN.md

@@ -1,158 +1,101 @@
 ---
 must_haves:
-  - "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests passes (all phases, cumulative)"
-  - "coreci_broker.py single file, line count < 800 (AC14)"
-  - "python3 -m py_compile coreci_broker.py coreci_broker_client.py"
-  - "broker boots standalone on an ephemeral port; DB + audit log created mode 0600; admin pass printed exactly once"
-  - "all AC1-AC14 acceptance criteria green by end of P5"
+  - "python3 -m unittest discover -s tests passes (cumulative — the v0.1 suite plus the v0.2 test files: test_build_cli, test_cli_packaging, test_release_upload, test_publish_image, test_dockerfile_consistency, test_acceptance_v02)"
+  - "python3 -m py_compile cli/__main__.py scripts/build_cli.py scripts/release.py scripts/publish_image.py scripts/_env_secrets.py"
+  - "broker line count unchanged: coreci_broker.py stays at its v0.1.5 count of 1390 lines (AC14, D-016..D-018 cap 1400) — zero broker edits"
+  - "two consecutive builds via scripts/build_cli.py produce byte-identical artifacts (sha256 equal) — same-environment scope (G-009)"
+  - "the built .pyz boots with v0.1 acceptance parity (admin pass printed exactly once, broker.db + broker.audit.log 0600, UI + client served, silent second boot)"
+  - "stub-registry publish roundtrip green (scripts/publish_image.py vs a local stub, including a relative-Location 307 case, G-019) and stub release upload green (scripts/release.py vs a local stub)"
 ---
 
-# PLAN — CoreCI Broker (Milestone v0.1)
+# PLAN — CoreCI Broker (Milestone v0.2 — cli-packaging)
 
-Execution conventions: sequential waves (within a wave, tasks run in listed order); each task = one subagent commit `feat(P##): …` carrying a `---ci---` block (phase, milestone: v0.1, status: execute, persona, task, requirements.covered). Tests ship with their task — never deferred. Personas per PERSONAS.md: backend-engineer (all phases), frontend-engineer (P2 only), security-engineer (P3+P5, review-only — findings route via lead-developer, never direct edits), lead-developer (coordination, no code writes). Verify commands: `python3 -m py_compile <files>`; `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests`; AC14 line-count via test. Test harness: in-process `ThreadingHTTPServer` on an ephemeral port + `tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()` state, driven with stdlib `urllib` (RESEARCH §6).
+Execution conventions: sequential waves (within a wave, tasks run in listed order); each task = one subagent commit `feat(P##): …` carrying a `---ci---` block (phase, milestone: v0.2, status: execute, persona, task, requirements.covered). Tests ship with their task — never deferred. Personas per PERSONAS.md: release-engineer (ALL v0.2 code — `cli/**`, `scripts/**`, the new test files, `Dockerfile`, `.dockerignore`, additive README, `.gitignore`), security-engineer (P3 only, review-only — findings route via lead-developer, never direct edits), lead-developer (coordination + ship steps, no code writes; sole gate for frozen-broker exceptions). The broker is FROZEN this milestone (1390/1400, REQ-17/AC14): no task edits `coreci_broker.py`, `coreci_broker_ui/`, `coreci_broker_client.py`, or `reference_tools/` — a P0 defect there is a lead-developer-dispatched exception only. Verify commands: `python3 -m py_compile <files>`; `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests`; broker zero-delta via the AC14 line-count test. Test harness (v0.1 §6 conventions extended, RESEARCH §4.3): `ThreadingHTTPServer` stubs on `("127.0.0.1", 0)` + `tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()` state + subprocess boots of the built artifact driven with stdlib `urllib`; scripts take base URLs as parameters (stub-testable); NEVER live-forge writes in tests (the only live-forge contact is the G-013 smoke gate + the ships themselves). Secrets resolve only via `scripts/_env_secrets.py` reading `.env`/`.env.secrets`/`.env.*` files — never shell env (`GITEA_TOKEN` is in `blocked_env_vars`); non-empty asserted before the first API call. `dist/` + `*.pyz` are gitignored — build artifacts are never committed. Release attach + image publish failures follow bounded retry (3) → `release_pending` escalation — never blocking tag+merge. Ships: phase 0 → `v0.2.0`, P1 → `v0.2.1`, P2 → `v0.2.2`, P3 → `v0.2.3` (final phase patch = milestone release, D-008 convention). **G-021: the `v0.2.0` phase-0 release carries NO `.pyz` and its notes must not promise one — D-020 starts at `v0.2.1`.** Release-tooling split (G-011): the sanctioned secrets loader + release attacher land in P1 (Wave 3) so every release from `v0.2.1` is script-attached; P2 owns the image publish client + Dockerfile.
 
 ## User-Facing Surface
 
-- **CEO admin UI** — server-rendered from `coreci_broker_ui/`, same port as the API, persistent nav with Logout: `/ui/login` (the CEO's bookmark), `/ui/app_registrations` (table + add-modal + revoke/reinstate), `/ui/user_allowlist` (same, optional email), `/ui/audit` (filterable, read-only, no export), `/ui/dashboard`.
-- **Tool-side client module** — `coreci_broker_client.py`: `ensure_registered()`, `get_state()`, `put_state()`, `read_secret()`; stdlib-urllib-only, importable with zero dependencies in any OWUI tool env; fetched unauthenticated at `/static/coreci_broker_client.py`.
-- **Standalone CLI** — `python3 coreci_broker.py`: binds `127.0.0.1:8765`; first boot prints the generated admin pass exactly once.
-- **OWUI Tools mount** — `Tools` class (same file): daemon-thread server behind a once-per-process guard, `self.valves`, `_`-prefixed helpers.
+- **Downloadable CLI artifact** — `coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz` on the gitea release page (every release from `v0.2.1`, D-020), alongside the existing source archive; its sha256 recorded in the release notes (computed by `scripts/release.py` from the artifact file — G-017).
+- **CLI boot** — `python3 coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz` or `./coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz` after `chmod +x` (shebang `#!/usr/bin/env python3`); boots the standalone broker — full admin UI at `/ui/`, client module at `/static/coreci_broker_client.py`, bound address per `BROKER_BIND` (default `127.0.0.1:8765`).
+- **`--version`** — prints the release version, exits 0.
+- **Docker image** — `docker pull git.coreci.dev/coreci/broker:<tag>` (+ `latest`); `docker run` with a volume for state.
+- **Release notes** — on the release page: milestone summary, phases, verification, CLI install + usage, docker usage.
+- The v0.1 surface (four-page UI + dashboard, client module, audit) unchanged — served through the packaged path.
 
 ## Happy Path
 
-1. First boot in a fresh directory: broker writes `.env` (32-byte base64 pepper + 32+-char admin pass), prints the pass to the startup log exactly once (AC1); a second boot prints nothing.
-2. CEO opens the `/ui/login` bookmark, logs in with the printed pass (session cookie `broker_session`), lands on the dashboard.
-3. CEO adds the tool's app UUID on `/ui/app_registrations` and the user_id on `/ui/user_allowlist`; each page reflects the persisted row right after the action (AC2/AC3); audit gets `add_app`/`add_user`.
-4. Tool author fetches `/static/coreci_broker_client.py` (unauthenticated) into the OWUI workspace and imports it — no third-party deps.
-5. Tool calls `ensure_registered()`: broker gates on the allowlists, derives the token server-side, returns `{token, token_expires_at, pepper}` (row-create); the client persists via `PUT /agents/<id>/state`.
-6. Tool reads `coreci/proxmox` with `Authorization: App <UUID> <token>` → 200 secret payload (AC5); audit line `read`/`ok`.
-7. Same tool requests `coreci/gitea` → scope mismatch → 403 (AC6); audit `read`/`denied`.
-8. Token expires (`BROKER_TOKEN_TTL`): next call → 401 (AC10) → client re-registers → new token → retry succeeds; audit `register`.
-9. CEO reviews `/ui/audit`: login/logout (AC9), allowlist adds, registers, reads ok/denied — every step audited.
+1. Owner downloads `coreci-broker-v0.2.3.pyz` from the `v0.2.3` release → `python3 coreci-broker-v0.2.3.pyz` (or `chmod +x` + `./…`) → first boot generates `.env` and prints the admin pass exactly once; `broker.db` + `broker.audit.log` created mode 0600 in the state dir → UI at the bound address (`/ui/login` bookmark works).
+2. Second boot: silent — pass never re-printed; state persists.
+3. Tool authors fetch `coreci_broker_client.py` from `/static/coreci_broker_client.py` exactly as in v0.1 — the packaged artifact is the only input.
+4. `--version` reports the release version without booting.
+5. Separately: `docker pull git.coreci.dev/coreci/broker:v0.2.3` → `docker run -p 8765:8765 -v broker-state:/state …` → identical first-boot/0600/UI behavior inside the container, state on the volume.
 
 ## UX Acceptance Criteria
 
-- **AC1** — first boot prints the admin pass exactly once; the CEO logs in at `/ui/login` with it; second boot prints nothing.
-- **AC2/AC3** — app registrations and user-allowlist entries are added and removed via the UI; the page reflects persisted state after every action (no stale views).
-- **AC9** — every login and logout writes an audit line (`login`/`logout`).
-- **UI** — server-rendered static HTML/CSS/JS from `coreci_broker_ui/` on the same port: no build step, no framework, no npm.
-- **Audit page** — read-only with filters; NO export button or download control of any kind.
-- **Client module** — `coreci_broker_client.py` imports cleanly with zero deps (stdlib urllib only) in any OWUI tool env; contains no secrets.
+- **Self-contained artifact** — the `.pyz` bundles broker + UI pages + client module; only runtime state lives outside it (`.env`, `broker.db`, `broker.audit.log`, materialized assets under `<state>/.coreci_broker_assets/`); one file serves the full admin UI at `/ui/` and the client at `/static/`.
+- **`--version`** — prints the release version (from the build-time `_cli_version.py`), exits 0, no broker import on that path.
+- **First-boot parity** — behavior through the packaged artifact is byte-exact with v0.1 standalone: admin pass printed exactly once, `broker.db` + `broker.audit.log` mode 0600, UI + client served, second boot silent.
+- **Per-release artifact** — every release from `v0.2.1` (D-020) carries `coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz` + release notes (CLI install/usage + sha256, docker usage); attachment failure escalates `release_pending`, never blocks tag+merge. `v0.2.0` carries none (G-021).
+- **Image published once per milestone** — at the final ship: `git.coreci.dev/coreci/broker:v0.2.3` + `latest` (D-021); publish failure escalates per the same contract with the G-020 closure runbook, never blocking the milestone merge.
 
-## Phase 1 — Core Skeleton
+## Phase 1 — CLI Packaging + Release Tooling
 
-Branch `phase/01-core-skeleton` → tag `v0.1.1`. Requirements: REQ-03, REQ-11, REQ-14, REQ-15, REQ-17, REQ-18.
-Exit: broker boots standalone on an ephemeral port; `broker.db` + `broker.audit.log` created mode 0600; admin pass printed exactly once (silent second boot); §6 token derivation byte-exact; source < 800 lines.
+Branch `phase/01-cli-packaging` → tag `v0.2.1`. Requirements: REQ-21, REQ-22.
+Exit: artifact builds reproducibly from a clean checkout (two consecutive same-environment builds → byte-identical sha256); the built `.pyz` boots with v0.1 acceptance parity (pass printed once, 0600 state files, UI + client served from materialized assets, silent second boot); `--version` wired; release-asset automation stub-verified; REQ-21 + REQ-22 consolidated green; the `v0.2.1` release carries the `.pyz` attached by `scripts/release.py`.
 
-### Wave 1 — persistence layer (independent)
+### Wave 1 — build pipeline + boot shim
 
-- **P1-01** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/test_config.py` · `.env` reader/writer at `BROKER_ENV_PATH` (spec §5.1 contract + documented additions); first-boot generation of `BROKER_INSTANCE_PEPPER` (32 random bytes, base64, synced to SQLite when the store boots — sync lands with P1-02's schema) and `BROKER_ADMIN_PASS` (32+ random chars), written to `.env`, printed to the startup log exactly once — never again · REQ-14 · test: first boot writes `.env` + prints pass once; second boot silent; `BROKER_*` overrides honored.
-- **P1-02** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/test_store.py` · SQLite schema per spec §5.2 (`broker_config`, `app_registrations`, `user_allowlist`, `agent_registrations`, `admin_sessions` + indexes); DB created mode 0600 via `os.open(..., 0o600)` (umask-independent); sole writer of `broker.db`, all SQL in-file · REQ-15 · test: boot creates `broker.db` at 0600 with all tables + indexes.
-- **P1-03** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/test_audit.py` · append-only JSONL audit writer at `BROKER_AUDIT_LOG_PATH`: one JSON object per line, fields `ts, user_id, app_registration_uuid, agent_id, action, path, result` (admin actions carry null user_id/uuid); mode 0600; flush + fsync per write; no rotation (D-007) · REQ-11 · test: each write appends one valid JSON line at mode 0600; all action verbs accepted.
+- **P1-01** · release-engineer · `scripts/build_cli.py`, `cli/__main__.py`, `.gitignore`, `tests/test_build_cli.py` · build pipeline + boot shim (RESEARCH §1.2/§1.3; G-009/G-018): `build_cli.py <version>` stages an explicit allowlist tree — `coreci_broker.py`, `coreci_broker_client.py`, `coreci_broker_ui/**`, `cli/__main__.py`, generated `_cli_version.py` (`VERSION = "<tag>"`) — then `python3 -m zipapp <staging> -o dist/coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz --python "/usr/bin/env python3" --compress` (zipapp defaults to ZIP_STORED — `--compress` mandatory), then a normalize post-pass making same-environment rebuilds byte-identical (G-009: zip entries sorted by name, `date_time=(1980,1,1,0,0,0)`, `ZIP_DEFLATED`, **`external_attr` SET to constants** — files `0o100644 << 16`, dirs `0o40755 << 16` — never preserved/umask-derived; shebang re-prepended + exec bit), and prints the artifact sha256 (digest-in-notes default; no sidecar asset); `cli/__main__.py` = the five-step shim: (1) `--version` first — print `_cli_version.VERSION`, exit 0, no broker import; (2) state-dir resolution identical to the broker (`BROKER_ENV_PATH`-anchored, relative paths stay CWD-relative — zero path changes); (3) materialize assets from `zipfile.ZipFile(sys.path[0])` → `<state>/.coreci_broker_assets/<VERSION>/{ui,static}` (temp + `os.replace`, versioned dirs, same-version overwrite self-repair, no cleanup); (4) override precedence user-wins — `BROKER_UI_ROOT`/`BROKER_STATIC_ROOT` set only when absent from process env AND the user `.env` (parsed via `coreci_broker._parse_env_file`); (5) handoff `coreci_broker.run_standalone()`; an `os.path.isdir(sys.path[0])` guard falls back to repo-relative roots when run unzipped (zipapp-only is the documented mode); the shim header documents its private-API coupling to the broker (`_parse_env_file`, `run_standalone` — G-018: loud `ImportError` breakage accepted and tracked in P3-02); `.gitignore` += `dist/`, `*.pyz`; broker sources are read-only staging inputs — zero broker lines · REQ-21 · test: `test_build_cli.py` — two consecutive same-environment builds → byte-identical sha256; `_cli_version.VERSION` embedded; archive enumerates exactly the staging allowlist (broker + client + UI pages + shim); constant `external_attr` asserted (no umask bleed); `py_compile` of the shim green; built artifact `--version` prints the version, exits 0.
 
-### Wave 2 — crypto primitives
+### Wave 2 — packaged boot acceptance
 
-- **P1-04** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/test_hasher.py` · dual-mode hasher (D-001): bcrypt when importable, else stdlib `hashlib.scrypt`; stored hashes format-prefixed (`$2b$…` / `scrypt$…`); verification format-aware · REQ-03 · test: scrypt hash/verify roundtrip + prefix dispatch on both formats (bcrypt path via format contract — no bcrypt locally).
-- **P1-05** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/test_token.py` · token engine: `base64(sha256(pepper:UUID:user_id:agent_id:','.join(sorted(tags))))` — 44-char ASCII, no prefix; pure function of (pepper, inputs); never stores plaintext tokens · REQ-03 · test: derivation matches the §6 formula byte-for-byte; 44-char assertion; tag order normalized.
+- **P1-02** · release-engineer · `tests/test_cli_packaging.py` · end-to-end boot acceptance through the built artifact (RESEARCH §4.3 pattern; G-010 harness hardening; consolidates REQ-21): build into a `TemporaryDirectory` → `Popen([sys.executable, "<pyz>"], env={"BROKER_BIND": "127.0.0.1:0", BROKER_ENV_PATH/DB/AUDIT/CREDS_FILE/CREDS_SOURCE: tmp paths})` → parse the `coreci-broker listening on http://…` line for the ephemeral base URL under an explicit deadline loop; first boot prints `BROKER_ADMIN_PASS=` exactly once (stdout fully drained after `terminate()` before the second-boot assertion); `.env` + `broker.db` + `broker.audit.log` created mode 0600 in the state dir (independent of CWD); `/healthz` 200, `/ui/login` + `/ui/dashboard` 200 from materialized assets, `/static/coreci_broker_client.py` byte-exact; admin login + agent register + state + secret-read reuse the v0.1 acceptance request patterns (v0.1 parity through the packaged path); second boot silent (pass never re-printed); `--version` exits 0 with the version string; materialized assets verified under `<state>/.coreci_broker_assets/<VERSION>/`; user override honored (`.env`-set `BROKER_UI_ROOT` wins over the shim default); plus one un-overridden default-anchoring boot (state in CWD of a temp dir — the owner's literal happy path, G-010) · REQ-21 · test: is the acceptance file.
 
-### Wave 3 — transport + mounts (listed in dependency order)
+### Wave 3 — release-asset automation (G-011: lands in P1)
 
-- **P1-06** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/test_router.py` · stdlib `ThreadingHTTPServer` + JSON router: body/param parsing, `{"error, message}` contract on 400/401/403/404/409/500, static-file serving hook for `/ui/` + `/static/` (fixed root, traversal-rejecting); no business logic in the router · REQ-18 · test: ephemeral-port boot; every error code returns the contract shape; static hook serves a fixture.
-- **P1-07** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/test_mounts.py` · OWUI `Tools` mount: `__init__` starts the daemon-thread server behind a once-per-process guard (no activate() hook exists — RESEARCH §4), `self.valves = self.Valves()`, `_`-prefixed helpers, paths resolved from env never `__file__`; standalone `__main__` entry · REQ-18 · test: `Tools()` double-instantiation starts exactly one server; standalone boot serves a 200.
+- **P1-03** · release-engineer · `scripts/_env_secrets.py`, `scripts/release.py`, `tests/test_release_upload.py` · sanctioned secrets loader + release attacher (REQ-22; RESEARCH §2): `_env_secrets.py` parses `.env`/`.env.secrets`/`.env.*` from the repo root + `.ciagent/` (mirroring the broker's `_parse_env_file` semantics, quote-stripping) — `GITEA_TOKEN` resolves ONLY from these files, never `os.environ` (structurally blocked by `blocked_env_vars`), asserted non-empty before the first API call (v1.8 lesson: empty token → gitea 404, masking auth failure); `release.py <tag> <artifact>` (gitea base URL + owner/repo parameterized): **computes the artifact sha256 from the file itself — never an argument, never hand-pasted (G-017)** → builds the notes body per the RESEARCH §2.3 model (milestone summary, phases, verification, CLI install + usage with the artifact sha256, docker usage) → create-or-get by tag (`GET /api/v1/repos/{o}/{r}/releases/tags/{tag}`; 404 → `POST .../releases` with the notes body) → idempotent attach (`GET .../releases/{id}/assets` — same name + size → success, no duplicate on bounded-retry re-runs) → `POST .../releases/{id}/assets` multipart (field name `attachment`, `?name=coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz`, `Authorization: token <T>`) → bounded retry (3 attempts, backoff) → exhaustion exits non-zero with a machine-readable marker for the `release_pending` escalation; never blocks tag+merge · REQ-22 · test: `test_release_upload.py` — `_StubGiteaHandler` on `("127.0.0.1", 0)` (v0.1 `_StubOwuiHandler` precedent, fake token, no live-forge writes): create-or-get in both orders (release exists / 404 → create), multipart parsed (field name + `?name=` + body bytes asserted), sha256-from-file asserted (passing a wrong digest argument is ignored/refused), idempotent re-attach uploads nothing twice, 500×3 → the `release_pending` marker, token discipline (file-only resolution + non-empty assert before the first call), notes sections present.
 
-### Wave 4 — phase acceptance
+### Wave 4 — phase ship
 
-- **P1-08** · backend-engineer · `tests/test_acceptance_p1.py` · AC14 line-count test (`coreci_broker.py` < 800 lines, wc-style, no comment stripping) + boot acceptance: 0600 on DB + audit log, admin pass printed exactly once (silent second boot), restart persistence of DB rows + audit history · REQ-17, REQ-16 (per REQUIREMENTS traceability), REQ-15 · test: is the acceptance file.
+- **P1-04** · lead-developer · no code writes (the release-engineer's built artifact + scripts are consumed read-only) · phase ship: tag `v0.2.1` → squash-merge `phase/01-cli-packaging` → `milestone/v0.2-cli-packaging` → push tag + branch → gitea release via `scripts/release.py` (D-020 starts here: `coreci-broker-v0.2.1.pyz` + its sha256 in the notes, attached by the repo script — no ad-hoc bridge, G-011) · REQ-21, REQ-22 (ship) · verify: `v0.2.1` tag + release on the forge with the `.pyz` attached; attachment failure → bounded retry (3) → `release_pending` escalation, never blocking tag+merge.
 
-## Phase 2 — Admin Plane
+## Phase 2 — Docker + Image Publish
 
-Branch `phase/02-admin-plane` → tag `v0.1.2`. Requirements: REQ-01, REQ-05, REQ-06, REQ-12, REQ-13.
-Exit: AC1/AC2/AC3/AC9 green; admin-usable (login → manage allowlists → query audit, all via UI).
+Branch `phase/02-docker-release-integration` → tag `v0.2.2`. Requirements: REQ-23 (+ REQ-21/REQ-22 docs refinement).
+Exit: daemonless publish client stub-verified end-to-end (no live-forge writes, no container runtime); Dockerfile + .dockerignore + README document the docker-user path and stay consistency-tested against the daemonless image; the `v0.2.2` release carries the `.pyz` attached by `scripts/release.py` with CLI + docker notes.
 
-### Wave 1 — admin auth
+### Wave 1 — daemonless OCI publish client
 
-- **P2-01** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/test_admin_auth.py` · `POST /api/broker/auth/login|logout|whoami`: verifies `BROKER_ADMIN_USER`/`BROKER_ADMIN_PASS`, creates `admin_sessions` row (TTL `BROKER_SESSION_TTL`, default 300s); cookie `broker_session` HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax (D-013); HTTP Basic accepted on all admin API endpoints; lazy expiry + boot cleanup of stale sessions · REQ-01, REQ-11 · test: login sets cookie; wrong pass → 401; expired session → 401; logout invalidates + audits (AC9 `login`/`logout` lines).
+- **P2-01** · release-engineer · `scripts/publish_image.py`, `tests/test_publish_image.py` · daemonless OCI publish client (D-019, G-014: one vertical task; all endpoints parameterized; G-019 wire hardening): pull — anonymous Docker Hub token (`auth.docker.io/token`, scope `repository:library/python:pull`) → `python:3.11-slim` manifest (D-022) with the full Accept set → branch on `"manifests"` vs `"layers"` (index → resolve the `linux/amd64` child manifest by digest) → fetch child + config + 4 layer blobs; record resolved digests (`--base-manifest` override for exact re-publishes); auth — gitea `GET /v2/token?service=container_registry&scope=repository:coreci/broker:pull,push` with `Authorization: Basic <user>:<GITEA_TOKEN>` (token via `_env_secrets`; username ignored by the forge) — insist on Basic credentials present + issued JWT non-empty (the endpoint answers 200 anonymously with an empty-scope JWT — fail loudly, never treat 200 as authorization); push — **per-request timeouts (~120s on blob POSTs, G-019)** + **blob-level retry with HEAD-skip** (HEAD each blob first: 200 → skip; base layers ~45.7 MB re-upload once per milestone, retries resume cheap) → monolithic `POST /v2/coreci/broker/blobs/uploads/?digest=sha256:<hex>` (fallback: two-step POST → 202 `Location` → PUT) with explicit Location-following on 307/308 (stdlib urllib does NOT follow method-preserving redirects on PUT/POST — verified; **the stub test covers a relative `Location` at least once, G-019**) → deterministic broker layer (tar entries sorted, fixed TarInfo metadata uid/gid 0, `gzip.compress(..., mtime=0, compresslevel=9)`) carrying `/app/coreci-broker.pyz`; config copied from the base + diff_id appended + `Entrypoint ["python3", "/app/coreci-broker.pyz"]`, `Cmd []`, `WorkingDir /state`, optional version Label, serialized `json.dumps(sort_keys=True, separators=(",",":"))`; manifest PUT with OCI media types end-to-end (manifest `application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json`, config `…image.config.v1+json`, layers `…image.layer.v1.tar+gzip`; base layer descriptors reused verbatim; never push an index) under `<version>` then `latest` (D-021); provenance digests recorded for the release notes · REQ-23 · test: `test_publish_image.py` — `_StubRegistryHandler` on `("127.0.0.1", 0)` (fake token via temp `.env` files): anonymous-token trap (200 with empty-scope JWT → loud failure), HEAD-skip on retry, monolithic upload with 307 → relative `Location` followed explicitly, manifest PUT with correct media types + tag sequence (version then `latest`), deterministic layer/config digests stable across two runs (gzip mtime=0), base manifest/layer handling against a fixture index, timeout wiring (a stalled endpoint → client aborts, does not hang).
 
-### Wave 2 — admin API
+### Wave 2 — Dockerfile + .dockerignore + docs
 
-- **P2-02** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/test_apps.py` · app_registrations CRUD: `GET/POST /api/broker/app_registrations`, `DELETE .../<uuid>` (marks revoked — new registrations rejected, existing tokens honored until TTL), `POST .../reinstate`; UUID format validation → 400; duplicate → 409; audited `add_app`/`remove_app` · REQ-05 · test: add/list/revoke/reinstate matrix + 400/409 + revoke-keeps-tokens + audit lines.
-- **P2-03** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/test_allowlist.py` · user_allowlist CRUD: same shape (`GET/POST`, `DELETE .../<user_id>` revoked semantics, `POST .../reinstate`), optional `email`, duplicate → 409; audited `add_user`/`remove_user` · REQ-06 · test: add/remove/reinstate + 409 + audit lines.
-- **P2-04** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/test_audit_query.py` · admin-only `GET /api/broker/audit`: filters `since`, `until`, `user_id`, `app_registration_uuid`, `action`; `limit` default 100 / max 1000; `next_since` cursor; streams the file line-by-line · REQ-12 · test: seeded audit file → filter combos, limit clamp, cursor pagination.
+- **P2-02** · release-engineer · `Dockerfile`, `.dockerignore`, `README.md` (additive section only — no v0.1 content rewrites), `tests/test_dockerfile_consistency.py` · docker-user path + usage docs (G-015/G-016): `Dockerfile` self-contained (no pre-built artifact in the build context): `FROM python:3.11-slim` → `COPY coreci_broker.py coreci_broker_client.py coreci_broker_ui/ cli/ /app/src/` → `ARG VERSION` → generated `_cli_version.py` from the build arg → `RUN python3 -m zipapp /app/src -o /app/coreci-broker.pyz --python "/usr/bin/env python3" --compress` → `WORKDIR /state` → `ENTRYPOINT ["python3", "/app/coreci-broker.pyz"]` → `EXPOSE 8765`; header documents the equivalence mapping to the daemonless-published image (same base family, entrypoint, pyz content, `/state` anchoring; differences: docker-build layering vs verbatim base layers + one broker layer, build-arg vs build-time version provenance; the daemonless client is the source of truth, byte-identity not required — RESEARCH §3.5); `.dockerignore` (G-015): `.git`, `.env`, `.env.*`, `data/`, `*.db`, `dist/`, `__pycache__/`, `tests/`, `.ciagent/` — no secrets, state, or build artifacts can enter an image build context; README additive section: CLI install + usage (release-page download, `chmod +x` / `python3`, `--version`, env-contract pointer, first-boot pass discipline, `BROKER_ENV_PATH` state anchoring, Python 3.11+ note) + docker usage (`docker pull git.coreci.dev/coreci/broker:<tag>` + `latest`; `docker run -p 8765:8765 -v broker-state:/state …`; state-on-volume contract) · REQ-23, REQ-21/REQ-22 (docs) · test: `test_dockerfile_consistency.py` (G-016 — equivalence made testable): Dockerfile COPY set == `build_cli.py` staging allowlist; zipapp flags identical (`--python`/`--compress`); `ARG VERSION` → `_cli_version` format parity; `ENTRYPOINT`/`WORKDIR` == the daemonless-published config values; `.dockerignore` excludes every forbidden context entry.
 
-### Wave 3 — admin UI (frontend-engineer; pages refresh via the admin API after each action; no direct DB/file access)
+### Wave 3 — phase ship
 
-- **P2-05** · frontend-engineer · `coreci_broker_ui/` (login page, dashboard, shared nav/CSS) · `/ui/login` (the CEO's bookmark) + `/ui/dashboard`; persistent nav header with Logout on every page · REQ-13, REQ-01 · verify: pages served 200 on the API port, post-login redirect to dashboard; full AC drive lands in P2-08.
-- **P2-06** · frontend-engineer · `coreci_broker_ui/` (app_registrations + user_allowlist pages) · table + add-modal + revoke/reinstate per row on both pages; after each action the page re-fetches via the corresponding API and reflects persisted state · REQ-13, REQ-05, REQ-06 · verify: AC2/AC3 flows (tests in P2-08); interim smoke — pages boot + served.
-- **P2-07** · frontend-engineer · `coreci_broker_ui/` (audit page) · filterable audit view (since/until/user_id/uuid/action) wired to `GET /api/broker/audit`; strictly read-only — no export button or control of any kind · REQ-13, REQ-12 · verify: page renders query results; no export element in the markup.
+- **P2-03** · lead-developer · no code writes · phase ship: tag `v0.2.2` → squash-merge `phase/02-docker-release-integration` → `milestone/v0.2-cli-packaging` → push tag + branch → release via `scripts/release.py` (notes per the §2.3 model now including docker usage, `coreci-broker-v0.2.2.pyz` + sha256 attached alongside the source archive) · REQ-23 (phase completion) · verify: `v0.2.2` tag + release on the forge with the `.pyz` + notes; attachment failure → bounded retry → `release_pending`, never blocks tag+merge.
 
-### Wave 4 — phase acceptance
+## Phase 3 — Final Review + Ship
 
-- **P2-08** · backend-engineer · `tests/test_acceptance_p2.py` · AC1 (first-boot login at `/ui/login` with the printed pass), AC2/AC3 (add + remove app/user through the UI; `app_registrations`/`user_allowlist` persist; page reflects state after each action), AC9 (login/logout audit lines) · REQ-01, REQ-05, REQ-06, REQ-12, REQ-13 · test: is the acceptance file.
+Branch `phase/03-final-review-ship` → tag `v0.2.3` (final phase patch = milestone release, D-008 convention). Requirements: REQ-21, REQ-22, REQ-23 (acceptance).
+Exit: cumulative v0.1 + v0.2 acceptance green; broker zero-delta verified (1390/1400, AC14); security review PASS (or findings remediated); `v0.2.3` on `main` with the `.pyz` attached + full notes; image published as a gitea package (or escalated per the bounded-retry contract + G-020 closure runbook — never blocking merge); REQUIREMENTS/ROADMAP closed out; checkpoint cleared.
 
-## Phase 3 — Tool Auth Plane
+### Wave 1 — acceptance consolidation
 
-Branch `phase/03-tool-auth-plane` → tag `v0.1.3`. Requirements: REQ-02, REQ-04, REQ-09, REQ-10.
-Exit: AC4/AC7/AC8/AC10/AC12 green; tool-auth usable (register → App-auth calls → state persistence).
-
-### Wave 1 — registration
-
-- **P3-01** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/test_register.py` · `POST /api/broker/agents/register` with `{agent_id, app_registration_uuid, user_id, tags}`: allowlist gates → 403 unknown/revoked UUID or user; malformed → 400; idempotent re-derive (D-005) — overwrite stored hash on input change, same derived token when unexpired + unchanged; TTL from `BROKER_TOKEN_TTL` (default 86400, D-007); pepper returned on row-create or tokenless register (KB-loss recovery); audited `register` · REQ-02, REQ-03 · test: gate matrix (AC7/AC8), idempotency/overwrite/same-token, pepper rule, 400s.
-
-### Wave 2 — App-auth + agent surface (listed in dependency order)
-
-- **P3-02** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/test_app_auth.py` · App-auth verification (D-004): parse `Authorization: App <UUID> <token>`; UUID-scoped slow-hash scan over that tool's rows; in-memory verified-token cache populated on first success, never authoritative — every hit re-checks row status + expiry; 401 missing/malformed/failed · REQ-04 · test: cache-miss scan + cache-hit re-check (revoke + expiry), both hash formats, 401 matrix; revoked-app token honored until TTL.
-- **P3-03** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/test_agent_meta.py` · `GET /api/broker/agents/<agent_id>` (D-015): App-auth + identity match; metadata-only response (no token, no hash) · REQ-04, REQ-02 · test: correct-identity 200 with metadata-only payload; identity mismatch → 403; no token material in response.
-- **P3-04** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/test_state.py` · `GET/PUT /api/broker/agents/<agent_id>/state` (App-auth): broker enforces calling UUID + token-derived user_id match the stored identity; 404 when no state exists; state schema per spec §8 (agent_id, app_registration_uuid, user_id, tags, pepper, current_token, token_expires_at, first_registered_at, last_seen_at); backend toggle `BROKER_AGENT_STATE_BACKEND=internal` (default, rows in `broker.db`) `| owui` (thin OWUI-API adapter, stub-verified) (D-003) · REQ-09, REQ-10 · test: state roundtrip + identity enforcement + 404; owui backend against a stub server.
-
-### Wave 3 — phase acceptance
-
-- **P3-05** · backend-engineer · `tests/test_acceptance_p3.py` · AC4 (broker- and tool-side derivation byte-identical; stored as slow-hash), AC7 (revoked/unknown UUID → 403), AC8 (unknown user → 403), AC10 (TTL expiry → 401 → re-register → new token, audited), AC12 (state read/write with identity enforcement) · REQ-02, REQ-04, REQ-09, REQ-10 · test: is the acceptance file.
-
-### Wave 4 — security review (review-only)
-
-- **P3-06** · security-engineer · review of `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/**` (no edits — findings STRIDE-classified, CWE-cited, routed via lead-developer) · tool-auth security pass: register gates, UUID-scoped scan + cache authority, identity enforcement, TTL/expiry handling, audit completeness · REQ-02, REQ-04, REQ-09 · verify: findings recorded in the task commit's `---ci---` block; remediation (if any) = follow-up backend commit dispatched by lead-developer.
-
-## Phase 4 — Secrets + Client Ecosystem
-
-Branch `phase/04-secrets-client-ecosystem` → tag `v0.1.4`. Requirements: REQ-07, REQ-08, REQ-19, REQ-20.
-Exit: AC5/AC6 green; full product — client module fetched from `/static/` drives a reference tool end-to-end against the test broker.
-
-### Wave 1 — secrets plane (listed in dependency order)
-
-- **P4-01** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/test_creds_source.py` · creds-source adapter (D-002): `FileCredsSource` default (JSON at `BROKER_CREDS_FILE`, default `data/creds.json` — D-014) + `OwuiApiCredsSource` (`BROKER_OWUI_BASE_URL` + `BROKER_OWUI_API_KEY`; RESEARCH §4 flow: KB lookup → file map → `/api/v1/files/{id}/data/content`); response `{path, data, version, updated_at}` (version synthesized broker-side if absent); broker never writes the KB · REQ-08 · test: file-source hit/miss; owui source against a stub HTTP server.
-- **P4-02** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/test_secrets.py` · `GET /api/broker/secrets/<path>` (App-auth): scope check `path == "coreci/" + agent_id` → 403 mismatch, 404 absent, 401 auth failure; every attempt audited (`read` ok/denied/error); traversal defense — URL-decode BEFORE validation, reject `..`, backslash, NUL, absolute paths (decoded form feeds the scope check) · REQ-07 · test: ok/401/403/404 matrix + URL-encoded traversal attempts rejected + audit per attempt.
-
-### Wave 2 — client ecosystem (listed in dependency order)
-
-- **P4-03** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker_client.py`, `tests/test_client.py`, `coreci_broker.py` (static route) · public client module: stdlib `urllib` only (no httpx, no bcrypt — importable in any OWUI tool env); `ensure_registered()` idempotent; `get_state()`/`put_state()`; `read_secret()` with 401 → re-register → retry-once; `data.get("pepper")` (never assumes the key — RESEARCH §2 defect 3); served unauthenticated at `/static/coreci_broker_client.py` via the P1-06 hook; contains no secrets · REQ-19 · test: zero third-party imports asserted; full flow against the in-process broker; 401→re-register→retry path.
-- **P4-04** · backend-engineer · `reference_tools/`, `tests/test_reference_tools.py` · reference OWUI tools (D-006): (a) proxmox-style §11 flow — first call registers + persists state, subsequent calls read the token from state and fetch `coreci/proxmox`, downstream call defaults to a safe dry-run; (b) minimal auth-first-then-use-a-second-tool showcase · REQ-20 · test: both tools drive the test broker (FileCredsSource); dry-run default asserted; no live infra.
-
-### Wave 3 — phase acceptance
-
-- **P4-05** · backend-engineer · `tests/test_acceptance_p4.py` · AC5 (valid token reads the secret; tampered token → 401), AC6 (proxmox-registered tool reading `coreci/gitea` → 403); end-to-end: fetch client from `/static/` unauthenticated → import → register → state → secret read · REQ-07, REQ-19, REQ-20 · test: is the acceptance file.
-
-## Phase 5 — Final Review + Ship
-
-Branch `phase/05-final-review-ship` → tag `v0.1.5` (final phase patch = milestone release, D-008). Requirements: REQ-01..REQ-20 (acceptance).
-Exit: AC1–AC14 all green; security review PASS; README complete with deviations; owner approval recorded; milestone merged to main, tagged `v0.1.5`, released on gitea.
-
-### Wave 1 — acceptance matrix
-
-- **P5-01** · backend-engineer · `tests/test_acceptance_full.py` · complete §12 matrix: AC1–AC13 as behavioral tests (consolidating the per-phase AC files and completing any remaining §12 criteria — 0600 modes, restart persistence, client-module fetch) + AC14 line-count capstone; cumulative suite green via `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests` · REQ-01..REQ-20 · test: is the acceptance suite.
+- **P3-01** · release-engineer · `tests/test_acceptance_v02.py` · v0.2 acceptance matrix: cumulative suite green via `python3 -m unittest discover -s tests` (all v0.1 files + the v0.2 test files); packaging acceptance consolidated — boot parity through the artifact (first-boot pass printed once, `broker.db` + `broker.audit.log` 0600, UI + client served, silent second boot, register/read flows), reproducibility (two consecutive same-environment builds → identical sha256), self-containment (only runtime state external to the `.pyz`: env/db/audit + materialized assets), stub publish roundtrip + stub release upload green; broker zero-delta — `coreci_broker.py` unchanged at 1390 lines vs `v0.1.5` (AC14 under the D-016..D-018 cap of 1400) · REQ-21, REQ-22, REQ-23 (acceptance) · test: is the acceptance file.
 
 ### Wave 2 — security review (review-only)
 
-- **P5-02** · security-engineer · review of `coreci_broker.py`, `coreci_broker_client.py`, `reference_tools/`, `tests/**` (no edits — STRIDE/CWE findings via lead-developer) · pre-ship security pass: path traversal incl. URL-encoded forms, pepper never re-printed (second boot, re-register), 0600 modes, token scoping + identity enforcement, audit completeness, static-serving roots · REQ-07, REQ-11, REQ-14, REQ-15 (+ all) · verify: PASS or CWE-cited findings; remediation follows in P5-03.
+- **P3-02** · security-engineer · review of `coreci_broker.py` (zero-delta verification only — writable by nobody this milestone), `cli/**`, `scripts/**`, `Dockerfile`, `.dockerignore`, `tests/**` (no edits — findings STRIDE-classified, CWE-cited, routed via lead-developer) · v0.2 security pass: secrets in artifacts (no secrets in the `.pyz` or any image layer; `.env` never inside the archive; pepper/admin pass generated at boot; no state baked into the image; build-context hygiene per `.dockerignore`, G-015), digest determinism (zip normalize pass with constant `external_attr` — G-009; sorted tar + fixed TarInfo; `gzip mtime=0`; sorted-key JSON), token discipline (file-only `_env_secrets` path, non-empty assert before first use, never shell env; gitea's anonymous-200 `/v2/token` quirk fails loudly), 307/308 Location handling incl. relative `Location`, traversal + disclosure over materialized asset roots (dot-dir roots vs request-path dot filtering; protected-paths realpaths wherever the state dir sits), shim private-API coupling tracked (G-018), attachment idempotency + bounded-retry escalation paths · REQ-21, REQ-22, REQ-23 (+ all) · verify: findings recorded in the task commit's `---ci---` block; remediation (if any) = the follow-up release-engineer commit dispatched by lead-developer (P3-03).
 
-### Wave 3 — remediation + docs
+### Wave 3 — remediation
 
-- **P5-03** · backend-engineer · `coreci_broker.py`, `tests/**` · remediate P5-02 findings (no-op skip if PASS) · affected REQs per finding · test: full suite re-green.
-- **P5-04** · backend-engineer · `README.md` · run/deploy notes: standalone + OWUI mount, env/config contract (spec §5.1 + documented additions), first-boot pass discipline, backup guidance (SQLite is the source of truth), client-module bootstrap; documented deviations distilled from D-001..D-015 incl. the spec defects + resolutions (PROJECT.md §Context) · REQ-14, REQ-18 (+ traceability) · test: README covers run/deploy/deviations; suite still green.
+- **P3-03** · release-engineer · `cli/**`, `scripts/**`, `Dockerfile`, `.dockerignore`, `tests/**` (never broker sources — a P0 broker defect routes through lead-developer dispatch only) · remediate P3-02 findings (no-op skip if PASS) · affected REQs per finding · test: full cumulative suite re-green.
 
