Files
coreci-chat/packages/secrets/tests/provider.test.ts
T
CIAgent be70f56657 feat(P1): Wave A foundations — monorepo, DB+RLS, audit, secrets, runtime
Wave A (Phase 1) implements the M1 foundations for REQ-038, REQ-039, REQ-040:

Monorepo scaffold (pnpm workspaces, TS strict, NodeNext):
- apps/control-plane (Next.js App Router scaffold — Wave B adds routes)
- apps/relay-agent (Go module scaffold — Wave D adds WebSocket + install)
- packages/db, packages/secrets, packages/runtime, packages/config

packages/db (REQ-038, REQ-039):
- 0001_init.sql: tenants, users, tenant_memberships, targets, byom_endpoints,
  invitations, audit_log (append-only hash-chain), runtime_health (not audited)
- RLS policies on all tenant-scoped tables + FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY
- withTenant(tenantId, fn): SET LOCAL app.tenant_id + transaction
- audit.ts: appendAudit with sha256(prev_hash || canonical(payload)) chain;
  AuditWriteHaltError on write failure (Edge 7 — halts + rolls back)
- BEFORE INSERT trigger enforces chain integrity (G-006: per-tenant
  concurrent-write serialization documented; M3 mitigation noted)
- create-db.ts: PGlite (dev/test) + pg Pool (prod) behind DbClient interface
- pen-test scaffold: cross-tenant isolation (PGlite RLS limitation documented;
  prod RLS test runs at M1 review)
- 12 tests, 98% coverage

packages/secrets (REQ-040, G-005, G-010):
- SecretProvider interface: get/put/delete + SecretRef + SecretValue
  (toString returns [REDACTED]; unwrap is the only read path)
- AwsSecretsManagerProvider (prod): coreci/<tenantId>/<name>, KMS-backed
- LocalEncryptedProvider (dev): AES-256-GCM, PBKDF2 from SECRET_MASTER_KEY_DEV
- relay-token.ts: JWT HS256 sign/verify/issue (G-005 contract — locked so
  Wave B + Wave D parallelize without blocking)
- 24 tests (14 provider + 10 relay-token)

packages/runtime (G-002, G-003):
- Trigger.dev bootstrap (initRuntime) — pre-investment for M3 (G-003)
- runtimeHealthCheck task: writes to runtime_health, NOT audit_log (G-002)
- 6 tests

packages/config (G-010):
- Two-tier credential taxonomy: infra env vars (tier a) vs tenant creds
  (SecretProvider only, tier b). PO's 'no env vars' applies to tenant creds.

Coverage: db 98%, secrets/runtime/config typecheck clean.
All 45 tests passing. Go relay-agent builds.

---ci---
phase: 1
milestone: v0.1
status: verify
---/ci---
2026-08-25 01:29:25 +00:00