 ### Wave 4 — review + reconstruction
 
-- **P5-05** · lead-developer · `.ciagent/*.md` review notes (no code writes) · multi-persona review of the milestone diff (backend, frontend P2 artifacts, security sign-offs); audit/reconstruction: every REQ-01..REQ-20 maps to green tests + traceable commits · REQ-01..REQ-20 · verify: sign-offs + reconstruction recorded in `---ci---` blocks.
+- **P3-04** · lead-developer · `.ciagent/*.md` review notes (no code writes) · multi-persona review of the milestone diff (release-engineer artifacts across P1/P2, security sign-off from P3-02/P3-03); audit/reconstruction: every REQ-21..REQ-23 maps to green tests + traceable commits; broker zero-delta verified (1390/1400, AC14); escalation ledger clean or `release_pending` entries documented · REQ-21, REQ-22, REQ-23 · verify: sign-offs + reconstruction recorded in `---ci---` blocks.
 
-### Wave 5 — ship
+### Wave 5 — milestone ship
 
-- **P5-06** · lead-developer · no code writes · owner approval gate recorded; squash-merge `milestone/v0.1-coreci-broker` → `main`; tag `v0.1.5`; first push to gitea `coreci/broker` (public, default branch main — forge repo exists before push, D-010/D-012) + release · REQ-01..REQ-20 · verify: `v0.1.5` on `main`; release visible on the forge.
+- **P3-05** · lead-developer · no code writes (release-engineer scripts invoked, never edited) · milestone ship, in this exact order (G-012: merge→tag→push BEFORE release attach — a pre-merge release create would mint `v0.2.3` at pre-merge main via gitea's target_commitish semantics): build the final `.pyz` (`python3 scripts/build_cli.py v0.2.3`) → squash-merge `milestone/v0.2-cli-packaging` → `main` → tag `v0.2.3` → push main + tag → **G-013 live smoke (env-gated `PUBLISH_SMOKE=1`, read-only, never in the default suite): real gitea `/v2/` auth challenge, token→JWT exchange, `GET` release-by-tag, Docker Hub index resolve — all must pass before the one live publish** → attach to the `v0.2.3` release with full notes (milestone summary, phases, verification, CLI install/usage + sha256, docker usage) via `scripts/release.py` → daemonless image publish ONCE (`python3 scripts/publish_image.py` → `git.coreci.dev/coreci/broker:v0.2.3` + `latest`, D-019/D-021/D-022) → branch cleanup → REQUIREMENTS/ROADMAP closeout → checkpoint cleared. Publish failure: bounded retry (3) → `release_pending` escalation **with the G-020 closure runbook committed alongside** (exact re-run command on `main` @ `v0.2.3`: build + smoke + `publish_image.py`; close condition = both tags visible as a gitea package) — never blocks the merge, never left open · REQ-21, REQ-22, REQ-23 · verify: `v0.2.3` on `main`; the release carries the `.pyz` + full notes; the image is visible as a gitea package (or escalated per contract + runbook, never blocking); closeout + checkpoint-clear commits recorded.

.ciagent/PROJECT.md

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ A single canonical credential flow for autonomous agent tools. The broker mediat
 
 ### Validated
 
-Source: Requirements Specification v0.5 (owner: coreci-coo, 2026-10-09; supersedes v0.4). The full v0.5 spec is distilled into REQ-01..REQ-20 in REQUIREMENTS.md, with acceptance criteria drawn from the spec's §12 list. Clarification decisions D-001..D-011 (recorded in the init commit) plus D-012..D-015 (recorded in the clarify stage) resolve the spec's ambiguities and residual defaults:
+Source: Requirements Specification v0.5 (owner: coreci-coo, 2026-10-09; supersedes v0.4) — distilled into REQ-01..REQ-20 (shipped in v0.1). v0.2 additions validated from owner directives (2026-10-10) — distilled into REQ-21..REQ-23: CLI zipapp packaging, per-release artifact attachment with notes on gitea, once-per-milestone docker publication to the gitea container/package registry. The v0.5 spec's ambiguities were resolved by D-001..D-015 (init + clarify commits, v0.1); v0.2's packaging/distribution ambiguities are resolved as D-019..D-022 (this milestone's clarify stage):
 
 - Dual-mode token hashing (bcrypt when importable, stdlib scrypt fallback; format-prefixed hashes)
 - Pluggable creds-source adapter (file-based default; Open WebUI HTTP API for production)
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ Source: Requirements Specification v0.5 (owner: coreci-coo, 2026-10-09; supersed
 
 ### Active
 
-Milestone v0.1 (`milestone/v0.1-coreci-broker`) implements the entire v0.5 spec: REQ-01..REQ-20. No requirement is deferred.
+Milestone v0.2 (`milestone/v0.2-cli-packaging`) — **CLI + distribution only**, no functional changes to the broker: REQ-21 (zipapp CLI packaging), REQ-22 (release assets attached + notes on gitea), REQ-23 (docker container built once per milestone, published as a gitea package). Owner-locked inputs: zipapp `.pyz` form factor; docker publication starts with v0.2 (no retroactive v0.1 image); scope excludes deferred v2 candidates.
 
 ### Out of Scope
 
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ See REQUIREMENTS.md §Out of Scope — federation, secret versioning, high avail
 
 ## Constraints
 
-- **Single-file broker**: `coreci_broker.py` under 800 lines (excluding tests, UI HTML, client module, reference tools) — spec §12.14
+- **Single-file broker**: `coreci_broker.py` under 1400 lines (amended from 800 via owner decisions D-016..D-018; excluding tests, UI HTML, client module, reference tools) — spec §12.14 as amended
 - **Stdlib-only runtime**: no pip in the target dev environment; bcrypt is the sole optional import (dual-mode hashing); tests use unittest
 - **SQLite is the source of truth**: single instance, no HA; back it up
 - **Bind default** `127.0.0.1:8765`; the bind address controls reachability
@@ -42,10 +42,21 @@ See REQUIREMENTS.md §Out of Scope — federation, secret versioning, high avail
 - **Token form**: `base64(sha256(pepper:UUID:user_id:agent_id:sorted_tags))` — 44-char ASCII, no prefix; `BROKER_TOKEN_TTL` default 86400s
 - **Open WebUI runtime**: bcrypt and httpx exist there; the client module must not depend on either (stdlib urllib) so any tool can import it
 
+v0.2 (packaging/distribution) constraints:
+
+- **No pip / stdlib-only build path**: the CLI artifact is a stdlib `zipapp` (`.pyz`); no wheel, no PyInstaller, no pip at build or runtime (D-009)
+- **No container runtime in the dev environment**: no docker/podman/buildah available — the once-per-milestone publish runs daemonless via a stdlib registry client (D-019)
+- **Self-contained artifact**: one `.pyz` bundles broker + UI assets + client module; asset roots resolved from env, never `__file__`
+- **Broker behavior frozen**: first-boot semantics, API surface, and all v0.1 acceptance criteria remain byte-identical when driven through the packaged CLI
+- **Release secrets discipline**: forge tokens resolved only from `.env*` files via the secrets-loader — never shell environment (v1.8 lesson)
+- **`broker.db`/`broker.audit.log` remain state-directory-local** — the CLI boots in a runtime state dir (docker: a volume), never writes inside its own archive
+
 ## Context
 
 CoreCI estate: sibling projects researchx and nextcraft live on gitea (`git.coreci.dev/coreci/*`) and use this same ciagent pipeline. The broker runs on the Open WebUI host as one workspace tool (embedded HTTP server in a daemon thread; also runnable standalone). The `creds-coreci-coo` KB currently mediates four credentials (`coreci/proxmox`, `coreci/gitea`, `coreci/executor` TBD, plus the COO's own login — independent of the broker's `BROKER_ADMIN_PASS`). The existing `proxmox_readonly_tool.py` is updated post-broker to use the public client module; it lives outside this repo, so this repo ships the reference implementation of the tool-side bootstrap instead.
 
+v0.2 context: milestone v0.1 shipped complete (all REQ-01..REQ-20, `v0.1.5` on main, six gitea releases each carrying a `broker-vX.Y.Z.tar.gz` source archive, zero escalations). Owner directives for v0.2 (2026-10-10): package the broker as a CLI; attach the CLI to every release alongside notes on gitea; build a docker container once per milestone and publish it as a package in the gitea registry. The v0.1 release-attachment mechanism (sanctioned `.env*` token path, per-release asset upload) is the proven base REQ-22 extends.
+
 Known spec defects resolved by clarification (recorded for traceability): §7.5's in-memory `token_hash` index is impossible with bcrypt salted hashes; §6 claims the tool derives a token every call while §9's flow uses the broker-returned token from the agent KB (the broker derives authoritatively; the tool stores); §9's snippet raises `KeyError` on `data["pepper"]` for re-registrations; the pepper chicken-and-egg (a token is needed to read agent state, but the pepper is needed to derive a token) is fixed by returning the pepper when the caller presents no valid token.
 
 ## Key Decisions
@@ -69,4 +80,8 @@ Known spec defects resolved by clarification (recorded for traceability): §7.5'
 | D-015 | `GET /api/broker/agents/<agent_id>`: App-auth + identity match, metadata-only response (no token, no hash) | §7.4 auth/response unspecified; mirrors state-endpoint identity enforcement; token material never leaves the broker | Binding for v0.1 |
 | D-016 | AC14 line cap amended: coreci_broker.py < 1000 lines (was < 800) | Owner-approved §12.14 amendment at P2: 11 lines of headroom vs ~275 lines of remaining handler surface; preserves the readable single-file intent without dense-cramming | Binding for v0.1 |
 | D-017 | D-016 extended: AC14 cap < 1200 lines | Second §12.14 amendment at P3 (owner's D-016 pattern applied with new data): P3-01 lands at 990/1000 with ~150-180 lines of remaining broker surface (App-auth cache, agent state, creds adapter, secrets endpoint); mild compaction reclaims only ~50 — same readability-over-cramming tradeoff the owner chose at D-016; subject to review at the P5 owner approval gate | Binding for v0.1 |
-| D-018 | D-017 extended: AC14 cap < 1400 lines — final projected amendment | Third §12.14 amendment, pre-P4 per the P3 verify planning signal: 1178/1200 after P3 with 21 lines headroom vs P4's ~105-140 line need (creds adapter + secrets endpoint, the LAST broker-surface additions); P5 adds only excluded artifacts (tests, README). Same owner pattern (D-016/D-017), flagged for the P5 owner approval gate | Binding for v0.1 |
+| D-018 | D-017 extended: AC14 cap < 1400 lines — final projected amendment | Third §12.14 amendment, pre-P4 per the P3 verify planning signal: 1178/1200 after P3 with 21 lines headroom vs P4's ~105-140 line need (creds adapter + secrets endpoint, the LAST broker-surface additions); P5 adds only excluded artifacts (tests, README). Same owner pattern (D-016/D-017), flagged for the P5 owner approval gate | Binding for v0.1 |
+| D-019 | Daemonless container publish: stdlib registry client (pull pinned base layers, append broker layer, push to gitea registry) | No docker/podman/buildah in the dev environment; gitea's package registry speaks OCI registry HTTP API v2 — fully automated once-per-milestone publish without a container runtime; stub-testable | Binding for v0.2 |
+| D-020 | Attach `coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz` to every release from `v0.2.1` onward | Consistent with v0.1's per-release `broker-vX.Y.Z.tar.gz` asset convention; every tagged release stays independently deployable | Binding for v0.2 |
+| D-021 | Image tags `git.coreci.dev/coreci/broker:<milestone-release-tag>` + `latest`, pushed once per milestone | Version tag pins the release; `latest` gives docker users a sane default; once-per-milestone honors the owner directive | Binding for v0.2 |
+| D-022 | Base image `python:3.11-slim` (pinned minor line) | Dev environment runs Python 3.11.2 — pinned minor matches tested stdlib behavior and stays reproducible | Binding for v0.2 |

.ciagent/REQUIREMENTS.md

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@
 
 ## Overview
 
-Source: Requirements Specification v0.5 (owner: coreci-coo, 2026-10-09; supersedes the v0.4 in-memory draft). "v0.5" is the spec's revision label; the product milestone is v0.1. REQ-01..REQ-20 constitute the full v0.1 scope — nothing is deferred. Acceptance criteria reference the spec's §12 list (AC1–AC14). Clarification decisions D-001..D-011 live in the init commit's `---ci---` block and are distilled in PROJECT.md.
+Source: Requirements Specification v0.5 (owner: coreci-coo, 2026-10-09). "v0.5" is the spec's revision label. REQ-01..REQ-20 (milestone v0.1) shipped complete as `v0.1.5`. **Milestone v0.2 (cli-packaging)** adds REQ-21..REQ-23 from owner directives (2026-10-10): package the broker as a CLI, attach it to every gitea release with notes, and publish a docker container once per milestone as a gitea package. Scope is CLI + distribution only — no functional changes to the broker. Clarification decisions D-001..D-015 (v0.1) remain binding; D-016+ resolve v0.2's packaging/distribution ambiguities.
 
-## v1 (Milestone v0.1)
+## v1 (Milestone v0.1 — complete, shipped as v0.1.5)
 
 ### Auth & Identity
 
@@ -50,7 +50,18 @@ Source: Requirements Specification v0.5 (owner: coreci-coo, 2026-10-09; supersed
 - **REQ-19 Public client module.** `coreci_broker_client.py` — dependency-free (stdlib urllib; no httpx, no bcrypt) — implements the tool-side bootstrap of spec §9: ensure-registered (idempotent), state get/put, secret read with 401 → re-register → retry-once, and never assumes the pepper key is present in register responses (`data.get("pepper")`). Served unauthenticated at `/static/coreci_broker_client.py` so any OWUI tool author can fetch it into their workspace and import it. It contains no secrets.
 - **REQ-20 Reference tools.** `reference_tools/` ships at least: (a) a proxmox-style reference implementing §11's flow — first call registers and persists state, subsequent calls read the token from state and fetch `coreci/proxmox`, downstream call defaults to a safe dry-run; (b) a minimal showcase of auth-first-then-use-a-second-tool. These are templates for tool authors, wired to the test broker in tests.
 
-## v2 (Deferred)
+## v2 (Milestone v0.2)
+
+### Packaging
+
+- **REQ-21 CLI packaging (zipapp).** The broker ships as a single-file executable CLI `coreci-broker.pyz` built with stdlib `python3 -m zipapp` from a clean checkout — no pip, no third-party build tooling (D-009 preserved). The archive is self-contained: it bundles `coreci_broker.py`, the `coreci_broker_ui/` pages, and `coreci_broker_client.py`, materializing the UI/static roots into the runtime state directory on boot (paths resolved from env, never `__file__`), so one file serves the full admin UI at `/ui/` and the client module at `/static/coreci_broker_client.py`. Running it boots the standalone server with first-boot semantics identical to REQ-14/REQ-18 (`.env` generation, admin pass printed exactly once, `broker.db` + `broker.audit.log` at mode 0600); `--version` reports the release version. A build script regenerates the artifact reproducibly, and tests boot the built artifact end-to-end.
+
+### Distribution
+
+- **REQ-22 Release assets.** Every gitea release from the phase that first builds the CLI (`v0.2.1`, D-020) onward attaches the built artifact `coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz` alongside the existing source archive. Uploads resolve the forge token only via the sanctioned secrets path (`.env*` files — never shell environment). Release notes document the CLI: artifact download + install (`chmod +x` / `python3`), the CLI surface (boot, `--version`, env contract), and docker usage per REQ-23. Attachment failure follows the ship workflow's bounded-retry then `release_pending` escalation — it never blocks tag+merge.
+- **REQ-23 Docker package.** The repo ships a `Dockerfile` and a **daemonless stdlib registry client** (D-019): once per milestone, at the final ship, the client pulls the pinned `python:3.11-slim` base image manifest + layers from the public registry (HTTP API v2), appends a layer carrying the CLI artifact, and pushes the image `git.coreci.dev/coreci/broker:<milestone-release-tag>` plus the `latest` alias (D-021/D-022) to the gitea container/package registry — no container runtime required. The container runs the CLI standalone with state on a volume. Registry auth, manifest, layer, and digest handling are stub-tested; publish failure follows bounded-retry escalation — it never blocks the milestone merge.
+
+## Deferred Beyond v0.2
 
 None defined. Future candidates held as out-of-scope decisions, not requirements: audit rotation with retention, multiple broker instances, approver-agent delegation, OWUI-KB credential sync.
 
@@ -96,4 +107,7 @@ None defined. Future candidates held as out-of-scope decisions, not requirements
 | REQ-17 | 1 | complete |
 | REQ-18 | 1 | complete |
 | REQ-19 | 4 | complete |
-| REQ-20 | 4 | complete |
+| REQ-20 | 4 | complete |
+| REQ-21 | 1 | complete |
+| REQ-22 | 1 | complete |
+| REQ-23 | 2 | complete |

.ciagent/RESEARCH.md

@@ -1,82 +1,191 @@
 # RESEARCH — CoreCI Broker
 
-Date: 2026-10-09 · Milestone: v0.1 · Phase: 0 (pre-execution) · Status: complete
-Sources: `.ciagent/` PROJECT/REQUIREMENTS/ARCHITECTURE/ROADMAP, git log (init ffdc5392, clarify 53d99e80), docs.openwebui.com + open-webui source at `main` (fetched 2026-10-09). No scope changes; D-001..D-015 reconfirmed; no secrets read or printed.
+Date: 2026-10-10 · Milestone: v0.2 (cli-packaging) · Phase: 0 (pre-execution) · Status: complete
+Sources: `.ciagent/` PROJECT/REQUIREMENTS/ARCHITECTURE/ROADMAP/PLAN, `coreci_broker.py` (1390 lines, read in full), git history/tags v0.1.0..v0.1.5, live gitea 1.26.1 API (`git.coreci.dev` swagger.v1.json + releases — read-only, token never printed), live Docker Hub registry + auth.docker.io (anonymous pulls, verified end-to-end), live gitea container-registry auth probes (read-only, no upload sessions created), stdlib source (`/usr/lib/python3.11/zipapp.py`, `urllib/request.py`), and an **end-to-end zipapp prototype booted from the real broker sources** (built + booted as subprocess + driven with urllib; `/tmp` scratch, repo untouched).
 
-## 1. Environment Constraints (verified facts — do not re-verify)
+## 0. Carried-Forward v0.1 Findings (still binding)
 
-- Python 3.11.2 on the dev host; NO pip, NO bcrypt locally → D-001 dual-mode hashing active: stdlib `hashlib.scrypt` in dev/tests, bcrypt in the OWUI runtime; hashes format-prefixed (`$2b$…` / `scrypt$…`). Tests = stdlib unittest (D-009). Pure-Python repo, no package.json.
-- Forge: gitea `git.coreci.dev`, org `coreci`; release target `coreci/broker` — repo created at first push/ship, public, default branch `main` (D-010/D-012). `GITEA_TOKEN` resolves from `.ciagent/.env.secrets` only (gitignored, mode 0600, never printed).
-- Stdlib components carrying the runtime: `http.server.ThreadingHTTPServer`, `sqlite3`, `hashlib` (scrypt/sha256), `secrets`, `json`, `base64`, `urllib` (client module), `threading`.
-- Repo state verified at research time: branches `main`, `milestone/v0.1-coreci-broker`, `phase/00-pre-execution`; `.gitignore` at root; `.ciagent/` holds PROJECT/REQUIREMENTS/ARCHITECTURE/ROADMAP/config.json/CHECKPOINT.json + `.env.secrets` (unread, 0600).
+- **Environment (v0.1 §1, re-confirmed)**: Python 3.11.2, NO pip anywhere, NO docker/podman/buildah runtime; stdlib-only runtime + build path (D-009 preserved by REQ-21/D-019); tests = stdlib unittest; forge gitea `git.coreci.dev`, owner `coreci`, repo `broker`, public, default branch `main`; `GITEA_TOKEN` resolves from `.ciagent/.env.secrets` only (mode 0600, never printed, `config.security.bash_allowlist.blocked_env_vars` includes GITEA_TOKEN → shell-env tokens are structurally blocked).
+- **Test harness (v0.1 §6)**: in-process `ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), Handler)` + daemon thread + `tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()` state + stdlib `urllib.request` client + `addCleanup`; 0600 assertions via `st_mode & 0o777 == 0o600`; stub-HTTP precedent: `_StubOwuiHandler` in `tests/test_creds_source.py` (BaseHTTPRequestHandler with class-level fixtures + hit recording) — this is the template for v0.2 stub registry/gitea servers.
+- **Ship contract (`ci/workflows/ship.md` + config.json)**: every phase ships; release creation best-effort with bounded retries (`ship.max_release_retries: 3`); on exhaustion commit escalation `resolution: "auto"`, `type: "release_pending"`, phase still complete — tag+merge is the gate, `release_blocking: false`; **all secrets resolved ONLY from `.env`/`.env.secrets`/`.env.*` files via the secrets-loader, never shell env** (v1.8 root cause: empty token → gitea answers 404, not 401, masking auth failure).
+- **OWUI integration surface (v0.1 §4)**: unchanged by v0.2 — the CLI does not touch the `Tools` mount; path resolution from env (never `__file__`) is the v0.1 property that makes zipapp packaging possible at all.
+- **Static-serving rules that the packaged CLI must preserve**: `_resolve_static_file` rejects `\x00`, `\`, leading `/`, `..` segments, and any *request* path part starting with `.`; roots are real-pathed (`os.path.realpath`) so a dot-named *root* directory is fine (materialized assets live under a dot-dir; only request paths are dot-filtered). `_broker_protected_paths` protects `.env`/db/audit/creds (+ `-journal/-wal/-shm` suffixes) from static reads.
 
-## 2. Spec Defects & Resolutions (PROJECT.md §Context; decisions in init/clarify commits)
+## 1. zipapp CLI Packaging (REQ-21)
 
-| # | Defect | Resolution | Test implication |
-|---|--------|------------|------------------|
-| 1 | §7.5 in-memory `token_hash` index impossible with bcrypt (salted hashes neither comparable nor indexable) | D-004: UUID-scoped slow-hash scan + in-memory verified-token cache; SQLite authoritative, cache never authoritative | Cover both paths: cache-miss scan and cache-hit re-check of row status/expiry; both hash formats |
-| 2 | §6 (tool derives every call) vs §9 (tool stores broker-returned token) contradiction | Broker derives authoritatively; tool stores via state endpoints (ARCHITECTURE.md DataFlow 2–4) | AC4: broker- and tool-side derivation byte-identical (§6 formula); state GET/PUT roundtrip |
-| 3 | §9 snippet `KeyError` on `data["pepper"]` for re-registrations | D-005: pepper returned only on row-create or tokenless register; REQ-19 mandates `data.get("pepper")` in the client | Re-registration without a pepper key must not crash the client; register still audited |
-| 4 | Pepper chicken-and-egg (token needed to read state; pepper needed to derive) | Tokenless register returns the pepper — the only KB-loss recovery path (D-005) | Recovery scenario: no valid token → register → pepper returned → tool can re-derive |
+### 1.1 stdlib mechanics (all VERIFIED empirically on Python 3.11.2)
 
-## 3. Sibling Conventions (data provided — not fetched)
+- Command: `python3 -m zipapp <srcdir> -o coreci-broker.pyz --python "/usr/bin/env python3" --compress`.
+- **`__main__.py` is mandatory** — `zipapp` refuses with `ZipAppError("Archive has no entry point")` without it (the `-m module:fn` form is the only alternative; the shipped `cli/__main__.py` source is cleaner and testable). Files staged: `coreci_broker.py`, `coreci_broker_client.py`, `coreci_broker_ui/**`, `cli/__main__.py`, generated `_cli_version.py`.
+- **Compression: `zipapp` defaults to ZIP_STORED** (stdlib source line 136: `zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED if compressed else zipfile.ZIP_STORED`). `--compress` is required for DEFLATED. Measured: ~95 KB content → 27.6 KB pyz compressed vs ~95 KB stored. Use `--compress`.
+- **Shebang + exec bit**: with `--python`, zipapp writes `#!/usr/bin/env python3\n` as a literal first line, then the zip (zip readers locate EOCD from the file end — leading bytes tolerated), and `chmod +x`es the target (`target.chmod(... | S_IEXEC)`). Both `./coreci-broker.pyz` and `python3 coreci-broker.pyz` verified working; `sys.argv[0]` = the archive path as invoked; `python3 -m zipapp --info` reads the interpreter back.
+- **Data files are NOT `open()`-able inside the archive** (verified `FileNotFoundError` for `assets/page.html`): zipimport only serves `.py` imports; the broker serves UI/static via **filesystem paths + `open()`** → asset materialization to disk at boot is *mandatory*, not optional. `importlib.resources` cannot provide a directory for `BROKER_UI_ROOT` — zipfile extraction is the only design that fits the broker's config contract. (Not a close call.)
+- **`__main__` module collision — none**: the archive's `__main__.py` IS the `__main__` module; `import coreci_broker` inside it executes the broker's module-level code once and its `if __name__ == "__main__"` block does NOT fire (verified: side-effect counter runs once, standalone print block silent). Call `coreci_broker.run_standalone()` — no re-execution of module code, no subprocess re-invocation needed.
+- **zipimport limits**: none bite here — the archive contains only pure-Python repo files; stdlib (`sqlite3`, `http.server`, C extensions) resolves from the host interpreter, and the broker's sole optional import (bcrypt) stays optional.
 
-- researchx: root = `.ciagent/`, `.gitignore`, `README.md`, `backend/`, `frontend/` — public repo, default branch main.
-- nextcraft: root = `.ciagent/`, `apps/`, `packages/`, `deploy/`, `scripts/`, pnpm workspace, `Dockerfile`, `.gitea/` — public repo, default branch main.
-- Implications: flat single-project `.ciagent/` (matches D-010); `README.md` at repo root expected at ship (P5); per-phase tags on the v0.1.x line (D-008); `---ci---` block in every commit; ships via gitea releases once the forge repo exists.
+### 1.2 Boot shim design (prototype built, booted, verified — recommended as-is)
 
-## 4. Open WebUI Integration Surface (researched 2026-10-09; docs live, post-v0.10 era)
+`cli/__main__.py` (staged into the pyz), five steps:
 
-### Workspace Tools — `Tools` class surface (docs: /features/extensibility/plugin/tools/development)
-- Single Python file; frontmatter docstring keys: `title`, `author`, `author_url`, `git_url`, `description`, `required_open_webui_version`, `requirements`, `version`, `licence`. Broker ships `requirements:` empty — stdlib-only + bcrypt already present in the OWUI runtime (PROJECT.md Constraints).
-- `Tools` class rules: `__init__` MUST set `self.valves = self.Valves()` (stored admin valves load only onto an instance that has a `valves` attribute); optional `Valves`/`UserValves` (pydantic BaseModel); every public callable is exposed to the model → helpers must be `_`-prefixed; method docstrings (reST `:param name:` form) + type hints generate the JSON schema; return str/dict/list; async methods preferred.
-- **Lifecycle: there is NO `activate()`/`deactivate()` hook for Tools.** The loader (`backend/open_webui/utils/plugin.py`) execs the source into a `tool_{id}` module in `sys.modules`, instantiates `module.Tools()` at load (create/update) and caches it on `app.state.TOOLS`; re-exec occurs on source change; module-top-level side effects persist, and disabling a tool does NOT undo them. ⇒ ARCHITECTURE.md's "mounts the server at activation" maps to constructor/module-load time: start the daemon-thread `ThreadingHTTPServer` in `__init__` (or module top level) behind a once-per-process idempotency guard.
-- Loader sets the module's `__file__` to a temp file deleted after exec ⇒ the broker must resolve DB/audit/env paths from config/env vars, never from `__file__`.
-- User context: OWUI provides no `self.user` attribute; the per-call reserved arg `__user__` is a dict (`id`, `email`, `name`, `role`, plus `valves` when UserValves defined) (docs: /features/extensibility/plugin/development/reserved-args). Broker admin auth (`BROKER_ADMIN_PASS`) is independent of OWUI identity; ARCHITECTURE.md's "self.user supplies admin-agnostic context" is the broker's own convention — the broker's Tools class can stash `__user__` or ignore it. Nuance only, no architecture change.
-- Background infra: OWUI's documented pattern is `asyncio.create_task` (Under the Hood §Patterns 4); the broker's stdlib analog is `threading.Thread(target=serve_forever, daemon=True)` — same once-per-process guard required (module re-exec on edits).
-- Asset serving: a tool may register FastAPI routes via `app.add_api_route` with an idempotency guard (Under the Hood §Patterns 3) — but such routes are unauthenticated unless gated. The broker deliberately serves UI + `/static/` from its OWN `ThreadingHTTPServer` on `127.0.0.1:8765` — no FastAPI coupling; `/static/coreci_broker_client.py` is intentionally unauthenticated (REQ-19).
-- Security posture: workspace tools execute unsandboxed Python in the server process (docs Plugin Security Warning) — the broker mount inherits that trust boundary.
+1. **`--version` first, before importing the broker**: parse `sys.argv[1:]`; if `--version`, `import _cli_version; print(_cli_version.VERSION); sys.exit(0)`. Version comes from a build-time-generated `_cli_version.py` (`VERSION = "vX.Y.Z"` written by `scripts/build_cli.py` from the tag) — chosen over a zip-comment (opaque, fragile, still needs a parser). No broker import on the `--version` path.
+2. **Resolve the state dir exactly like the broker**: `env_path = os.environ.get("BROKER_ENV_PATH") or ".env"`; `state_dir = dirname(abspath(env_path)) or cwd`. Broker path resolution (read from code, authoritative): `BROKER_ENV_PATH` default `.env`, `BROKER_DB_PATH` `broker.db`, `BROKER_AUDIT_LOG_PATH` `broker.audit.log`, `BROKER_CREDS_FILE` `data/creds.json`, `BROKER_UI_ROOT` `coreci_broker_ui`, `BROKER_STATIC_ROOT` `.` — **all CWD-relative when relative**; process env beats `.env` beats defaults. The CLI therefore needs no path changes at all: relative paths land in the CWD (docker: `WORKDIR /state` + volume).
+3. **Materialize assets**: `zipfile.ZipFile(sys.path[0])` (inside a zipapp, `sys.path[0]` is the `.pyz` itself — verified) → extract `coreci_broker_ui/**` → `<state>/.coreci_broker_assets/<VERSION>/ui/` and `coreci_broker_client.py` → `<...>/static/`. Write temp + `os.replace` (atomic vs a concurrently-serving older instance). **Versioned asset dir**: upgrades materialize a new dir; old dirs are left in place (another instance may still serve them; ~30 KB each — cleanup explicitly NOT done in v0.2). Overwrite-same-version on every boot (self-repair, assets are immutable inputs; extraction happens before this instance's server starts).
+4. **Override precedence — user wins**: `import coreci_broker`; parse the user `.env` with the broker's own `coreci_broker._parse_env_file(env_path)`; set `os.environ["BROKER_UI_ROOT"]` / `["BROKER_STATIC_ROOT"]` only when the key is in **neither** `os.environ` nor the `.env` values. Net precedence: process env → `.env` → shim defaults → broker defaults — identical to the broker's own contract, achieved with **zero broker changes**.
+5. **Hand off**: `coreci_broker.run_standalone()` (foreground loop + KeyboardInterrupt shutdown; prints `coreci-broker listening on http://<host>:<port>` with the *actual bound address* — `BROKER_BIND=127.0.0.1:0` gives an ephemeral port via `_parse_bind` (`"0".isdigit()` → True) and the harness parses the printed URL).
 
-### Knowledge Bases API — read path (source-verified: `backend/open_webui/routers/knowledge.py`, `files.py` at main, 2026-10-09)
-- Auth: `Authorization: Bearer <API_KEY>` (sk-… key from Settings→Account; JWT also accepted; `x-api-key` alt header via `CUSTOM_API_KEY_HEADER`) — feeds `BROKER_OWUI_BASE_URL` + `BROKER_OWUI_API_KEY` (REQ-08/D-002). Exact layout deferred to P4 per ARCHITECTURE.md §Notes; candidates below.
-- Router `/api/v1/knowledge` (all endpoints `get_verified_user`):
-  - `GET /api/v1/knowledge/?page=N` — paginated KB list (30/page) → `{items:[{id,name,description,write_access,…}], total}`
-  - `GET /api/v1/knowledge/search?query=&page=` — same shape; candidate for finding `creds-coreci-coo` by name
-  - `GET /api/v1/knowledge/{id}` — KB detail + `files[]` (per-file metadata) + `write_access`
-  - `GET /api/v1/knowledge/{id}/files?query=&include_content=&page=` — file list; `include_content=true` embeds extracted content (docs flag it as expensive)
-  - `GET /api/v1/knowledge/{id}/files/pending`, `GET /api/v1/knowledge/{id}/export` (zip) — auxiliary
-  - Write ops exist (`/create`, `/{id}/update`, `/{id}/file/add|update|remove|move`, `/{id}/files/batch/add`, `/{id}/delete`, `/{id}/reset`, `/{id}/sync/*`, `/{id}/dirs/*`) — the broker never calls them (read-only, REQ-08).
-- Router `/api/v1/files`:
-  - `GET /api/v1/files/{id}` → FileModel; `data.content` holds extracted text
-  - `GET /api/v1/files/{id}/data/content` → `{"content": "<extracted text>"}` — JSON form, best fit for credential JSON files
-  - `GET /api/v1/files/{id}/content` → raw bytes (FileResponse)
-  - `GET /api/v1/files/{id}/process/status` → `{"status": "pending"|"completed"|"failed"}`
-  - `GET /api/v1/files/?page=` (`content=true` default), `GET /api/v1/files/search?filename=<glob>`
-- Candidate P4 flow: search KB by name → map path→file (filename convention TBD in P4) → `GET /api/v1/files/{file_id}/data/content` → parse JSON → `{path, data, version, updated_at}`. Note: OWUI exposes `meta.size`/`updated_at` but no version field → `version` may be synthesized broker-side (P4 detail; REQ-08 response shape unchanged).
+**Verified end-to-end prototype results** (real broker sources, subprocess, urllib): first boot printed `BROKER_ADMIN_PASS=…` exactly once then the listening line; `/healthz` 200; `/ui/login` + `/ui/dashboard` 200 (served from materialized assets); `/static/coreci_broker_client.py` 200 byte-exact (6180 B); `.env` + `broker.db` + `broker.audit.log` created mode 0600 in the state dir; second boot silent (no pass re-print); state dir fully independent of CWD (env paths pin it).
 
-## 5. Security Prior Art
+### 1.3 Determinism / reproducibility
 
-- Peppered derivation + slow-hash storage: the token derives from a 256-bit random pepper (`BROKER_INSTANCE_PEPPER`, 32 bytes), so an attacker holding `token_hash` faces an offline brute force over the pepper — infeasible. Online guessing is rate-limit-free (spec §14: trusted network + `127.0.0.1` bind), but each guess costs one scrypt/bcrypt op, and the UUID-scoped scan bounds verification work (D-004). Storing only the salted slow hash (never the plaintext token) follows OWASP password-storage guidance; format prefixes keep verification format-aware (D-001).
-- Append-only JSONL audit: one JSON object per line; flush-per-write (+ `os.fsync` for the process-restart case) is affordable at the broker's write volume (register/read/admin actions) and preserves the no-loss guarantee; file mode 0600; no rotation — manual `mv` (D-007, spec §13 Q1). Exact flush/fsync choice is a P1 plan decision, not research.
-- Session cookie `broker_session`: HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax (D-013); no Secure flag (loopback HTTP by default); Path scoped to the broker.
-- Path traversal on `/secrets/<path>`: URL-decode (`urllib.parse.unquote`) BEFORE validation; reject `..` segments, absolute paths, backslashes, NUL; the scope check `path == "coreci/" + agent_id` runs on the decoded value (REQ-07). Static serving of `/static/` and UI must likewise resolve against a fixed root and reject traversal.
-- OWUI-runtime boundary: broker binds `127.0.0.1:8765` — bind address controls reachability (PROJECT.md Constraints). The OWUI process hosts both the tool (broker mount) and the KB the broker reads; `BROKER_OWUI_API_KEY` is the only OWUI-side credential the broker holds, and it lives in the broker `.env` (0600 discipline, REQ-15).
+- **Raw `zipapp` is NOT reliably byte-reproducible**: zip entries carry the source files' mtimes (`z.write` → `ZipInfo.from_file`), no SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH handling exists anywhere in zipapp, and entry order is `rglob('*')` = `os.scandir` order (unsorted, filesystem-dependent). My two identical staging-dir builds hashed equal *only because* mtimes and scandir order happened to match — a fresh `git clone` (checkout-time mtimes) or a different filesystem breaks it.
+- **Fix — normalization post-pass (verified byte-identical across rebuilds)**: after zipapp builds the artifact, the build script reads it (shebang line + zip body), rewrites the zip with entries **sorted by name**, `date_time=(1980,1,1,0,0,0)` (zip epoch minimum), `ZIP_DEFLATED`, preserved `external_attr`, and re-prepends the shebang (+`chmod +x`). Verified: two builds → identical sha256; normalized pyz still executes (`--version` OK). Alternative (rejected): `os.utime`-ing the staging tree pre-build — fixes mtimes but not entry order; the post-pass fixes both and keeps `python3 -m zipapp` as the format mechanism (the normalized file is still "shebang + zip", the zipapp format).
+- Reproducibility test: `test_build_cli.py` builds twice into separate dirs, asserts identical sha256, and asserts the embedded `_cli_version.VERSION`.
 
-## 6. Testing Prior Art
+### 1.4 Defects / risks (zipapp)
 
-- In-process server harness (stdlib, matches D-009/REQ-18): `ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), Handler)` for an ephemeral port in `setUp`; `threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True)`; drive requests with `urllib.request` against `http://127.0.0.1:{port}`; `shutdown()` + `server_close()` via `addCleanup`.
-- Temp state: `tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()` per test for `broker.db`, `broker.audit.log`, `.env`, `data/creds.json`; point the broker at them via env vars (`BROKER_ENV_PATH`, `BROKER_CREDS_FILE`, audit path).
-- 0600 modes: `os.stat(path).st_mode & 0o777 == 0o600` after first boot; create with `os.open(path, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY, 0o600)` (umask-independent) in the broker, so the test just asserts.
-- AC14 line-count test (REQ-17): `coreci_broker.py` is a single file — tests/UI HTML/client module/reference tools are separate files, so a plain line count of that one file is the spec's measure (< 800, spec §12.14); test reads the file and asserts `sum(1 for _ in f) <= 800` (wc -l-style, no comment stripping).
-- TTL tests: set `BROKER_TOKEN_TTL` to 1–2 s and `time.sleep`, or inject an expired `token_expires_at` directly in SQLite (faster, deterministic).
-- Dual-hash tests: both `scrypt$…` and `$2b$…` verification paths; CI can only execute the scrypt path (no bcrypt locally) — the bcrypt path's format-awareness is tested via the prefix and mocked/verified against the format contract.
+- **RISK** — stale-asset drift if a *user* sets `BROKER_UI_ROOT`/`BROKER_STATIC_ROOT` in `.env`: honored (by design, documented in notes) — the archive still carries the assets, they're just unused. Tests cover the override path.
+- **RISK** — first-boot extraction torn reads if two instances share a state dir and the same version: mitigated by temp+`os.replace`; multi-instance sharing one SQLite remains unsupported (as v0.1).
+- **NOTE** — shebang `env python3` may resolve to a non-3.11 python on exotic hosts; the broker needs 3.7+ features in practice but is tested on 3.11 only — release notes state "Python 3.11+ required" (D-022 alignment).
+- **NOTE** — `sys.path[0]` is the archive only when run as a zipapp; the shim is not meant to run from an unzipped checkout (guard: it can `os.path.isdir` check and fall back to repo-relative roots, or simply document zipapp-only — planner's choice, zero-cost either way).
+- **NOTE** — assets land under a dot-directory (`.coreci_broker_assets`) — hidden-dir hygiene in the state dir; broker dot-filtering applies to request paths, not roots (verified `_resolve_static_file`).
+- **NOTE** — AC14 (line count) counts `coreci_broker.py` ONLY (REQ-17); the shim/build scripts are separate files → v0.2 needs **zero broker lines**; broker is 1390/1400 — only 10 lines of headroom anyway, so zero-change is also a hard constraint, and it is satisfied (verified: `run_standalone`, `_parse_env_file`, `boot` are importable and sufficient as-is).
 
-## 7. Research Conclusions
+## 2. Gitea Release Assets (REQ-22)
 
-- P1 (skeleton): bootstrap `.env` + first-boot generation (pepper/admin pass printed exactly once — log once, never again on second boot); SQLite schema per spec §5.2 at 0600; audit writer (JSONL, 0600); dual-mode hasher with format prefixes; token engine pure-function of (pepper, inputs); ThreadingHTTPServer + `{"error, message}` router; OWUI mount = `Tools.__init__` starts the daemon-thread server behind a once-per-process guard (no activate() hook exists), `self.valves = self.Valves()` required, `_`-prefixed helpers; standalone `__main__`; path resolution from env, never `__file__`; keep the 800-line budget from the first commit (UI/client/reference are separate files).
-- P2 (admin plane): cookie `broker_session` HttpOnly+SameSite=Lax; HTTP Basic + session cookie both accepted on all admin API endpoints; four pages + dashboard served from `coreci_broker_ui/` on the same port; audit query streams the file line-by-line with `next_since` cursor (limit default 100/max 1000).
-- P3 (tool auth): register semantics per D-005 (idempotent re-derive, overwrite on input change, pepper on row-create-or-tokenless); verification per D-004 (UUID-scoped slow-hash scan; cache hit re-checks row status/expiry); `GET /agents/<id>` per D-015 (metadata-only); state endpoints with identity enforcement; `BROKER_AGENT_STATE_BACKEND=internal` default.
-- P4 (secrets + ecosystem): `OwuiApiCredsSource` builds on the KB read endpoints in §4 (Bearer key; `/{id}` + `/{id}/files` for mapping, `/api/v1/files/{id}/data/content` for content); `FileCredsSource` default `data/creds.json` (D-014); client module stdlib-urllib-only, `data.get("pepper")`, served unauthenticated at `/static/`; reference tools with safe dry-run default.
-- P5 (review + ship): AC1–AC13 behavioral + AC14 line-count; security checklist (traversal incl. URL-decoded forms, pepper never re-printed, 0600 modes, token scoping, audit completeness); README with documented deviations; ship to gitea (repo exists before first push).
-- ARCHITECTURE.md verification: **no assumption changes required.** The adapter-contract note (OWUI KB-file layout resolved in P4, ARCHITECTURE.md §Notes) stands — candidate endpoints captured in §4. One nuance for P1, not a defect: "mounts the server at activation" maps to constructor-time in the actual OWUI loader (no activate()/deactivate() lifecycle for Tools), and OWUI supplies `__user__` per call rather than a `self.user` attribute — the broker's Tools class owns that convention.
-- No genuine blockers found. Environment, OWUI surface, and forge conventions all support the v0.1 scope as specified.
+### 2.1 Verified API shapes (live gitea 1.26.1, `git.coreci.dev/swagger.v1.json` + working calls)
+
+- **List**: `GET /api/v1/repos/coreci/broker/releases?limit=20` → `[{id, tag_name, name, body, assets: [{id, name, size, download_count, browser_download_url}], draft, prerelease, created_at}]`. **By tag**: `GET /api/v1/repos/coreci/broker/releases/tags/{tag}` (200 or 404). **Latest**: `GET .../releases/latest`.
+- **Create**: `POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases` — JSON `CreateReleaseOption` `{tag_name, name, body, draft, prerelease, target_commitish, tag_message}` (schema verified from swagger).
+- **Attach asset**: `POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/releases/{id}/assets` — **consumes `multipart/form-data`** (or `application/octet-stream`); params verified from swagger: `id` (path, int64), `name` (query), **`attachment` (formData, type file)** — the multipart field name is `attachment`. Response: attachment JSON with `id`, `name`, `size`, `browser_download_url`.
+- **Auth**: `Authorization: token <GITEA_TOKEN>` (verified working on live forge; gitea also accepts Basic `user:token` — use the `token` form).
+- **Asset size**: gitea `[attachment] MAX_SIZE` default is 4 MB — the pyz is ~30 KB (deflated) → no issue; NOTE if server policy changes, attachment failure escalates through the bounded-retry path rather than blocking.
+- **Multipart with stdlib** (no `requests`): hand-rolled body, ~15 lines — boundary string, `Content-Disposition: form-data; name="attachment"; filename="coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz"`, `Content-Type: application/octet-stream`, `?name=` query param; gitea parses with standard Go multipart — boundary is ours to choose. Test against a stub gitea (§2.4).
+
+### 2.2 v0.1 attachment forensics (how it was actually done)
+
+- All six releases v0.1.0..v0.1.5 carry `broker-vX.Y.Z.tar.gz` (29 KB → 99 KB, growing with the codebase). Downloaded v0.1.5's asset: **57 members = the complete working tree including `.ciagent/`** (53 git-tracked files + 4 dir entries; matches `git ls-tree -r v0.1.5` exactly, plus directory entries), **no top-level prefix**, uniform `mtime 1791646214` (= the release timestamp), `uid 0/uname root`, modes 0664/0775.
+- Interpretation: the archive was produced by the **ship harness's packaging infrastructure** (ship.md step "Create distribution packages" via the `coreci build/package/release upload` CLI — **not installed in this dev environment**; the root-owned uniform timestamps indicate a container-side packaging step) — i.e. **ad-hoc from the repo's perspective: no repo-owned script exists**. The only repo-visible traces are ship.md's generic instructions.
+- Conclusion for v0.2: REQ-22 formalizes exactly this — a repo-owned `scripts/release.py` (plus `scripts/build_cli.py`) replaces the absent harness path. The v0.1 *conventions* carry over: per-release asset naming (now `coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz`, D-020), notes model (§2.3), and the bounded-retry contract (ship.md). The existing source-archive `broker-vX.Y.Z.tar.gz` convention continues to be the harness's own product (best-effort); the repo script owns the `.pyz` (+ digest).
+
+### 2.3 Release notes content model (v0.1.5 body verified; v0.2 sections)
+
+v0.1.5 body sections: `Milestone summary` → `Phases` (P0..P5 with tags) → `Verification` (test counts, security review, audit) → `Deployment`. v0.2 releases add the REQ-22-mandated CLI + docker documentation; recommended body structure (build-able by `scripts/release.py` from PLAN/ROADMAP/requirements data):
+
+1. `Milestone summary` — one paragraph (carries the v0.1 style).
+2. `Phases` — phase list with tags (auto from `git log vX.Y.Z-1..vX.Y.Z`/ROADMAP).
+3. `Verification` — test count, security review verdict, escalations.
+4. `CLI install + usage` — download `coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz` from this release's assets; `chmod +x` then `./coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz` or `python3 coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz`; `--version`; env contract table pointer (README); first-boot pass discipline (printed once, 0600 state files); state-dir anchoring (`BROKER_ENV_PATH`); **sha256 of the .pyz embedded** (plus optional `.sha256` sidecar asset — planner's call; lean default: digest in notes only).
+5. `Docker usage` (REQ-23/D-021) — `docker pull git.coreci.dev/coreci/broker:vX.Y.Z` (and `latest`); `docker run -p 8765:8765 -v broker-state:/state …`; state-on-volume contract.
+
+### 2.4 `scripts/release.py` design (stdlib, ~200 lines)
+
+- **Secrets**: token via a shared file-reading loader `scripts/_env_secrets.py` (~20 lines: parse `.ciagent/.env.secrets` `KEY=VALUE`, strip quotes — mirror the broker's `_parse_env_file` semantics). NEVER `os.environ` (GITEA_TOKEN is in `blocked_env_vars`). **Assert token non-empty before any API call** (v1.8 lesson: empty token → gitea 404, masking auth failure).
+- Flow: (1) resolve tag → `GET /releases/tags/{tag}`; 404 → `POST /releases` (create with notes body, `draft: false`, `prerelease: false`); (2) `GET .../releases/{id}/assets` — if `coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz` already present with matching size → **idempotent success** (no duplicate asset on bounded-retry re-run); (3) POST multipart attach (field `attachment`, `?name=`); (4) bounded retry: 3 attempts with backoff on URLError/5xx/HTTPError; on exhaustion → exit non-zero with a machine-readable marker → ship harness commits `release_pending` escalation; **never blocks tag+merge**.
+- **Stub-test** (`tests/test_release_upload.py`): `_StubGiteaHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler)` on `ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0))` (v0.1 `_StubOwuiHandler` precedent): routes `GET /api/v1/repos/{o}/{r}/releases/tags/{tag}` (200 fixture / 404), `POST .../releases` (assert body JSON), `POST .../releases/{id}/assets` (parse multipart with a stdlib parser — e.g. `email` or manual boundary split — assert field name `attachment` + `?name=` + body bytes), plus failure-modes: 500×3 → release_pending path; existing asset → no second upload.
+
+### 2.5 Defects / risks (release assets)
+
+- **RISK** — multipart hand-rolling bugs (boundary quoting, CRLF): mitigated by stub-gitea test with byte-exact assertions.
+- **RISK** — release may not exist when the attacher runs (ship harness creates it best-effort): create-or-get flow covers both orders; idempotent re-attach covers partial failure.
+- **NOTE** — 4 MB attachment cap (default) — pyz far under; failure would surface through bounded-retry, not silently.
+- **NOTE** — `GET /releases?limit=50` paging: prefer `/releases/tags/{tag}` (exact, no paging).
+
+## 3. Daemonless OCI Build + Push (REQ-23, D-019/D-021/D-022)
+
+### 3.1 PULL from Docker Hub (verified live, anonymous, end-to-end)
+
+- `GET https://registry-1.docker.io/v2/` → 401 `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="https://auth.docker.io/token",service="registry.docker.io"`; anonymous rate limit header `ratelimit-limit: 100;w=3600` (100 req/h) — ample for once-per-milestone.
+- `GET https://auth.docker.io/token?service=registry.docker.io&scope=repository:library/python:pull` → 200 `{token, access_token, expires_in, issued_at}` — anonymous OK (verified).
+- `GET /v2/library/python/manifests/3.11-slim` with `Accept: application/vnd.oci.image.index.v1+json, application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest.list.v2+json, application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json, application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest.v2+json` → **200 `Content-Type: application/vnd.oci.image.index.v1+json` — `python:3.11-slim` IS an OCI image index (16 children: 8 platform manifests + 8 attestation manifests `unknown/unknown`)**. The client MUST resolve the `linux/amd64` child manifest by digest and fetch it separately.
+- Verified nuance: Docker Hub currently returns the index **even without Accept** (and even Accepting only schema2) — but the client still sends the full Accept set (contract correctness) and branches on the response `"manifests"` key (index) vs `"layers"` (manifest), not on hope.
+- amd64 child (verified, digest drifts upstream — resolve at publish time and record it): `application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json`, config `application/vnd.oci.image.config.v1+json` (`Cmd: ["python3"]`, Env PATH/LANG/GPG_KEY/`PYTHON_VERSION=3.11.17`/PYTHON_SHA256 — base runs 3.11.17 vs dev 3.11.2, same pinned minor line per D-022), **4 layers** `application/vnd.oci.image.layer.v1.tar+gzip` (≈29.8 MB + 1.3 MB + 14.5 MB + 250 B ≈ 45.7 MB total).
+- `GET /v2/library/python/blobs/<digest>` → blob bytes (layers + config). All flows urllib-only.
+
+### 3.2 Auth to the gitea registry (verified live; username+token shapes pinned)
+
+- `GET https://git.coreci.dev/v2/` → 401 `WWW-Authenticate: Bearer realm="https://git.coreci.dev/v2/token",service="container_registry",scope="*"`.
+- Token endpoint: `GET https://git.coreci.dev/v2/token?service=container_registry&scope=repository:coreci/broker:pull,push` with **`Authorization: Basic base64(<username>:<GITEA_TOKEN>)`** → 200 `{"token": "<JWT>"}` (HS256; `exp-nbf = 86400` s = 24 h).
+- **Verified**: the Basic **username is ignored** — `coreci`, `nosuchuser123`, and empty all return the same JWT (UserID 57, scopes `write:activitypub,…,write:package,…` — the existing GITEA_TOKEN has package-write). The token (as password) identifies the user. Docker login convention: username = the gitea user, password = the token; the client sends any non-empty username.
+- **Verified quirk (must handle)**: the token endpoint answers **200 even anonymously** with an unusable JWT (`UserID: -1`, empty scope). A 200 from `/v2/token` proves nothing about push rights — the client must (a) insist on Basic credentials being present, (b) check the issued token is non-empty, and let real operations fail loudly.
+- Verified: `Authorization: Bearer <JWT>` on `/v2/` → 200; `HEAD /v2/coreci/broker/blobs/sha256:0…0` → 404 (existence checks work); `GET /v2/coreci/broker/tags/list` → 404 `NAME_UNKNOWN` (the container package doesn't exist until first push — expected today).
+
+### 3.3 PUSH flow + media-type choice
+
+- **Manifest media type: OCI image manifest end-to-end** — `application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json`, config `application/vnd.oci.image.config.v1+json`, layers `application/vnd.oci.image.layer.v1.tar+gzip`. Rationale: (1) the pulled base child manifest already uses exactly these descriptor types — reusing its 4 layer digests **verbatim** keeps descriptor/mediaType/blob consistency; (2) gitea 1.26 accepts docker schema2 and OCI manifests — OCI is the modern default and what upstream itself serves; (3) Docker CLI ≥ 18.06 and podman/buildah pull OCI manifests from any v2 registry. **Do NOT push an index/manifest-list**: one linux/amd64 manifest per tag; docker pulls it directly.
+- **Blob uploads (OCI dist-spec, gitea-conformant)**: primary = **monolithic** `POST /v2/coreci/broker/blobs/uploads/?digest=sha256:<hex>` with the blob as body → 201 (single round trip); fallback = two-step `POST /v2/<name>/blobs/uploads/` → 202 + `Location` → `PUT <Location>?digest=…` → 201. Always `HEAD /v2/<name>/blobs/<digest>` first — 200 → skip upload (base layers re-run-proof: a partially-failed publish resumes cheaply). **Base layers must be re-uploaded to gitea** (~45.7 MB once per milestone) — gitea cannot mount blobs from Docker Hub; acceptable per D-019's once-per-milestone cadence.
+- **Redirect trap (verified in CPython 3.11 source)**: `HTTPRedirectHandler.redirect_request` only follows GET/HEAD (301/302/303 POST→GET); **307/308 on a PUT/POST raise HTTPError** — stdlib urllib does NOT follow method-preserving redirects. The client must implement explicit Location-following (read `Location`, `urljoin` against the registry base — gitea's `Location` may be relative or absolute — re-issue the request with method+body). Gitea default local storage answers directly, but the client is correct against any conformance-grade registry.
+- **Manifest PUT**: `PUT /v2/coreci/broker/manifests/<tag>` with `Content-Type: application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json` → 201. Tags: `<milestone-release-tag>` (e.g. `v0.2.3`) **and** `latest` — two PUTs of the same manifest (D-021).
+
+### 3.4 Layer + config + manifest construction (exact recipe)
+
+1. **Broker layer**: deterministic tar (`tarfile`, entries sorted, fixed `TarInfo` metadata — uid/gid 0, uname/gname fixed, `mtime=0`/1980-epoch, file mode 0644) containing `/app/coreci-broker.pyz` (the built artifact). Gzip with `gzip.compress(data, compresslevel=9, mtime=0)` — **`mtime=0` is mandatory** (default `None` = wall clock → nondeterministic digests); fix the compresslevel in code (stable per build).
+2. Digests: **layer digest** = sha256 of the gzip blob; **diff_id** = sha256 of the *uncompressed* tar.
+3. **New config blob**: copy the pulled base config; append the new diff_id to `rootfs.diff_ids`; set `config.Entrypoint = ["python3", "/app/coreci-broker.pyz"]`, `config.Cmd = []` (so `docker run image --version` appends `--version` through the entrypoint), `config.WorkingDir = "/state"`, keep base `Env`; optional `config.Labels = {"org.opencontainers.image.version": "<tag>"}`. Serialize deterministically (`json.dumps(..., sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))`) → reproducible config digest.
+4. **Push order**: HEAD all blobs (4 base layers, new layer, new config) → monolithic POST each missing one → PUT manifest referencing the base's 4 layer descriptors **verbatim** (original digests + mediaTypes) + the new layer descriptor + the new config descriptor. Record the resolved base index digest + amd64 child digest + all blob digests in the release notes (provenance; also `--base-manifest` override argument for exact re-publishes, default = tag resolution with documented upstream drift).
+5. Image name: `git.coreci.dev/coreci/broker` (gitea registry = `owner/name`; the package links to the repo by owner+name). gitea creates the package at first push (verified `NAME_UNKNOWN` until then).
+
+### 3.5 Dockerfile role + mapping limits (documentation; daemonless client = source of truth)
+
+- The Dockerfile is for users WITH docker; the daemonless client is what the pipeline publishes. **Equivalence required, byte-identity not.** Self-contained Dockerfile (no pre-built artifact in build context): `FROM python:3.11-slim`; `COPY coreci_broker.py coreci_broker_client.py coreci_broker_ui/ cli/ /app/src/`; `ARG VERSION=dev`; generated `_cli_version.py` via build arg; `RUN python3 -m zipapp /app/src -o /app/coreci-broker.pyz --python "/usr/bin/env python3" --compress`; `WORKDIR /state`; `ENTRYPOINT ["python3", "/app/coreci-broker.pyz"]`; `EXPOSE 8765`.
+- Mapping: same base family (tag drift upstream ≠ the pinned digests the client resolved at publish time), same entrypoint, same pyz content, same `/state` state anchoring; differences: docker-build layering (COPY+RUN blobs vs verbatim base layers + one broker layer) and version string provenance (build-arg vs build-time injection). Document both in the Dockerfile header.
+
+### 3.6 Stub-test plan (`tests/test_publish_image.py`; v0.1 stub precedent)
+
+- `_StubRegistryHandler` on an ephemeral port: `GET /v2/` → 401 + `WWW-Authenticate` (realm = stub `/token`); `GET /token` → `{"token":"stub"}` (plus the anonymous-empty-token variant → client must fail cleanly); `GET /v2/<name>/manifests/<ref>` → fixture index (Accept-checked) / child manifest; `GET /v2/<name>/blobs/<digest>` → fixture bytes; `HEAD` blob → 200/404; `POST /v2/<name>/blobs/uploads/` (+`?digest=`) → 201 monolithic (assert body sha256 == digest param) or 202+`Location`; `PUT .../uploads/<uuid>?digest=` → 201; `PUT /v2/<name>/manifests/<tag>` → 201 (assert `Content-Type` == OCI manifest, all referenced digests already uploaded, diff_ids count == layers count).
+- Real-manifest fixture: tiny synthetic OCI index/manifest/config/1-2 tiny layers built in-test with the same tar+gzip code (NOT the 45 MB real base — suite stays fast); plus one "live-shape" assertion test using the digests/mediaTypes captured in §3.1 as constants.
+- End-to-end offline: stub Docker Hub + stub gitea → run the publish flow → assert both tags PUT, base layer bytes passed through, broker layer contains the pyz at `/app/`.
+- Redirect edge: stub answers 307 on the two-step upload PUT → client follows Location explicitly (urllib would raise otherwise).
+
+### 3.7 Defects / risks (daemonless)
+
+- **RISK** — upstream tag drift (`3.11-slim` moves): pin at publish time by recording digests + `--base-manifest` override; notes carry provenance.
+- **RISK** — 307/308 not followed by urllib (verified): explicit Location-following required; stub-tested.
+- **RISK** — ~46 MB upload per milestone (base layers re-uploaded; no cross-registry mount): bounded, once-per-milestone; HEAD-skip makes retries cheap.
+- **RISK** — gitea's anonymous-200 token quirk (verified): empty-scope JWT must not be treated as auth success.
+- **NOTE** — monolithic upload limits: gitea handles multi-MB bodies; the config/manifest are KB-scale, the largest blob is the 29.8 MB base layer — fine for monolithic POST (dist-spec; gitea conformance-tested upstream).
+- **NOTE** — publish failure follows the same bounded-retry → `release_pending` escalation as releases; never blocks the milestone merge (ROADMAP P3).
+
+## 4. Cross-Cutting: Layout, Security, Line Count
+
+### 4.1 Recommended repo layout (new files only)
+
+```
+cli/__main__.py              # boot shim (staged into the pyz; NOT coreci_broker.py → outside AC14)
+scripts/build_cli.py         # stage + zipapp + normalize; emits dist/coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz (+ sha256)
+scripts/release.py           # notes builder + create-or-get release + asset attach + bounded retry
+scripts/publish_image.py     # daemonless registry client (pull base → append layer → push, D-019)
+scripts/_env_secrets.py      # shared .env-file secrets loader (~20 lines, one discipline point)
+Dockerfile                   # documentation + docker-user path (§3.5)
+dist/                        # build output (gitignored)
+tests/test_cli_packaging.py  # build in tmp + boot subprocess + boot-parity flows via urllib
+tests/test_build_cli.py      # reproducibility: two builds → identical sha256; --version wiring
+tests/test_release_upload.py # stub-gitea attachment + retry/escalation paths
+tests/test_publish_image.py  # stub-registry pull/push flows + manifest assembly
+```
+
+- `scripts/_env_secrets.py` shared rather than copy-pasted per script: one place asserts the "file-only, non-empty" token discipline; `python3 scripts/release.py` runs with `sys.path[0] == scripts/` so the sibling import works without path setup.
+- **.gitignore additions**: `dist/`, `*.pyz` (root-level strays). Existing patterns already cover `__pycache__`, `*.db`, `*.log`, `.env*`, `data/`.
+- Phase mapping (per ROADMAP): Phase 1 = `cli/` + `scripts/build_cli.py` + its tests (REQ-21); Phase 2 = `release.py` + `publish_image.py` + `Dockerfile` + stub tests (REQ-22/23).
+
+### 4.2 Broker changes: ZERO (verified)
+
+- `run_standalone()`, `boot()`, `load_config()`, `_parse_env_file()` are module-level and importable; the shim + scripts need nothing added to the broker. `coreci_broker.py` = 1390/1400 lines (D-018 cap) — v0.2 adds no lines; AC14 stays green by construction.
+
+### 4.3 Test-harness conventions (carried v0.1 §6 + new packaging patterns)
+
+- Packaging test pattern (verified in prototype): `TemporaryDirectory` → `build_cli.build(state=tmp)` → subprocess `Popen(["python3", "<pyz>"], env={BROKER_BIND: "127.0.0.1:0", BROKER_ENV_PATH/DB/AUDIT: tmp paths}, stdout=PIPE)` → read stdout lines until `coreci-broker listening on http://…` (parse base URL; the `BROKER_ADMIN_PASS=` line comes first and is captured for login) → drive `urllib` flows (healthz, login, register, secret read — reuse v0.1 acceptance request patterns) → `proc.terminate()` in cleanup. Boot cost ~1–2 s; suite impact acceptable (v0.1 suite ≈ 2 min).
+- Stub servers: extend the `_StubOwuiHandler` pattern (class-level fixtures + hit recording + `addCleanup`) to `_StubGiteaHandler` / `_StubRegistryHandler`; all stubs bind `("127.0.0.1", 0)` and the code under test takes a base URL parameter (no hardcoded hosts in scripts — required for stubbing anyway).
+
+### 4.4 Security posture (v0.2-specific)
+
+- **No secrets in the artifact**: the pyz bundles broker + UI + client only; the client module contains no credentials; the broker generates pepper/admin pass at first boot; `.env` is never inside the archive. Same for the image: no state baked in (`WORKDIR /state` empty at build; first boot generates).
+- **Token discipline**: `release.py` / `publish_image.py` read `GITEA_TOKEN` ONLY via the `.env*` file loader (never shell env — structurally blocked by `blocked_env_vars`); assert non-empty before first use (v1.8: empty token → gitea 404 masks auth failure). Stubs use fake tokens; no live-forge writes in tests.
+- **Artifact integrity**: sha256 of the `.pyz` computed at build, embedded in release notes; reproducible build makes the digest meaningful across rebuilds.
+- **Static disclosure**: v0.1's `_broker_protected_paths` behavior extends unchanged to materialized roots (assets contain no secrets; `.env`/db/audit realpaths remain protected wherever the state dir sits).
+
+## 5. Research Conclusions (planner-ready)
+
+- **Phase 1 (REQ-21)**: `cli/__main__.py` five-step shim (§1.2 — prototype verified end-to-end, lift it), `scripts/build_cli.py` (stage → zipapp `--compress` → normalize post-pass §1.3 → sha256), `tests/test_cli_packaging.py` + `tests/test_build_cli.py`. Zero broker lines.
+- **Phase 2 (REQ-22/23)**: `scripts/_env_secrets.py` + `release.py` (create-or-get by tag, idempotent attach, bounded retry → release_pending, notes model §2.3); `scripts/publish_image.py` (§3.1–3.4 flows; OCI manifest end-to-end; monolithic uploads + HEAD skip + explicit Location-following); `Dockerfile` (§3.5); stub tests §2.4/§3.6.
+- **Phase 3 (acceptance)**: boot-parity matrix through the artifact (first-boot pass once, 0600 modes, silent second boot, UI + client served, register/read flows), reproducibility sha256, stub-releasability of both pipelines, security review (no secrets in artifact/image; token discipline), then milestone ship: build → attach to `v0.2.3` → publish image tags `v0.2.3` + `latest` → merge.
+- **No BLOCKERs found.** All environment facts were verified live (registry auth shapes, index resolution, gitea API, zipapp mechanics) and the packaging design is proven by a working prototype against the real broker sources. Remaining open items are NOTE/RISK grade and owned by the plan: sidecar `.sha256` asset vs digest-in-notes; shim fallback when run unzipped (trivial); `latest`-tag manifest PUT ordering (push version tag first, `latest` second — trivial).

.ciagent/ROADMAP.md

@@ -1,60 +1,45 @@
-# Roadmap — Milestone v0.1 (coreci-broker)
+# Roadmap — Milestone v0.2 (cli-packaging)
 
 ## Overview
 
-One milestone, owner-directed 2026-10-09: implement Requirements Specification v0.5 in full. **Milestone v0.1 — coreci-broker** (feature type): the single-file broker, its SQLite store, audit log, four-page admin UI, tool-auth plane, secrets mediation, public client module, and reference tools, with the spec's §12 acceptance matrix (AC1–AC14) green. The spec's "v0.5" is its requirements-doc revision label, not the product version (D-008).
+One milestone, owner-directed 2026-10-10: package the completed v0.1 broker for distribution. **Milestone v0.2 — cli-packaging** (feature type): the broker as a single-file zipapp CLI (`coreci-broker.pyz`, self-contained), the CLI attached to every gitea release alongside release notes, and a docker container built **once per milestone** and published as a package in the gitea container registry. Scope is CLI + distribution only — no functional changes to the broker (REQ-21..REQ-23). Docker publication starts with v0.2; no retroactive v0.1 image.
 
-Versioning (greenfield deviation, researchx/nextcraft precedent): the milestone branch is `milestone/v0.1-coreci-broker`; phase tags run on the milestone's own line — phase 0 ships `v0.1.0`, execution phases ship `v0.1.1`..`v0.1.4`, and the final phase's patch (`v0.1.5`) IS the milestone release; no separate minor tag. MAJOR remains 0 until an owner-approved v1 release. Ships go to gitea (`git.coreci.dev/coreci/broker`); the forge repo must exist before the first push.
+Versioning (greenfield convention, D-008): the milestone branch is `milestone/v0.2-cli-packaging`; phase tags run on the milestone's own line — phase 0 ships `v0.2.0`, execution phases ship `v0.2.1`..`v0.2.2`, and the final phase's patch (`v0.2.3`) IS the milestone release; no separate minor tag. MAJOR remains 0 until an owner-approved v1 release. Ships go to gitea (`git.coreci.dev/coreci/broker`); releases are best-effort with bounded retry, never blocking tag+merge.
 
 Autonomy: **guided** — escalate on every decision gate; threshold 0.85; 1 revision iteration; clarify budget 20.
 
 ## Phase 0 — Pre-Execution
 
-- **Description**: Specification parsing, clarification (decisions D-001..D-011 recorded in the init commit), `.ciagent/` reference files, and the pre-execution pipeline stages: specify → clarify → research → plan → grill. Init has landed the reference files; `/ci-run` phase 0 completes RESEARCH.md (environment constraints, spec defects, sibling conventions), PLAN.md (task-level breakdown), PERSONAS.md, and the GRILL verdict before any code.
+- **Description**: Specification parsing (REQ-21..REQ-23), clarification (packaging/distribution decisions D-019..D-022), research (zipapp mechanics, gitea release-asset API, gitea container registry + OCI registry HTTP API v2, Docker Hub anonymous pulls), plan (task-level breakdown with waves), grill, MVP/UX check. `/ci-run` phase 0 completes REQUIREMENTS.md v2 section, RESEARCH.md, PLAN.md, PERSONAS.md, and the grill verdict before any code.
 - **Requirements covered**: none (planning artifacts)
-- **Success criteria**: `.ciagent/` files reflect the 6-phase structure; REQ-01..REQ-20 defined and traceable; milestone v0.1 established in config.json and PROJECT.md; PLAN.md + PERSONAS.md committed; grill verdict recorded; phase tagged `v0.1.0`
+- **Success criteria**: REQ-21..REQ-23 defined and traceable; milestone v0.2 established in config.json and PROJECT.md; D-016+ decisions recorded; PLAN.md + PERSONAS.md committed; grill verdict recorded; MVP/UX sections present; phase tagged `v0.2.0`
 - **Depends on**: —
-- **Status**: complete
+- **Status**: complete (shipped as `v0.2.0`, release id 970)
 
-## Phase 1 — Core Skeleton
+## Phase 1 — CLI Packaging + Release Tooling
 
-- **Description**: `coreci_broker.py` foundation: `.env` read/write + first-boot generation (pepper + admin pass, printed once), SQLite schema + indexes per spec §5.2, mode-0600 on DB and audit log, append-only JSONL audit writer per §5.3, dual-mode bcrypt/scrypt hasher (D-001), server-side token derivation per §6, stdlib `ThreadingHTTPServer` + JSON router + `{"error, message}` contract per §7, Open WebUI `Tools`-class mount (daemon thread) + standalone `__main__` entry.
-- **Requirements covered**: REQ-03, REQ-11, REQ-14, REQ-15, REQ-16, REQ-17, REQ-18
-- **Success criteria**: broker boots standalone on an ephemeral port, creates DB + audit log at 0600, prints the generated admin pass exactly once (not on second boot); token derivation matches the §6 formula byte-for-byte; source under 800 lines
+- **Description**: `coreci-broker.pyz` build pipeline: stdlib `python3 -m zipapp` build script (no pip) with G-009 normalize pass (sorted entries, fixed timestamps, constant external_attr); self-contained archive bundling `coreci_broker.py` + `coreci_broker_ui/` + `coreci_broker_client.py` with asset materialization at boot (env-resolved roots, never `__file__`); standalone boot parity with v0.1 (first-boot `.env` generation, admin pass printed once, 0600 modes, full admin UI + client module served); `--version` flag; release-asset automation (G-011: `scripts/_env_secrets.py` + `scripts/release.py` land here so the v0.2.1 ship attach is script-driven — no ad-hoc bridge); tests boot the built artifact end-to-end and stub-verify the gitea upload.
+- **Requirements covered**: REQ-21, REQ-22
+- **Success criteria**: artifact builds reproducibly from a clean checkout (two consecutive same-environment builds → byte-identical sha256); `python3 coreci-broker.pyz` boots with behavior byte-identical to `python3 coreci_broker.py` (v0.1 suite green through the packaged path); UI pages + client module served from the archive; first-boot semantics preserved on second boot; the `v0.2.1` release carries the `.pyz` attached by `scripts/release.py` (D-020 starts here; `v0.2.0` carries none — G-021)
 - **Depends on**: 0
-- **Status**: complete
+- **Status**: complete (shipped as `v0.2.1` — 325 cumulative tests green, verify four-layer PASS, .pyz attached by script, asset id 396)
 
-## Phase 2 — Admin Plane
+## Phase 2 — Docker + Image Publish
 
-- **Description**: Session auth (cookie `broker_session` + HTTP Basic both accepted), `POST /api/broker/auth/login`, `logout`, `whoami` (§7.1); app_registrations list/add/revoke/reinstate (§7.2, UUID format validation, 409 on duplicate, revoke keeps existing tokens until TTL); user_allowlist list/add/revoke/reinstate (§7.3); audit query with filters + `next_since` cursor (§7.6); the four UI pages + dashboard + persistent nav (§10) served from `coreci_broker_ui/`; session cleanup.
-- **Requirements covered**: REQ-01, REQ-05, REQ-06, REQ-12, REQ-13
-- **Success criteria**: AC1 (first-boot login with the printed pass), AC2 (app registration add/remove via UI, persisted in `app_registrations`, UI updates after each action), AC3 (user allowlist same), AC9's login/logout audit lines
+- **Description**: Daemonless publish client per D-019 (once-per-milestone pull pinned base layers / append broker layer / push to `git.coreci.dev/coreci/broker` with version + `latest` tags, D-021/D-022; G-019 wire hardening: per-request timeouts, blob retry with HEAD-skip, explicit 307/308 relative-Location handling); `Dockerfile` + `.dockerignore` (G-015) + consistency-tested equivalence mapping (G-016); README additive section (CLI + docker usage); the `v0.2.2` release attaches the `.pyz` via `scripts/release.py` with CLI + docker notes.
+- **Requirements covered**: REQ-23 (+ REQ-21/REQ-22 docs)
+- **Success criteria**: daemonless publish client stub-verified end-to-end (no live-forge writes, no container runtime); Dockerfile/.dockerignore consistency tests green; this phase's release (`v0.2.2`) carries the `.pyz` attached alongside the source archive with notes; bounded-retry → `release_pending` paths covered by tests
 - **Depends on**: 1
-- **Status**: complete
+- **Status**: complete (shipped as `v0.2.2` — 341 cumulative tests green, verify four-layer PASS, .pyz attached by script, asset id 397)
 
-## Phase 3 — Tool Auth Plane
+## Phase 3 — Final Review + Ship
 
-- **Description**: `POST /api/broker/agents/register` (§7.4): allowlist gates → 403 on unknown/revoked UUID or user; idempotent re-registration re-derives from request inputs and overwrites on input change (D-005); pepper returned on row-create or when the caller presents no valid token; TTL set from `BROKER_TOKEN_TTL`. App-auth verification: parse `Authorization: App <UUID> <token>`, UUID-scoped slow-hash scan + in-memory verified-token cache (D-004). `GET /api/broker/agents/<agent_id>` (§7.4). State endpoints `GET/PUT /api/broker/agents/<id>/state` (§9.1) with identity enforcement (calling UUID + token-derived user_id must match stored identity) and the backend toggle `BROKER_AGENT_STATE_BACKEND=internal` (default) `| owui` (D-003).
-- **Requirements covered**: REQ-02, REQ-04, REQ-09, REQ-10
-- **Success criteria**: AC4 (token derived + stored as slow-hash, same value computed both sides), AC7 (revoked/unknown UUID → 403), AC8 (unknown user → 403), AC10 (TTL expiry → 401 → re-register → new token, audited), AC12 (state read/write with identity enforcement)
+- **Description**: Full acceptance: cumulative v0.1 suite green plus v0.2 packaging acceptance (boot parity through the artifact, self-containment, daemonless publish flow); security review (artifact integrity, no secrets in the archive/image, token discipline in upload paths, build-context hygiene); multi-persona review of the milestone diff; audit/reconstruction (REQ-21..23 traceable); milestone ship in the G-012-corrected order — build CLI → squash-merge `milestone/v0.2-cli-packaging` → `main` → tag `v0.2.3` → push → G-013 live smoke (read-only, env-gated) → attach `.pyz` + full notes via `scripts/release.py` → daemonless image publish once (D-019..D-022, with the G-020 closure runbook on failure) → branch cleanup → closeout.
+- **Requirements covered**: REQ-21, REQ-22, REQ-23 (acceptance)
+- **Success criteria**: all v0.1 + v0.2 acceptance green; security review PASS; `v0.2.3` on `main` with the `.pyz` attached + notes on the gitea release; docker image published as a gitea package (or escalated per the bounded-retry contract + closure runbook, never blocking merge); REQUIREMENTS/ROADMAP closed out; checkpoint cleared
 - **Depends on**: 2
-- **Status**: complete
+- **Status**: complete (shipped as `v0.2.3` — milestone release; 356 cumulative tests green, security review PASS-WITH-FINDINGS remediated, `.pyz` attached + notes, image published once)
 
-## Phase 4 — Secrets + Client Ecosystem
+## Post-Milestone Notes (carry-forward from v0.1, GRILL G-008)
 
-- **Description**: Creds-source adapter (D-002): `FileCredsSource` (default; JSON document at `BROKER_CREDS_FILE` mapping paths to secret objects) and `OwuiApiCredsSource` (`BROKER_OWUI_BASE_URL` + `BROKER_OWUI_API_KEY`). `GET /api/broker/secrets/<path>` (§7.5): App-auth, scope check `path == "coreci/" + agent_id` → 403 on mismatch, 404 when absent, audit every attempt. Public client module `coreci_broker_client.py` (stdlib urllib only): ensure-registered, state get/put, secret read with 401 → re-register → retry-once; served unauthenticated at `/static/coreci_broker_client.py`. Reference OWUI tools (`reference_tools/`): proxmox reference + a minimal auth-then-use showcase, safe dry-run default (§9, §11; D-006).
-- **Requirements covered**: REQ-07, REQ-08, REQ-19, REQ-20
-- **Success criteria**: AC5 (valid token reads the secret; tampered token → 401), AC6 (proxmox-registered tool reading `coreci/gitea` → 403); client module fetchable unauthenticated and drives a reference tool end-to-end against a test broker
-- **Depends on**: 3
-- **Status**: complete
-
-## Phase 5 — Final Review + Ship
-
-- **Description**: Full §12 acceptance matrix as tests (AC1–AC13 as behavioral tests, AC14 as a line-count test); security review pass (path traversal on `<path>`, pepper never re-printed, 0600 modes, token scoping, audit completeness); README with run/deploy notes and documented spec deviations, including the owner-run post-ship live-OWUI smoke checklist (mount/register/read on the deployed v0.11.3 host — G-005/G-006); multi-persona review of the milestone diff; owner approval gate; milestone merge to main and tag `v0.1.5` (final phase patch = milestone release); first push to gitea once the forge repo exists.
-- **Requirements covered**: REQ-01..REQ-20 (acceptance)
-- **Success criteria**: AC1–AC14 all green (`python3 -m unittest discover -s tests`); security review PASS; README complete with deviations; owner approval recorded; milestone squash-merged to main, tagged `v0.1.5`, release created
-- **Depends on**: 4
-- **Status**: not_started
-## Post-Milestone Notes (owner-promoted from GRILL G-008)
-
-- **90-day adoption criterion**: `proxmox_readonly_tool.py` runs on `coreci_broker_client.py` with direct KB reads removed by **2027-01-09**; the owner owns the date. No real tool migrates to the broker before the post-ship OWUI smoke checklist (G-005) passes on the deployed v0.11.3 host.
+- **90-day adoption criterion**: `proxmox_readonly_tool.py` runs on `coreci_broker_client.py` with direct KB reads removed by **2027-01-09**; the owner owns the date. No real tool migrates to the broker before the owner-run post-ship OWUI smoke checklist (G-005) passes on the deployed v0.11.3 host. These v0.1 post-ship obligations remain open after the v0.1 ship (2026-10-10) and carry forward unchanged.