136 lines
5.1 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* LocalEncryptedProvider unit tests (REQ-040, D-003).
*
* AWS SM impl is not unit-tested (requires AWS creds); LocalEncryptedProvider
* is the tested dev impl. Uses a temp dir for `.secrets/`.
*/
import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, beforeEach, afterAll } from "vitest";
import { mkdtemp, rm, readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { tmpdir } from "node:os";
import { join } from "node:path";
import { LocalEncryptedProvider, SecretValue } from "../src/index.js";
const T1 = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001";
const SIGNING_KEY = "test-master-key-for-pbkdf2-dev-only-0123456789";
let tmpDir: string;
beforeAll(async () => {
tmpDir = await mkdtemp(join(tmpdir(), "coreci-secrets-"));
process.env.SECRET_MASTER_KEY_DEV = SIGNING_KEY;
});
afterAll(async () => {
await rm(tmpDir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
describe("LocalEncryptedProvider", () => {
let provider: LocalEncryptedProvider;
beforeEach(() => {
provider = new LocalEncryptedProvider({ baseDir: tmpDir });
});
it("put returns a local SecretRef", async () => {
const ref = await provider.put(T1, "byom", "sk-byom-abc123");
expect(ref).toBe(`local:${T1}/byom`);
});
it("get returns the secret put", async () => {
await provider.put(T1, "byom", "sk-byom-abc123");
const got = await provider.get(T1, "byom");
expect(got.unwrap()).toBe("sk-byom-abc123");
});
it("put overwrites an existing secret", async () => {
await provider.put(T1, "byom", "first");
await provider.put(T1, "byom", "second");
const got = await provider.get(T1, "byom");
expect(got.unwrap()).toBe("second");
});
it("get throws if the secret does not exist", async () => {
await expect(provider.get(T1, "missing")).rejects.toThrow(/not found/);
});
it("delete removes the secret", async () => {
await provider.put(T1, "byom", "sk-x");
await provider.delete(T1, "byom");
await expect(provider.get(T1, "byom")).rejects.toThrow(/not found/);
});
it("delete is a no-op for a missing secret", async () => {
await expect(provider.delete(T1, "never")).resolves.toBeUndefined();
});
it("secrets are isolated by tenant", async () => {
const T2 = "00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002";
await provider.put(T1, "byom", "t1-key");
await provider.put(T2, "byom", "t2-key");
expect((await provider.get(T1, "byom")).unwrap()).toBe("t1-key");
expect((await provider.get(T2, "byom")).unwrap()).toBe("t2-key");
});
it("SecretValue.toString() returns [REDACTED]", async () => {
const ref = await provider.put(T1, "byom", "super-secret-key");
void ref;
const got = await provider.get(T1, "byom");
expect(`${got}`).toBe("[REDACTED]");
expect(String(got)).toBe("[REDACTED]");
expect(got.toString()).toBe("[REDACTED]");
});
it("SecretValue.toJSON() returns [REDACTED]", async () => {
await provider.put(T1, "byom", "super-secret-key");
const got = await provider.get(T1, "byom");
expect(JSON.stringify(got)).toBe('"[REDACTED]"');
});
it("SecretValue.unwrap() returns the raw secret", async () => {
await provider.put(T1, "byom", "raw-value-xyz");
const got = await provider.get(T1, "byom");
expect(got.unwrap()).toBe("raw-value-xyz");
});
it("stores ciphertext at rest (not plaintext) on disk", async () => {
await provider.put(T1, "byom", "plaintext-must-not-appear-on-disk");
const onDisk = await readFile(join(tmpDir, ".secrets", "local-encrypted.json"), "utf8");
expect(onDisk).not.toContain("plaintext-must-not-appear-on-disk");
expect(onDisk).toContain("ciphertext");
expect(onDisk).toContain("iv");
expect(onDisk).toContain("authTag");
expect(onDisk).toContain("salt");
});
it("throws if SECRET_MASTER_KEY_DEV is missing and no override", () => {
const saved = process.env.SECRET_MASTER_KEY_DEV;
delete process.env.SECRET_MASTER_KEY_DEV;
expect(() => new LocalEncryptedProvider({ baseDir: tmpDir })).toThrow(/SECRET_MASTER_KEY_DEV/);
process.env.SECRET_MASTER_KEY_DEV = saved;
});
it("tampered ciphertext fails authenticated decryption (GCM auth tag)", async () => {
await provider.put(T1, "byom", "legit");
const onDisk = await readFile(join(tmpDir, ".secrets", "local-encrypted.json"), "utf8");
const store = JSON.parse(onDisk) as Record<string, { ciphertext: string }>;
const key = `${T1}/byom`;
const entry = store[key]!;
const buf = Buffer.from(entry.ciphertext, "base64");
buf[0] = buf[0]! ^ 0xff;
entry.ciphertext = buf.toString("base64");
store[key] = entry;
await rm(join(tmpDir, ".secrets", "local-encrypted.json"));
const { writeFile } = await import("node:fs/promises");
await writeFile(join(tmpDir, ".secrets", "local-encrypted.json"), JSON.stringify(store));
const provider2 = new LocalEncryptedProvider({ baseDir: tmpDir });
await expect(provider2.get(T1, "byom")).rejects.toThrow();
});
});
describe("SecretValue (direct)", () => {
it("redacts via toString even when interpolated in a template", () => {
const v = new SecretValue("leak-me");
expect(`value=${v}`).toBe("value=[REDACTED]");
});
});