.ciagent/config.json

@@ -46,9 +46,9 @@
   "projects": [],
   "active_project": null,
   "milestone": {
-    "version": "v0.1",
-    "name": "coreci-broker",
+    "version": "v0.2",
+    "name": "cli-packaging",
     "type": "feature",
-    "branch": "milestone/v0.1-coreci-broker"
+    "branch": "milestone/v0.2-cli-packaging"
   }
 }

.dockerignore

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Build-context hygiene (G-015): no secrets, state, or build artifacts
+# may enter an image build context.
+.git
+.env
+.env.*
+data/
+*.db
+*.log
+dist/
+__pycache__/
+tests/
+.ciagent/
+# Nested matches too (P3-03, CWE-693): the root-anchored `__pycache__/`
+# above misses cli/__pycache__/*.pyc — build artifacts must stay out of
+# the context wherever they sit in the tree.
+**/__pycache__/
+**/*.pyc

.gitignore

@@ -10,4 +10,8 @@ __pycache__/
 # Broker runtime state
 data/
 *.db
-*.log
+*.log
+
+# v0.2 build artifacts
+dist/
+*.pyz

Dockerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+# coreci-broker docker image (v0.2, REQ-23).
+#
+# Equivalence mapping to the daemonless-published image
+# (scripts/publish_image.py — the pipeline's source of truth):
+#   same base family: python:3.11-slim (D-022 pinned minor)
+#   same artifact:    coreci_broker.py + coreci_broker_client.py +
+#                     coreci_broker_ui/ + cli/__main__.py + _cli_version.py,
+#                     packed by the same `python3 -m zipapp` invocation
+#                     (--python "/usr/bin/env python3" --compress)
+#   same entrypoint:  ["python3", "/app/coreci-broker.pyz"]
+#   same state anchor: WORKDIR /state (volume-backed; first boot generates
+#                     .env, broker.db, broker.audit.log there)
+# Documented differences (equivalence required, byte-identity NOT):
+#   - docker-build layering (COPY + RUN) vs the daemonless client's
+#     verbatim base layers + one deterministic broker layer
+#   - version provenance: ARG VERSION here vs build-time _cli_version.py
+#     injection in scripts/build_cli.py
+#   - no normalize pass here (docker rebuilds are not digest-pinned)
+FROM python:3.11-slim
+
+# Staging mirrors scripts/build_cli.py EXACTLY (P3-03, CWE-636): Docker
+# copies directory CONTENTS flattened, so the staging layout must come
+# from the destination paths — root sources at /app/src/, UI pages under
+# /app/src/coreci_broker_ui/ (cli/__main__.py:80-83 materializes only
+# coreci_broker_ui/* members; a flattened copy leaves /ui/* 404ing), and
+# the shim staged as the archive-root __main__.py (zipapp boots the
+# root __main__.py; the file-to-file rename mirrors build_cli's
+# STAGED_SHIM staging).
+COPY coreci_broker.py coreci_broker_client.py /app/src/
+COPY coreci_broker_ui/ /app/src/coreci_broker_ui/
+COPY cli/__main__.py /app/src/__main__.py
+
+ARG VERSION=dev
+RUN printf 'VERSION = "%s"\n' "$VERSION" > /app/src/_cli_version.py \
+    && python3 -m zipapp /app/src -o /app/coreci-broker.pyz \
+        --python "/usr/bin/env python3" --compress
+
+WORKDIR /state
+
+ENTRYPOINT ["python3", "/app/coreci-broker.pyz"]
+
+EXPOSE 8765

README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+# CoreCI Broker
+
+**TL;DR** — CoreCI Broker — single-file credential broker for autonomous agent tools (Open WebUI workspace tool / standalone). This file explains how to stand it up and who to contact; the machinery detail stays lower under Details.
+
+
+A single-file credential broker for autonomous agent tools on the Open WebUI
+host. Tools authenticate with derived tokens instead of shared secrets, the
+CEO gates access through UI-managed allowlists of app UUIDs and user IDs,
+every read lands in an append-only audit log, and secret reads are path-scoped
+to `coreci/<agent_id>` — one Python file, one SQLite DB, a four-page admin UI,
+zero pip installs, no build step.
+
+## Quickstart (standalone)
+
+```bash
+python3 coreci_broker.py
+```
+
+- Stdlib-only runtime, Python 3.11+. Zero pip installs: bcrypt when
+  importable, stdlib scrypt otherwise (format-prefixed hashes).
+- First boot generates `.env`: a 32-byte base64 pepper plus a 32+-char admin
+  password. The password is printed to the startup log as `BROKER_ADMIN_PASS=…`
+  **exactly once** — save it immediately; it is never printed again. Lost pass:
+  remove `BROKER_ADMIN_PASS` from `.env` and reboot — a new one prints once.
+- The server binds `127.0.0.1:8765`. Open `http://127.0.0.1:8765/ui/login` and
+  log in with the printed pass.
+- Stop with Ctrl+C. Durable state is exactly three files: `broker.db`,
+  `broker.audit.log`, `.env` — back them up.
+
+## Configuration
+
+Read on boot from the `.env` at `BROKER_ENV_PATH`. Precedence:
+**process env → `.env` → defaults**.
+
+| Variable | Default | Purpose |
+|----------|---------|---------|
+| `BROKER_BIND` | `127.0.0.1:8765` | Listen address; the bind controls reachability |
+| `BROKER_ADMIN_USER` | `admin` | Admin login user name |
+| `BROKER_ADMIN_PASS` | generated first boot | Admin login password (32+ random chars) |
+| `BROKER_INSTANCE_PEPPER` | generated first boot | 32-byte base64 pepper; token derivation input, synced to SQLite |
+| `BROKER_ENV_PATH` | `.env` | Path of the `.env` file the broker reads/writes |
+| `BROKER_TOKEN_TTL` | `86400` | Tool token lifetime, seconds (24 h) |
+| `BROKER_SESSION_TTL` | `300` | Admin UI session cookie lifetime, seconds |
+| `BROKER_DB_PATH` | `broker.db` | SQLite database (mode 0600) |
+| `BROKER_AUDIT_LOG_PATH` | `broker.audit.log` | Append-only JSONL audit log (mode 0600) |
+| `BROKER_CREDS_SOURCE` | `file` | Credential source adapter: `file` (dev/tests) or `owui` (production) |
+| `BROKER_CREDS_FILE` | `data/creds.json` | `FileCredsSource` JSON document: paths → secret objects |
+| `BROKER_OWUI_BASE_URL` | — | Open WebUI base URL for the OWUI creds source |
+| `BROKER_OWUI_API_KEY` | — | Open WebUI API key (Bearer) for KB read access |
+| `BROKER_AGENT_STATE_BACKEND` | `internal` | Agent-state storage: `internal` (rows in broker.db) or `owui` |
+| `BROKER_MAX_AGENTS_PER_APP` | `50` | Cap on agent registrations per app UUID |
+| `BROKER_UI_ROOT` | `coreci_broker_ui` | Directory served for `/ui/*` pages |
+| `BROKER_STATIC_ROOT` | `.` | Directory served for `/static/*` (client module) |
+
+Production: `BROKER_CREDS_SOURCE=owui` with `BROKER_OWUI_BASE_URL` +
+`BROKER_OWUI_API_KEY` (0600 `.env` discipline). Keep `BROKER_BIND` on
+loopback unless you deliberately widen reachability.
+
+## Running as an Open WebUI workspace tool
+
+Paste `coreci_broker.py` into Open WebUI as a workspace Tool (frontmatter
+`requirements:` stays empty — the runtime already ships everything). Notes
+that matter:
+
+- The server starts in `Tools.__init__` behind a once-per-process guard; the
+  OWUI loader has no activate/deactivate hook, and disabling a tool does not
+  stop a previously started server.
+- **After editing the broker tool source, restart Open WebUI.** The loader
+  re-execs the module on source change, but the previously loaded server keeps
+  its port — the new instance fails loud with a bind-error message telling you
+  to restart, rather than silently serving old code.
+- Paths (DB, audit log, `.env`, UI roots) resolve from environment config,
+  never from `__file__` — the OWUI loader deletes the temp file it execs.
+- Durable state: `broker.db` + `broker.audit.log` + `.env` — **back those
+  three up**; SQLite is the source of truth, no HA, restore is a file copy.
+- `Tools.status()` reports the serving address; call it from a chat to verify
+  the mount, or hit `/healthz` on the bind.
+
+## Admin UI
+
+Four pages + dashboard, server-rendered on the same port as the API:
+
+- `/ui/login` — the CEO's bookmark. First-boot pass discipline: the printed
+  pass is shown once; record it in your secret store on first login.
+- `/ui/app_registrations` — allowlist of tool app UUIDs: add, revoke, reinstate.
+- `/ui/user_allowlist` — allowlist of user IDs (optional email): same actions.
+- `/ui/audit` — filterable, read-only view of the audit log (no export in v0.1).
+- `/ui/dashboard` — landing page with persistent nav header and Logout.
+
+Allowlist semantics: **revoke keeps existing tokens working until TTL expiry —
+by design.** Revocation immediately blocks new registrations; already-issued
+tokens live at most one `BROKER_TOKEN_TTL` (24 h by default).
+
+## Tool authors
+
+Fetch the public client module — unauthenticated, from
+`http://<broker>/static/coreci_broker_client.py` — into your workspace and
+import it. Flow: `ensure_registered(state)` → `put_state(state)` →
+`read_secret("coreci/<agent_id>", state)`. Stdlib-urllib-only (no httpx, no
+bcrypt), so any tool can import it; on a 401 it re-registers and retries
+once. State endpoints are the tool's only persistence channel — keep `state`
+there, not in local files. See `reference_tools/` for the proxmox-style §11
+flow and a minimal auth-then-use showcase; downstream calls default to a
+safe dry-run.
+
+## Security model
+
+- Derived token: `base64(sha256(pepper:UUID:user_id:agent_id:sorted_tags))` —
+  44 ASCII chars, no prefix, no challenge protocol. Stored only as a slow
+  hash (`$2b$…` / `scrypt$…`), never in plaintext.
+- Allowlists are the gate: unknown or revoked app UUIDs and unknown users get
+  403 at registration; the token is the consequence, not the authority.
+- Every secret-read attempt is audited (ok/denied/error) with user, UUID,
+  agent, and path.
+- Secret reads are path-scoped: a registration reads exactly
+  `coreci/<agent_id>` — cross-path → 403, absent → 404.
+- The broker never writes to `creds-coreci-coo`; the CEO maintains that KB
+  through the Open WebUI UI.
+- `broker.db`, `broker.audit.log`, and `.env` are mode 0600.
+- Binds `127.0.0.1` by default; trusted-network posture — no rate limiting by
+  design (spec §14).
+
+## Documented spec deviations
+
+Honest list; full detail in `.ciagent/PROJECT.md`:
+
+- **Line-cap amendments (D-016/D-017/D-018)**: the single-file constraint grew
+  800 → 1000 → 1200 → 1400 lines via the owner-approved §12.14 amendment
+  pattern (readability over dense cramming). Current source: 1390 lines; AC14
+  enforces the cap.
+- **Dual-mode hashing (D-001)**: spec §6 mandates bcrypt; the runtime is
+  stdlib-only, so scrypt fallback with format-prefixed hashes.
+- **Token verification (D-004)**: spec §7.5's in-memory `token_hash` index is
+  impossible with salted slow hashes; the broker scans rows scoped to the
+  presented UUID and keeps a non-authoritative verified-token cache.
+- **Pepper rule (D-005)**: the pepper is returned only on row creation or
+  tokenless registration (the KB-loss recovery path); spec §9's snippet would
+  raise `KeyError` on re-registration.
+- **Spec defects resolved**: §7.5 index, §6-vs-§9 (the broker derives
+  authoritatively; the tool stores), §9's `KeyError` — see PROJECT.md §Context.
+- `BROKER_ADMIN_USER` defaults to `admin` (spec silent on a default).
+- Register cap `BROKER_MAX_AGENTS_PER_APP` (50) — a documented addition.
+- Reinstate actions audit as `add_app`/`add_user` (no separate audit action).
+- In-scope but absent secrets audit as `read` with `result: error` (404s are
+  audited, not silent).
+
+## Post-ship live-OWUI smoke checklist (owner-run)
+
+Before migrating any real tool (G-005; deployed host pinned v0.11.3, G-006):
+
+1. Confirm the deployed Open WebUI version (expected **v0.11.3**) and that the
+   KB read endpoints match the researched surface: `/api/v1/knowledge/{id}` and
+   `/api/v1/files/{id}/data/content`.
+2. Add the broker as a workspace tool; check `/healthz` on the bind.
+3. CEO first-boot login at `/ui/login` with the printed pass.
+4. Add one app UUID and one user to the allowlists via the UI.
+5. In a scratch tool: import the client module from `/static/` →
+   `ensure_registered` → read `coreci/proxmox` via the OWUI creds source.
+6. Verify every step in `/ui/audit`.
+7. Rollback = disable the tool + restore the three state files.
+
+No real tool migrates before this passes; the 90-day adoption criterion
+(proxmox tool on the client, direct KB reads removed) is due 2027-01-09.
+
+## Tests
+
+```bash
+timeout 300 python3 -m unittest discover -s tests
+```
+
+295 tests, stdlib unittest only (~2 min; one skip where bcrypt is not
+importable). The AC1–AC14 acceptance matrix is green.
+
+## Repository layout
+
+| Path | What it is |
+|------|------------|
+| `coreci_broker.py` | The broker: single file — server, store, audit, auth, UI serving |
+| `coreci_broker_client.py` | Public stdlib-only client module (served at `/static/`) |
+| `coreci_broker_ui/` | Server-rendered HTML for the four pages + dashboard |
+| `reference_tools/` | Tool-author templates (proxmox-style §11 flow + minimal showcase) |
+| `tests/` | Stdlib-unittest suite incl. the AC1–AC14 acceptance matrix |
+| `.ciagent/` | CI pipeline artifacts (project, requirements, roadmap, decisions) |
+## CLI and Docker (v0.2)
+
+From v0.2.1 onward every gitea release attaches the broker packaged as a
+self-contained CLI zipapp: `coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz` (its sha256 is in
+the release notes).
+
+**CLI install + usage:**
+
+```bash
+# from the release page assets:
+chmod +x coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz
+./coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz --version          # prints the release version
+./coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz                   # boots the standalone broker
+# or: python3 coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz       (Python 3.11+)
+```
+
+The artifact bundles the broker, the admin UI pages, and the client
+module — one file serves everything (UI at `/ui/`, client at
+`/static/coreci_broker_client.py`). First boot prints
+`BROKER_ADMIN_PASS=...` exactly once and creates `.env`, `broker.db`,
+and `broker.audit.log` mode 0600 in the state dir; state is anchored by
+`BROKER_ENV_PATH` (relative paths stay CWD-relative). The full
+`BROKER_*` env contract is in the Configuration section above.
+
+**Docker:**
+
+```bash
+docker pull git.coreci.dev/coreci/broker:<tag>     # also :latest
+docker run -p 8765:8765 -v broker-state:/state \
+    git.coreci.dev/coreci/broker:<tag>
+```
+
+State lives on the `/state` volume (`WORKDIR /state`; first boot
+generates `.env`, `broker.db`, and `broker.audit.log there) — mount a
+persistent volume or the admin pass and any registrations are lost with
+the container. The image is built and published once per milestone at
+the milestone release (see `scripts/publish_image.py` — the daemonless
+registry client; the `Dockerfile` documents the docker-user path and
+its equivalence mapping).

cli/__main__.py

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+# coreci-broker CLI boot shim; staged by scripts/build_cli.py as the root
+# __main__.py of the coreci-broker-vX.Y.Z.pyz zipapp (the documented mode —
+# running this file unzipped from a source tree is a guarded fallback).
+#
+# Boot sequence: (1) --version prints _cli_version.VERSION and exits 0 before
+# any broker import; (2) the state dir is resolved exactly like the broker
+# resolves it (BROKER_ENV_PATH-anchored; relative default paths stay
+# CWD-relative — the broker's path contract is inherited unchanged);
+# (3) bundled assets are materialized from the running archive
+# (zipfile.ZipFile(sys.path[0])) into
+# <state>/.coreci_broker_assets/<VERSION>/{ui,static} — ui/ receives the
+# bundled coreci_broker_ui/ pages, static/ receives the bundled
+# coreci_broker_client.py — via a temp dir plus os.replace (versioned dirs;
+# same-version overwrite self-repairs; other versions are never cleaned);
+# (4) BROKER_UI_ROOT/BROKER_STATIC_ROOT are pointed at the materialized
+# dirs only when the key is absent from both the process env and the user
+# .env (user wins); (5) coreci_broker.run_standalone() boots the broker.
+# Guard: when sys.path[0] is a directory (or empty) this shim is running
+# unzipped from a source tree — materialization is skipped and the broker's
+# repo-relative defaults apply.
+#
+# Private-API coupling (grill G-018, tracked in P3-02): this shim imports
+# coreci_broker._parse_env_file and coreci_broker.run_standalone —
+# module-level but private-surfaced broker APIs (coreci_broker.py is frozen
+# at 1390 lines). Any future broker refactor that removes or renames them
+# breaks packaged boots loudly (ImportError/AttributeError); that breakage
+# is accepted — the fix is to update this shim and re-run the v0.2 packaged
+# acceptance (tests/test_cli_packaging.py).
+
+import os
+import shutil
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import zipfile
+
+ASSET_DIR_NAME = ".coreci_broker_assets"
+
+
+def _version_requested():
+    return "--version" in sys.argv[1:]
+
+
+def _resolve_state_dir():
+    env_path = os.environ.get("BROKER_ENV_PATH") or ".env"
+    return os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(env_path)) or os.getcwd()
+
+
+def _safe_relative(name):
+    if not name or "\x00" in name or "\\" in name or name.startswith("/"):
+        return None
+    parts = name.split("/")
+    if ".." in parts or any(part.startswith(".") for part in parts):
+        return None
+    return name
+
+
+def _write_asset(target_dir, relative, payload):
+    target = os.path.join(target_dir, relative)
+    os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(target), exist_ok=True)
+    with open(target, "wb") as handle:
+        handle.write(payload)
+
+
+def _materialize_assets(archive_path, state_dir):
+    import _cli_version
+
+    base_dir = os.path.join(state_dir, ASSET_DIR_NAME, _cli_version.VERSION)
+    parent_dir = os.path.dirname(base_dir)
+    os.makedirs(parent_dir, exist_ok=True)
+    tmp_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(dir=parent_dir, prefix=".tmp-")
+    try:
+        ui_dir = os.path.join(tmp_dir, "ui")
+        static_dir = os.path.join(tmp_dir, "static")
+        os.makedirs(ui_dir)
+        os.makedirs(static_dir)
+        with zipfile.ZipFile(archive_path) as archive:
+            for name in archive.namelist():
+                if name == "coreci_broker_client.py":
+                    _write_asset(static_dir, name, archive.read(name))
+                elif name.startswith("coreci_broker_ui/") and not name.endswith("/"):
+                    relative = _safe_relative(name[len("coreci_broker_ui/"):])
+                    if relative is not None:
+                        _write_asset(ui_dir, relative, archive.read(name))
+        if os.path.isdir(base_dir):
+            stale_dir = base_dir + ".stale"
+            shutil.rmtree(stale_dir, ignore_errors=True)
+            os.replace(base_dir, stale_dir)
+            try:
+                os.replace(tmp_dir, base_dir)
+            except OSError:
+                os.replace(stale_dir, base_dir)
+                raise
+            shutil.rmtree(stale_dir, ignore_errors=True)
+        else:
+            os.replace(tmp_dir, base_dir)
+    finally:
+        shutil.rmtree(tmp_dir, ignore_errors=True)
+    return {"ui": os.path.join(base_dir, "ui"), "static": os.path.join(base_dir, "static")}
+
+
+def _apply_asset_roots(roots, env_path):
+    import coreci_broker
+
+    file_values = dict(coreci_broker._parse_env_file(env_path))
+    for key, name in (("BROKER_UI_ROOT", "ui"), ("BROKER_STATIC_ROOT", "static")):
+        if key not in os.environ and key not in file_values:
+            os.environ[key] = roots[name]
+
+
+def main():
+    if _version_requested():
+        import _cli_version
+        print(_cli_version.VERSION)
+        return 0
+    archive_path = sys.path[0]
+    if archive_path and not os.path.isdir(archive_path):
+        env_path = os.environ.get("BROKER_ENV_PATH") or ".env"
+        roots = _materialize_assets(archive_path, _resolve_state_dir())
+        _apply_asset_roots(roots, env_path)
+    import coreci_broker
+    coreci_broker.run_standalone()
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())

coreci_broker.py

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ licence: MIT
 """
 import base64
 import datetime
+import errno
 import hashlib
 import hmac
 import http.cookies
@@ -728,11 +729,16 @@ def _required_string(value):
     return value if isinstance(value, str) and value else None
 
 
-def _valid_user_id(value):
+def _has_control_chars(value):
+    return any(ord(ch) < 32 or ord(ch) == 127 for ch in value)
+
+
+def _valid_id(value):
     if not _required_string(value):
         return None
-    if (":" in value or "/" in value or "\\" in value
-            or any(ord(ch) < 32 or ord(ch) == 127 for ch in value)):
+    if value in (".", ".."):
+        return None
+    if ":" in value or "/" in value or "\\" in value or _has_control_chars(value):
         return None
     return value
 
@@ -760,7 +766,7 @@ def _apps_add(request):
 
 
 def _users_add(request):
-    _add_row(request, "user_allowlist", "user_id", "email", "add_user", _valid_user_id)
+    _add_row(request, "user_allowlist", "user_id", "email", "add_user", _valid_id)
 
 
 def _set_row_status(request, table, key, status, action):
@@ -875,10 +881,10 @@ def _agents_register(request):
     if len(strings) != 3 or not isinstance(tags, list) or not all(isinstance(v, str) for v in tags):
         request.send_error_json(400, "invalid registration")
         return
-    if ":" in agent_id or "/" in agent_id or "\\" in agent_id:
+    if _valid_id(agent_id) is None:
         request.send_error_json(400, "invalid agent_id")
         return
-    if any(":" in tag for tag in tags):
+    if any(":" in tag or _has_control_chars(tag) for tag in tags):
         request.send_error_json(400, "invalid tags")
         return
     path = "/api/broker/agents/register"
@@ -1343,7 +1349,16 @@ class Tools:
 
     def __init__(self):
         self.valves = self.Valves()
-        self._server = _start_guarded_server()
+        try:
+            self._server = _start_guarded_server()
+        except OSError as error:
+            if error.errno != errno.EADDRINUSE:
+                raise
+            raise RuntimeError(
+                f"broker bind failed ({error}): a broker from previously loaded "
+                "module code is still serving the configured bind; restart "
+                "Open WebUI to load the updated broker"
+            ) from error
 
     def status(self) -> str:
         """Report the broker server state as a one-line string."""

scripts/_env_secrets.py

@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Sanctioned secrets loader for the v0.2 distribution scripts (stdlib only).
+
+Secrets resolve ONLY from env files on disk — never from the process
+environment (``GITEA_TOKEN`` sits in ``config.security.bash_allowlist
+.blocked_env_vars``, so shell-env tokens are structurally blocked; the
+v1.8 lesson: an empty or mis-sourced token makes gitea answer 404 rather
+than 401, masking the auth failure).
+
+Parsing mirrors ``coreci_broker._parse_env_file`` semantics exactly:
+blank lines and ``#`` comments are skipped, keys/values are whitespace-
+stripped, and a value wrapped in matching single or double quotes is
+unquoted.
+
+File precedence — later files win. Locations in order (``root``, then the
+sanctioned ``.ciagent/`` dir under it); each location in ``config.json``
+``secrets.env_files`` pattern order (``.env``, ``.env.secrets``, then the
+``.env.*`` glob, sorted)::
+
+    <root>/.env, <root>/.env.secrets, <root>/.env.*
+    <root>/.ciagent/.env, <root>/.ciagent/.env.secrets, <root>/.ciagent/.env.*
+
+``load()`` returns the merged mapping; ``get_token()`` enforces the
+non-empty assert that callers MUST let happen before their first API
+call. This module never prints secret values.
+"""
+
+import glob
+import os
+
+ENV_FILE_PATTERNS = (".env", ".env.secrets", ".env.*")
+CIAGENT_SUBDIR = ".ciagent"
+
+
+class SecretsError(RuntimeError):
+    """A required secret is missing or empty in the sanctioned env files."""
+
+
+def default_root():
+    """Repo root: the parent directory of this scripts/ folder."""
+    return os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+
+
+def _parse_env_file(path):
+    """Mirror coreci_broker._parse_env_file (comments, blanks, quotes)."""
+    entries = []
+    if not os.path.isfile(path):
+        return entries
+    with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        for raw in handle:
+            line = raw.strip()
+            if not line or line.startswith("#") or "=" not in line:
+                continue
+            key, _, value = (part.strip() for part in line.partition("="))
+            if len(value) >= 2 and value[0] == value[-1] and value[0] in "\"'":
+                value = value[1:-1]
+            if key:
+                entries.append((key, value))
+    return entries
+
+
+def _candidate_files(root):
+    """Ordered, deduplicated env-file paths; later files win."""
+    seen = set()
+    files = []
+    for location in (root, os.path.join(root, CIAGENT_SUBDIR)):
+        for pattern in ENV_FILE_PATTERNS:
+            for path in sorted(glob.glob(os.path.join(location, pattern))):
+                if not os.path.isfile(path):
+                    continue
+                real = os.path.abspath(path)
+                if real in seen:
+                    continue
+                seen.add(real)
+                files.append(real)
+    return files
+
+
+def load(root=None):
+    """Merge every sanctioned env file under ``root`` into one dict.
+
+    ``root`` defaults to the repo root (the parent of scripts/).
+    """
+    base = os.path.abspath(root) if root is not None else default_root()
+    values = {}
+    for path in _candidate_files(base):
+        for key, value in _parse_env_file(path):
+            values[key] = value
+    return values
+
+
+def get_token(var="GITEA_TOKEN", root=None):
+    """Return the non-empty value of ``var`` from the env files only.
+
+    Raises SecretsError when the value is missing, empty, or whitespace-
+    only — callers must surface this BEFORE any HTTP call (an empty token
+    makes gitea answer 404 and masks the auth failure — the v1.8 lesson).
+    """
+    token = load(root).get(var, "")
+    if not token.strip():
+        base = os.path.abspath(root) if root is not None else default_root()
+        searched = ", ".join(
+            os.path.join(location, pattern)
+            for location in (base, os.path.join(base, CIAGENT_SUBDIR))
+            for pattern in ENV_FILE_PATTERNS
+        )
+        raise SecretsError(
+            "{} is missing or empty in the sanctioned env files "
+            "(searched: {}); it never resolves from the process "
+            "environment".format(var, searched)
+        )
+    return token.strip()

scripts/build_cli.py

@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Build the coreci-broker CLI zipapp artifact (stdlib only).
+
+Usage: python3 scripts/build_cli.py <version>
+
+Stages an explicit allowlist into a temp dir, packs it with
+``python3 -m zipapp ... --python "/usr/bin/env python3" --compress``, then
+runs a normalize post-pass (G-009) so same-environment rebuilds are
+byte-identical: entries sorted by name, ``date_time=(1980,1,1,0,0,0)``,
+``ZIP_DEFLATED``, ``external_attr`` set to constants (files
+``0o100644 << 16``, dirs ``0o40755 << 16`` — never preserved/umask-derived),
+shebang re-prepended, exec bit preserved. Prints the artifact sha256.
+"""
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import io
+import os
+import shutil
+import stat
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import zipfile
+
+ROOT_SOURCES = ("coreci_broker.py", "coreci_broker_client.py")
+UI_SOURCE_DIR = "coreci_broker_ui"
+SHIM_SOURCE = os.path.join("cli", "__main__.py")
+STAGED_SHIM = "__main__.py"
+VERSION_MODULE = "_cli_version.py"
+FIXED_DATE_TIME = (1980, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)
+FILE_EXTERNAL_ATTR = 0o100644 << 16
+DIR_EXTERNAL_ATTR = 0o40755 << 16
+
+
+def repo_root():
+    return os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+
+
+def artifact_name(version):
+    tag = version[1:] if version.startswith("v") else version
+    return "coreci-broker-v{}.pyz".format(tag)
+
+
+def stage_sources(repo, staging):
+    for name in ROOT_SOURCES:
+        shutil.copyfile(os.path.join(repo, name), os.path.join(staging, name))
+    ui_root = os.path.join(repo, UI_SOURCE_DIR)
+    staged_ui = os.path.join(staging, UI_SOURCE_DIR)
+    for current, _dirs, files in os.walk(ui_root):
+        relative = os.path.relpath(current, ui_root)
+        target_dir = staged_ui if relative == "." else os.path.join(staged_ui, relative)
+        os.makedirs(target_dir, exist_ok=True)
+        for name in sorted(files):
+            shutil.copyfile(os.path.join(current, name), os.path.join(target_dir, name))
+    shutil.copyfile(os.path.join(repo, SHIM_SOURCE), os.path.join(staging, STAGED_SHIM))
+
+
+def write_version_module(staging, version):
+    with open(os.path.join(staging, VERSION_MODULE), "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        handle.write('VERSION = "{}"\n'.format(version))
+
+
+def run_zipapp(staging, artifact):
+    command = [
+        sys.executable, "-m", "zipapp", staging,
+        "-o", artifact,
+        "--python", "/usr/bin/env python3",
+        "--compress",
+    ]
+    completed = subprocess.run(command, capture_output=True, text=True)
+    if completed.returncode != 0:
+        detail = (completed.stderr or completed.stdout).strip()
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            "zipapp failed with code {}: {}".format(completed.returncode, detail)
+        )
+
+
+def normalize_archive(artifact):
+    with open(artifact, "rb") as handle:
+        raw = handle.read()
+    if not raw.startswith(b"#!"):
+        raise RuntimeError("zipapp artifact is missing its shebang prefix")
+    shebang = raw.split(b"\n", 1)[0] + b"\n"
+    entries = []
+    with zipfile.ZipFile(io.BytesIO(raw)) as archive:
+        for info in archive.infolist():
+            payload = b"" if info.is_dir() else archive.read(info)
+            entries.append((info.filename, payload))
+    entries.sort(key=lambda entry: entry[0])
+    body = io.BytesIO()
+    with zipfile.ZipFile(body, "w", compression=zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED) as archive:
+        for name, payload in entries:
+            info = zipfile.ZipInfo(name, date_time=FIXED_DATE_TIME)
+            info.compress_type = zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED
+            info.external_attr = DIR_EXTERNAL_ATTR if name.endswith("/") else FILE_EXTERNAL_ATTR
+            archive.writestr(info, payload)
+    mode = os.stat(artifact).st_mode | stat.S_IXUSR | stat.S_IXGRP | stat.S_IXOTH
+    temp_path = artifact + ".tmp"
+    with open(temp_path, "wb") as handle:
+        handle.write(shebang)
+        handle.write(body.getvalue())
+    os.replace(temp_path, artifact)
+    os.chmod(artifact, mode)
+
+
+def sha256_file(path):
+    digest = hashlib.sha256()
+    with open(path, "rb") as handle:
+        for chunk in iter(lambda: handle.read(65536), b""):
+            digest.update(chunk)
+    return digest.hexdigest()
+
+
+def build(version, repo=None, dist_dir=None):
+    repo = os.path.abspath(repo or repo_root())
+    dist_dir = dist_dir or os.path.join(repo, "dist")
+    os.makedirs(dist_dir, exist_ok=True)
+    artifact = os.path.join(dist_dir, artifact_name(version))
+    with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="coreci-broker-cli-") as staging:
+        stage_sources(repo, staging)
+        write_version_module(staging, version)
+        run_zipapp(staging, artifact)
+    normalize_archive(artifact)
+    return artifact
+
+
+def main(argv=None):
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        description="Build the coreci-broker CLI zipapp artifact."
+    )
+    parser.add_argument("version", help="release version of the artifact, e.g. v0.2.1")
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+    artifact = build(args.version)
+    print(artifact)
+    print("sha256: {}".format(sha256_file(artifact)))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())

scripts/publish_image.py

@@ -0,0 +1,844 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Daemonless OCI image publish client (D-019; stdlib only).
+
+Usage:
+    python3 scripts/publish_image.py <tag> [--smoke]
+        [--artifact PATH] [--hub-registry URL] [--hub-auth URL]
+        [--gitea-registry URL] [--env-root DIR] [--owner O] [--repo R]
+        [--base-manifest DIGEST] [--timeout SECS]
+
+Flow (REQ-23, RESEARCH §3): pull the pinned ``python:3.11-slim`` base
+from the public registry anonymously (token -> OCI index -> resolve the
+linux/amd64 child manifest by digest -> config + layer blobs; digests
+recorded for provenance; ``--base-manifest`` overrides the tag
+resolution for exact re-publishes) -> authenticate to the gitea
+container registry (``GET /v2/token`` with Basic credentials — the
+gitea token comes only from the sanctioned env files via
+``scripts/_env_secrets.py``; the endpoint answers 200 even anonymously
+with an empty-scope JWT, so the issued token must be non-empty and
+failures must be loud — never treat a 200 alone as authorization) ->
+push: HEAD each blob first (200 -> skip — retries resume cheap; the
+~45.7 MB base layers are re-uploaded once per milestone because the
+registries cannot cross-mount) -> monolithic blob upload
+``POST /v2/<name>/blobs/uploads/?digest=`` (202 + ``Location`` ->
+two-step PUT) with explicit Location-following on 307/308 (stdlib
+urllib does NOT method-preserve on PUT/POST redirects) -> deterministic
+broker layer (sorted tar entries, fixed metadata, member at the stable
+path ``/app/coreci-broker.pyz``, ``gzip.compress(..., mtime=0)``) ->
+new config blob (base config + appended diff_id; Entrypoint
+``["python3", "/app/coreci-broker.pyz"]``, ``Cmd []``, ``WorkingDir
+"/state"``, version label; serialized with sort_keys) -> OCI manifest
+PUT with the base layer descriptors reused verbatim under ``<tag>``
+FIRST, then ``latest`` (D-021).
+
+Exit codes: 0 only after both manifest PUTs confirm 201; 1 after a
+remote failure — bounded retries (3 attempts, 2s/4s backoff) exhausted
+OR a permanent registry answer — printing the machine-readable
+``IMAGE_PENDING <image>:<tag>`` marker for the ship escalation (never
+blocks tag+merge); 2 for local precondition errors (missing artifact,
+token, or config — nothing attempted remotely, no marker). Token values
+are never printed.
+
+Smoke mode (``--smoke``; G-013) — read-only pre-ship verify. NEVER part
+of the default publish flow (the flag dispatches an early return; the
+publish path above never consults it): four GET-only checks against
+the live endpoints, run in order and stopping at the first failure —
+nothing is uploaded, no manifest is PUT, no remote state is mutated.
+
+1. ``GET {gitea}/v2/`` must answer 401 with a Bearer challenge whose
+   realm is the gitea token endpoint (the realm is recorded for 2).
+2. Token->JWT exchange at that recorded realm
+   (``?service=container_registry&scope=repository:{o}/{r}:pull,push``)
+   with Basic auth — the gitea token resolves ONLY from the sanctioned
+   env files via ``scripts/_env_secrets.py`` (never the shell
+   environment); an empty token in the 200 answer is the anonymous-200
+   trap and fails loudly.
+3. ``GET {gitea}/api/v1/repos/{o}/{r}/releases/tags/<tag>`` — 200
+   (exists) and 404 (not yet created) are BOTH acceptable pre-ship and
+   the line says which; the release's asset names print as a fact, and
+   a hard assertion binds ONLY when the tag is exactly ``v0.2.0``
+   (G-021 forge-side confirmation: the phase-0 release predates the
+   CLI and must carry NO ``.pyz`` asset, so any ``.pyz`` in its asset
+   list fails the smoke — the structural half of the guarantee,
+   release.py taking the tag as a positional argument with no v0.2.0
+   code path, is already machine-checked in the suite).
+4. Docker Hub anonymous index resolve of ``python:3.11-slim`` with the
+   full Accept set must yield an index whose linux/amd64 child is
+   resolved; the amd64 child digest is printed — the base-drift fact
+   the P3-05 ship compares against expectations.
+
+Smoke exit codes mirror the publish flow: 0 all four PASS; 1 with one
+clear FAILED line per failure (checks after the failed one never run);
+2 for local preconditions (missing token — nothing attempted
+remotely). Smoke never prints token values and never emits
+``IMAGE_PENDING`` (nothing was attempted, so nothing is pending).
+
+Live gating (G-013): the LIVE smoke executes only at the P3-05 ship
+step, which sets ``PUBLISH_SMOKE=1`` in the environment before invoking
+this mode — this script neither reads nor requires that variable (the
+SHIP GATE owns the gating). The smoke's LOGIC is what the default
+unittest suite exercises (stub-tested, zero network access); the live
+smoke itself never runs in the default suite.
+"""
+
+import argparse
+import base64
+import gzip
+import hashlib
+import http.client
+import io
+import json
+import os
+import re
+import sys
+import tarfile
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+
+_SCRIPTS_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
+if _SCRIPTS_DIR not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, _SCRIPTS_DIR)
+
+import _env_secrets  # sibling import (scripts/ dir on sys.path)
+
+METADATA_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30
+BLOB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 120
+MAX_ATTEMPTS = 3
+BACKOFF_SECONDS = (2, 4)
+MAX_REDIRECTS = 5
+BASE_REPO = "library/python"
+BASE_TAG = "3.11-slim"
+HUB_AUTH_SERVICE = "registry.docker.io"
+GITEA_AUTH_SERVICE = "container_registry"
+# The smoke-mode G-021 forge-side no-.pyz assertion binds ONLY this
+# tag: the phase-0 release predates the CLI (D-020 starts at v0.2.1).
+SMOKE_G021_TAG = "v0.2.0"
+
+OCI_INDEX = "application/vnd.oci.image.index.v1+json"
+OCI_MANIFEST = "application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json"
+OCI_CONFIG = "application/vnd.oci.image.config.v1+json"
+OCI_LAYER = "application/vnd.oci.image.layer.v1.tar+gzip"
+DOCKER_LIST = "application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest.list.v2+json"
+DOCKER_MANIFEST = "application/vnd.docker.distribution.manifest.v2+json"
+ACCEPT_MANIFESTS = ", ".join(
+    (OCI_INDEX, DOCKER_LIST, OCI_MANIFEST, DOCKER_MANIFEST))
+
+
+class PublishError(Exception):
+    """Image-publisher failure base."""
+
+
+class TransientFailure(PublishError):
+    """Connection error or 5xx persisting past the bounded retries."""
+
+
+class RegistryApiError(PublishError):
+    """Permanent registry answer carrying the remote detail."""
+
+
+class LocalError(PublishError):
+    """Local precondition failure (nothing was attempted remotely)."""
+
+
+def repo_root():
+    return os.path.dirname(_SCRIPTS_DIR)
+
+
+def load_release_defaults(root=None):
+    """Read the release block from .ciagent/config.json ({} if absent)."""
+    path = os.path.join(root or repo_root(), ".ciagent", "config.json")
+    try:
+        with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            config = json.load(handle)
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        return {}
+    block = config.get("release")
+    return block if isinstance(block, dict) else {}
+
+
+def _error_detail(body):
+    try:
+        payload = json.loads(body.decode("utf-8", "replace"))
+    except ValueError:
+        text = body.decode("utf-8", "replace").strip()
+        return text[:200] if text else "<empty body>"
+    if isinstance(payload, dict):
+        for key in ("errors", "message"):
+            if payload.get(key):
+                return json.dumps(payload[key])[:200]
+    return json.dumps(payload)[:200] if not isinstance(payload, str) else payload[:200]
+
+
+def _header(headers, name):
+    """Case-insensitive response-header lookup — ``_attempt_once``
+    returns a plain dict whose keys keep the wire casing, and registry
+    header casing is not guaranteed (e.g. WWW-Authenticate)."""
+    for key, value in headers.items():
+        if key.lower() == name.lower():
+            return value
+    return None
+
+
+def _parse_json(body, context, status):
+    """Parse a remote JSON body (token / manifest / config answers).
+
+    Malformed bodies raise RegistryApiError — never an uncaught
+    ValueError — so main()'s handler keeps the exit-1 + IMAGE_PENDING
+    marker contract for this failure class (CWE-754).
+    """
+    try:
+        return json.loads(body.decode("utf-8", "replace"))
+    except ValueError as error:
+        raise RegistryApiError(
+            "{} answered malformed JSON ({})".format(context, error),
+            status, body)
+
+
+def _attempt_once(method, url, headers, data, timeout):
+    """One HTTP exchange; HTTPError becomes a completed answer."""
+    request = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, method=method)
+    for key, value in headers.items():
+        request.add_header(key, value)
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=timeout) as response:
+            body = b"" if method == "HEAD" else response.read()
+            return response.status, body, dict(response.headers.items())
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as error:
+        body = b"" if method == "HEAD" else error.read()
+        return error.code, body, dict((error.headers or {}).items())
+
+
+def _origin(url):
+    """(scheme, netloc) of a URL — two URLs share an origin iff both match."""
+    parts = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
+    return (parts.scheme, parts.netloc)
+
+
+def _attempt_following(method, url, headers, data, timeout):
+    """One attempt, following 307/308 redirects explicitly (urllib does
+    NOT method-preserve on PUT/POST — the Location may be relative).
+
+    Cross-origin discipline (CWE-200): when a followed Location resolves
+    to a different origin than the ORIGINAL request's, the Authorization
+    header is stripped from the re-issued request — the registry JWT
+    must never reach another origin (blob-upload Locations are commonly
+    presigned external storage). Same-origin redirects keep it; once
+    stripped it is never re-attached."""
+    current_url = url
+    current_headers = dict(headers)
+    for _ in range(MAX_REDIRECTS + 1):
+        status, body, resp_headers = _attempt_once(
+            method, current_url, current_headers, data, timeout)
+        if status in (307, 308) and resp_headers.get("Location"):
+            next_url = urllib.parse.urljoin(
+                current_url, resp_headers["Location"])
+            if _origin(next_url) != _origin(url):
+                current_headers.pop("Authorization", None)
+            current_url = next_url
+            continue
+        return status, body, resp_headers
+    raise RegistryApiError(
+        "too many redirects following {} {}".format(method, url), 500, b"")
+
+
+def _request(method, url, headers, data, timeout,
+             max_attempts=None, backoff=None):
+    """Bounded-retry HTTP: retries connection errors and 5xx answers.
+
+    Returns (status, body, response_headers) for any answer below 500;
+    a 4xx returns immediately (permanent). Raises TransientFailure once
+    the retry budget is exhausted.
+    """
+    attempts = MAX_ATTEMPTS if max_attempts is None else int(max_attempts)
+    delays = BACKOFF_SECONDS if backoff is None else tuple(backoff)
+    failure = "unknown failure"
+    for attempt in range(1, attempts + 1):
+        try:
+            status, body, resp_headers = _attempt_following(
+                method, url, headers, data, timeout)
+        except (OSError, http.client.HTTPException) as error:
+            status = None
+            failure = "connection error: {}: {}".format(
+                type(error).__name__, error)
+        else:
+            if status < 500:
+                return status, body, resp_headers
+            failure = "HTTP {}: {}".format(status, _error_detail(body))
+        if attempt < attempts and delays:
+            time.sleep(delays[min(attempt - 1, len(delays) - 1)])
+    raise TransientFailure(
+        "{} {} failed after {} attempt(s): {}".format(
+            method, url, attempts, failure))
+
+
+def _hub_token(hub_auth, scope):
+    query = urllib.parse.urlencode(
+        {"service": HUB_AUTH_SERVICE, "scope": scope})
+    status, body, _ = _request(
+        "GET", "{}?{}".format(hub_auth, query), {}, None,
+        METADATA_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
+    if status != 200:
+        raise RegistryApiError("hub token request failed", status, body)
+    payload = _parse_json(body, "hub token endpoint", status)
+    token = ""
+    if isinstance(payload, dict):
+        token = payload.get("token") or payload.get("access_token") or ""
+    if not token:
+        raise RegistryApiError("hub token endpoint returned no token",
+                               status, body)
+    return token
+
+
+def _fetch_manifest(registry, repository, ref, bearer, accept=ACCEPT_MANIFESTS):
+    url = "{}/v2/{}/manifests/{}".format(registry.rstrip("/"), repository, ref)
+    status, body, _ = _request(
+        "GET", url, {"Authorization": "Bearer {}".format(bearer),
+                     "Accept": accept}, None, METADATA_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
+    if status != 200:
+        raise RegistryApiError(
+            "manifest fetch {} {}".format(repository, ref), status, body)
+    return _parse_json(
+        body, "manifest fetch {} {}".format(repository, ref), status)
+
+
+def _resolve_amd64_child(index):
+    """linux/amd64 child digest from a base index; malformed index
+    shapes degrade to the not-found RegistryApiError, never a crash."""
+    manifests = index.get("manifests") if isinstance(index, dict) else None
+    if not isinstance(manifests, list):
+        manifests = []
+    for descriptor in manifests:
+        if not isinstance(descriptor, dict):
+            continue
+        platform = descriptor.get("platform")
+        if not isinstance(platform, dict):
+            continue
+        if platform.get("os") == "linux" and platform.get(
+                "architecture") == "amd64":
+            return descriptor.get("digest")
+    raise RegistryApiError(
+        "no linux/amd64 child manifest in the base index", 404,
+        json.dumps(manifests).encode("utf-8", "replace"))
+
+
+def _fetch_blob(registry, repository, digest, bearer, timeout):
+    url = "{}/v2/{}/blobs/{}".format(
+        registry.rstrip("/"), repository, digest)
+    status, body, _ = _request(
+        "GET", url, {"Authorization": "Bearer {}".format(bearer)}, None,
+        timeout)
+    if status != 200:
+        raise RegistryApiError("blob fetch {}".format(digest), status, body)
+    if "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(body).hexdigest() != digest:
+        raise RegistryApiError("blob digest mismatch {}".format(digest),
+                               500, b"")
+    return body
+
+
+def _child_parts(child):
+    """Validated (config descriptor, layer descriptors) of a base child
+    manifest — missing or malformed keys raise a clear RegistryApiError
+    (never an uncaught KeyError), keeping the marker contract for this
+    failure class (CWE-754)."""
+    def malformed(reason):
+        return RegistryApiError(
+            "malformed base child manifest: {}".format(reason), 500,
+            json.dumps(child).encode("utf-8", "replace"))
+
+    if not isinstance(child, dict):
+        raise malformed("not a JSON object")
+    config = child.get("config")
+    if not isinstance(config, dict) or not config.get("digest"):
+        raise malformed("missing or empty config.digest")
+    layers = child.get("layers")
+    if not isinstance(layers, list):
+        raise malformed("missing or non-list layers")
+    for descriptor in layers:
+        if not isinstance(descriptor, dict) or not descriptor.get("digest"):
+            raise malformed("layer descriptor without a digest")
+    return config, layers
+
+
+def _gitea_jwt(token_url, owner, repo, token, timeout):
+    """Token->JWT exchange at a token endpoint URL (Basic auth).
+
+    ``token_url`` is the FULL endpoint: the registry's ``/v2/token``
+    for the publish flow, or the realm recorded from a ``/v2/``
+    challenge for the smoke (the standard token-auth flow).
+    """
+    query = urllib.parse.urlencode({
+        "service": GITEA_AUTH_SERVICE,
+        "scope": "repository:{}/{}:pull,push".format(owner, repo),
+    })
+    basic = base64.b64encode(
+        "publisher:{}".format(token).encode("utf-8")).decode("ascii")
+    status, body, _ = _request(
+        "GET", "{}?{}".format(token_url, query),
+        {"Authorization": "Basic {}".format(basic)}, None, timeout)
+    if status != 200:
+        raise RegistryApiError("gitea registry token request failed",
+                               status, body)
+    payload = _parse_json(body, "gitea registry token endpoint", status)
+    jwt = (payload.get("token") or "") if isinstance(payload, dict) else ""
+    if not jwt:
+        # The endpoint answers 200 even anonymously with an unusable
+        # (empty-scope) JWT — a 200 proves nothing about push rights.
+        raise RegistryApiError(
+            "gitea registry token endpoint returned an empty token "
+            "(anonymous-200 trap refused; never treat 200 as authorization)",
+            status, body)
+    return jwt
+
+
+def _bearer_challenge(www_authenticate):
+    """Realm recorded from a Bearer WWW-Authenticate challenge.
+
+    Returns None when the header is absent, is not a Bearer challenge,
+    or carries no realm — a challenge without a realm cannot be
+    followed to the token endpoint, so the smoke treats that as no
+    challenge at all.
+    """
+    if not www_authenticate:
+        return None
+    parts = www_authenticate.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2 or parts[0].lower() != "bearer":
+        return None
+    match = re.search(r'\brealm\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"', parts[1])
+    return match.group(1) if match else None
+
+
+def _asset_names(release):
+    """Asset display names from a gitea release payload — odd shapes
+    degrade to [] (the read-only smoke never crashes on them)."""
+    if not isinstance(release, dict):
+        return []
+    assets = release.get("assets")
+    if not isinstance(assets, list):
+        return []
+    names = []
+    for asset in assets:
+        if isinstance(asset, dict) and isinstance(asset.get("name"), str):
+            names.append(asset["name"])
+    return names
+
+
+def _blob_exists(gitea_registry, name, digest, jwt, timeout):
+    url = "{}/v2/{}/blobs/{}".format(
+        gitea_registry.rstrip("/"), name, digest)
+    status, _, _ = _request(
+        "HEAD", url, {"Authorization": "Bearer {}".format(jwt)}, None,
+        timeout)
+    return status == 200
+
+
+def _upload_blob(gitea_registry, name, digest, blob, jwt, timeout):
+    base_url = gitea_registry.rstrip("/")
+    url = "{}/v2/{}/blobs/uploads/?digest={}".format(base_url, name, digest)
+    headers = {"Authorization": "Bearer {}".format(jwt),
+               "Content-Type": "application/octet-stream"}
+    status, body, resp_headers = _request(
+        "POST", url, headers, blob, timeout)
+    if status in (200, 201):
+        return
+    if status == 202 and resp_headers.get("Location"):
+        location = urllib.parse.urljoin(url, resp_headers["Location"])
+        if "digest=" not in location:
+            separator = "&" if "?" in location else "?"
+            location = "{}{}digest={}".format(location, separator, digest)
+        status, body, _ = _request(
+            "PUT", location, headers, blob, timeout)
+        if status in (200, 201):
+            return
+    raise RegistryApiError("blob upload {}".format(digest), status, body)
+
+
+def _push_blob_if_missing(gitea_registry, name, digest, blob, jwt, timeout):
+    """HEAD-skip then upload — retries resume cheap."""
+    if _blob_exists(gitea_registry, name, digest, jwt, timeout):
+        return False
+    _upload_blob(gitea_registry, name, digest, blob, jwt, timeout)
+    return True
+
+
+def build_broker_layer(artifact_bytes):
+    """Deterministic layer carrying /app/coreci-broker.pyz.
+
+    Returns (gzip_blob, layer_digest, diff_id): sorted single entry,
+    fixed TarInfo metadata, gzip with mtime=0 — byte-stable rebuilds.
+    """
+    info = tarfile.TarInfo("app/coreci-broker.pyz")
+    info.size = len(artifact_bytes)
+    info.mode = 0o644
+    info.uid = 0
+    info.gid = 0
+    info.uname = ""
+    info.gname = ""
+    info.mtime = 0
+    buffer = io.BytesIO()
+    with tarfile.open(fileobj=buffer, mode="w",
+                      format=tarfile.GNU_FORMAT) as archive:
+        archive.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(artifact_bytes))
+    raw = buffer.getvalue()
+    compressed = gzip.compress(raw, compresslevel=9, mtime=0)
+    layer_digest = "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(compressed).hexdigest()
+    diff_id = "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(raw).hexdigest()
+    return compressed, layer_digest, diff_id
+
+
+def build_config_blob(base_config, diff_id, tag):
+    """Base config + appended diff_id + CLI entrypoint/WorkingDir/label.
+
+    Serialized with sort_keys — deterministic config digest.
+    """
+    config = dict(base_config)
+    rootfs = dict(base_config.get("rootfs") or {})
+    rootfs["diff_ids"] = list(rootfs.get("diff_ids") or []) + [diff_id]
+    if "type" not in rootfs:
+        rootfs["type"] = "layers"
+    config["rootfs"] = rootfs
+    inner = dict(base_config.get("config") or {})
+    inner["Entrypoint"] = ["python3", "/app/coreci-broker.pyz"]
+    inner["Cmd"] = []
+    inner["WorkingDir"] = "/state"
+    inner["Labels"] = {"org.opencontainers.image.version": tag}
+    config["config"] = inner
+    return json.dumps(config, sort_keys=True,
+                      separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def build_manifest_blob(base_layer_descriptors, broker_layer_descriptor,
+                        config_descriptor):
+    manifest = {
+        "schemaVersion": 2,
+        "mediaType": OCI_MANIFEST,
+        "config": config_descriptor,
+        "layers": list(base_layer_descriptors) + [broker_layer_descriptor],
+    }
+    return json.dumps(manifest, sort_keys=True,
+                      separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")
+
+
+def _descriptor(digest, size, media_type):
+    return {"mediaType": media_type, "digest": digest, "size": size}
+
+
+def _put_manifest(gitea_registry, name, tag, manifest_blob, jwt, timeout):
+    url = "{}/v2/{}/manifests/{}".format(
+        gitea_registry.rstrip("/"), name, tag)
+    status, body, _ = _request(
+        "PUT", url, {"Authorization": "Bearer {}".format(jwt),
+                     "Content-Type": OCI_MANIFEST}, manifest_blob, timeout)
+    if status not in (200, 201):
+        raise RegistryApiError("manifest PUT {}".format(tag), status, body)
+    return "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(manifest_blob).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _load_artifact(path):
+    if not os.path.isfile(path):
+        raise LocalError("artifact not found: {}".format(path))
+    with open(path, "rb") as handle:
+        return handle.read()
+
+
+def smoke(tag, gitea_registry, hub_registry, hub_auth, owner, repo,
+          timeout, env_root):
+    """G-013 read-only live smoke: the four GET-only pre-ship checks.
+
+    Never part of the default publish flow; never mutates remote state
+    (no uploads, no manifest PUTs). The LIVE invocation happens only
+    at the P3-05 ship step, which gates it by setting PUBLISH_SMOKE=1
+    in the environment — this script neither reads nor requires that
+    variable (the SHIP GATE owns the gating). The default unittest
+    suite exercises this LOGIC against stubs (zero network).
+
+    Checks, in order, stopping at the first failure (see the module
+    docstring for the full G-021 tie-in): [1/4] the gitea /v2/ 401
+    Bearer challenge (realm recorded); [2/4] the token->JWT exchange at
+    the recorded realm — the gitea token resolves only from the
+    sanctioned env files via ``_env_secrets.get_token`` (never the
+    shell environment), and an empty token is the anonymous-200 trap
+    refused loudly; [3/4] the gitea API release-by-tag GET — 200
+    (exists) and 404 (not yet created) are both acceptable pre-ship,
+    asset names print as a fact, and the hard no-.pyz assertion binds
+    ONLY the tag v0.2.0 exactly (G-021 forge-side confirmation);
+    [4/4] the Docker Hub anonymous index resolve of python:3.11-slim —
+    the linux/amd64 child digest prints (the drift fact P3-05
+    compares against expectations).
+
+    Returns 0 (all PASS), or 1 after one clear FAILED line (token
+    values are never printed; IMAGE_PENDING is never emitted — nothing
+    was attempted, so nothing is pending). Local preconditions (a
+    missing token) raise ``_env_secrets.SecretsError`` BEFORE any
+    request; main() maps that to exit 2.
+    """
+    gitea_token = _env_secrets.get_token(root=env_root)
+    metadata_timeout = min(METADATA_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, timeout)
+    gitea_base = gitea_registry.rstrip("/")
+
+    # [1/4] gitea /v2/ auth challenge (anonymous; realm recorded).
+    try:
+        status, _, resp_headers = _request(
+            "GET", "{}/v2/".format(gitea_base), {}, None, metadata_timeout)
+    except (TransientFailure, RegistryApiError) as error:
+        print("FAILED [1/4] gitea /v2/ auth challenge: {}".format(error))
+        return 1
+    challenge = _header(resp_headers, "WWW-Authenticate")
+    realm = _bearer_challenge(challenge)
+    if status != 401 or not realm:
+        print("FAILED [1/4] gitea /v2/ auth challenge: expected 401 with "
+              "a Bearer challenge, got HTTP {} (WWW-Authenticate: {!r})"
+              .format(status, challenge))
+        return 1
+    print("PASS [1/4] gitea /v2/ auth challenge: 401 + Bearer challenge "
+          "(realm {})".format(realm))
+
+    # [2/4] token->JWT exchange at the recorded realm (Basic auth).
+    try:
+        _gitea_jwt(realm, owner, repo, gitea_token, metadata_timeout)
+    except (TransientFailure, RegistryApiError) as error:
+        print("FAILED [2/4] gitea token->JWT exchange at {}: {}".format(
+            realm, error))
+        return 1
+    print("PASS [2/4] gitea token->JWT exchange: 200 + non-empty token "
+          "(service {}, scope repository:{}/{}:pull,push)".format(
+              GITEA_AUTH_SERVICE, owner, repo))
+
+    # [3/4] release-by-tag GET (gitea API; 200 exists, 404 pre-ship ok).
+    release_url = "{}/api/v1/repos/{}/{}/releases/tags/{}".format(
+        gitea_base, owner, repo, urllib.parse.quote(tag, safe=""))
+    try:
+        status, body, _ = _request(
+            "GET", release_url,
+            {"Authorization": "token {}".format(gitea_token)}, None,
+            metadata_timeout)
+    except (TransientFailure, RegistryApiError) as error:
+        print("FAILED [3/4] release-by-tag {}: {}".format(tag, error))
+        return 1
+    if status == 404:
+        print("PASS [3/4] release-by-tag {}: not yet created (404) — "
+              "acceptable pre-ship".format(tag))
+    elif status != 200:
+        print("FAILED [3/4] release-by-tag {}: expected 200 or 404, got "
+              "HTTP {}".format(tag, status))
+        return 1
+    else:
+        try:
+            release = _parse_json(
+                body, "release-by-tag {}".format(tag), status)
+        except RegistryApiError as error:
+            print("FAILED [3/4] release-by-tag {}: {}".format(tag, error))
+            return 1
+        asset_names = _asset_names(release)
+        pyz_assets = [name for name in asset_names
+                      if name.endswith(".pyz")]
+        if tag == SMOKE_G021_TAG and pyz_assets:
+            print("FAILED [3/4] release-by-tag {}: G-021 violation — the "
+                  "phase-0 release must carry no .pyz asset, found: {}"
+                  .format(tag, ", ".join(pyz_assets)))
+            return 1
+        listing = ", ".join(asset_names) if asset_names else "(none)"
+        note = (" — G-021 confirmed: no .pyz asset"
+                if tag == SMOKE_G021_TAG else "")
+        print("PASS [3/4] release-by-tag {}: exists (assets: {}){}".format(
+            tag, listing, note))
+
+    # [4/4] Docker Hub index resolve (anonymous; amd64 drift print).
+    try:
+        hub_bearer = _hub_token(
+            hub_auth, "repository:{}:pull".format(BASE_REPO))
+        index = _fetch_manifest(hub_registry, BASE_REPO, BASE_TAG,
+                                hub_bearer)
+        child_digest = _resolve_amd64_child(index)
+        if not child_digest:
+            raise RegistryApiError(
+                "amd64 child descriptor carries no digest", 500, b"")
+    except (TransientFailure, RegistryApiError) as error:
+        print("FAILED [4/4] hub index resolve {}:{}: {}".format(
+            BASE_REPO, BASE_TAG, error))
+        return 1
+    print("PASS [4/4] hub index resolve {}:{} -> linux/amd64 child {}"
+          .format(BASE_REPO, BASE_TAG, child_digest))
+    return 0
+
+
+def publish(tag, artifact_path, hub_registry, hub_auth, gitea_registry,
+            owner, repo, base_manifest, timeout, env_root):
+    """Run the full publish flow; returns the image provenance dict."""
+    artifact_bytes = _load_artifact(artifact_path)
+    gitea_token = _env_secrets.get_token(root=env_root)
+    name = "{}/{}".format(owner, repo)
+    metadata_timeout = min(METADATA_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, timeout)
+
+    hub_bearer = _hub_token(hub_auth, "repository:{}:pull".format(BASE_REPO))
+    if base_manifest:
+        child_digest = base_manifest
+        child = _fetch_manifest(hub_registry, BASE_REPO, base_manifest,
+                                hub_bearer)
+        index_digest = None
+    else:
+        base = _fetch_manifest(hub_registry, BASE_REPO, BASE_TAG, hub_bearer)
+        index_digest = "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(
+            json.dumps(base, sort_keys=True,
+                       separators=(",", ":")).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
+        child_digest = (_resolve_amd64_child(base)
+                        if "manifests" in base else BASE_TAG)
+        child = _fetch_manifest(hub_registry, BASE_REPO, child_digest,
+                                hub_bearer)
+    child_config, base_layer_descriptors = _child_parts(child)
+    base_config_bytes = _fetch_blob(
+        hub_registry, BASE_REPO, child_config["digest"], hub_bearer,
+        timeout)
+    base_config = _parse_json(base_config_bytes, "base config blob", 200)
+    if not isinstance(base_config, dict):
+        raise RegistryApiError("base config blob is not a JSON object",
+                               500, base_config_bytes)
+
+    jwt = _gitea_jwt("{}/v2/token".format(gitea_registry.rstrip("/")),
+                     owner, repo, gitea_token, metadata_timeout)
+
+    pushed = []
+    pushed.append(_push_blob_if_missing(
+        gitea_registry, name, child_config["digest"], base_config_bytes,
+        jwt, timeout))
+    for descriptor in base_layer_descriptors:
+        if _blob_exists(gitea_registry, name, descriptor["digest"], jwt,
+                        timeout):
+            continue
+        blob = _fetch_blob(hub_registry, BASE_REPO, descriptor["digest"],
+                           hub_bearer, timeout)
+        _upload_blob(gitea_registry, name, descriptor["digest"], blob, jwt,
+                     timeout)
+        pushed.append(True)
+
+    layer_blob, layer_digest, diff_id = build_broker_layer(artifact_bytes)
+    config_blob = build_config_blob(base_config, diff_id, tag)
+    config_digest = "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(config_blob).hexdigest()
+    _push_blob_if_missing(gitea_registry, name, layer_digest, layer_blob,
+                          jwt, timeout)
+    _push_blob_if_missing(gitea_registry, name, config_digest, config_blob,
+                          jwt, timeout)
+
+    manifest_blob = build_manifest_blob(
+        base_layer_descriptors,
+        _descriptor(layer_digest, len(layer_blob), OCI_LAYER),
+        _descriptor(config_digest, len(config_blob), OCI_CONFIG))
+    manifest_digest = _put_manifest(
+        gitea_registry, name, tag, manifest_blob, jwt, timeout)
+    _put_manifest(gitea_registry, name, "latest", manifest_blob, jwt,
+                  timeout)
+
+    return {
+        "base_index_digest": index_digest,
+        "base_child_digest": child_digest if child_digest != BASE_TAG
+        else "tag-resolved",
+        "base_config_digest": child_config["digest"],
+        "base_layers": [descriptor["digest"]
+                        for descriptor in base_layer_descriptors],
+        "broker_layer_digest": layer_digest,
+        "broker_layer_diff_id": diff_id,
+        "config_digest": config_digest,
+        "manifest_digest": manifest_digest,
+        "blobs_uploaded": sum(1 for flag in pushed if flag),
+    }
+
+
+def main(argv=None):
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        description="Daemonless OCI image publish (REQ-23, D-019)."
+    )
+    parser.add_argument("tag", help="image tag, e.g. v0.2.3")
+    parser.add_argument("--artifact",
+                        help="path to the built .pyz artifact "
+                             "(default: dist/coreci-broker-v<tag>.pyz)")
+    parser.add_argument("--hub-registry",
+                        default="https://registry-1.docker.io",
+                        help="public base-image registry")
+    parser.add_argument("--hub-auth", default="https://auth.docker.io/token",
+                        help="public registry token service")
+    parser.add_argument("--gitea-registry", default="https://git.coreci.dev",
+                        help="gitea registry base URL")
+    parser.add_argument("--owner", help="gitea owner (default: release.owner)")
+    parser.add_argument("--repo", help="gitea repo (default: release.repo)")
+    parser.add_argument("--base-manifest",
+                        help="base child-manifest digest for exact "
+                             "re-publishes (skips tag resolution)")
+    parser.add_argument("--smoke", action="store_true",
+                        help="G-013 read-only live smoke: four GET-only "
+                             "pre-ship checks, NO publish (see the "
+                             "module docstring)")
+    parser.add_argument("--timeout", type=float, default=BLOB_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+                        help="per-request timeout for blob operations "
+                             "(seconds; metadata uses the smaller of this "
+                             "and 30)")
+    parser.add_argument("--env-root",
+                        help="root dir for the sanctioned .env* files "
+                             "(default: repo root)")
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+
+    defaults = load_release_defaults()
+    owner = args.owner or defaults.get("owner")
+    repo = args.repo or defaults.get("repo")
+    if not owner or not repo:
+        print("ERROR: missing gitea target (owner/repo); pass the flags or"
+              " extend the .ciagent/config.json release block",
+              file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+    blob_timeout = max(1.0, float(args.timeout))
+    if args.smoke:
+        # G-013 read-only live smoke: dispatched BEFORE any
+        # publish-side work and returning directly — the default
+        # publish flow below can never trigger it.
+        try:
+            return smoke(
+                tag=args.tag, gitea_registry=args.gitea_registry,
+                hub_registry=args.hub_registry, hub_auth=args.hub_auth,
+                owner=owner, repo=repo, timeout=blob_timeout,
+                env_root=args.env_root)
+        except _env_secrets.SecretsError as error:
+            print("ERROR: {}".format(error), file=sys.stderr)
+            return 2
+    artifact_path = args.artifact or os.path.join(
+        "dist", "coreci-broker-{}.pyz".format(args.tag))
+    # Reuse the smaller metadata timeout for the registry auth exchange so
+    # the timeout-abort path stays bounded for every request class.
+    try:
+        provenance = publish(
+            tag=args.tag, artifact_path=artifact_path,
+            hub_registry=args.hub_registry, hub_auth=args.hub_auth,
+            gitea_registry=args.gitea_registry, owner=owner, repo=repo,
+            base_manifest=args.base_manifest, timeout=blob_timeout,
+            env_root=args.env_root)
+    except _env_secrets.SecretsError as error:
+        print("ERROR: {}".format(error), file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+    except LocalError as error:
+        print("ERROR: {}".format(error), file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+    except (TransientFailure, RegistryApiError) as error:
+        print("ERROR: {}".format(error), file=sys.stderr)
+        registry_host = urllib.parse.urlsplit(
+            args.gitea_registry).netloc or args.gitea_registry
+        print("IMAGE_PENDING {}/{}:{}".format(registry_host, owner, repo,
+                                               args.tag))
+        return 1
+
+    print("image: {}/{}:{} (+ latest)".format(
+        args.gitea_registry.rstrip("/"), owner, repo, args.tag))
+    print("base index: {}".format(
+        provenance["base_index_digest"] or "direct (--base-manifest)"))
+    print("base amd64 manifest: {}".format(provenance["base_child_digest"]))
+    print("base config: {}".format(provenance["base_config_digest"]))
+    print("base layers: {}".format(", ".join(provenance["base_layers"])))
+    print("broker layer: {} (diff_id {})".format(
+        provenance["broker_layer_digest"],
+        provenance["broker_layer_diff_id"]))
+    print("config: {}".format(provenance["config_digest"]))
+    print("manifest: {}".format(provenance["manifest_digest"]))
+    print("blobs uploaded this run: {}".format(provenance["blobs_uploaded"]))
+    return 0
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())

scripts/release.py

@@ -0,0 +1,380 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Attach the built CLI artifact to a gitea release (stdlib only).
+
+Usage:
+    python3 scripts/release.py <tag> <artifact>
+        [--base-url URL] [--owner O] [--repo R] [--env-root DIR]
+
+Flow (REQ-22, RESEARCH §2): resolve the forge token from the sanctioned
+env files via ``scripts/_env_secrets.py`` — never the process environment,
+asserted non-empty BEFORE the first API call (v1.8 lesson: an empty token
+makes gitea answer 404, masking the auth failure) -> compute the artifact
+sha256 from the FILE itself (G-017: there is no sha argument, ever) ->
+build the release notes (Summary / Requirements / Verification / CLI
+install + usage with the digest inline / Docker usage) -> create-or-get
+the release by tag -> idempotent attach (same name AND size -> skip) ->
+multipart attach (field ``attachment``, ``?name=``, ``Authorization:
+token <T>``) under bounded retry (3 attempts, 2s/4s backoff on connection
+errors and 5xx).
+
+Exit codes: 0 only on a confirmed or idempotent attach; 1 after a remote
+failure — bounded retries exhausted OR a permanent 4xx — both print the
+machine-readable ``RELEASE_PENDING <tag> <artifact>`` marker on stdout for
+the ship harness's release_pending escalation (tag+merge is never
+blocked); 2 for local precondition errors (missing artifact, token, or
+config — nothing was attempted remotely, so no marker). Gitea JSON error
+bodies are included in failure diagnostics. Token values are never
+printed.
+"""
+
+import argparse
+import hashlib
+import http.client
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import time
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.parse
+import urllib.request
+
+_SCRIPTS_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
+if _SCRIPTS_DIR not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, _SCRIPTS_DIR)
+
+import _env_secrets  # sibling import (scripts/ dir on sys.path)
+
+TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30
+MAX_ATTEMPTS = 3
+BACKOFF_SECONDS = (2, 4)
+ATTACHMENT_FIELD = "attachment"
+# Fixed, distinctive boundary: a hand-rolled multipart body needs our own
+# delimiter; collision with artifact bytes is negligible at this length.
+MULTIPART_BOUNDARY = "coreci-broker-release-boundary-9a7f3c2e6b41"
+
+
+class ReleaseError(Exception):
+    """Release-attacher failure base."""
+
+
+class TransientFailure(ReleaseError):
+    """Connection error or 5xx persisting past the bounded retries."""
+
+
+class GiteaApiError(ReleaseError):
+    """Permanent API answer (4xx or malformed) carrying gitea's detail."""
+
+    def __init__(self, context, status, body):
+        self.status = status
+        self.body = body
+        super().__init__("{} -> HTTP {}: {}".format(
+            context, status, _error_detail(body)))
+
+
+def repo_root():
+    return os.path.dirname(_SCRIPTS_DIR)
+
+
+def load_release_defaults(root=None):
+    """Read the release block from .ciagent/config.json ({} if absent)."""
+    path = os.path.join(root or repo_root(), ".ciagent", "config.json")
+    try:
+        with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            config = json.load(handle)
+    except (OSError, ValueError):
+        return {}
+    block = config.get("release")
+    return block if isinstance(block, dict) else {}
+
+
+def _error_detail(body):
+    """Summarize a gitea JSON error body ({"message": ...} shape)."""
+    try:
+        payload = json.loads(body.decode("utf-8", "replace"))
+    except ValueError:
+        text = body.decode("utf-8", "replace").strip()
+        return text[:200] if text else "<empty body>"
+    if isinstance(payload, dict) and payload.get("message"):
+        return str(payload["message"])
+    return json.dumps(payload)[:200] if not isinstance(payload, str) else payload[:200]
+
+
+def _api_base(base_url, owner, repo):
+    return "{}/api/v1/repos/{}/{}".format(base_url.rstrip("/"), owner, repo)
+
+
+def _image_reference(base_url, owner, repo):
+    host = urllib.parse.urlsplit(base_url).netloc or base_url
+    return "{}/{}/{}".format(host.rstrip("/"), owner, repo)
+
+
+def build_notes(tag, artifact_name, sha256, image_reference):
+    """Release-notes body (RESEARCH §2.3 model; REQ-22 CLI + docker docs)."""
+    lines = [
+        "## Summary",
+        "",
+        "coreci-broker {tag}: the broker packaged as a self-contained CLI"
+        " zipapp artifact. {artifact} is built by scripts/build_cli.py with"
+        " a deterministic normalization pass - the same sources rebuild"
+        " byte-identical on the same environment, so the digest below is"
+        " meaningful across rebuilds.".format(tag=tag, artifact=artifact_name),
+        "",
+        "## Requirements",
+        "",
+        "REQ-22: from the first CLI-building release onward, every gitea"
+        " release attaches the built coreci-broker artifact alongside the"
+        " existing source archive. The upload resolves the forge token only"
+        " via the sanctioned .env* files (never the process environment),"
+        " asserted non-empty before the first API call.",
+        "",
+        "## Verification",
+        "",
+        "The artifact sha256 in the CLI section below is computed from the"
+        " attached file itself (G-017 - never an argument, never"
+        " hand-pasted). Re-run the cumulative suite on the tagged commit:",
+        "",
+        "    python3 -m unittest discover -s tests",
+        "",
+        "## CLI install + usage",
+        "",
+        "1. Download {artifact} from this release's assets.".format(
+            artifact=artifact_name),
+        "2. Install: chmod +x {artifact} then ./{artifact}, or run it"
+        " directly with python3 {artifact} (Python 3.11+).".format(
+            artifact=artifact_name),
+        "3. Check the build: ./{artifact} --version prints {tag}.".format(
+            artifact=artifact_name, tag=tag),
+        "4. The env contract (every BROKER_* variable) is documented in the"
+        " README; state is anchored by BROKER_ENV_PATH - the .env file's"
+        " directory is the state dir and relative paths stay CWD-relative.",
+        "5. First boot prints BROKER_ADMIN_PASS=... exactly once and creates"
+        " the .env, broker.db, and broker.audit.log state files with mode"
+        " 0600; the printed admin pass is not shown again - store it.",
+        "",
+        "Artifact sha256 (computed from the attached file):",
+        "",
+        "    sha256:{sha}  {artifact}".format(sha=sha256, artifact=artifact_name),
+        "",
+        "## Docker usage",
+        "",
+        "docker pull {image}:{tag}".format(image=image_reference, tag=tag),
+        "",
+        "docker run -p 8765:8765 -v broker-state:/state {image}:{tag}".format(
+            image=image_reference, tag=tag),
+        "",
+        "State lives on the /state volume (WORKDIR /state; the first boot"
+        " generates the .env, broker.db, and broker.audit.log there) -"
+        " mount a persistent volume or the admin pass and any registered"
+        " apps are lost with the container.",
+        "",
+    ]
+    return "\n".join(lines)
+
+
+def _request_once(method, url, token, data=None, headers=None):
+    """One HTTP exchange; returns (status, body). HTTPError becomes a
+    completed answer (status + gitea error body); connection-level errors
+    propagate for the caller's retry policy."""
+    request = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, method=method)
+    request.add_header("Authorization", "token {}".format(token))
+    for key, value in (headers or {}).items():
+        request.add_header(key, value)
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=TIMEOUT_SECONDS) as response:
+            return response.status, response.read()
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as error:
+        return error.code, error.read()
+
+
+def _request(method, url, token, data=None, headers=None,
+             max_attempts=None, backoff=None):
+    """Bounded-retry HTTP: retries connection errors and 5xx answers.
+
+    Returns (status, body) for any answer below 500. A 4xx returns
+    immediately (permanent — surfaced with the gitea error body). Raises
+    TransientFailure once the retry budget is exhausted.
+    """
+    attempts = MAX_ATTEMPTS if max_attempts is None else int(max_attempts)
+    delays = BACKOFF_SECONDS if backoff is None else tuple(backoff)
+    failure = "unknown failure"
+    for attempt in range(1, attempts + 1):
+        try:
+            status, body = _request_once(method, url, token, data, headers)
+        except (OSError, http.client.HTTPException) as error:
+            status = None
+            failure = "connection error: {}: {}".format(
+                type(error).__name__, error)
+        else:
+            if status < 500:
+                return status, body
+            failure = "HTTP {}: {}".format(status, _error_detail(body))
+        if attempt < attempts and delays:
+            time.sleep(delays[min(attempt - 1, len(delays) - 1)])
+    raise TransientFailure(
+        "{} {} failed after {} attempt(s): {}".format(
+            method, url, attempts, failure))
+
+
+def _release_id_from(payload_body, context, status):
+    try:
+        return int(json.loads(payload_body)["id"])
+    except (ValueError, KeyError, TypeError):
+        raise GiteaApiError(context + " returned malformed JSON", status, payload_body)
+
+
+def _get_or_create_release(base, tag, token, notes):
+    by_tag = base + "/releases/tags/" + urllib.parse.quote(tag, safe="")
+    status, body = _request("GET", by_tag, token)
+    if status == 200:
+        return _release_id_from(body, "GET release by tag", status)
+    if status != 404:
+        # A 401/403 here is a genuine auth failure — the non-empty token
+        # assert already ran, so this 404-vs-auth ambiguity is resolved.
+        raise GiteaApiError("GET release by tag failed", status, body)
+    payload = json.dumps({
+        "tag_name": tag,
+        "name": "{}: coreci-broker release".format(tag),
+        "body": notes,
+        "draft": False,
+        "prerelease": False,
+    }).encode("utf-8")
+    status, body = _request(
+        "POST", base + "/releases", token, data=payload,
+        headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"})
+    if status not in (200, 201):
+        raise GiteaApiError("create release failed", status, body)
+    return _release_id_from(body, "create release", status)
+
+
+def _assets_url(base, release_id):
+    return "{}/releases/{}/assets".format(base, release_id)
+
+
+def _list_assets(base, release_id, token):
+    status, body = _request("GET", _assets_url(base, release_id), token)
+    if status != 200:
+        raise GiteaApiError("list release assets failed", status, body)
+    try:
+        assets = json.loads(body)
+    except ValueError:
+        raise GiteaApiError(
+            "list release assets returned malformed JSON", status, body)
+    if not isinstance(assets, list):
+        raise GiteaApiError(
+            "list release assets returned non-list JSON", status, body)
+    return assets
+
+
+def _asset_already_attached(assets, name, size):
+    """Idempotency: same name AND same size means the upload succeeded
+    on an earlier (possibly retried) run."""
+    for asset in assets:
+        if not isinstance(asset, dict) or asset.get("name") != name:
+            continue
+        try:
+            if int(asset.get("size")) == size:
+                return True
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            continue
+    return False
+
+
+def _multipart_body(field, filename, content):
+    head = (
+        "--{boundary}\r\n"
+        "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"{field}\";"
+        " filename=\"{filename}\"\r\n"
+        "Content-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n"
+        "\r\n"
+    ).format(boundary=MULTIPART_BOUNDARY, field=field,
+             filename=filename).encode("utf-8")
+    tail = "\r\n--{}--\r\n".format(MULTIPART_BOUNDARY).encode("utf-8")
+    return head + content + tail
+
+
+def _attach_asset(base, release_id, token, name, content):
+    url = "{}?{}".format(
+        _assets_url(base, release_id), urllib.parse.urlencode({"name": name}))
+    status, body = _request(
+        "POST", url, token, data=_multipart_body(ATTACHMENT_FIELD, name, content),
+        headers={
+            "Content-Type":
+                "multipart/form-data; boundary={}".format(MULTIPART_BOUNDARY),
+        })
+    if status not in (200, 201):
+        raise GiteaApiError("attach asset failed", status, body)
+    try:
+        return json.loads(body)
+    except ValueError:
+        return {}
+
+
+def main(argv=None):
+    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
+        description="Attach the built CLI artifact to a gitea release (REQ-22)."
+    )
+    parser.add_argument("tag", help="release tag, e.g. v0.2.1")
+    parser.add_argument("artifact", help="path to the built .pyz artifact")
+    parser.add_argument("--base-url",
+                        help="gitea base URL (default: .ciagent/config.json release.base_url)")
+    parser.add_argument("--owner",
+                        help="gitea owner (default: release.owner)")
+    parser.add_argument("--repo",
+                        help="gitea repo (default: release.repo)")
+    parser.add_argument("--env-root",
+                        help="root dir for the sanctioned .env* files (default: repo root)")
+    args = parser.parse_args(argv)
+
+    defaults = load_release_defaults()
+    base_url = args.base_url or defaults.get("base_url")
+    owner = args.owner or defaults.get("owner")
+    repo = args.repo or defaults.get("repo")
+    missing = [flag for flag, value in (
+        ("--base-url", base_url), ("--owner", owner), ("--repo", repo))
+        if not value]
+    if missing:
+        print("ERROR: missing gitea target {}; pass the flag(s) or extend"
+              " the .ciagent/config.json release block".format(
+                  ", ".join(missing)), file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+    if not os.path.isfile(args.artifact):
+        print("ERROR: artifact not found: {}".format(args.artifact), file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+    # Token FIRST, from the sanctioned env files only, non-empty enforced —
+    # strictly before any HTTP call (v1.8: an empty token makes gitea answer
+    # 404 and masks the auth failure).
+    try:
+        token = _env_secrets.get_token(root=args.env_root)
+    except _env_secrets.SecretsError as error:
+        print("ERROR: {}".format(error), file=sys.stderr)
+        return 2
+
+    with open(args.artifact, "rb") as handle:
+        content = handle.read()
+    # G-017: the digest is computed from the artifact file itself — there is
+    # no sha argument, ever.
+    sha256 = hashlib.sha256(content).hexdigest()
+    name = os.path.basename(args.artifact)
+    size = len(content)
+    notes = build_notes(args.tag, name, sha256,
+                        _image_reference(base_url, owner, repo))
+    base = _api_base(base_url, owner, repo)
+    try:
+        release_id = _get_or_create_release(base, args.tag, token, notes)
+        if _asset_already_attached(_list_assets(base, release_id, token), name, size):
+            print("attach skipped (idempotent): {} already on {}/{} release"
+                  " {} (sha256 {})".format(name, owner, repo, args.tag, sha256))
+            return 0
+        attachment = _attach_asset(base, release_id, token, name, content)
+        asset_id = attachment.get("id", "?") if isinstance(attachment, dict) else "?"
+        print("attached: {} -> {}/{} release {} (asset id {}, sha256 {})".format(
+            name, owner, repo, args.tag, asset_id, sha256))
+        return 0
+    except (TransientFailure, GiteaApiError) as error:
+        print("ERROR: {}".format(error), file=sys.stderr)
+        print("RELEASE_PENDING {} {}".format(args.tag, args.artifact))
+        return 1
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    sys.exit(main())

tests/test_acceptance_full.py

@@ -0,0 +1,345 @@
+import ast
+import base64
+import contextlib
+import datetime
+import importlib.util
+import io
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import time
+import unittest
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+import uuid as uuidlib
+
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), os.pardir)))
+
+import coreci_broker
+
+ADMIN_USER = "admin"
+REPO_ROOT = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), os.pardir))
+BROKER_SOURCE_PATH = os.path.join(REPO_ROOT, "coreci_broker.py")
+CLIENT_SOURCE_PATH = os.path.join(REPO_ROOT, "coreci_broker_client.py")
+CLIENT_STATIC_PATH = "/static/coreci_broker_client.py"
+LOGIN_PATH = "/api/broker/auth/login"
+LOGOUT_PATH = "/api/broker/auth/logout"
+REGISTER_PATH = "/api/broker/agents/register"
+APPS_PATH = "/api/broker/app_registrations"
+USERS_PATH = "/api/broker/user_allowlist"
+AUDIT_PATH = "/api/broker/audit"
+SECRETS_PREFIX = "/api/broker/secrets/"
+PROXMOX_PATH = "coreci/proxmox"
+GITEA_PATH = "coreci/gitea"
+PROXMOX_SECRET = {"url": "https://pve.coreci.dev:8006", "token": "pve-tok"}
+GITEA_SECRET = {"url": "https://git.coreci.dev", "token": "git-tok"}
+
+AC_PIN_IDS = {
+    "AC1": "test_acceptance_p2.AcceptanceP2Tests.test_ac1_first_boot_printed_pass_login_via_ui_login_page",
+    "AC2": "test_acceptance_p2.AcceptanceP2Tests.test_ac2_app_registration_lifecycle_via_session_cookie",
+    "AC3": "test_acceptance_p2.AcceptanceP2Tests.test_ac3_user_allowlist_lifecycle_via_session_cookie",
+    "AC4": "test_acceptance_p3.AcceptanceP3Tests.test_ac4_derivation_identical_both_sides_stored_as_slow_hash",
+    "AC5": "test_acceptance_p4.AcceptanceP4Tests.test_ac5_valid_token_reads_secret_tampered_token_is_401",
+    "AC6": "test_acceptance_p4.AcceptanceP4Tests.test_ac6_cross_path_read_is_403_with_denied_audit",
+    "AC7": "test_acceptance_p3.AcceptanceP3Tests.test_ac7_revoked_or_unknown_uuid_denied_existing_token_honored",
+    "AC8": "test_acceptance_p3.AcceptanceP3Tests.test_ac8_unknown_or_revoked_user_denied",
+    "AC9": "test_acceptance_p2.AcceptanceP2Tests.test_ac9_login_and_logout_audit_lines_with_null_identity",
+    "AC10": "test_acceptance_p3.AcceptanceP3Tests.test_ac10_expiry_401_reregister_refreshes_expiry_and_audits",
+    "AC11": "test_acceptance_full.AcceptanceFullTests.test_ac11_fresh_boot_state_files_0600_umask_independent",
+    "AC12": "test_acceptance_p3.AcceptanceP3Tests.test_ac12_state_roundtrip_with_identity_enforcement",
+    "AC13": "test_acceptance_full.AcceptanceFullTests.test_ac13_client_module_fetch_byte_identical_importable_standalone",
+    "AC14": "test_acceptance_full.AcceptanceFullTests.test_ac14_coreci_broker_line_count_under_1400",
+}
+
+
+def _basic_header(password):
+    raw = "%s:%s" % (ADMIN_USER, password)
+    return {"Authorization": "Basic " + base64.b64encode(raw.encode("utf-8")).decode("ascii")}
+
+
+class AcceptanceFullTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.addCleanup(tmp.cleanup)
+        self.tmp = tmp.name
+        self.creds_path = os.path.join(self.tmp, "creds.json")
+        with open(self.creds_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            handle.write(json.dumps({PROXMOX_PATH: PROXMOX_SECRET, GITEA_PATH: GITEA_SECRET}))
+
+    def _env(self, root=None, extra=None):
+        root = self.tmp if root is None else root
+        env = {
+            "BROKER_ENV_PATH": os.path.join(root, ".env"),
+            "BROKER_DB_PATH": os.path.join(root, "broker.db"),
+            "BROKER_AUDIT_LOG_PATH": os.path.join(root, "broker.audit.log"),
+            "BROKER_CREDS_SOURCE": "file",
+            "BROKER_CREDS_FILE": self.creds_path,
+            "BROKER_UI_ROOT": os.path.join(REPO_ROOT, "coreci_broker_ui"),
+            "BROKER_STATIC_ROOT": REPO_ROOT,
+        }
+        env.update(extra or {})
+        return env
+
+    def _boot(self, env):
+        buffer = io.StringIO()
+        with contextlib.redirect_stdout(buffer):
+            broker = coreci_broker.boot(dict(env))
+        self.addCleanup(broker.audit.close)
+        self.addCleanup(broker.store.close)
+        return broker, buffer.getvalue()
+
+    def _serve(self, broker):
+        server = coreci_broker.serve("127.0.0.1", 0, broker)
+        self.addCleanup(server.server_close)
+        self.addCleanup(server.shutdown)
+        return "http://127.0.0.1:%d" % server.server_address[1]
+
+    def _printed_pass(self, output):
+        printed = [
+            line.split("=", 1)[1]
+            for line in output.splitlines()
+            if line.startswith("BROKER_ADMIN_PASS=")
+        ]
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(printed))
+        return printed[0]
+
+    def _request(self, base, method, path, payload=None, headers=None):
+        data = None if payload is None else json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8")
+        request = urllib.request.Request(base + path, data=data, method=method)
+        for key, value in (headers or {}).items():
+            request.add_header(key, value)
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=10) as response:
+                return response.status, response.read(), response.headers
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as error:
+            return error.code, error.read(), error.headers
+
+    def _request_json(self, base, method, path, payload=None, headers=None):
+        status, body, response_headers = self._request(base, method, path, payload, headers)
+        return status, json.loads(body.decode("utf-8")), response_headers
+
+    def _assert_null_identity(self, entry):
+        self.assertIsNone(entry["user_id"])
+        self.assertIsNone(entry["app_registration_uuid"])
+        self.assertIsNone(entry["agent_id"])
+
+    def _assert_tool_identity(self, entry, app_uuid):
+        self.assertEqual("ceo", entry["user_id"])
+        self.assertEqual(app_uuid, entry["app_registration_uuid"])
+        self.assertEqual("proxmox", entry["agent_id"])
+
+    def _assert_state_files_0600(self, env):
+        for key in ("BROKER_DB_PATH", "BROKER_AUDIT_LOG_PATH", "BROKER_ENV_PATH"):
+            path = env[key]
+            self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(path), path)
+            self.assertEqual(0o600, os.stat(path).st_mode & 0o777, path)
+
+    def test_ac11_fresh_boot_state_files_0600_umask_independent(self):
+        env = self._env()
+        self._boot(env)
+        self._assert_state_files_0600(env)
+        other = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.addCleanup(other.cleanup)
+        other_env = self._env(root=other.name)
+        previous_umask = os.umask(0o777)
+        try:
+            probe = os.path.join(other.name, "umask-probe")
+            os.close(os.open(probe, os.O_CREAT | os.O_WRONLY, 0o666))
+            self.assertEqual(0o000, os.stat(probe).st_mode & 0o777)
+            self._boot(other_env)
+        finally:
+            os.umask(previous_umask)
+        self._assert_state_files_0600(other_env)
+
+    def test_ac13_client_module_fetch_byte_identical_importable_standalone(self):
+        broker, _ = self._boot(self._env())
+        base = self._serve(broker)
+        with open(CLIENT_SOURCE_PATH, "rb") as handle:
+            expected = handle.read()
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(base + CLIENT_STATIC_PATH, timeout=10) as response:
+            self.assertEqual(200, response.status)
+            fetched = response.read()
+        self.assertEqual(expected, fetched)
+        imports = set()
+        for node in ast.walk(ast.parse(fetched.decode("utf-8"))):
+            if isinstance(node, ast.Import):
+                imports.update(alias.name for alias in node.names)
+            elif isinstance(node, ast.ImportFrom):
+                imports.add(node.module or "")
+        self.assertTrue(imports)
+        for name in imports:
+            self.assertIn(name.split(".")[0], sys.stdlib_module_names, name)
+        copy_path = os.path.join(self.tmp, "fetched_coreci_broker_client.py")
+        with open(copy_path, "wb") as handle:
+            handle.write(fetched)
+        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("full_fetched_client", copy_path)
+        module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+        spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+        self.assertTrue(callable(module.BrokerClient))
+        self.assertTrue(callable(module.fetch_client_module))
+        for method in ("ensure_registered", "get_state", "put_state", "read_secret"):
+            self.assertTrue(callable(getattr(module.BrokerClient, method)), method)
+
+    def test_ac14_coreci_broker_line_count_under_1400(self):
+        with open(BROKER_SOURCE_PATH, "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            line_count = sum(1 for _ in handle)
+        self.assertLess(line_count, 1400)
+
+    def test_milestone_story_full_happy_path_consolidates_ac1_ac10_ac12(self):
+        env = self._env(extra={"BROKER_TOKEN_TTL": "1"})
+        first, output = self._boot(env)
+        printed_pass = self._printed_pass(output)
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(len(printed_pass), 32)
+        self.assertEqual(1, output.count(printed_pass))
+        pepper = None
+        with open(env["BROKER_ENV_PATH"], "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            for line in handle:
+                if line.startswith("BROKER_INSTANCE_PEPPER="):
+                    pepper = line.split("=", 1)[1].strip()
+        self.assertIsNotNone(pepper)
+        self.assertNotIn(pepper, output)
+        second, silent = self._boot(env)
+        self.assertEqual("", silent)
+        second.audit.close()
+        second.store.close()
+        base = self._serve(first)
+        status, body, headers = self._request(base, "GET", "/ui/login")
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertTrue(headers.get("Content-Type", "").startswith("text/html"))
+        self.assertIn('name="password"', body.decode("utf-8"))
+        status, body, response_headers = self._request_json(
+            base, "POST", LOGIN_PATH, {"username": ADMIN_USER, "password": printed_pass}
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual({"ok": True, "username": ADMIN_USER}, body)
+        raw_cookie = response_headers.get("Set-Cookie")
+        self.assertTrue(raw_cookie)
+        self.assertTrue(raw_cookie.startswith("broker_session="))
+        self.assertIn("HttpOnly", raw_cookie)
+        self.assertIn("SameSite=Lax", raw_cookie)
+        cookie = {"Cookie": raw_cookie.split(";", 1)[0]}
+        app_uuid = str(uuidlib.uuid4())
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(
+            base, "POST", APPS_PATH,
+            {"uuid": app_uuid, "name": "proxmox-tool"}, headers=cookie,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(201, status)
+        self.assertEqual({"uuid": app_uuid, "status": "active"}, body)
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(
+            base, "POST", USERS_PATH,
+            {"user_id": "ceo", "email": "ceo@coreci.dev"}, headers=cookie,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(201, status)
+        self.assertEqual({"user_id": "ceo", "status": "active"}, body)
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(base + CLIENT_STATIC_PATH, timeout=10) as response:
+            self.assertEqual(200, response.status)
+            client_source = response.read()
+        with open(CLIENT_SOURCE_PATH, "rb") as handle:
+            self.assertEqual(handle.read(), client_source)
+        copy_path = os.path.join(self.tmp, "story_coreci_broker_client.py")
+        with open(copy_path, "wb") as handle:
+            handle.write(client_source)
+        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("full_story_client", copy_path)
+        client_module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+        spec.loader.exec_module(client_module)
+        client = client_module.BrokerClient(base, "proxmox", app_uuid, "ceo", ["coreci"])
+        state = {}
+        client.ensure_registered(state)
+        self.assertEqual(44, len(state["current_token"]))
+        self.assertTrue(state["current_token"].isascii())
+        self.assertIn("pepper", state)
+        self.assertEqual("proxmox", state["agent_id"])
+        self.assertEqual(app_uuid, state["app_registration_uuid"])
+        self.assertEqual("ceo", state["user_id"])
+        self.assertTrue(client.put_state(state))
+        snapshot = dict(state)
+        self.assertEqual(snapshot, client.get_state(state))
+        document = client.read_secret(PROXMOX_PATH, state)
+        self.assertEqual({"path", "data", "version", "updated_at"}, set(document))
+        self.assertEqual(PROXMOX_PATH, document["path"])
+        self.assertEqual(PROXMOX_SECRET, document["data"])
+        with self.assertRaises(client_module.BrokerError) as caught:
+            client.read_secret(GITEA_PATH, state)
+        self.assertEqual(403, caught.exception.status)
+        expired_at = state["token_expires_at"]
+        time.sleep(1.2)
+        document = client.read_secret(PROXMOX_PATH, state)
+        self.assertEqual(PROXMOX_SECRET, document["data"])
+        self.assertGreater(
+            datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(state["token_expires_at"]),
+            datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(expired_at),
+        )
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(base, "POST", LOGOUT_PATH, headers=cookie)
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual({"ok": True}, body)
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(
+            base, "GET", AUDIT_PATH + "?limit=1000", headers=_basic_header(printed_pass)
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertIsNone(body["next_since"])
+        entries = body["entries"]
+
+        def select(action, result=None):
+            return [
+                entry for entry in entries
+                if entry["action"] == action and (result is None or entry["result"] == result)
+            ]
+
+        logins = select("login", "ok")
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(logins))
+        self.assertEqual(LOGIN_PATH, logins[0]["path"])
+        self._assert_null_identity(logins[0])
+        add_apps = select("add_app", "ok")
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(add_apps))
+        self.assertEqual(APPS_PATH + "/" + app_uuid, add_apps[0]["path"])
+        self._assert_null_identity(add_apps[0])
+        add_users = select("add_user", "ok")
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(add_users))
+        self.assertEqual(USERS_PATH + "/ceo", add_users[0]["path"])
+        self._assert_null_identity(add_users[0])
+        registers = select("register", "ok")
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(len(registers), 2)
+        for entry in registers:
+            self.assertEqual(REGISTER_PATH, entry["path"])
+            self._assert_tool_identity(entry, app_uuid)
+        ok_reads = select("read", "ok")
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(len(ok_reads), 2)
+        for entry in ok_reads:
+            self.assertEqual(PROXMOX_PATH, entry["path"])
+            self._assert_tool_identity(entry, app_uuid)
+        denied_reads = select("read", "denied")
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(denied_reads))
+        self.assertEqual(GITEA_PATH, denied_reads[0]["path"])
+        self._assert_tool_identity(denied_reads[0], app_uuid)
+        auth_denied = [
+            entry for entry in select("denied", "denied")
+            if entry["path"] == SECRETS_PREFIX + PROXMOX_PATH
+        ]
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(len(auth_denied), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(app_uuid, auth_denied[0]["app_registration_uuid"])
+        self.assertIsNone(auth_denied[0]["user_id"])
+        self.assertIsNone(auth_denied[0]["agent_id"])
+        logouts = select("logout", "ok")
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(logouts))
+        self.assertEqual(LOGOUT_PATH, logouts[0]["path"])
+        self._assert_null_identity(logouts[0])
+
+    def test_coverage_tally_pins_ac1_through_ac14_across_suite(self):
+        self.assertEqual(14, len(AC_PIN_IDS))
+        loader = unittest.TestLoader()
+        suite = loader.discover(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+        stack, ids = [suite], set()
+        while stack:
+            item = stack.pop()
+            if isinstance(item, unittest.TestSuite):
+                stack.extend(item)
+            else:
+                ids.add(item.id())
+        for ac in sorted(AC_PIN_IDS):
+            with self.subTest(ac=ac):
+                self.assertIn(AC_PIN_IDS[ac], ids)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_acceptance_v02.py

@@ -0,0 +1,548 @@
+"""v0.2 acceptance matrix (PLAN P3-01; REQ-21/REQ-22/REQ-23 acceptance).
+
+Consolidates the milestone's acceptance as thin, high-value assertions that
+the deliverable holds end-to-end. The deep per-feature logic stays in its own
+files — test_build_cli, test_cli_packaging, test_publish_image,
+test_release_upload, test_dockerfile_consistency — which run green in the
+same cumulative suite (``python3 -m unittest discover -s tests``; suite
+greenness is the runner's job, asserted by nobody in here). This file does
+NOT re-run their cases; the stub roundtrips are smoke-asserted instead via
+module presence + runnable TestSuite sizes (defaultTestLoader).
+
+The matrix (binding order):
+1. boot parity through the artifact — the built ``.pyz`` is booted as a real
+   subprocess child (``[sys.executable, artifact]``, never a bare
+   "python3") with an ephemeral bind + temp state, and v0.1 acceptance
+   parity must hold through the packaged path: admin pass printed exactly
+   once, ``broker.db`` + ``broker.audit.log`` 0600 in the state dir,
+   ``/ui/login`` + ``/ui/dashboard`` 200, ``/static/coreci_broker_client.py``
+   byte-exact vs the repo file, one admin-login + agent-register +
+   state-put/get + secret-read flow (v0.1 request patterns), second boot
+   silent (asserted only after terminate + full drain — G-010);
+2. reproducibility — two consecutive same-environment builds produce
+   byte-identical artifacts (identical sha256, G-009);
+3. self-containment — the archive contains ONLY the staging allowlist
+   (broker + client + UI pages + shim + ``_cli_version.py``): no ``.env``,
+   no ``dist/``, no state, no tests;
+4. stub publish roundtrip + stub release upload green — their test modules
+   import cleanly and expose runnable TestSuites of the expected size;
+5. broker zero-delta — ``coreci_broker.py`` unchanged at its v0.1.5 count
+   of 1390 lines (AC14 under the D-016..D-018 cap of 1400) and carrying no
+   v0.2 packaging references (``_cli_version`` / the shim / the shim's
+   materialized-asset dir — frozen means untouched); plus the AC14
+   no-touch clause machine-checked against the ``v0.1.5`` tag when the
+   working tree carries it (skipped otherwise);
+6. Dockerfile/.dockerignore consistency — module present with its full
+   TestCase set (it runs in the same suite).
+
+The build happens ONCE per class (setUpClass) and every artifact/boot is
+reused across methods where safe; the boot tests dominate and the whole
+file is budgeted to stay well under 30s. Every child is terminated +
+drained exactly once (idempotent ``stop`` via ``addCleanup``); every temp
+dir is ``addCleanup``-registered. Builds use the ``scripts/build_cli.py``
+API (never a shell path) into ``TemporaryDirectory`` dist dirs — no
+committed ``dist/``, no state, no live-forge contact.
+"""
+
+import hashlib
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import os
+import select
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import time
+import unittest
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+import uuid as uuidlib
+import zipfile
+
+REPO = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), os.pardir))
+TESTS_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
+BUILD_CLI_PATH = os.path.join(REPO, "scripts", "build_cli.py")
+BROKER_SOURCE_PATH = os.path.join(REPO, "coreci_broker.py")
+REPO_CLIENT_PATH = os.path.join(REPO, "coreci_broker_client.py")
+VERSION = "v0.2.3"  # the milestone release this acceptance gates (P3-05 ship)
+
+ADMIN_USER = "admin"
+ADMIN_PASS_PREFIX = "BROKER_ADMIN_PASS="
+LISTENING_PREFIX = "coreci-broker listening on http://"
+STATE_FILE_NAMES = (".env", "broker.db", "broker.audit.log")
+
+LOGIN_PATH = "/api/broker/auth/login"
+APPS_PATH = "/api/broker/app_registrations"
+USERS_PATH = "/api/broker/user_allowlist"
+REGISTER_PATH = "/api/broker/agents/register"
+AGENT_STATE_PATH = "/api/broker/agents/proxmox/state"
+SECRETS_PATH = "/api/broker/secrets/coreci/proxmox"
+CLIENT_STATIC_PATH = "/static/coreci_broker_client.py"
+UI_LOGIN_PATH = "/ui/login"
+UI_DASHBOARD_PATH = "/ui/dashboard"
+
+PROXMOX_PATH = "coreci/proxmox"
+PROXMOX_SECRET = {"url": "https://pve.coreci.dev:8006", "token": "pve-tok"}
+
+BOOT_DEADLINE_SECONDS = 30.0
+POLL_SECONDS = 0.1
+DRAIN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 20.0
+HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 10
+GIT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 30
+
+# Frozen-broker sources (PLAN: no task edits these in v0.2) — used only by
+# the AC14 no-touch clause check, never modified.
+FROZEN_SOURCES = ("coreci_broker.py", "coreci_broker_client.py",
+                  "coreci_broker_ui", "reference_tools")
+# v0.2 packaging artifacts the frozen broker must know nothing about.
+FROZEN_MARKER_STRINGS = ("_cli_version", "cli/__main__", "coreci_broker_assets")
+
+# The v0.2 test surface consolidated here — presence/count floors only
+# (the roundtrips themselves run green in their own files, same suite).
+STUB_MODULE_MIN_CASES = {
+    "test_publish_image.py": 9,        # stub publish roundtrip
+    "test_release_upload.py": 15,      # stub release upload + env-secrets
+    "test_dockerfile_consistency.py": 7,
+}
+
+
+def _load_build_cli():
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+        "acceptance_build_cli", BUILD_CLI_PATH)
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+build_cli = _load_build_cli()
+
+
+def _sha256(path):
+    digest = hashlib.sha256()
+    with open(path, "rb") as handle:
+        for chunk in iter(lambda: handle.read(65536), b""):
+            digest.update(chunk)
+    return digest.hexdigest()
+
+
+class _BrokerChild:
+    """A subprocess child booted from the built zipapp artifact.
+
+    The merged stdout/stderr pipe is pumped via ``select`` + raw ``os.read``
+    under an explicit deadline until the broker announces its ephemeral
+    listen address. ``stop()`` is the G-010 kill/drain protocol:
+    ``terminate()`` then a full ``communicate()`` drain (kill fallback on
+    drain timeout). It is idempotent and registered with ``addCleanup`` at
+    construction, so no child leaks even when an assertion trips mid-test.
+    Silence and pass-once assertions are made ONLY on ``full_output()``
+    after ``stop()``.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, testcase, artifact, env, cwd):
+        self.testcase = testcase
+        self.artifact = artifact
+        self.proc = subprocess.Popen(
+            [sys.executable, artifact],
+            env=env, cwd=cwd,
+            stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
+        )
+        self.lines = []
+        self.partial = b""
+        self.drained = b""
+        self.base_url = None
+        self._eof = False
+        self._stopped = False
+        testcase.addCleanup(self.stop)
+        self._await_listening(BOOT_DEADLINE_SECONDS)
+
+    def _pump(self, timeout):
+        if self._eof:
+            return False
+        fd = self.proc.stdout.fileno()
+        ready, _, _ = select.select([fd], [], [], timeout)
+        if not ready:
+            return True
+        try:
+            chunk = os.read(fd, 4096)
+        except OSError:
+            chunk = b""
+        if not chunk:
+            self._eof = True
+            return False
+        self.partial += chunk
+        while b"\n" in self.partial:
+            raw, self.partial = self.partial.split(b"\n", 1)
+            self.lines.append(raw.decode("utf-8", "replace"))
+        return True
+
+    def _await_listening(self, deadline_seconds):
+        deadline = time.monotonic() + deadline_seconds
+        cursor = 0
+        while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+            alive = self._pump(POLL_SECONDS)
+            while cursor < len(self.lines):
+                line = self.lines[cursor]
+                cursor += 1
+                if line.startswith(LISTENING_PREFIX):
+                    self.base_url = line.split(" on ", 1)[1].strip()
+                    return
+            if not alive:
+                break
+        self.stop()
+        self.testcase.fail(
+            "packaged broker did not announce %r within %.0fs "
+            "(artifact=%s exit=%s)\n--- captured child output ---\n%s"
+            % (LISTENING_PREFIX, deadline_seconds, self.artifact,
+               self.proc.returncode, self.full_output())
+        )
+
+    def stop(self):
+        if self._stopped:
+            return
+        self._stopped = True
+        if self.proc.poll() is None:
+            self.proc.terminate()
+        try:
+            remainder, _ = self.proc.communicate(timeout=DRAIN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
+        except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+            self.proc.kill()
+            remainder, _ = self.proc.communicate()
+        self.drained = remainder or b""
+
+    def full_output(self):
+        text = "\n".join(self.lines)
+        tail = self.partial + self.drained
+        if tail:
+            text += "\n" + tail.decode("utf-8", "replace")
+        return text
+
+    def printed_admin_pass(self):
+        values = [
+            line.split("=", 1)[1]
+            for line in self.lines
+            if line.startswith(ADMIN_PASS_PREFIX)
+        ]
+        self.testcase.assertEqual(
+            1, len(values),
+            "expected exactly one %s line, got: %r" % (ADMIN_PASS_PREFIX, values)
+        )
+        return values[0]
+
+
+class AcceptanceV02Tests(unittest.TestCase):
+    @classmethod
+    def setUpClass(cls):
+        cls.build_root = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="coreci-acc-v02-")
+        cls.addClassCleanup(cls.build_root.cleanup)
+        cls.artifact = build_cli.build(
+            VERSION, repo=REPO, dist_dir=cls.build_root.name
+        )
+        cls.artifact_sha256 = _sha256(cls.artifact)
+
+    # -- harness helpers --------------------------------------------------
+
+    def _temp_dir(self):
+        handle = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="coreci-acc-v02-")
+        self.addCleanup(handle.cleanup)
+        return handle.name
+
+    def _child_env(self, **overrides):
+        """A child env with no inherited BROKER_* keys, then overrides."""
+        env = {
+            key: value
+            for key, value in os.environ.items()
+            if not key.startswith("BROKER_")
+        }
+        env.update(overrides)
+        return env
+
+    def _state_env(self, state_dir):
+        """Ephemeral bind + temp state + a seeded file creds source."""
+        creds_path = os.path.join(state_dir, "creds.json")
+        with open(creds_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            json.dump({PROXMOX_PATH: PROXMOX_SECRET}, handle)
+        return self._child_env(
+            BROKER_BIND="127.0.0.1:0",
+            BROKER_ENV_PATH=os.path.join(state_dir, ".env"),
+            BROKER_DB_PATH=os.path.join(state_dir, "broker.db"),
+            BROKER_AUDIT_LOG_PATH=os.path.join(state_dir, "broker.audit.log"),
+            BROKER_CREDS_SOURCE="file",
+            BROKER_CREDS_FILE=creds_path,
+        )
+
+    def _boot(self, state_dir):
+        """Boot the artifact against state_dir; CWD is a separate temp dir."""
+        return _BrokerChild(
+            self, self.artifact, self._state_env(state_dir), self._temp_dir()
+        )
+
+    def _request(self, base, method, path, payload=None, headers=None):
+        data = None if payload is None else json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8")
+        request = urllib.request.Request(base + path, data=data, method=method)
+        for key, value in (headers or {}).items():
+            request.add_header(key, value)
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(
+                request, timeout=HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+            ) as response:
+                return response.status, response.read(), response.headers
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as error:
+            return error.code, error.read(), error.headers
+
+    def _request_json(self, base, method, path, payload=None, headers=None):
+        status, body, response_headers = self._request(
+            base, method, path, payload, headers
+        )
+        return status, json.loads(body.decode("utf-8")), response_headers
+
+    def _admin_login(self, base, password):
+        """v0.1 pattern: POST login, assert the broker_session cookie."""
+        status, body, headers = self._request_json(
+            base, "POST", LOGIN_PATH,
+            {"username": ADMIN_USER, "password": password},
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual({"ok": True, "username": ADMIN_USER}, body)
+        raw_cookie = headers.get("Set-Cookie")
+        self.assertTrue(raw_cookie)
+        self.assertTrue(raw_cookie.startswith("broker_session="))
+        self.assertIn("HttpOnly", raw_cookie)
+        self.assertIn("SameSite=Lax", raw_cookie)
+        return {"Cookie": raw_cookie.split(";", 1)[0]}
+
+    def _load_test_module(self, file_name):
+        """Import a sibling test module cleanly (by path, any invocation)."""
+        path = os.path.join(TESTS_DIR, file_name)
+        stem = os.path.splitext(file_name)[0]
+        spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
+            "acceptance_probe_" + stem, path)
+        module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+        spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+        return module
+
+    def _runnable_case_count(self, module):
+        """Flatten defaultTestLoader's suite, counting runnable TestCases."""
+        suite = unittest.defaultTestLoader.loadTestsFromModule(module)
+        stack, count = [suite], 0
+        while stack:
+            item = stack.pop()
+            if isinstance(item, unittest.TestSuite):
+                stack.extend(item)
+            else:
+                self.assertIsInstance(item, unittest.TestCase)
+                count += 1
+        return count
+
+    # -- matrix 1: boot parity through the artifact ----------------------
+
+    def test_boot_parity_through_artifact_second_boot_silent(self):
+        state_dir = self._temp_dir()
+        child = self._boot(state_dir)
+        base = child.base_url
+        printed_pass = child.printed_admin_pass()
+
+        # liveness + full UI served from the packaged artifact
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(base, "GET", "/healthz")
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual({"ok": True}, body)
+        for ui_path in (UI_LOGIN_PATH, UI_DASHBOARD_PATH):
+            status, body, headers = self._request(base, "GET", ui_path)
+            self.assertEqual(200, status, ui_path)
+            self.assertTrue(
+                headers.get("Content-Type", "").startswith("text/html"),
+                ui_path,
+            )
+        # the tool-author surface: client module byte-exact vs the repo file
+        status, served, _ = self._request(base, "GET", CLIENT_STATIC_PATH)
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        with open(REPO_CLIENT_PATH, "rb") as handle:
+            self.assertEqual(handle.read(), served)
+
+        # one consolidated v0.1 request-pattern flow:
+        # admin login -> app + user allowlist -> agent register -> state
+        # put/get -> secret read
+        cookie = self._admin_login(base, printed_pass)
+        app_uuid = str(uuidlib.uuid4())
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(
+            base, "POST", APPS_PATH,
+            {"uuid": app_uuid, "name": "acceptance-tool"}, headers=cookie,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(201, status)
+        self.assertEqual({"uuid": app_uuid, "status": "active"}, body)
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(
+            base, "POST", USERS_PATH,
+            {"user_id": "ceo", "email": "ceo@coreci.dev"}, headers=cookie,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(201, status)
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(
+            base, "POST", REGISTER_PATH,
+            {"agent_id": "proxmox", "app_registration_uuid": app_uuid,
+             "user_id": "ceo", "tags": ["coreci"]},
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(201, status)
+        app_header = {"Authorization": "App %s %s" % (app_uuid, body["token"])}
+        state_document = {"milestone": "v0.2", "matrix": "acceptance"}
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(
+            base, "PUT", AGENT_STATE_PATH, state_document, headers=app_header
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual({"ok": True}, body)
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(
+            base, "GET", AGENT_STATE_PATH, headers=app_header
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual(state_document, body)
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(
+            base, "GET", SECRETS_PATH, headers=app_header
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual({"path", "data", "version", "updated_at"}, set(body))
+        self.assertEqual(PROXMOX_PATH, body["path"])
+        self.assertEqual(PROXMOX_SECRET, body["data"])
+
+        # v0.1 state-file parity: 0600 in the state dir
+        for name in STATE_FILE_NAMES:
+            path = os.path.join(state_dir, name)
+            self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(path), path)
+            self.assertEqual(0o600, os.stat(path).st_mode & 0o777, path)
+
+        # pass printed exactly once + pepper never printed — asserted on
+        # the FULLY drained output after terminate (G-010)
+        pepper = None
+        with open(os.path.join(state_dir, ".env"), "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            for line in handle:
+                if line.startswith("BROKER_INSTANCE_PEPPER="):
+                    pepper = line.split("=", 1)[1].strip()
+        self.assertIsNotNone(pepper)
+        child.stop()
+        first_output = child.full_output()
+        self.assertEqual(1, first_output.count(ADMIN_PASS_PREFIX), first_output)
+        self.assertEqual(1, first_output.count(printed_pass))
+        self.assertNotIn(pepper, first_output)
+
+        # SECOND boot on the same state dir: silent after terminate + drain
+        second = self._boot(state_dir)
+        # the SAME pass still logs in: state persisted across the reboot
+        self._admin_login(second.base_url, printed_pass)
+        second.stop()
+        second_output = second.full_output()
+        self.assertIn(LISTENING_PREFIX, second_output)
+        self.assertNotIn(ADMIN_PASS_PREFIX, second_output)
+        self.assertNotIn(printed_pass, second_output)
+
+    # -- matrix 2: reproducibility ----------------------------------------
+
+    def test_reproducibility_two_consecutive_builds_identical_sha256(self):
+        digests = []
+        for _ in range(2):
+            with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="coreci-acc-repro-") as dist_dir:
+                artifact = build_cli.build(
+                    VERSION, repo=REPO, dist_dir=dist_dir
+                )
+                digests.append(_sha256(artifact))
+        self.assertNotEqual(digests[0], "0" * 64)
+        self.assertEqual(digests[0], digests[1])
+        # and the shared setUpClass build matches too (same environment)
+        self.assertEqual(self.artifact_sha256, digests[0])
+        print("v0.2 acceptance two-build sha256: {}".format(digests[0]))
+
+    # -- matrix 3: self-containment ---------------------------------------
+
+    def test_self_containment_archive_is_exactly_the_allowlist(self):
+        ui_root = os.path.join(REPO, "coreci_broker_ui")
+        expected = {
+            "__main__.py",
+            "_cli_version.py",
+            "coreci_broker.py",
+            "coreci_broker_client.py",
+            "coreci_broker_ui/",
+        }
+        expected.update(
+            "coreci_broker_ui/%s" % name
+            for name in os.listdir(ui_root)
+            if os.path.isfile(os.path.join(ui_root, name))
+        )
+        with zipfile.ZipFile(self.artifact) as archive:
+            names = set(archive.namelist())
+        # ONLY the allowlist members — nothing more, nothing less
+        self.assertEqual(expected, names)
+        # no .env, no dist/, no state, no tests, no bytecode can ride along
+        for name in names:
+            for forbidden in (".env", "dist", "broker.db", "broker.audit.log",
+                             "test", "__pycache__", ".pyc"):
+                self.assertNotIn(forbidden, name, name)
+        # per-release artifact name (D-020) for the milestone release
+        self.assertEqual(
+            build_cli.artifact_name(VERSION),
+            os.path.basename(self.artifact),
+        )
+
+    # -- matrix 4: stub publish roundtrip + stub release upload green ------
+
+    def test_stub_publish_roundtrip_module_green_in_suite(self):
+        module = self._load_test_module("test_publish_image.py")
+        self.assertTrue(hasattr(module, "PublishImageTests"))
+        count = self._runnable_case_count(module)
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(
+            count, STUB_MODULE_MIN_CASES["test_publish_image.py"]
+        )
+
+    def test_stub_release_upload_module_green_in_suite(self):
+        module = self._load_test_module("test_release_upload.py")
+        self.assertTrue(hasattr(module, "ReleaseUploadTests"))
+        self.assertTrue(hasattr(module, "EnvSecretsLoaderTests"))
+        count = self._runnable_case_count(module)
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(
+            count, STUB_MODULE_MIN_CASES["test_release_upload.py"]
+        )
+
+    # -- matrix 6: Dockerfile/.dockerignore consistency ---------------------
+
+    def test_dockerfile_consistency_module_green_in_suite(self):
+        module = self._load_test_module("test_dockerfile_consistency.py")
+        self.assertTrue(hasattr(module, "DockerfileConsistencyTests"))
+        count = self._runnable_case_count(module)
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(
+            count, STUB_MODULE_MIN_CASES["test_dockerfile_consistency.py"]
+        )
+
+    # -- matrix 5: broker zero-delta (AC14, frozen means untouched) --------
+
+    def test_broker_zero_delta_1390_lines_no_packaging_references(self):
+        with open(BROKER_SOURCE_PATH, "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            line_count = sum(1 for _ in handle)
+        # exact v0.1.5 count, under the D-016..D-018 cap of 1400 (AC14)
+        self.assertEqual(1390, line_count)
+        self.assertLess(line_count, 1400)
+        with open(BROKER_SOURCE_PATH, "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            source = handle.read()
+        # frozen means untouched: no v0.2 packaging reference leaked into it
+        for marker in FROZEN_MARKER_STRINGS:
+            self.assertNotIn(marker, source)
+
+    def test_broker_untouched_by_any_commit_since_v0_1_5(self):
+        """The AC14 no-touch clause, machine-checked when the tag exists."""
+        try:
+            verify = subprocess.run(
+                ["git", "rev-parse", "-q", "--verify", "v0.1.5^{commit}"],
+                cwd=REPO, capture_output=True, text=True,
+                timeout=GIT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+            )
+        except (OSError, subprocess.TimeoutExpired):
+            self.skipTest("git unavailable in this environment")
+        if verify.returncode != 0:
+            self.skipTest("v0.1.5 tag not present in this working tree")
+        log = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "log", "--oneline", "v0.1.5..HEAD", "--"] + list(FROZEN_SOURCES),
+            cwd=REPO, capture_output=True, text=True,
+            timeout=GIT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(0, log.returncode, log.stderr)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            "", log.stdout.strip(),
+            "v0.2 commits touched frozen broker sources:\n" + log.stdout
+        )
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_build_cli.py

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+"""Reproducibility and packaging tests for the coreci-broker CLI build.
+
+Covers scripts/build_cli.py (REQ-21): two consecutive same-environment
+builds are byte-identical, `_cli_version.VERSION` is embedded, the archive
+contains exactly the staging allowlist, entry metadata is normalized to
+constants (G-009), both new files py_compile green, and the built artifact
+answers `--version` with exit code 0 (shebang + exec bit verified).
+"""
+
+import contextlib
+import hashlib
+import importlib.util
+import io
+import os
+import pathlib
+import py_compile
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+import zipfile
+
+REPO = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+BUILD_CLI_PATH = REPO / "scripts" / "build_cli.py"
+SHIM_PATH = REPO / "cli" / "__main__.py"
+VERSION = "v0.2.0"
+
+UI_PAGES = (
+    "app_registrations.html",
+    "audit.html",
+    "dashboard.html",
+    "index.html",
+    "login.html",
+    "nav.js",
+    "shared.css",
+    "user_allowlist.html",
+)
+
+FILE_EXTERNAL_ATTR = 0o100644 << 16
+DIR_EXTERNAL_ATTR = 0o40755 << 16
+SHEBANG = b"#!/usr/bin/env python3\n"
+FIXED_DATE_TIME = (1980, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0)
+
+
+def _load_build_cli():
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("build_cli", BUILD_CLI_PATH)
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+build_cli = _load_build_cli()
+
+
+def _sha256(path):
+    digest = hashlib.sha256()
+    with open(path, "rb") as handle:
+        for chunk in iter(lambda: handle.read(65536), b""):
+            digest.update(chunk)
+    return digest.hexdigest()
+
+
+class BuildCliTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    @classmethod
+    def setUpClass(cls):
+        cls.build_root = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="coreci-broker-pyz-")
+        cls.addClassCleanup(cls.build_root.cleanup)
+        cls.artifact = build_cli.build(
+            VERSION, repo=str(REPO), dist_dir=cls.build_root.name
+        )
+        cls.artifact_sha256 = _sha256(cls.artifact)
+
+    def test_two_builds_byte_identical(self):
+        digests = []
+        for _ in range(2):
+            with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="coreci-broker-pyz-") as dist_dir:
+                artifact = build_cli.build(
+                    VERSION, repo=str(REPO), dist_dir=dist_dir
+                )
+                digests.append(_sha256(artifact))
+        self.assertEqual(digests[0], digests[1])
+        self.assertEqual(self.artifact_sha256, digests[0])
+        print("two-build sha256: {}".format(digests[0]))
+
+    def test_cli_version_module_embedded(self):
+        with zipfile.ZipFile(self.artifact) as archive:
+            source = archive.read("_cli_version.py").decode("utf-8")
+        self.assertEqual('VERSION = "{}"\n'.format(VERSION), source)
+        namespace = {}
+        exec(compile(source, "_cli_version.py", "exec"), namespace)
+        self.assertEqual(VERSION, namespace["VERSION"])
+
+    def test_archive_allowlist_exact(self):
+        ui_dir = REPO / "coreci_broker_ui"
+        on_disk = {entry.name for entry in ui_dir.iterdir() if entry.is_file()}
+        self.assertEqual(set(UI_PAGES), on_disk)
+        expected = {
+            "__main__.py",
+            "_cli_version.py",
+            "coreci_broker.py",
+            "coreci_broker_client.py",
+            "coreci_broker_ui/",
+        }
+        expected.update("coreci_broker_ui/{}".format(name) for name in UI_PAGES)
+        with zipfile.ZipFile(self.artifact) as archive:
+            self.assertEqual(expected, set(archive.namelist()))
+
+    def test_entry_metadata_constants(self):
+        with zipfile.ZipFile(self.artifact) as archive:
+            infos = archive.infolist()
+        names = [info.filename for info in infos]
+        self.assertEqual(sorted(names), names)
+        self.assertTrue(any(info.is_dir() for info in infos))
+        self.assertTrue(any(not info.is_dir() for info in infos))
+        for info in infos:
+            self.assertEqual(FIXED_DATE_TIME, info.date_time)
+            if info.is_dir():
+                self.assertEqual(DIR_EXTERNAL_ATTR, info.external_attr)
+            else:
+                self.assertEqual(FILE_EXTERNAL_ATTR, info.external_attr)
+                self.assertEqual(zipfile.ZIP_DEFLATED, info.compress_type)
+
+    def test_py_compile_green(self):
+        for path in (SHIM_PATH, BUILD_CLI_PATH):
+            py_compile.compile(str(path), doraise=True)
+
+    def test_version_flag(self):
+        completed = subprocess.run(
+            [sys.executable, self.artifact, "--version"],
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+            timeout=60,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(0, completed.returncode)
+        self.assertEqual(VERSION, completed.stdout.strip())
+
+    def test_shebang_and_exec_bit(self):
+        with open(self.artifact, "rb") as handle:
+            self.assertEqual(SHEBANG, handle.readline())
+        self.assertTrue(os.stat(self.artifact).st_mode & 0o111)
+        completed = subprocess.run(
+            [self.artifact, "--version"],
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+            timeout=60,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(0, completed.returncode)
+        self.assertEqual(VERSION, completed.stdout.strip())
+
+    def test_artifact_name_no_double_v(self):
+        self.assertEqual("coreci-broker-v0.2.0.pyz", build_cli.artifact_name(VERSION))
+        self.assertEqual("coreci-broker-v0.2.0.pyz", build_cli.artifact_name("0.2.0"))
+        self.assertEqual("coreci-broker-v0.2.0.pyz", os.path.basename(self.artifact))
+
+    def test_cli_requires_version_argument(self):
+        with contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()):
+            with self.assertRaises(SystemExit) as raised:
+                build_cli.main([])
+        self.assertEqual(2, raised.exception.code)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_cli_packaging.py

@@ -0,0 +1,528 @@
+"""End-to-end packaged-boot acceptance for the coreci-broker CLI zipapp (REQ-21).
+
+Builds the P1-01 artifact once per class via the scripts/build_cli.py build
+API into a ``TemporaryDirectory``, then boots it as a real subprocess child —
+always ``[sys.executable, "<pyz>"]``, never a bare "python3" — and drives the
+live server with stdlib urllib, reusing the v0.1 acceptance request patterns
+(tests/test_acceptance_full.py, tests/test_acceptance_p4.py).
+
+G-010 harness hardening, all bound here:
+- explicit deadline loop (30s) polling the merged stdout/stderr pipe for the
+  ``coreci-broker listening on http://…`` line; loud failure with the captured
+  child output when it never arrives;
+- pass-once and silent-second-boot assertions are made only after
+  ``terminate()`` plus a full ``communicate()`` drain of the child;
+- child env pins ``BROKER_CREDS_SOURCE=file`` + a seeded ``BROKER_CREDS_FILE``
+  (v0.1 precedent: tests/test_acceptance_full.py);
+- one un-overridden default-anchoring boot — state lands in the child's CWD;
+- every child is terminated + drained exactly once (idempotent ``stop``
+  registered with ``addCleanup``): no leaked processes, and every wait is
+  deadline-bounded (boot wait, drain timeout with kill fallback, HTTP and
+  subprocess timeouts).
+"""
+
+import importlib.util
+import json
+import os
+import select
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import time
+import unittest
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+import uuid as uuidlib
+
+REPO = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), os.pardir))
+BUILD_CLI_PATH = os.path.join(REPO, "scripts", "build_cli.py")
+REPO_CLIENT_PATH = os.path.join(REPO, "coreci_broker_client.py")
+REPO_LOGIN_PAGE_PATH = os.path.join(REPO, "coreci_broker_ui", "login.html")
+REPO_DASHBOARD_PAGE_PATH = os.path.join(REPO, "coreci_broker_ui", "dashboard.html")
+VERSION = "v0.2.0"
+
+ADMIN_USER = "admin"
+ADMIN_PASS_PREFIX = "BROKER_ADMIN_PASS="
+LISTENING_PREFIX = "coreci-broker listening on http://"
+ASSET_DIR_NAME = ".coreci_broker_assets"
+STATE_FILE_NAMES = (".env", "broker.db", "broker.audit.log")
+
+LOGIN_PATH = "/api/broker/auth/login"
+APPS_PATH = "/api/broker/app_registrations"
+USERS_PATH = "/api/broker/user_allowlist"
+REGISTER_PATH = "/api/broker/agents/register"
+AGENT_STATE_PATH = "/api/broker/agents/proxmox/state"
+SECRETS_PATH = "/api/broker/secrets/coreci/proxmox"
+AUDIT_PATH = "/api/broker/audit"
+CLIENT_STATIC_PATH = "/static/coreci_broker_client.py"
+UI_LOGIN_PATH = "/ui/login"
+UI_DASHBOARD_PATH = "/ui/dashboard"
+
+PROXMOX_PATH = "coreci/proxmox"
+PROXMOX_SECRET = {"url": "https://pve.coreci.dev:8006", "token": "pve-tok"}
+GITEA_PATH = "coreci/gitea"
+GITEA_SECRET = {"url": "https://git.coreci.dev", "token": "git-tok"}
+
+BOOT_DEADLINE_SECONDS = 30.0
+POLL_SECONDS = 0.1
+DRAIN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 20.0
+HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 10
+SUBPROCESS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 60
+
+
+def _load_build_cli():
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location("build_cli", BUILD_CLI_PATH)
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+build_cli = _load_build_cli()
+
+
+class PackagedBrokerChild:
+    """A subprocess child booted from the built zipapp artifact.
+
+    stdout and stderr are merged into one pipe read via ``select`` + ``os.read``
+    (raw fd reads — no buffered-reader/select skew) under an explicit deadline
+    until the broker announces its ephemeral listen address. ``stop()`` is the
+    G-010 kill/drain protocol: ``terminate()`` then a full ``communicate()``
+    drain; it is idempotent and registered with ``addCleanup`` at construction,
+    so no child leaks even when a boot fails or an assertion trips mid-test.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, testcase, artifact, env, cwd):
+        self.testcase = testcase
+        self.artifact = artifact
+        self.proc = subprocess.Popen(
+            [sys.executable, artifact],
+            env=env, cwd=cwd,
+            stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
+        )
+        self.lines = []
+        self.partial = b""
+        self.drained = b""
+        self.base_url = None
+        self._eof = False
+        self._stopped = False
+        testcase.addCleanup(self.stop)
+        self._await_listening(BOOT_DEADLINE_SECONDS)
+
+    def _pump(self, timeout):
+        """Move whatever is on the merged pipe into line storage.
+
+        Returns False once the child's stream reached EOF; True otherwise
+        (including when the poll window simply elapsed with no data).
+        """
+        if self._eof:
+            return False
+        fd = self.proc.stdout.fileno()
+        ready, _, _ = select.select([fd], [], [], timeout)
+        if not ready:
+            return True
+        try:
+            chunk = os.read(fd, 4096)
+        except OSError:
+            chunk = b""
+        if not chunk:
+            self._eof = True
+            return False
+        self.partial += chunk
+        while b"\n" in self.partial:
+            raw, self.partial = self.partial.split(b"\n", 1)
+            self.lines.append(raw.decode("utf-8", "replace"))
+        return True
+
+    def _await_listening(self, deadline_seconds):
+        deadline = time.monotonic() + deadline_seconds
+        cursor = len(self.lines)
+        while time.monotonic() < deadline:
+            alive = self._pump(POLL_SECONDS)
+            while cursor < len(self.lines):
+                line = self.lines[cursor]
+                cursor += 1
+                if line.startswith(LISTENING_PREFIX):
+                    self.base_url = line.split(" on ", 1)[1].strip()
+                    return
+            if not alive:
+                break
+        self.stop()
+        self.testcase.fail(
+            "packaged broker did not announce %r within %.0fs "
+            "(artifact=%s exit=%s)\n--- captured child output ---\n%s"
+            % (LISTENING_PREFIX, deadline_seconds, self.artifact,
+               self.proc.returncode, self.full_output())
+        )
+
+    def stop(self):
+        """Kill/drain protocol (G-010): terminate, then fully drain."""
+        if self._stopped:
+            return
+        self._stopped = True
+        if self.proc.poll() is None:
+            self.proc.terminate()
+        try:
+            remainder, _ = self.proc.communicate(timeout=DRAIN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
+        except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
+            self.proc.kill()
+            remainder, _ = self.proc.communicate()
+        self.drained = remainder or b""
+
+    def full_output(self):
+        """Everything the child printed: complete lines + unterminated tail."""
+        text = "\n".join(self.lines)
+        tail = self.partial + self.drained
+        if tail:
+            text += "\n" + tail.decode("utf-8", "replace")
+        return text
+
+    def printed_admin_pass(self):
+        values = [
+            line.split("=", 1)[1]
+            for line in self.lines
+            if line.startswith(ADMIN_PASS_PREFIX)
+        ]
+        self.testcase.assertEqual(
+            1, len(values),
+            "expected exactly one %s line, got: %r" % (ADMIN_PASS_PREFIX, values)
+        )
+        return values[0]
+
+
+class CliPackagingAcceptanceTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    @classmethod
+    def setUpClass(cls):
+        cls.build_root = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="coreci-broker-pkg-")
+        cls.addClassCleanup(cls.build_root.cleanup)
+        cls.artifact = build_cli.build(
+            VERSION, repo=REPO, dist_dir=cls.build_root.name
+        )
+
+    # -- harness helpers -------------------------------------------------
+
+    def _temp_dir(self):
+        handle = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="coreci-broker-pkg-")
+        self.addCleanup(handle.cleanup)
+        return handle.name
+
+    def _child_env(self, **overrides):
+        """A child env with no inherited BROKER_* keys, then test overrides."""
+        env = {
+            key: value
+            for key, value in os.environ.items()
+            if not key.startswith("BROKER_")
+        }
+        env.update(overrides)
+        return env
+
+    def _seed_creds(self, state_dir):
+        creds_path = os.path.join(state_dir, "creds.json")
+        with open(creds_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            json.dump({PROXMOX_PATH: PROXMOX_SECRET, GITEA_PATH: GITEA_SECRET},
+                      handle)
+        return creds_path
+
+    def _state_env(self, state_dir):
+        """G-010: pin bind + state paths + a seeded file creds source."""
+        return self._child_env(
+            BROKER_BIND="127.0.0.1:0",
+            BROKER_ENV_PATH=os.path.join(state_dir, ".env"),
+            BROKER_DB_PATH=os.path.join(state_dir, "broker.db"),
+            BROKER_AUDIT_LOG_PATH=os.path.join(state_dir, "broker.audit.log"),
+            BROKER_CREDS_SOURCE="file",
+            BROKER_CREDS_FILE=self._seed_creds(state_dir),
+        )
+
+    def _boot(self, env, cwd):
+        return PackagedBrokerChild(self, self.artifact, env, cwd)
+
+    def _boot_in_state(self, state_dir, cwd=None):
+        """Boot with state pinned into state_dir; CWD is a separate temp dir."""
+        return self._boot(self._state_env(state_dir),
+                          cwd if cwd is not None else self._temp_dir())
+
+    def _assert_state_files_0600_in(self, directory):
+        for name in STATE_FILE_NAMES:
+            path = os.path.join(directory, name)
+            self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(path), path)
+            self.assertEqual(0o600, os.stat(path).st_mode & 0o777, path)
+
+    def _request(self, base, method, path, payload=None, headers=None):
+        data = None if payload is None else json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8")
+        request = urllib.request.Request(base + path, data=data, method=method)
+        for key, value in (headers or {}).items():
+            request.add_header(key, value)
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(
+                request, timeout=HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS
+            ) as response:
+                return response.status, response.read(), response.headers
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as error:
+            return error.code, error.read(), error.headers
+
+    def _request_json(self, base, method, path, payload=None, headers=None):
+        status, body, response_headers = self._request(
+            base, method, path, payload, headers
+        )
+        return status, json.loads(body.decode("utf-8")), response_headers
+
+    def _admin_login(self, base, password):
+        """v0.1 pattern: POST login, assert the broker_session cookie is set."""
+        status, body, headers = self._request_json(
+            base, "POST", LOGIN_PATH,
+            {"username": ADMIN_USER, "password": password},
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual({"ok": True, "username": ADMIN_USER}, body)
+        raw_cookie = headers.get("Set-Cookie")
+        self.assertTrue(raw_cookie)
+        self.assertTrue(raw_cookie.startswith("broker_session="))
+        self.assertIn("HttpOnly", raw_cookie)
+        self.assertIn("SameSite=Lax", raw_cookie)
+        return {"Cookie": raw_cookie.split(";", 1)[0]}
+
+    def _assert_tool_identity(self, entry, app_uuid):
+        self.assertEqual("ceo", entry["user_id"])
+        self.assertEqual(app_uuid, entry["app_registration_uuid"])
+        self.assertEqual("proxmox", entry["agent_id"])
+
+    def _read_repo_bytes(self, path):
+        with open(path, "rb") as handle:
+            return handle.read()
+
+    # -- tests ------------------------------------------------------------
+
+    def test_version_flag_subprocess_exits_zero_printing_version(self):
+        completed = subprocess.run(
+            [sys.executable, self.artifact, "--version"],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=SUBPROCESS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(0, completed.returncode)
+        self.assertEqual(VERSION, completed.stdout.strip())
+
+    def test_first_boot_state_0600_cwd_independent_and_http_acceptance(self):
+        state_dir = self._temp_dir()
+        cwd_dir = self._temp_dir()  # deliberately NOT the state dir
+        child = self._boot_in_state(state_dir, cwd=cwd_dir)
+        base = child.base_url
+
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(base, "GET", "/healthz")
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual({"ok": True}, body)
+
+        # UI pages served from the materialized assets (byte-exact vs repo)
+        status, body, headers = self._request(base, "GET", UI_LOGIN_PATH)
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertTrue(headers.get("Content-Type", "").startswith("text/html"))
+        self.assertEqual(self._read_repo_bytes(REPO_LOGIN_PAGE_PATH), body)
+        status, body, headers = self._request(base, "GET", UI_DASHBOARD_PATH)
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertTrue(headers.get("Content-Type", "").startswith("text/html"))
+        self.assertEqual(self._read_repo_bytes(REPO_DASHBOARD_PAGE_PATH), body)
+
+        # packaged client module served byte-exact vs the repo file
+        status, served, _ = self._request(base, "GET", CLIENT_STATIC_PATH)
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual(self._read_repo_bytes(REPO_CLIENT_PATH), served)
+
+        # materialized assets under <state>/.coreci_broker_assets/<VERSION>/
+        asset_base = os.path.join(state_dir, ASSET_DIR_NAME, VERSION)
+        self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(os.path.join(asset_base, "ui")))
+        self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(os.path.join(asset_base, "static")))
+        for name in ("login.html", "dashboard.html"):
+            self.assertTrue(
+                os.path.isfile(os.path.join(asset_base, "ui", name)), name
+            )
+        self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(
+            os.path.join(asset_base, "static", "coreci_broker_client.py")
+        ))
+
+        # state resolved from BROKER_ENV_PATH: 0600 files in the state dir,
+        # nothing whatsoever in the child's CWD
+        self._assert_state_files_0600_in(state_dir)
+        self.assertEqual([], os.listdir(cwd_dir))
+
+        # pass printed exactly once — asserted on the FULLY drained output
+        printed_pass = child.printed_admin_pass()
+        child.stop()
+        output = child.full_output()
+        self.assertEqual(1, output.count(ADMIN_PASS_PREFIX), output)
+        self.assertEqual(1, output.count(printed_pass))
+        pepper = None
+        with open(os.path.join(state_dir, ".env"), "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            for line in handle:
+                if line.startswith("BROKER_INSTANCE_PEPPER="):
+                    pepper = line.split("=", 1)[1].strip()
+        self.assertIsNotNone(pepper)
+        self.assertNotIn(pepper, output)
+
+    def test_v01_parity_flows_through_packaged_artifact(self):
+        state_dir = self._temp_dir()
+        child = self._boot_in_state(state_dir)
+        base = child.base_url
+        printed_pass = child.printed_admin_pass()
+        cookie = self._admin_login(base, printed_pass)
+
+        # seed allowlists first via the admin API (v0.1 pattern)
+        app_uuid = str(uuidlib.uuid4())
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(
+            base, "POST", APPS_PATH,
+            {"uuid": app_uuid, "name": "proxmox-tool"}, headers=cookie,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(201, status)
+        self.assertEqual({"uuid": app_uuid, "status": "active"}, body)
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(
+            base, "POST", USERS_PATH,
+            {"user_id": "ceo", "email": "ceo@coreci.dev"}, headers=cookie,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(201, status)
+
+        # agent register flow
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(
+            base, "POST", REGISTER_PATH,
+            {"agent_id": "proxmox", "app_registration_uuid": app_uuid,
+             "user_id": "ceo", "tags": ["coreci"]},
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(201, status)
+        token = body["token"]
+        app_header = {"Authorization": "App %s %s" % (app_uuid, token)}
+
+        # state put/get roundtrip
+        state_document = {"phase": "v0.2", "boot": "packaged", "items": ["parity"]}
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(
+            base, "PUT", AGENT_STATE_PATH, state_document, headers=app_header
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual({"ok": True}, body)
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(
+            base, "GET", AGENT_STATE_PATH, headers=app_header
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual(state_document, body)
+
+        # one secret read via the seeded FileCredsSource
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(
+            base, "GET", SECRETS_PATH, headers=app_header
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual({"path", "data", "version", "updated_at"}, set(body))
+        self.assertEqual(PROXMOX_PATH, body["path"])
+        self.assertEqual(PROXMOX_SECRET, body["data"])
+        self.assertRegex(body["version"], r"^[0-9a-f]{8}$")
+
+        # audit lines exist for the driven flow
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(
+            base, "GET", AUDIT_PATH + "?limit=1000", headers=cookie
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        entries = body["entries"]
+
+        def select(action, result="ok"):
+            return [entry for entry in entries
+                    if entry["action"] == action and entry["result"] == result]
+
+        logins = select("login")
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(logins))
+        self.assertEqual(LOGIN_PATH, logins[0]["path"])
+        add_apps = select("add_app")
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(add_apps))
+        self.assertEqual(APPS_PATH + "/" + app_uuid, add_apps[0]["path"])
+        add_users = select("add_user")
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(add_users))
+        self.assertEqual(USERS_PATH + "/ceo", add_users[0]["path"])
+        registers = select("register")
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(registers))
+        self.assertEqual(REGISTER_PATH, registers[0]["path"])
+        self._assert_tool_identity(registers[0], app_uuid)
+        ok_reads = select("read")
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(ok_reads))
+        self.assertEqual(PROXMOX_PATH, ok_reads[0]["path"])
+        self._assert_tool_identity(ok_reads[0], app_uuid)
+
+        child.stop()
+        self.assertEqual(1, child.full_output().count(ADMIN_PASS_PREFIX))
+
+    def test_second_boot_silent_and_state_persists(self):
+        state_dir = self._temp_dir()
+        first = self._boot_in_state(state_dir)
+        printed_pass = first.printed_admin_pass()
+        cookie = self._admin_login(first.base_url, printed_pass)
+        app_uuid = str(uuidlib.uuid4())
+        status, _, _ = self._request_json(
+            first.base_url, "POST", APPS_PATH,
+            {"uuid": app_uuid, "name": "persist-check"}, headers=cookie,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(201, status)
+
+        # kill/drain protocol BEFORE any silence assertion (G-010)
+        first.stop()
+        first_output = first.full_output()
+        self.assertEqual(1, first_output.count(ADMIN_PASS_PREFIX))
+        self.assertIn(printed_pass, first_output)
+
+        second = self._boot_in_state(state_dir)
+        # the same pass still logs in on the second boot: .env persisted
+        cookie = self._admin_login(second.base_url, printed_pass)
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(
+            second.base_url, "GET", APPS_PATH, headers=cookie
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        listed = [row["uuid"] for row in body["registrations"]]
+        self.assertIn(app_uuid, listed)
+
+        second.stop()
+        second_output = second.full_output()
+        self.assertIn(LISTENING_PREFIX, second_output)
+        self.assertNotIn(ADMIN_PASS_PREFIX, second_output)
+
+    def test_user_env_ui_root_override_wins_over_materialized_default(self):
+        state_dir = self._temp_dir()
+        custom_root = os.path.join(state_dir, "custom_ui")
+        os.makedirs(custom_root)
+        marker = b"<h1>packaged-override-marker</h1>\n"
+        with open(os.path.join(custom_root, "login.html"), "wb") as handle:
+            handle.write(marker)
+        # a user .env (at the child's BROKER_ENV_PATH) wins over the shim default
+        with open(os.path.join(state_dir, ".env"), "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            handle.write("BROKER_UI_ROOT=%s\n" % custom_root)
+
+        child = self._boot_in_state(state_dir)
+        status, body, headers = self._request(child.base_url, "GET", UI_LOGIN_PATH)
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertTrue(headers.get("Content-Type", "").startswith("text/html"))
+        self.assertEqual(marker, body)
+        # the custom root is the whole UI root: no dashboard.html there
+        status, _, _ = self._request(child.base_url, "GET", UI_DASHBOARD_PATH)
+        self.assertEqual(404, status)
+        # the materialized static default still applies (not overridden)
+        status, served, _ = self._request(child.base_url, "GET", CLIENT_STATIC_PATH)
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual(self._read_repo_bytes(REPO_CLIENT_PATH), served)
+        # materialized defaults still exist on disk; they were simply not forced
+        self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(
+            state_dir, ASSET_DIR_NAME, VERSION, "ui", "login.html"
+        )))
+        child.stop()
+
+    def test_default_anchoring_boot_writes_state_to_cwd(self):
+        # the owner's literal happy path: no state overrides except the bind
+        cwd_dir = self._temp_dir()
+        env = self._child_env(BROKER_BIND="127.0.0.1:0")
+        child = self._boot(env, cwd_dir)
+
+        status, body, _ = self._request_json(child.base_url, "GET", "/healthz")
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertEqual({"ok": True}, body)
+        status, body, headers = self._request(child.base_url, "GET", UI_LOGIN_PATH)
+        self.assertEqual(200, status)
+        self.assertTrue(headers.get("Content-Type", "").startswith("text/html"))
+
+        # state lands in the child's CWD, at 0600
+        self._assert_state_files_0600_in(cwd_dir)
+
+        child.stop()
+        self.assertEqual(1, child.full_output().count(ADMIN_PASS_PREFIX))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_dockerfile_consistency.py

@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+"""Dockerfile consistency tests (G-016 — equivalence made testable).
+
+The Dockerfile documents the docker-user path; the daemonless client
+(``scripts/publish_image.py``) is the pipeline's source of truth for
+the published image. Byte-identity is NOT required — these tests pin the
+equivalence contract: same staged sources (member-set parity — the
+docker-staged layout must equal build_cli's staging EXACTLY, or the
+packaged shim materializes an empty UI dir and /ui/* 404s in
+docker-built images; P3-03/CWE-636), same zipapp invocation, same
+entrypoint/working-dir, same pinned base, and a hygienic build context.
+"""
+
+import json
+import os
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+import zipfile
+
+_SCRIPTS_DIR = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(
+    os.path.abspath(__file__))), "scripts")
+if _SCRIPTS_DIR not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, _SCRIPTS_DIR)
+
+import build_cli  # noqa: E402  (scripts/ dir on sys.path)
+import publish_image  # noqa: E402  (scripts/ dir on sys.path)
+
+REPO = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
+APP_SRC = "/app/src/"
+DOCKERFILE_IGNORE_PATTERNS = (
+    ".git", ".env", ".env.*", "data/", "*.db", "*.log", "dist/",
+    "__pycache__/", "tests/", ".ciagent/",
+    "**/__pycache__/", "**/*.pyc",
+)
+
+
+def read(name):
+    with open(os.path.join(REPO, name), "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        return handle.read()
+
+
+def _tree_members(prefix, root):
+    """Zipapp member names for the tree at ``root`` staged under
+    ``prefix`` (``""`` for the archive root; the prefix itself is
+    included — zipapp writes directory entries)."""
+    members = {prefix} if prefix else set()
+    for current, dirs, files in os.walk(root):
+        relative = os.path.relpath(current, root)
+        base = prefix + ("" if relative == "." else relative + "/")
+        for name in dirs:
+            members.add(base + name + "/")
+        for name in files:
+            members.add(base + name)
+    return members
+
+
+def _build_cli_staged_members():
+    """The member set build_cli stages, derived via its constants:
+    ROOT_SOURCES at the root, UI under the coreci_broker_ui/ prefix,
+    cli/__main__.py staged as __main__.py, _cli_version.py generated."""
+    members = set(build_cli.ROOT_SOURCES)
+    members.add(build_cli.STAGED_SHIM)
+    members.add(build_cli.VERSION_MODULE)
+    members |= _tree_members(
+        build_cli.UI_SOURCE_DIR + "/",
+        os.path.join(REPO, build_cli.UI_SOURCE_DIR))
+    return members
+
+
+def _run_zipapp(staged_dir, artifact):
+    """The Dockerfile's packing invocation (zipapp writes dir entries;
+    the member set is interpreter-stable across 3.x)."""
+    completed = subprocess.run(
+        [sys.executable, "-m", "zipapp", staged_dir,
+         "-o", artifact,
+         "--python", "/usr/bin/env python3", "--compress"],
+        capture_output=True, text=True)
+    if completed.returncode != 0:
+        raise AssertionError(
+            "zipapp failed ({}): {}".format(
+                completed.returncode,
+                (completed.stderr or completed.stdout).strip()))
+
+
+class DockerfileConsistencyTests(unittest.TestCase):
+
+    @classmethod
+    def setUpClass(cls):
+        cls.dockerfile = read("Dockerfile")
+        cls.dockerignore = read(".dockerignore")
+        # Join backslash continuations into logical stanzas; skip comments.
+        stanzas = []
+        for line in cls.dockerfile.splitlines():
+            stripped = line.strip()
+            if not stripped or stripped.startswith("#"):
+                continue
+            if stanzas and stanzas[-1].endswith("\\"):
+                stanzas[-1] = stanzas[-1].rstrip("\\").rstrip() + " " + stripped
+                continue
+            stanzas.append(stripped)
+        cls.stanzas = stanzas
+        cls.copy_lines = [s for s in stanzas if s.startswith("COPY ")]
+        cls.zipapp_lines = [s for s in stanzas
+                            if "zipapp" in s and s.startswith("RUN ")]
+        cls.version_lines = [s for s in stanzas
+                             if "_cli_version.py" in s
+                             and s.startswith("RUN ")]
+
+    def _copy_specs(self):
+        """[(sources, dest)] per COPY stanza, dest verified to stage
+        under /app/src/."""
+        specs = []
+        for line in self.copy_lines:
+            tokens = line.split()[1:]
+            sources, dest = tokens[:-1], tokens[-1]
+            self.assertTrue(dest.startswith(APP_SRC),
+                            "COPY destination {} must stage under /app/src/"
+                            .format(dest))
+            specs.append((sources, dest))
+        return specs
+
+    def _docker_staged_members(self):
+        """The member set the COPY stanzas stage under /app/src/ (Docker
+        semantics: directory CONTENTS land flattened INSIDE the
+        destination dir; a dest without trailing slash is a file rename),
+        plus the RUN-generated _cli_version.py."""
+        members = set()
+        for sources, dest in self._copy_specs():
+            if dest.endswith("/"):
+                prefix = dest[len(APP_SRC):]
+                for source in sources:
+                    path = os.path.join(REPO, source.rstrip("/"))
+                    self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(path),
+                                    "COPY source missing in the repo: {}"
+                                    .format(source))
+                    if os.path.isdir(path):
+                        members |= _tree_members(prefix, path)
+                    else:
+                        members.add(prefix + os.path.basename(source))
+            else:
+                # file-to-file rename (mirrors build_cli's STAGED_SHIM
+                # staging — zipapp requires __main__.py at the root)
+                self.assertEqual(len(sources), 1,
+                                 "file-rename COPY stages exactly one "
+                                 "source: {}".format(dest))
+                members.add(dest[len(APP_SRC):])
+        members.add(build_cli.VERSION_MODULE)  # the RUN printf stanza
+        return members
+
+    def test_from_pins_base(self):
+        from_lines = [line for line in self.dockerfile.splitlines()
+                      if line.startswith("FROM ")]
+        self.assertEqual(len(from_lines), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(from_lines[0].split()[1], "python:3.11-slim")
+
+    def test_copy_staged_member_set_matches_build_cli_staging(self):
+        """The COPY stanzas stage EXACTLY build_cli's member set — set
+        parity, no extras, no missing (a flattened UI copy or a missing
+        root __main__.py breaks the packaged boot; P3-03/CWE-636)."""
+        self.assertEqual(self._docker_staged_members(),
+                         _build_cli_staged_members(),
+                         "docker-staged member set == build_cli-staged "
+                         "member set")
+        for line in self.copy_lines:
+            self.assertNotIn("dist/", line,
+                             "no pre-built artifact in the build context")
+
+    def test_docker_layout_simulation_member_set_parity(self):
+        """Docker-layout simulation gate (P3-03/CWE-636): apply the
+        Dockerfile COPY semantics to the real repo sources, add the
+        generated _cli_version.py, zipapp-pack, and the archive's member
+        set must EQUAL the build_cli-built artifact's member set."""
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="docker-layout-") as tmp:
+            staged = os.path.join(tmp, "src")
+            os.makedirs(staged)
+            for sources, dest in self._copy_specs():
+                if dest.endswith("/"):
+                    target = os.path.join(staged, dest[len(APP_SRC):])
+                    os.makedirs(target, exist_ok=True)
+                    for source in sources:
+                        path = os.path.join(REPO, source.rstrip("/"))
+                        if os.path.isdir(path):
+                            # directory CONTENTS land inside the dest dir
+                            shutil.copytree(path, target,
+                                            dirs_exist_ok=True)
+                        else:
+                            shutil.copy2(
+                                path,
+                                os.path.join(target,
+                                             os.path.basename(source)))
+                else:
+                    self.assertEqual(len(sources), 1)
+                    shutil.copy2(os.path.join(REPO, sources[0]),
+                                 os.path.join(staged, dest[len(APP_SRC):]))
+            with open(os.path.join(staged, build_cli.VERSION_MODULE), "w",
+                      encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                handle.write('VERSION = "{}"\n'.format("v0.2-layout-sim"))
+            docker_artifact = os.path.join(tmp, "docker-layout.pyz")
+            _run_zipapp(staged, docker_artifact)
+            with zipfile.ZipFile(docker_artifact) as archive:
+                docker_members = set(archive.namelist())
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="build-cli-ref-") as dist:
+            reference = build_cli.build("v0.2-layout-sim", repo=REPO,
+                                        dist_dir=dist)
+            with zipfile.ZipFile(reference) as archive:
+                build_members = set(archive.namelist())
+        self.assertEqual(docker_members, build_members,
+                         "docker-layout archive members == build_cli "
+                         "artifact members")
+
+    def test_zipapp_invocation_flags_match_build_script(self):
+        """Same --python interpreter and --compress flag as build_cli."""
+        self.assertEqual(len(self.zipapp_lines), 1)
+        stanza = self.zipapp_lines[0]
+        self.assertIn('--python "/usr/bin/env python3"', stanza)
+        self.assertIn("--compress", stanza)
+        self.assertIn("-m zipapp", stanza)
+        self.assertIn("/app/src", stanza)
+        self.assertIn("/app/coreci-broker.pyz", stanza)
+
+    def test_version_module_format_parity(self):
+        """ARG VERSION feeds the same VERSION = "<value>" format."""
+        self.assertEqual(len(self.version_lines), 1)
+        self.assertIn('VERSION = "%s"', self.version_lines[0])
+        self.assertEqual(build_cli.VERSION_MODULE, "_cli_version.py")
+        self.assertTrue(any(s.startswith("ARG VERSION=") for s in self.stanzas),
+                        "ARG VERSION provides the version")
+
+    def test_entrypoint_and_workdir_match_published_config(self):
+        """ENTRYPOINT/WORKDIR equal the daemonless client's pushed config."""
+        base_config = json.loads('{"config": {}, "rootfs": {}}')
+        blob = json.loads(publish_image.build_config_blob(
+            base_config, "sha256:" + "0" * 64, "v-parity"))
+        entrypoint = blob["config"]["Entrypoint"]
+        working_dir = blob["config"]["WorkingDir"]
+        docker_entrypoint = [line for line in self.dockerfile.splitlines()
+                             if line.startswith("ENTRYPOINT ")]
+        docker_workdir = [line for line in self.dockerfile.splitlines()
+                          if line.startswith("WORKDIR ")]
+        self.assertEqual(len(docker_entrypoint), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(json.loads(
+            docker_entrypoint[0].split(" ", 1)[1]), entrypoint)
+        self.assertEqual(len(docker_workdir), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(docker_workdir[0].split(" ", 1)[1], working_dir)
+        self.assertEqual(working_dir, "/state")
+
+    def test_dockerignore_hygiene(self):
+        entries = {line.strip() for line in self.dockerignore.splitlines()
+                   if line.strip() and not line.strip().startswith("#")}
+        for pattern in DOCKERFILE_IGNORE_PATTERNS:
+            self.assertIn(pattern, entries,
+                          ".dockerignore must exclude {}".format(pattern))
+
+    def test_no_absolute_source_copies(self):
+        for line in self.copy_lines:
+            for token in line.split()[1:-1]:
+                self.assertFalse(token.startswith("/"),
+                                "build context sources are repo-relative")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_p5_remediation.py

@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+import base64
+import contextlib
+import errno
+import io
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+import uuid as uuidlib
+from unittest import mock
+
+sys.path.insert(0, os.path.abspath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), os.pardir)))
+
+import coreci_broker
+
+ADMIN_USER = "admin"
+ADMIN_PASS = "correct-horse-battery-staple"
+REGISTER_PATH = "/api/broker/agents/register"
+APPS_PATH = "/api/broker/app_registrations"
+USERS_PATH = "/api/broker/user_allowlist"
+AGENT_ID_BODY = {"error": 400, "message": "invalid agent_id"}
+TAGS_BODY = {"error": 400, "message": "invalid tags"}
+USER_ID_BODY = {"error": 400, "message": "invalid user_id"}
+
+
+def _basic_header(username, password):
+    raw = "%s:%s" % (username, password)
+    return "Basic " + base64.b64encode(raw.encode("utf-8")).decode("ascii")
+
+
+class P5RegisterValidationTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.addCleanup(tmp.cleanup)
+        self.tmp = tmp.name
+        self.env = {
+            "BROKER_ENV_PATH": os.path.join(self.tmp, ".env"),
+            "BROKER_DB_PATH": os.path.join(self.tmp, "broker.db"),
+            "BROKER_AUDIT_LOG_PATH": os.path.join(self.tmp, "broker.audit.log"),
+            "BROKER_ADMIN_USER": ADMIN_USER,
+            "BROKER_ADMIN_PASS": ADMIN_PASS,
+        }
+        with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()):
+            self.broker = coreci_broker.boot(dict(self.env))
+        self.addCleanup(self.broker.audit.close)
+        self.addCleanup(self.broker.store.close)
+        self.server = coreci_broker.serve("127.0.0.1", 0, self.broker)
+        self.addCleanup(self.server.shutdown)
+        self.addCleanup(self.server.server_close)
+        self.base = "http://127.0.0.1:%d" % self.server.server_address[1]
+        self.admin = {"Authorization": _basic_header(ADMIN_USER, ADMIN_PASS)}
+        self.app_uuid = str(uuidlib.uuid4())
+        self.user_id = "ceo"
+        self._seed()
+
+    def _request(self, method, path, payload=None, headers=None):
+        data = None if payload is None else json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8")
+        request = urllib.request.Request(self.base + path, data=data, method=method)
+        for key, value in (headers or {}).items():
+            request.add_header(key, value)
+        try:
+            with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=10) as response:
+                return response.status, json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
+        except urllib.error.HTTPError as error:
+            return error.code, json.loads(error.read().decode("utf-8"))
+
+    def _seed(self):
+        status, _ = self._request("POST", APPS_PATH, {"uuid": self.app_uuid}, self.admin)
+        self.assertEqual(201, status)
+        status, _ = self._request("POST", USERS_PATH, {"user_id": self.user_id}, self.admin)
+        self.assertEqual(201, status)
+
+    def _register(self, agent_id="agent-1", tags=("coreci",)):
+        return self._request("POST", REGISTER_PATH, {
+            "agent_id": agent_id,
+            "app_registration_uuid": self.app_uuid,
+            "user_id": self.user_id,
+            "tags": list(tags),
+        })
+
+    def _audit(self, action=None, result=None):
+        with open(self.env["BROKER_AUDIT_LOG_PATH"], "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            entries = [json.loads(raw) for raw in handle if raw.strip()]
+        return [
+            entry for entry in entries
+            if (action is None or entry["action"] == action)
+            and (result is None or entry["result"] == result)
+        ]
+
+    def test_agent_id_bare_dot_and_dotdot_rejected(self):
+        for agent_id in (".", ".."):
+            status, body = self._register(agent_id=agent_id)
+            self.assertEqual(400, status, repr(agent_id))
+            self.assertEqual(AGENT_ID_BODY, body)
+        self.assertEqual([], self.broker.store.agents_by_uuid(self.app_uuid))
+        self.assertEqual([], self._audit("register"))
+
+    def test_agent_id_control_chars_rejected(self):
+        for agent_id in ("a\x00b", "a\nb", "a\x1fb", "a\x7fb"):
+            status, body = self._register(agent_id=agent_id)
+            self.assertEqual(400, status, repr(agent_id))
+            self.assertEqual(AGENT_ID_BODY, body)
+        self.assertEqual([], self.broker.store.agents_by_uuid(self.app_uuid))
+        self.assertEqual([], self._audit("register"))
+
+    def test_agent_id_embedded_dots_still_accepted(self):
+        status, body = self._register(agent_id="a.b")
+        self.assertEqual(201, status)
+        self.assertTrue(body["created"])
+        status, body = self._register(agent_id="tool.v2")
+        self.assertEqual(201, status)
+        self.assertTrue(body["created"])
+        self.assertIsNotNone(self.broker.store.get_agent("a.b", self.app_uuid))
+        self.assertIsNotNone(self.broker.store.get_agent("tool.v2", self.app_uuid))
+        self.assertEqual(2, len(self._audit("register", "ok")))
+
+    def test_tag_control_chars_rejected(self):
+        for tags in (("ok", "ba\x00d"), ("ok", "ba\x7fd"), ("ok", "ba:d")):
+            status, body = self._register(tags=tags)
+            self.assertEqual(400, status, repr(tags))
+            self.assertEqual(TAGS_BODY, body)
+        self.assertEqual([], self.broker.store.agents_by_uuid(self.app_uuid))
+        status, body = self._register(tags=("a.b", ".."))
+        self.assertEqual(201, status)
+        self.assertTrue(body["created"])
+        row = self.broker.store.get_agent("agent-1", self.app_uuid)
+        self.assertEqual(["..", "a.b"], json.loads(row[3]))
+
+    def test_agent_id_path_separators_still_rejected(self):
+        for agent_id in ("a:b", "a/b", "a\\b"):
+            status, body = self._register(agent_id=agent_id)
+            self.assertEqual(400, status, repr(agent_id))
+            self.assertEqual(AGENT_ID_BODY, body)
+        self.assertEqual([], self._audit("register"))
+        status, body = self._register(agent_id="plain-agent")
+        self.assertEqual(201, status)
+        self.assertTrue(body["created"])
+
+    def test_user_allowlist_add_shares_id_rules(self):
+        for user_id in (".", "..", "a\x00b", "a:b", "a/b"):
+            status, body = self._request("POST", USERS_PATH, {"user_id": user_id}, self.admin)
+            self.assertEqual(400, status, repr(user_id))
+            self.assertEqual(USER_ID_BODY, body)
+        status, body = self._request("POST", USERS_PATH, {"user_id": "ceo.two"}, self.admin)
+        self.assertEqual(201, status)
+
+
+class P5ReexecGuardTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        coreci_broker._reset_server_guard()
+        self.addCleanup(coreci_broker._reset_server_guard)
+        tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.addCleanup(tmp.cleanup)
+        self.tmp = tmp.name
+
+    def _env(self, bind):
+        return {
+            "BROKER_ENV_PATH": os.path.join(self.tmp, ".env"),
+            "BROKER_DB_PATH": os.path.join(self.tmp, "broker.db"),
+            "BROKER_AUDIT_LOG_PATH": os.path.join(self.tmp, "broker.audit.log"),
+            "BROKER_BIND": bind,
+        }
+
+    def _exec_broker(self):
+        with open(coreci_broker.__file__, "r", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            source = handle.read()
+        namespace = {"__name__": "coreci_broker_reexec"}
+        exec(compile(source, "coreci_broker.py", "exec"), namespace)
+        return namespace
+
+    def _healthz(self, port):
+        url = "http://127.0.0.1:%d/healthz" % port
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(url, timeout=5) as response:
+            return response.status, json.loads(response.read().decode("utf-8"))
+
+    def test_fresh_namespace_tools_fails_loud_when_old_module_serves(self):
+        first = self._exec_broker()
+        with mock.patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("127.0.0.1:0"), clear=True):
+            with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()):
+                first_tools = first["Tools"]()
+                first_again = first["Tools"]()
+        server = first["_started_server"]
+        self.addCleanup(first["_reset_server_guard"])
+        self.assertIs(server, first_tools._server)
+        self.assertIs(first_tools._server, first_again._server)
+        port = server.server_address[1]
+        self.assertNotEqual(0, port)
+        second = self._exec_broker()
+        self.assertIsNone(second["_started_server"])
+        with mock.patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("127.0.0.1:%d" % port), clear=True):
+            with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()):
+                with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as caught:
+                    second["Tools"]()
+        message = str(caught.exception).lower()
+        self.assertIn("restart", message)
+        self.assertIn("open webui", message)
+        self.assertIsInstance(caught.exception.__cause__, OSError)
+        self.assertEqual(errno.EADDRINUSE, caught.exception.__cause__.errno)
+        self.assertIsNone(second["_started_server"])
+        self.assertEqual((200, {"ok": True}), self._healthz(port))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_publish_image.py

@@ -0,0 +1,799 @@
+"""Stub-registry tests for scripts/publish_image.py (REQ-23, G-019).
+
+Two local stub servers stand in for the public image registry (anonymous
+pull) and the gitea container registry (JWT auth + blob uploads +
+manifest PUTs). No network access; tiny in-memory fixtures; every
+spawned server is cleaned via addCleanup.
+"""
+
+import base64
+import hashlib
+import io
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import threading
+import time
+import unittest
+import urllib.parse
+from contextlib import redirect_stderr, redirect_stdout
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+
+_SCRIPTS_DIR = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(
+    os.path.abspath(__file__))), "scripts")
+if _SCRIPTS_DIR not in sys.path:
+    sys.path.insert(0, _SCRIPTS_DIR)
+
+import publish_image  # noqa: E402  (scripts/ dir on sys.path)
+
+OCI_MANIFEST = "application/vnd.oci.image.manifest.v1+json"
+OCI_INDEX = "application/vnd.oci.image.index.v1+json"
+OCI_CONFIG = "application/vnd.oci.image.config.v1+json"
+OCI_LAYER = "application/vnd.oci.image.layer.v1.tar+gzip"
+OWNER = "testowner"
+REPO = "testrepo"
+NAME = "{}/{}".format(OWNER, REPO)
+
+
+def _sha(data):
+    return "sha256:" + hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
+
+
+def _dump(payload):
+    return json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
+
+
+class HubFixtures:
+    """A tiny synthetic base image: index -> amd64/arm64 children."""
+
+    def __init__(self):
+        self.layer0 = b"base layer zero payload\x00" + b"\xa5" * 64
+        self.layer1 = b"base layer one payload" * 7
+        self.config = _dump({
+            "architecture": "amd64",
+            "os": "linux",
+            "config": {"Cmd": ["python3"], "Env": ["PATH=/usr/local/bin"]},
+            "rootfs": {"type": "layers",
+                       "diff_ids": [_sha(self.layer0), _sha(self.layer1)]},
+        })
+        self.child = {
+            "schemaVersion": 2,
+            "mediaType": OCI_MANIFEST,
+            "config": {"mediaType": OCI_CONFIG,
+                       "digest": _sha(self.config),
+                       "size": len(self.config)},
+            "layers": [
+                {"mediaType": OCI_LAYER, "digest": _sha(self.layer0),
+                 "size": len(self.layer0)},
+                {"mediaType": OCI_LAYER, "digest": _sha(self.layer1),
+                 "size": len(self.layer1)},
+            ],
+        }
+        self.child_digest = _sha(_dump(self.child))
+        arm64_child = dict(self.child)
+        arm64_child["annotations"] = {"test-fixture": "arm64"}
+        self.arm64_child_digest = _sha(_dump(arm64_child))
+        self.index = {
+            "schemaVersion": 2,
+            "mediaType": OCI_INDEX,
+            "manifests": [
+                {"mediaType": OCI_MANIFEST, "digest": self.child_digest,
+                 "size": len(_dump(self.child)),
+                 "platform": {"os": "linux", "architecture": "amd64"}},
+                {"mediaType": OCI_MANIFEST,
+                 "digest": self.arm64_child_digest,
+                 "size": len(_dump(arm64_child)),
+                 "platform": {"os": "linux", "architecture": "arm64"}},
+            ],
+        }
+        self.blobs = {
+            _sha(self.config): self.config,
+            _sha(self.layer0): self.layer0,
+            _sha(self.layer1): self.layer1,
+        }
+
+
+class _StubHubHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    fixtures = None  # set per test class run
+    requests = None
+    token_mode = "ok"  # ok | malformed (200 with an INVALID JSON body)
+
+    def _record(self):
+        length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length") or 0)
+        body = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b""
+        self.requests.append({
+            "method": self.command,
+            "path": self.path,
+            "authorization": self.headers.get("Authorization", ""),
+            "accept": self.headers.get("Accept", ""),
+            "body": body,
+        })
+
+    def _send(self, status, payload, content_type):
+        data = payload if isinstance(payload, bytes) else _dump(payload)
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", content_type)
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        if self.command != "HEAD":
+            self.wfile.write(data)
+
+    def do_GET(self):
+        self._record()
+        path = urllib.parse.urlsplit(self.path).path
+        query = dict(urllib.parse.parse_qsl(
+            urllib.parse.urlsplit(self.path).query))
+        if path == "/token":
+            if self.token_mode == "malformed":
+                # 200 + invalid JSON: the CWE-754 probe — must surface as
+                # a remote failure WITH the IMAGE_PENDING marker, never
+                # a bare traceback.
+                self._send(200, b"this { is not valid json", "application/json")
+            else:
+                self._send(200, {"token": "hub-anon-token"}, "application/json")
+        elif path == "/v2/library/python/manifests/3.11-slim":
+            self._send(200, self.fixtures.index, OCI_INDEX)
+        elif path == "/v2/library/python/manifests/" + self.fixtures.child_digest:
+            self._send(200, self.fixtures.child, OCI_MANIFEST)
+        else:
+            digest = path.rsplit("/", 1)[-1]
+            if digest in self.fixtures.blobs:
+                self._send(200, self.fixtures.blobs[digest],
+                           "application/octet-stream")
+            else:
+                self._send(404, {"errors": [{"digest": digest}]},
+                           "application/json")
+
+    def log_message(self, format, *args):
+        pass
+
+
+class _StubGiteaHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    """Scriptable gitea registry stub.
+
+    state dict keys: requests, uploaded, token_mode (ok|empty),
+    upload_mode (monolithic|redirect307|redirect307_cross|stall),
+    manifest_mode (ok|fail500), redirect_seen, manifest_puts,
+    cross_origin_base (absolute URL of the second-origin stub used by
+    redirect307_cross).
+    """
+
+    state = None
+
+    def _record(self):
+        length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length") or 0)
+        body = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b""
+        self.state["requests"].append({
+            "method": self.command,
+            "path": self.path,
+            "authorization": self.headers.get("Authorization", ""),
+            "content_type": self.headers.get("Content-Type", ""),
+            "body": body,
+        })
+
+    def _send(self, status, payload=b"", content_type="application/json",
+              headers=None):
+        data = payload if isinstance(payload, bytes) else _dump(payload)
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", content_type)
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
+        for key, value in (headers or {}).items():
+            self.send_header(key, value)
+        self.end_headers()
+        if self.command != "HEAD":
+            self.wfile.write(data)
+
+    def do_GET(self):
+        self._record()
+        parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(self.path)
+        if parsed.path == "/v2/":
+            # G-013 smoke check 1: the registry auth challenge (401 +
+            # Bearer; the realm defaults to this stub's own token
+            # endpoint so pre-existing state dicts work unchanged).
+            realm = self.state.get("challenge_realm") or \
+                "http://{}:{}/v2/token".format(
+                    self.server.server_address[0],
+                    self.server.server_address[1])
+            self._send(401, {"errors": [{"code": "UNAUTHORIZED"}]},
+                       headers={
+                           "WWW-Authenticate":
+                           'Bearer realm="{}",service="{}"'.format(
+                               realm, publish_image.GITEA_AUTH_SERVICE)})
+            return
+        if parsed.path == "/v2/token":
+            if self.state["token_mode"] == "empty":
+                self._send(200, {"token": ""})
+            else:
+                self._send(200, {"token": "stub-jwt"})
+            return
+        if parsed.path.startswith("/api/v1/repos/") and \
+                "/releases/tags/" in parsed.path:
+            # G-013 smoke check 3: the gitea API release-by-tag GET
+            # (state["releases"]: tag -> release payload; absent -> 404).
+            tag = parsed.path.rsplit("/", 1)[-1]
+            release = self.state.get("releases", {}).get(tag)
+            if release is None:
+                self._send(404, {"errors": [{"message": "release not found"}]})
+            else:
+                self._send(200, release)
+            return
+
+    def do_HEAD(self):
+        self._record()
+        parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(self.path)
+        digest = parsed.path.rsplit("/", 1)[-1]
+        if digest in self.state["uploaded"]:
+            self._send(200, b"")
+        else:
+            self._send(404, b"")
+
+    def do_POST(self):
+        self._record()
+        parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(self.path)
+        query = dict(urllib.parse.parse_qsl(parsed.query))
+        digest = query.get("digest", "")
+        if self.state["upload_mode"] == "stall":
+            time.sleep(15)
+            return
+        if self.state["upload_mode"] == "redirect307_cross" and \
+                digest not in self.state["redirect_seen"]:
+            # CWE-200 probe: ABSOLUTE Location pointing at a DIFFERENT
+            # origin (the second stub server) — the client must follow
+            # WITHOUT the Authorization header.
+            self.state["redirect_seen"].add(digest)
+            location = "{}/v2/{}/blobs/uploads/?digest={}".format(
+                self.state["cross_origin_base"], NAME, digest)
+            self._send(307, b"", headers={"Location": location})
+            return
+        if self.state["upload_mode"] == "redirect307" and \
+                digest not in self.state["redirect_seen"]:
+            self.state["redirect_seen"].add(digest)
+            location = "/v2/{}/blobs/uploads/?digest={}".format(NAME, digest)
+            self._send(307, b"", headers={"Location": location})
+            return
+        if _sha(self.state["requests"][-1]["body"]) == digest:
+            self.state["uploaded"][digest] = self.state["requests"][-1]["body"]
+            self._send(201, {"status": "created"})
+        else:
+            self._send(400, {"errors": [{"digest": digest}]})
+
+    def do_PUT(self):
+        self._record()
+        parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(self.path)
+        query = dict(urllib.parse.parse_qsl(parsed.query))
+        body = self.state["requests"][-1]["body"]
+        if "/manifests/" in parsed.path:
+            if self.state["manifest_mode"] == "fail500":
+                self.state.setdefault("manifest_fail_count", 0)
+                self.state["manifest_fail_count"] += 1
+                self._send(500, {"errors": [{"code": "UNKNOWN"}]})
+                return
+            manifest = json.loads(body)
+            referenced = [manifest["config"]["digest"]] + [
+                layer["digest"] for layer in manifest["layers"]]
+            if any(digest not in self.state["uploaded"]
+                   for digest in referenced):
+                self._send(400, {"errors": [{"code": "BLOB_UNKNOWN"}]})
+                return
+            if self.headers.get("Content-Type") != OCI_MANIFEST:
+                self._send(400, {"errors": [{"code": "MANIFEST_INVALID"}]})
+                return
+            self.state.setdefault("manifest_puts", []).append(
+                {"tag": parsed.path.rsplit("/", 1)[-1],
+                 "content_type": self.headers.get("Content-Type", ""),
+                 "manifest": manifest})
+            self._send(201, {})
+            return
+        digest = query.get("digest", "")
+        if _sha(body) == digest:
+            self.state["uploaded"][digest] = body
+            self._send(201, {})
+        else:
+            self._send(400, {"errors": [{"code": "DIGEST_INVALID"}]})
+
+
+class _StubCrossOriginHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    """Second-origin stub (another port) for the CWE-200 redirect probe.
+
+    state dict keys: requests, uploaded — ``uploaded`` is SHARED with the
+    gitea stub (the redirect target models the registry's presigned
+    external storage; a landed blob is visible to the registry), while
+    ``requests`` stays separate so the test can assert on exactly what
+    this origin received — above all that NO Authorization header
+    crossed the origin boundary.
+    """
+
+    state = None
+
+    def _record(self):
+        length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length") or 0)
+        body = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b""
+        self.state["requests"].append({
+            "method": self.command,
+            "path": self.path,
+            "authorization": self.headers.get("Authorization", ""),
+            "content_type": self.headers.get("Content-Type", ""),
+            "body": body,
+        })
+        return body
+
+    def _send(self, status, payload=b"", content_type="application/json"):
+        data = payload if isinstance(payload, bytes) else _dump(payload)
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", content_type)
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        if self.command != "HEAD":
+            self.wfile.write(data)
+
+    def do_POST(self):
+        body = self._record()
+        query = dict(urllib.parse.parse_qsl(
+            urllib.parse.urlsplit(self.path).query))
+        digest = query.get("digest", "")
+        if _sha(body) == digest:
+            self.state["uploaded"][digest] = body
+            self._send(201, {"status": "created"})
+        else:
+            self._send(400, {"errors": [{"code": "DIGEST_INVALID"}]})
+
+    def log_message(self, format, *args):
+        pass
+
+
+class PublishImageTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    """End-to-end publish flows against local stub registries."""
+
+    TAG = "v0.2.2-test"
+
+    @classmethod
+    def setUpClass(cls):
+        cls.fixtures = HubFixtures()
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.temp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.addCleanup(self.temp.cleanup)
+        self.artifact = os.path.join(self.temp.name, "coreci-broker.pyz")
+        with open(self.artifact, "wb") as handle:
+            handle.write(b"fake pyz payload for tests" * 3)
+        self.env_root = os.path.join(self.temp.name, "envroot")
+        os.makedirs(self.env_root)
+        with open(os.path.join(self.env_root, ".env.secrets"), "w") as handle:
+            handle.write("GITEA_TOKEN=testtoken123\n")
+
+        self.hub_requests = []
+        _StubHubHandler.fixtures = self.fixtures
+        _StubHubHandler.requests = self.hub_requests
+        _StubHubHandler.token_mode = "ok"
+        self.hub = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), _StubHubHandler)
+        threading.Thread(target=self.hub.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
+        self.addCleanup(self.hub.shutdown)
+        self.addCleanup(self.hub.server_close)
+
+        self.gitea_state = {
+            "requests": [], "uploaded": {}, "token_mode": "ok",
+            "upload_mode": "monolithic", "manifest_mode": "ok",
+            "redirect_seen": set(),
+        }
+        _StubGiteaHandler.state = self.gitea_state
+        self.gitea = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), _StubGiteaHandler)
+        threading.Thread(target=self.gitea.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
+        self.addCleanup(self.gitea.shutdown)
+        self.addCleanup(self.gitea.server_close)
+
+    def run_publish(self, tag=None, timeout=60, artifact=None, env_root=None):
+        argv = [
+            tag or self.TAG,
+            "--artifact", artifact or self.artifact,
+            "--hub-registry", "http://127.0.0.1:{}".format(self.hub.server_address[1]),
+            "--hub-auth", "http://127.0.0.1:{}/token".format(self.hub.server_address[1]),
+            "--gitea-registry", "http://127.0.0.1:{}".format(self.gitea.server_address[1]),
+            "--owner", OWNER, "--repo", REPO,
+            "--env-root", env_root or self.env_root,
+            "--timeout", str(timeout),
+        ]
+        out, err = io.StringIO(), io.StringIO()
+        with redirect_stdout(out), redirect_stderr(err):
+            code = publish_image.main(argv)
+        return code, out.getvalue(), err.getvalue()
+
+    # 1 -----------------------------------------------------------------
+    def test_happy_path_end_to_end(self):
+        code, out, err = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertEqual(code, 0, err or out)
+        puts = self.gitea_state.get("manifest_puts", [])
+        self.assertEqual([entry["tag"] for entry in puts],
+                         [self.TAG, "latest"],
+                         "version tag FIRST, then latest (D-021)")
+        manifest = puts[0]["manifest"]
+        self.assertEqual(puts[0]["content_type"], OCI_MANIFEST)
+        self.assertEqual(manifest["config"]["mediaType"], OCI_CONFIG)
+        broker_layer = manifest["layers"][-1]
+        self.assertEqual(broker_layer["mediaType"], OCI_LAYER)
+        base_descriptors = self.fixtures.child["layers"]
+        self.assertEqual(manifest["layers"][:-1], base_descriptors,
+                         "base layer descriptors reused verbatim")
+        # deterministic broker layer digest matches an independent build
+        with open(self.artifact, "rb") as handle:
+            artifact_bytes = handle.read()
+        layer_blob, layer_digest, diff_id = publish_image.build_broker_layer(
+            artifact_bytes)
+        self.assertEqual(broker_layer["digest"], layer_digest)
+        self.assertEqual(broker_layer["size"], len(layer_blob))
+        # pushed config content
+        pushed_config = json.loads(
+            self.gitea_state["uploaded"][manifest["config"]["digest"]])
+        self.assertEqual(pushed_config["config"]["Entrypoint"],
+                         ["python3", "/app/coreci-broker.pyz"])
+        self.assertEqual(pushed_config["config"]["Cmd"], [])
+        self.assertEqual(pushed_config["config"]["WorkingDir"], "/state")
+        self.assertEqual(pushed_config["config"]["Labels"],
+                         {"org.opencontainers.image.version": self.TAG})
+        self.assertEqual(pushed_config["rootfs"]["diff_ids"][-1], diff_id)
+        self.assertEqual(len(pushed_config["rootfs"]["diff_ids"]),
+                         len(self.fixtures.child["layers"]) + 1)
+        # base config blob uploaded verbatim (digest invariant)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            self.gitea_state["uploaded"][self.fixtures.child["config"]["digest"]],
+            self.fixtures.config)
+        # all blobs present
+        for descriptor in manifest["layers"]:
+            self.assertIn(descriptor["digest"], self.gitea_state["uploaded"])
+        self.assertNotIn("IMAGE_PENDING", out)
+
+    # 2 -----------------------------------------------------------------
+    def test_head_skip_blob_not_reuploaded(self):
+        preseed = self.fixtures.child["layers"][0]["digest"]
+        self.gitea_state["uploaded"][preseed] = self.fixtures.layer0
+        code, out, err = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertEqual(code, 0, err or out)
+        posts = [r for r in self.gitea_state["requests"]
+                 if r["method"] == "POST" and preseed in r["path"]]
+        self.assertEqual(posts, [], "pre-seeded blob must not be re-uploaded")
+        hub_blob_gets = [r for r in self.hub_requests
+                         if r["method"] == "GET" and "/blobs/" in r["path"]
+                         and preseed in r["path"]]
+        self.assertEqual(hub_blob_gets, [],
+                         "skipped blob is never fetched from the hub")
+
+    # 3 -----------------------------------------------------------------
+    def test_redirect_307_relative_location_followed(self):
+        self.gitea_state["upload_mode"] = "redirect307"
+        code, out, err = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertEqual(code, 0, err or out)
+        blob_posts = [r for r in self.gitea_state["requests"]
+                      if r["method"] == "POST" and "/blobs/uploads/" in r["path"]
+                      and "digest=" in r["path"]]
+        self.assertGreater(len(blob_posts), 0)
+        digests = [dict(urllib.parse.parse_qsl(
+            urllib.parse.urlsplit(r["path"]).query))["digest"]
+            for r in blob_posts]
+        self.assertTrue(all(d in self.gitea_state["uploaded"]
+                            for d in digests),
+                        "every redirected upload must land")
+        # each redirected digest POSTed twice (307 + follow)
+        for digest in set(digests):
+            self.assertEqual(digests.count(digest), 2,
+                             "307 then explicit re-POST per digest")
+        # same-origin (relative Location) redirects KEEP the
+        # Authorization header — the CWE-200 strip is cross-origin ONLY
+        for request in blob_posts:
+            self.assertEqual(
+                request["authorization"], "Bearer stub-jwt",
+                "same-origin redirect must keep Authorization")
+
+    # 4 -----------------------------------------------------------------
+    def test_anonymous_token_trap_refused_before_push(self):
+        self.gitea_state["token_mode"] = "empty"
+        code, out, err = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertEqual(code, 1, "remote auth failure -> non-zero")
+        self.assertIn("anonymous-200 trap refused", err)
+        self.assertIn("IMAGE_PENDING", out)
+        post_put = [r for r in self.gitea_state["requests"]
+                    if r["method"] in ("POST", "PUT")]
+        self.assertEqual(post_put, [],
+                         "no blob upload or manifest PUT may happen")
+
+    # 5 -----------------------------------------------------------------
+    def test_layer_and_config_determinism(self):
+        with open(self.artifact, "rb") as handle:
+            artifact = handle.read()
+        first = publish_image.build_broker_layer(artifact)
+        second = publish_image.build_broker_layer(artifact)
+        self.assertEqual(first[1], second[1], "layer digest stable")
+        self.assertEqual(first[2], second[2], "diff_id stable")
+        base_config = json.loads(self.fixtures.config)
+        c1 = publish_image.build_config_blob(base_config, first[2], "t1")
+        c2 = publish_image.build_config_blob(base_config, first[2], "t1")
+        self.assertEqual(_sha(c1), _sha(c2), "config digest stable")
+
+    # 6 -----------------------------------------------------------------
+    def test_amd64_child_selected(self):
+        code, out, err = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertEqual(code, 0, err or out)
+        child_gets = [r for r in self.hub_requests
+                      if "/manifests/sha256:" in r["path"]]
+        self.assertTrue(child_gets, "child manifest must be fetched by digest")
+        self.assertTrue(all(self.fixtures.child_digest in r["path"]
+                            for r in child_gets),
+                        "amd64 child only")
+        self.assertFalse(any(self.fixtures.arm64_child_digest in r["path"]
+                              for r in self.hub_requests),
+                         "arm64 child never touched")
+
+    # 7 -----------------------------------------------------------------
+    def test_timeout_aborts_rather_than_hangs(self):
+        self.gitea_state["upload_mode"] = "stall"
+        started = time.monotonic()
+        code, out, err = self.run_publish(timeout=1)
+        elapsed = time.monotonic() - started
+        self.assertEqual(code, 1)
+        self.assertIn("IMAGE_PENDING", out)
+        self.assertLess(elapsed, 30, "bounded retries, no hang")
+        stalls = [r for r in self.gitea_state["requests"]
+                  if r["method"] == "POST" and "/blobs/uploads/" in r["path"]]
+        self.assertLessEqual(len(stalls), 3, "bounded retry attempts")
+
+    # 8 -----------------------------------------------------------------
+    def test_manifest_retry_exhaustion_marker(self):
+        self.gitea_state["manifest_mode"] = "fail500"
+        code, out, err = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertEqual(code, 1)
+        self.assertIn("IMAGE_PENDING", out)
+        self.assertEqual(self.gitea_state.get("manifest_fail_count"), 3,
+                         "exactly three bounded attempts on the tag PUT")
+        self.assertNotIn("latest",
+                         [r["path"].rsplit("/", 1)[-1]
+                          for r in self.gitea_state["requests"]
+                          if r["method"] == "PUT"],
+                         "latest must not be attempted after exhaustion")
+
+    # 9 -----------------------------------------------------------------
+    def test_token_discipline(self):
+        code, out, err = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertEqual(code, 0, err or out)
+        token_calls = [r for r in self.gitea_state["requests"]
+                       if r["path"].startswith("/v2/token")]
+        self.assertTrue(token_calls)
+        expected = base64.b64encode(
+            b"publisher:testtoken123").decode("ascii")
+        for call in token_calls:
+            self.assertEqual(call["authorization"],
+                             "Basic {}".format(expected))
+        # scope requested with pull,push (registry v2 scope form)
+        query = urllib.parse.unquote(
+            urllib.parse.urlsplit(token_calls[0]["path"]).query)
+        self.assertIn("repository:{}/{}:pull,push".format(OWNER, REPO),
+                      query)
+        # missing token: local precondition, zero remote requests
+        empty_root = os.path.join(self.temp.name, "emptyroot")
+        os.makedirs(empty_root)
+        before = len(self.gitea_state["requests"]) + len(self.hub_requests)
+        code, out, err = self.run_publish(env_root=empty_root)
+        self.assertEqual(code, 2, "local precondition -> exit 2")
+        self.assertNotIn("IMAGE_PENDING", out, "no marker for local errors")
+        after = len(self.gitea_state["requests"]) + len(self.hub_requests)
+        self.assertEqual(before, after, "no request of any kind was made")
+
+    # 10 ----------------------------------------------------------------
+    def test_malformed_hub_token_json_keeps_pending_marker(self):
+        """CWE-754 marker discipline: a 200 with an INVALID JSON body from
+        the hub token endpoint fails as a remote answer — exit 1 WITH the
+        IMAGE_PENDING marker — never an uncaught-ValueError traceback."""
+        _StubHubHandler.token_mode = "malformed"
+        code, out, err = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertEqual(code, 1)
+        self.assertIn("malformed JSON", err,
+                      "the failure class must be named in the error")
+        self.assertIn("IMAGE_PENDING", out,
+                      "marker discipline holds for malformed remote JSON")
+        self.assertNotIn("Traceback", out + err)
+        self.assertEqual(self.gitea_state["requests"], [],
+                         "nothing is attempted against gitea")
+
+    # 11 ----------------------------------------------------------------
+    def test_redirect_307_cross_origin_strips_authorization(self):
+        """CWE-200: a 307 whose Location resolves to a DIFFERENT origin
+        is followed WITHOUT the Authorization header — the registry JWT
+        never crosses origins — and the blob still lands."""
+        cross_state = {"requests": [], "uploaded": self.gitea_state["uploaded"]}
+        _StubCrossOriginHandler.state = cross_state
+        cross = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), _StubCrossOriginHandler)
+        threading.Thread(target=cross.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
+        self.addCleanup(cross.shutdown)
+        self.addCleanup(cross.server_close)
+        self.gitea_state["upload_mode"] = "redirect307_cross"
+        self.gitea_state["cross_origin_base"] = "http://127.0.0.1:{}".format(
+            cross.server_address[1])
+        code, out, err = self.run_publish()
+        self.assertEqual(code, 0, err or out)
+        self.assertTrue(cross_state["requests"],
+                        "the redirect was followed to the other origin")
+        for request in cross_state["requests"]:
+            self.assertEqual(
+                request["authorization"], "",
+                "Authorization must be stripped on cross-origin redirects")
+        # the blob landed (visible through the shared registry blob store)
+        self.assertEqual(len(self.gitea_state["uploaded"]), 5,
+                         "base config + 2 base layers + broker layer + "
+                         "image config all landed")
+        # and the flow still completes: both manifest PUTs back on the
+        # origin, where Authorization remains in play
+        self.assertEqual(
+            [entry["tag"] for entry in self.gitea_state.get(
+                "manifest_puts", [])],
+            [self.TAG, "latest"])
+
+
+class SmokeModeTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    """G-013 --smoke logic, stub-tested.
+
+    The LIVE smoke never runs in this suite — it executes only at the
+    P3-05 ship, where the ship gate sets PUBLISH_SMOKE=1 in the
+    environment (the script itself never reads that variable). Here the
+    four GET-only checks run against fresh stub instances: zero network,
+    and the stub records double as the read-only proof (a POST/PUT
+    landing anywhere in a smoke run is a hard failure).
+    """
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.temp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.addCleanup(self.temp.cleanup)
+        self.env_root = os.path.join(self.temp.name, "envroot")
+        os.makedirs(self.env_root)
+        with open(os.path.join(self.env_root, ".env.secrets"), "w") as handle:
+            handle.write("GITEA_TOKEN=testtoken123\n")
+
+        self.fixtures = HubFixtures()
+        self.hub_requests = []
+        _StubHubHandler.fixtures = self.fixtures
+        _StubHubHandler.requests = self.hub_requests
+        _StubHubHandler.token_mode = "ok"
+        self.hub = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), _StubHubHandler)
+        threading.Thread(target=self.hub.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
+        self.addCleanup(self.hub.shutdown)
+        self.addCleanup(self.hub.server_close)
+
+        self.gitea_state = {
+            "requests": [], "uploaded": {}, "token_mode": "ok",
+            "upload_mode": "monolithic", "manifest_mode": "ok",
+            "redirect_seen": set(), "releases": {},
+        }
+        _StubGiteaHandler.state = self.gitea_state
+        self.gitea = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), _StubGiteaHandler)
+        threading.Thread(target=self.gitea.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
+        self.addCleanup(self.gitea.shutdown)
+        self.addCleanup(self.gitea.server_close)
+        # The /v2/ challenge realm must point back at THIS stub's token
+        # endpoint so the recorded-realm exchange stays in-stub.
+        self.gitea_state["challenge_realm"] = \
+            "http://127.0.0.1:{}/v2/token".format(
+                self.gitea.server_address[1])
+
+    def run_smoke(self, tag, env_root=None):
+        argv = [
+            tag, "--smoke",
+            "--hub-registry",
+            "http://127.0.0.1:{}".format(self.hub.server_address[1]),
+            "--hub-auth",
+            "http://127.0.0.1:{}/token".format(
+                self.hub.server_address[1]),
+            "--gitea-registry",
+            "http://127.0.0.1:{}".format(self.gitea.server_address[1]),
+            "--owner", OWNER, "--repo", REPO,
+            "--env-root", env_root or self.env_root,
+        ]
+        out, err = io.StringIO(), io.StringIO()
+        with redirect_stdout(out), redirect_stderr(err):
+            code = publish_image.main(argv)
+        return code, out.getvalue(), err.getvalue()
+
+    def _post_put(self):
+        """(gitea POST/PUT, hub POST/PUT) across the stub records."""
+        return ([r for r in self.gitea_state["requests"]
+                 if r["method"] in ("POST", "PUT")],
+                [r for r in self.hub_requests
+                 if r["method"] in ("POST", "PUT")])
+
+    def _release_gets(self):
+        return [r for r in self.gitea_state["requests"]
+                if "/releases/tags/" in r["path"]]
+
+    # 12 ----------------------------------------------------------------
+    def test_smoke_all_checks_pass(self):
+        self.gitea_state["releases"]["v0.2.0"] = {
+            "tag_name": "v0.2.0",
+            "assets": [{"name": "phase0-notes.txt"}],
+        }
+        code, out, err = self.run_smoke("v0.2.0")
+        self.assertEqual(code, 0, err or out)
+        for marker in ("PASS [1/4]", "PASS [2/4]", "PASS [3/4]",
+                       "PASS [4/4]"):
+            self.assertIn(marker, out)
+        self.assertIn("G-021 confirmed: no .pyz asset", out,
+                      "the v0.2.0 run carries the G-021 forge-side "
+                      "confirmation")
+        self.assertIn("phase0-notes.txt", out, "asset names print as a fact")
+        self.assertIn(self.fixtures.child_digest, out,
+                      "the amd64 child digest prints (drift check)")
+        # the manifest GET carries the full Accept set
+        manifest_gets = [r for r in self.hub_requests
+                         if "/manifests/3.11-slim" in r["path"]]
+        self.assertEqual(len(manifest_gets), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(manifest_gets[0]["accept"],
+                         publish_image.ACCEPT_MANIFESTS)
+        # the release GET uses the gitea API token auth form
+        release_gets = self._release_gets()
+        self.assertEqual(len(release_gets), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(release_gets[0]["authorization"],
+                         "token testtoken123")
+        # READ-ONLY PROOF: zero POST/PUT recorded at either stub
+        gitea_writes, hub_writes = self._post_put()
+        self.assertEqual(gitea_writes, [], "no gitea write of any kind")
+        self.assertEqual(hub_writes, [], "no hub write of any kind")
+        self.assertNotIn("IMAGE_PENDING", out)
+
+    # 13 ----------------------------------------------------------------
+    def test_smoke_v0_2_0_no_pyz_assertion(self):
+        pyz_release = {"tag_name": "v0.2.0",
+                       "assets": [{"name": "coreci-broker-v0.2.0.pyz"}]}
+        self.gitea_state["releases"]["v0.2.0"] = pyz_release
+        self.gitea_state["releases"]["v0.2.2"] = pyz_release
+        # v0.2.0 + a .pyz asset: the G-021 hard assertion fails the smoke
+        code, out, err = self.run_smoke("v0.2.0")
+        self.assertEqual(code, 1)
+        self.assertIn("FAILED [3/4]", out)
+        self.assertIn("G-021", out, "the failure line names G-021")
+        self.assertIn(".pyz", out)
+        self.assertEqual(self.hub_requests, [],
+                         "a FAILED check stops the smoke: the hub "
+                         "resolve (step 4) never runs")
+        # the SAME release under a different tag: the assertion binds
+        # v0.2.0 only -> all four checks pass
+        code, out, err = self.run_smoke("v0.2.2")
+        self.assertEqual(code, 0, err or out)
+        for marker in ("PASS [3/4]", "PASS [4/4]"):
+            self.assertIn(marker, out)
+        self.assertNotIn("G-021 violation", out)
+        gitea_writes, hub_writes = self._post_put()
+        self.assertEqual(gitea_writes + hub_writes, [],
+                         "still read-only across both runs")
+
+    # 14 ----------------------------------------------------------------
+    def test_smoke_trap_refused(self):
+        self.gitea_state["token_mode"] = "empty"
+        self.gitea_state["releases"]["v0.2.3"] = {
+            "tag_name": "v0.2.3", "assets": [],
+        }
+        code, out, err = self.run_smoke("v0.2.3")
+        self.assertEqual(code, 1, "the trap is a loud remote failure")
+        self.assertIn("FAILED [2/4]", out)
+        self.assertIn("anonymous-200 trap refused", out)
+        self.assertIn("PASS [1/4]", out, "check 1 ran (order 1 -> 4)")
+        self.assertNotIn("PASS [3/4]", out, "checks after the trap never run")
+        self.assertNotIn("PASS [4/4]", out)
+        self.assertEqual(self._release_gets(), [],
+                         "the release GET (step 3) is skipped")
+        self.assertEqual(self.hub_requests, [],
+                         "zero hub requests: the index resolve (step 4) "
+                         "is skipped")
+
+    # 15 ----------------------------------------------------------------
+    def test_smoke_missing_token_local(self):
+        empty_root = os.path.join(self.temp.name, "emptyroot")
+        os.makedirs(empty_root)
+        code, out, err = self.run_smoke("v0.2.3", env_root=empty_root)
+        self.assertEqual(code, 2, "local precondition -> exit 2")
+        self.assertIn("ERROR", err)
+        self.assertIn("GITEA_TOKEN", err)
+        self.assertEqual(self.gitea_state["requests"], [],
+                         "zero gitea requests — the precondition fires "
+                         "before anything remote")
+        self.assertEqual(self.hub_requests, [], "zero hub requests")
+        self.assertNotIn("IMAGE_PENDING", out, "no marker for local errors")
+        self.assertNotIn("PASS", out, "no smoke check ever ran")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_release_upload.py

@@ -0,0 +1,511 @@
+"""Stub-gitea release-attacher tests (REQ-22, RESEARCH §2.4).
+
+Drives scripts/release.py against an in-process stub gitea
+(``_StubGiteaHandler`` on ``127.0.0.1:0`` — the v0.1 ``_StubOwuiHandler``
+precedent; fake token, no live-forge writes) plus the sanctioned
+secrets loader scripts/_env_secrets.py: create-or-get in both orders,
+byte-exact multipart shape, sha256-from-file discipline (G-017),
+idempotent re-attach, bounded-retry exhaustion -> RELEASE_PENDING marker,
+and file-only token resolution asserted before the first HTTP call.
+"""
+
+import contextlib
+import hashlib
+import importlib.util
+import io
+import json
+import os
+import pathlib
+import re
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import threading
+import unittest
+import urllib.parse
+from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, ThreadingHTTPServer
+
+REPO = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+RELEASE_PATH = REPO / "scripts" / "release.py"
+ENV_SECRETS_PATH = REPO / "scripts" / "_env_secrets.py"
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(REPO))
+
+import coreci_broker  # repo root on sys.path (parser-parity assertion)
+
+
+def _load_module(name, path):
+    spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, str(path))
+    module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
+    spec.loader.exec_module(module)
+    return module
+
+
+release = _load_module("release", RELEASE_PATH)
+env_secrets = _load_module("env_secrets", ENV_SECRETS_PATH)
+
+OWNER = "coreci"
+REPO_NAME = "broker"
+TAG = "v0.2.1"
+TOKEN = "testtoken123"
+ARTIFACT_NAME = "coreci-broker-v0.2.1.pyz"
+
+_RELEASE_BY_TAG_RE = re.compile(
+    r"^/api/v1/repos/([^/]+)/([^/]+)/releases/tags/([^/]+)$")
+_RELEASES_RE = re.compile(r"^/api/v1/repos/([^/]+)/([^/]+)/releases$")
+_ASSETS_RE = re.compile(r"^/api/v1/repos/([^/]+)/([^/]+)/releases/(\d+)/assets$")
+
+
+def _header_params(value):
+    """'a; b=\"c\"' -> {'b': 'c'} — Content-Type/Disposition params."""
+    params = {}
+    for item in value.split(";")[1:]:
+        key, _, val = item.strip().partition("=")
+        if key:
+            params[key.strip()] = val.strip().strip('"')
+    return params
+
+
+def _split_multipart(content_type, body):
+    """Minimal multipart parser: boundary from the Content-Type header."""
+    boundary = _header_params(content_type).get("boundary", "")
+    parts = []
+    if boundary:
+        for element in body.split(("--" + boundary).encode("utf-8"))[1:]:
+            if element.startswith(b"--"):
+                continue  # closing delimiter
+            if element.startswith(b"\r\n"):
+                element = element[2:]
+            header_blob, separator, content = element.partition(b"\r\n\r\n")
+            if not separator:
+                continue
+            if content.endswith(b"\r\n"):
+                content = content[:-2]  # framing CRLF before the next delimiter
+            part_headers = {}
+            for line in header_blob.decode("utf-8", "replace").split("\r\n"):
+                name, _, value = line.partition(":")
+                if name:
+                    part_headers[name.strip().lower()] = value.strip()
+            parts.append((part_headers, content))
+    return boundary, parts
+
+
+class _StubGiteaHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    """Scriptable gitea stub (RESEARCH §2.1 routes); records everything."""
+
+    state = None     # scriptable state dict (class attr, bound per server)
+    requests = None  # every request: method, path, headers, body (+extras)
+
+    def log_message(self, format, *args):
+        pass
+
+    def _record(self):
+        length = int(self.headers.get("Content-Length") or 0)
+        body = self.rfile.read(length) if length else b""
+        record = {
+            "method": self.command,
+            "path": self.path,
+            "headers": {key.lower(): value
+                        for key, value in self.headers.items()},
+            "body": body,
+        }
+        self.requests.append(record)
+        return record
+
+    def _send_json(self, status, payload):
+        data = json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8")
+        self.send_response(status)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "application/json")
+        self.send_header("Content-Length", str(len(data)))
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(data)
+
+    def do_GET(self):
+        self._record()
+        parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(self.path)
+        if _RELEASE_BY_TAG_RE.match(parsed.path):
+            if self.state.get("release_exists"):
+                self._send_json(200, {"id": self.state.get("release_id", 970)})
+            else:
+                self._send_json(404, {"message": "Release not found"})
+            return
+        if _ASSETS_RE.match(parsed.path):
+            self._send_json(200, list(self.state.get("assets", [])))
+            return
+        self._send_json(404, {"message": "Not Found"})
+
+    def do_POST(self):
+        record = self._record()
+        parsed = urllib.parse.urlsplit(self.path)
+        if _RELEASES_RE.match(parsed.path):
+            self.state.setdefault("create_calls", []).append(record)
+            status = self.state.get("create_status", 201)
+            if status >= 400:
+                self._send_json(
+                    status,
+                    {"message": self.state.get("create_error", "create failed")})
+            else:
+                self._send_json(status, {"id": self.state.get("release_id", 970)})
+            return
+        if _ASSETS_RE.match(parsed.path):
+            self.state.setdefault("attach_calls", []).append(record)
+            status = self.state.get("attach_status", 201)
+            if status >= 400:
+                self._send_json(
+                    status,
+                    {"message": self.state.get("attach_error", "attach failed")})
+                return
+            self._describe_attachment(record, parsed)
+            self._send_json(201, {
+                "id": 2,
+                "name": record["attach"]["query_name"],
+                "size": record["attach"]["size"],
+            })
+            return
+        self._send_json(404, {"message": "Not Found"})
+
+    def _describe_attachment(self, record, parsed):
+        boundary, parts = _split_multipart(
+            record["headers"].get("content-type", ""), record["body"])
+        field_name = filename = part_type = None
+        content = b""
+        if len(parts) == 1:
+            part_headers, content = parts[0]
+            disposition = _header_params(
+                part_headers.get("content-disposition", ""))
+            field_name = disposition.get("name")
+            filename = disposition.get("filename")
+            part_type = part_headers.get("content-type")
+        expected = self.state.get("expected_asset_bytes")
+        record["attach"] = {
+            "boundary": boundary,
+            "field_name": field_name,
+            "filename": filename,
+            "part_content_type": part_type,
+            "query_name":
+                (urllib.parse.parse_qs(parsed.query).get("name") or [None])[0],
+            "content": content,
+            "size": len(content),
+            "content_matches_expected":
+                None if expected is None else content == expected,
+        }
+
+
+class StubGiteaServer:
+    """Bound stub server (v0.1 StubOwuiServer pattern)."""
+
+    def __init__(self, state):
+        self.state = state
+        self.requests = []
+        handler = type("BoundStubHandler", (_StubGiteaHandler,), {
+            "state": state,
+            "requests": self.requests,
+        })
+        self.server = ThreadingHTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), handler)
+        threading.Thread(target=self.server.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
+
+    @property
+    def base_url(self):
+        return "http://127.0.0.1:%d" % self.server.server_address[1]
+
+    def close(self):
+        self.server.shutdown()
+        self.server.server_close()
+
+
+class ReleaseUploadTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="coreci-release-test-")
+        self.addCleanup(tmp.cleanup)
+        self.tmp = tmp.name
+        self.artifact_path = os.path.join(self.tmp, ARTIFACT_NAME)
+        # Includes every byte value (CR/LF inside) — byte-exact multipart
+        # transport must survive content that looks like framing.
+        self.artifact_bytes = (
+            b"#!/usr/bin/env python3\nstub-zipapp-payload:" + bytes(range(256)) * 2)
+        with open(self.artifact_path, "wb") as handle:
+            handle.write(self.artifact_bytes)
+        self.env_root = os.path.join(self.tmp, "env-root")
+        os.makedirs(self.env_root)
+        secrets_fd = os.open(
+            os.path.join(self.env_root, ".env.secrets"),
+            os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC, 0o600)
+        with os.fdopen(secrets_fd, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            handle.write("GITEA_TOKEN={}\n".format(TOKEN))
+        self.state = {
+            "release_exists": True,
+            "release_id": 970,
+            "assets": [],
+            "create_status": 201,
+            "attach_status": 201,
+            "expected_asset_bytes": self.artifact_bytes,
+        }
+        self.stub = StubGiteaServer(self.state)
+        self.addCleanup(self.stub.close)
+
+    def _argv(self, **overrides):
+        argv = [
+            TAG, self.artifact_path,
+            "--base-url", self.stub.base_url,
+            "--owner", OWNER, "--repo", REPO_NAME,
+            "--env-root", self.env_root,
+        ]
+        for key, value in overrides.items():
+            argv.extend(["--" + key.replace("_", "-"), value])
+        return argv
+
+    def _run(self, **overrides):
+        stdout, stderr = io.StringIO(), io.StringIO()
+        with contextlib.redirect_stdout(stdout), contextlib.redirect_stderr(stderr):
+            code = release.main(self._argv(**overrides))
+        return code, stdout.getvalue(), stderr.getvalue()
+
+    def _paths(self, method):
+        return [record["path"] for record in self.stub.requests
+                if record["method"] == method]
+
+    def test_existing_release_attaches_exact_multipart_shape(self):
+        code, out, err = self._run()
+        self.assertEqual(0, code)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            ["/api/v1/repos/{}/{}/releases/tags/{}".format(OWNER, REPO_NAME, TAG),
+             "/api/v1/repos/{}/{}/releases/970/assets".format(OWNER, REPO_NAME)],
+            self._paths("GET"))
+        self.assertEqual(
+            ["/api/v1/repos/{}/{}/releases/970/assets?name={}".format(
+                OWNER, REPO_NAME, ARTIFACT_NAME)],
+            self._paths("POST"))
+        self.assertEqual([], self.state.get("create_calls", []))
+        attach = self.stub.requests[-1]
+        shape = attach["attach"]
+        self.assertEqual("attachment", shape["field_name"])
+        self.assertEqual(ARTIFACT_NAME, shape["filename"])
+        self.assertEqual(ARTIFACT_NAME, shape["query_name"])
+        self.assertEqual("application/octet-stream", shape["part_content_type"])
+        self.assertEqual(self.artifact_bytes, shape["content"])
+        self.assertTrue(shape["content_matches_expected"])
+        self.assertIn("multipart/form-data; boundary=",
+                      attach["headers"]["content-type"])
+        self.assertTrue(self.stub.requests)
+        for record in self.stub.requests:
+            self.assertEqual("token " + TOKEN, record["headers"]["authorization"])
+
+    def test_missing_release_creates_with_notes_then_attaches(self):
+        self.state["release_exists"] = False
+        code, out, err = self._run()
+        self.assertEqual(0, code)
+        create_calls = self.state.get("create_calls", [])
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(create_calls))
+        create = create_calls[0]
+        self.assertEqual(
+            "/api/v1/repos/{}/{}/releases".format(OWNER, REPO_NAME), create["path"])
+        self.assertEqual("application/json", create["headers"]["content-type"])
+        payload = json.loads(create["body"])
+        self.assertEqual(TAG, payload["tag_name"])
+        self.assertEqual(TAG + ": coreci-broker release", payload["name"])
+        self.assertIs(False, payload["draft"])
+        self.assertIs(False, payload["prerelease"])
+        for section in ("## Summary", "## Requirements", "## Verification",
+                        "## CLI install + usage", "## Docker usage"):
+            self.assertIn(section, payload["body"])
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(self.state.get("attach_calls", [])))
+
+    def test_matching_asset_is_idempotent_skip(self):
+        self.state["assets"] = [{
+            "id": 1, "name": ARTIFACT_NAME, "size": len(self.artifact_bytes),
+        }]
+        code, out, err = self._run()
+        self.assertEqual(0, code)
+        self.assertEqual([], self._paths("POST"))
+        self.assertEqual(
+            ["/api/v1/repos/{}/{}/releases/tags/{}".format(OWNER, REPO_NAME, TAG),
+             "/api/v1/repos/{}/{}/releases/970/assets".format(OWNER, REPO_NAME)],
+            self._paths("GET"))
+        self.assertEqual([], self.state.get("attach_calls", []))
+        self.assertEqual([], self.state.get("create_calls", []))
+
+    def test_same_name_but_wrong_size_reattaches(self):
+        self.state["assets"] = [{"id": 1, "name": ARTIFACT_NAME, "size": 1}]
+        code, out, err = self._run()
+        self.assertEqual(0, code)
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(self.state.get("attach_calls", [])))
+
+    def test_attach_500_exhausts_retries_and_marks_pending(self):
+        self.state["attach_status"] = 500
+        completed = subprocess.run(
+            [sys.executable, str(RELEASE_PATH)] + self._argv(),
+            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(1, completed.returncode)
+        self.assertIn(
+            "RELEASE_PENDING {} {}".format(TAG, self.artifact_path),
+            completed.stdout)
+        self.assertEqual(3, len(self.state.get("attach_calls", [])))
+        self.assertEqual([], self.state.get("create_calls", []))
+        self.assertIn("500", completed.stderr)
+        self.assertNotIn(TOKEN, completed.stdout)
+        self.assertNotIn(TOKEN, completed.stderr)
+
+    def test_permanent_attach_error_reports_gitea_body(self):
+        self.state["attach_status"] = 400
+        self.state["attach_error"] = "attachment too large"
+        code, out, err = self._run()
+        self.assertEqual(1, code)
+        self.assertEqual(1, len(self.state.get("attach_calls", [])))  # 4xx: no retry
+        self.assertIn("attachment too large", err)
+        self.assertIn(
+            "RELEASE_PENDING {} {}".format(TAG, self.artifact_path), out)
+
+    def test_sha256_comes_from_file_and_cli_has_no_sha_argument(self):
+        before = len(self.stub.requests)
+        with contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()):
+            with self.assertRaises(SystemExit) as raised:
+                release.main(self._argv() + ["--sha", "deadbeef"])
+        self.assertEqual(2, raised.exception.code)
+        with contextlib.redirect_stderr(io.StringIO()):
+            with self.assertRaises(SystemExit) as raised:
+                release.main(self._argv() + ["0deadbeef"])
+        self.assertEqual(2, raised.exception.code)
+        self.assertEqual(before, len(self.stub.requests))  # refused pre-HTTP
+        self.state["release_exists"] = False  # force create so notes hit the wire
+        code, out, err = self._run()
+        self.assertEqual(0, code)
+        notes = json.loads(self.state["create_calls"][0]["body"])["body"]
+        expected = hashlib.sha256(self.artifact_bytes).hexdigest()
+        self.assertIn("sha256:" + expected, notes)
+        self.assertNotIn("deadbeef", notes)
+
+    def test_token_resolves_from_env_file_on_every_request(self):
+        code, out, err = self._run()
+        self.assertEqual(0, code)
+        self.assertTrue(self.stub.requests)
+        for record in self.stub.requests:
+            self.assertEqual("token " + TOKEN, record["headers"]["authorization"])
+        # Structural discipline: the loader + attacher never touch the
+        # process environment, and the token value is never printed.
+        for path in (ENV_SECRETS_PATH, RELEASE_PATH):
+            source = path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+            self.assertNotIn("os.environ", source)
+            self.assertNotIn("os.getenv", source)
+        self.assertNotIn(TOKEN, out)
+        self.assertNotIn(TOKEN, err)
+
+    def test_missing_or_empty_token_fails_before_any_http(self):
+        empty_root = os.path.join(self.tmp, "empty-env-root")
+        os.makedirs(empty_root)
+        code, out, err = self._run(env_root=empty_root)
+        self.assertEqual(2, code)
+        self.assertEqual([], self.stub.requests)  # no HTTP attempted
+        self.assertIn("GITEA_TOKEN", err)
+        self.assertNotIn("RELEASE_PENDING", out)
+        with open(os.path.join(empty_root, ".env.secrets"), "w",
+                  encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            handle.write("GITEA_TOKEN=\n")
+        code, out, err = self._run(env_root=empty_root)
+        self.assertEqual(2, code)
+        self.assertEqual([], self.stub.requests)
+        self.assertIn("GITEA_TOKEN", err)
+
+    def test_notes_sections_sha_line_and_docker_usage(self):
+        self.state["release_exists"] = False
+        code, out, err = self._run()
+        self.assertEqual(0, code)
+        notes = json.loads(self.state["create_calls"][0]["body"])["body"]
+        for section in ("## Summary", "## Requirements", "## Verification",
+                        "## CLI install + usage", "## Docker usage"):
+            self.assertIn(section, notes)
+        expected = hashlib.sha256(self.artifact_bytes).hexdigest()
+        self.assertIn("sha256:" + expected, notes)
+        self.assertIn("chmod +x " + ARTIFACT_NAME, notes)
+        self.assertIn("--version", notes)
+        self.assertIn("README", notes)
+        self.assertIn("BROKER_ENV_PATH", notes)
+        self.assertIn("BROKER_ADMIN_PASS", notes)
+        self.assertIn("docker pull ", notes)
+        self.assertIn("/{}/{}:{}".format(OWNER, REPO_NAME, TAG), notes)
+        self.assertIn("-v broker-state:/state", notes)
+
+
+class EnvSecretsLoaderTests(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="coreci-envsecrets-")
+        self.addCleanup(tmp.cleanup)
+        self.root = tmp.name
+
+    def _write(self, relative, content):
+        path = os.path.join(self.root, relative)
+        os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(path), exist_ok=True)
+        with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            handle.write(content)
+        return path
+
+    def test_parse_semantics_mirror_broker_parser(self):
+        fixture = (
+            "# comment\n"
+            "\n"
+            "GITEA_TOKEN='quoted-single'\n"
+            "OTHER_TOKEN=\"quoted double\"\n"
+            "SPACED =  spaced value  \n"
+            "PLAIN=unquoted\n"
+            "EMPTY=\n"
+            "ONE_QUOTE=\"\n"
+            "NO_EQUALS_SIGN\n"
+            "=\n"
+        )
+        path = self._write(".env.secrets", fixture)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            coreci_broker._parse_env_file(path),
+            env_secrets._parse_env_file(path))
+        values = env_secrets.load(self.root)
+        self.assertEqual("quoted-single", values["GITEA_TOKEN"])
+        self.assertEqual("quoted double", values["OTHER_TOKEN"])
+        self.assertEqual("spaced value", values["SPACED"])
+        self.assertEqual("unquoted", values["PLAIN"])
+        self.assertEqual("", values["EMPTY"])
+        self.assertEqual('"', values["ONE_QUOTE"])
+        self.assertNotIn("NO_EQUALS_SIGN", values)
+
+    def test_later_files_win_across_locations_and_patterns(self):
+        ladder = (
+            (".env", "GITEA_TOKEN=step1\n"),
+            (".env.secrets", "GITEA_TOKEN=step2\n"),
+            (".env.local", "GITEA_TOKEN=step3\n"),        # root .env.* glob
+            (os.path.join(".ciagent", ".env"), "GITEA_TOKEN=step4\n"),
+            (os.path.join(".ciagent", ".env.secrets"), "GITEA_TOKEN=step5\n"),
+            (os.path.join(".ciagent", ".env.staging"), "GITEA_TOKEN=step6\n"),
+        )
+        for relative, content in ladder:
+            self._write(relative, content)
+            self.assertEqual(
+                content.partition("=")[2].strip(),
+                env_secrets.load(self.root)["GITEA_TOKEN"])
+
+    def test_missing_or_empty_token_raises_clear_error(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(env_secrets.SecretsError) as caught:
+            env_secrets.get_token(root=self.root)
+        self.assertIn("GITEA_TOKEN", str(caught.exception))
+        self._write(os.path.join(".ciagent", ".env.secrets"), "GITEA_TOKEN=\n")
+        with self.assertRaises(env_secrets.SecretsError):
+            env_secrets.get_token(root=self.root)
+        self._write(os.path.join(".ciagent", ".env.secrets"),
+                    'GITEA_TOKEN="  "\n')  # whitespace-only is empty too
+        with self.assertRaises(env_secrets.SecretsError):
+            env_secrets.get_token(root=self.root)
+        self._write(os.path.join(".ciagent", ".env.secrets"),
+                    "GITEA_TOKEN='tok'\n")
+        self.assertEqual("tok", env_secrets.get_token(root=self.root))
+
+    def test_custom_variable_name(self):
+        self._write(".env", "OTHER_TOKEN=tok\n")
+        self.assertEqual("tok", env_secrets.get_token("OTHER_TOKEN", root=self.root))
+        with self.assertRaises(env_secrets.SecretsError) as caught:
+            env_secrets.get_token("GITEA_TOKEN", root=self.root)
+        self.assertIn("GITEA_TOKEN", str(caught.exception))
+
+    def test_default_root_is_repo_root(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            os.path.realpath(str(REPO)), os.path.realpath(env_secrets.default_root()))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()